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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Before:
The Hon’ble Justice Anuj Singh.
W.P.A. No. 25795 of 2023
Sonali Barui Paramanik & Ors.
v.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Arka Pratim Chowdhury
Ms. Puja Rajbhor
Mr. Swattik Batabyal
……… Advocate.
For the State
: Mr. Goutam Mistra
……… Advocate
Heard on
: 28.09.2026
Judgement on
: 09.10.2026
Anuj Singh, J:.
1. The instant writ petition has been filed by the writ petitioners
inter alia, praying for expunging their names from the Hirapur
Police Station Case No. 244 of 2022, registered for investigation
into
the
offences
punishable
under
sections
353/186/504/506/120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. The Petitioners herein are a group of persons, who at all material
times, were aggrieved by the manner of recruitment by School
Service Commission. The writ petitioners contend that in order to
express their grievance against improper recruitment procedure
adopted by the School Service Commission, the Petitioners
started peaceful protest on 28.09.2021.
3. The said petitioners further contend that the Petitioners wanted
to express their grievances in front of the Hon‟ble Chief Minister,
and thus, went to a political meeting of the Hon‟ble Chief Minister
at
Asansol
Stadium
Ground,
to
protest
against
hunger,
unemployment and illegal recruitment. However, Hirapur Police
Station Case No. 244 of 2022, registered for investigation into the
offences punishable under sections 353/186/504/506/120B and
34 of the Indian Penal Code. The investigation of the case is said
to be pending.
4. The complaint was lodged by LSI Piyali Jana, Officer-in-Charge. A
perusal of the complaint, which led to registration of the FIR,
reveals that:
a. On 28.06.2022, during the public meeting of the Hon‟ble Chief
Minister at Asansol Stadium Ground, four women in ladies‟
block stood up and started shouting that they have been
selected in SLST 2016, but had not received appointment, and
displayed posters demanding a meeting with the Hon‟ble Chief
Minister.
b. It is alleged that when the lady police officers requested them
to keep calm, they obstructed the police officers in discharging
their public functions by displaying aggressive body language
and gestures, and intentionally insulted and provoked the
public, and disrupted the meeting.
c. The above acts constituted the offense punishable under
sections 353/186/504/506/120B and 34 of the Indian Penal
Code.
5. By way of the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the writ petitioners have Petitioners have for Writ in
the nature of mandamus to strike off the name of petitioners from
Hirapur Police Station Case No. 244 of 2022, registered for
investigation
into
the
offences
punishable
under
sections
353/186/504/506/120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
6. Ld. Advocate for the Petitioners submits that the Petitioners were
exercising their right to assemble peacefully and voice their
grievances under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution
of India. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance
upon the decision of the Madras High Court in J. Jayaraj v. The
Chief Educational Officer, W.P.(MD) Nos. 13409 to 13415 of
2022, in support of the arguments that petitioners have a right to
protest peacefully. It is further submitted that the police
authorities were not authorised by Respondent No. 1 to take
action against the Petitioners, as no notification/notice was
issued in 2021 authorising such action against peaceful assembly
and protest.
7. Reliance has been also placed on the Supreme Court‟s decision in
Re: Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of
India, 2012 AIR SCW 2660, to contend that an order under
Section 144 Cr.P.C. requires urgency necessitating immediate
and speedy intervention and must disclose the material facts
warranting such intervention, whereas no grave or severe offence
was made out from the Petitioners‟ protest.
8. It is further submitted that this Court, in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, may prevent
abuse of process and quash proceedings where the allegations do
not disclose a prima facie offence. The Learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed reliance on State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga
Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 AIR 604.
9. It is further submitted that the Petitioners have sought quashing
of the investigation arising out of Hirapur Police Station Case No.
244 of 2022, registered for investigation into the offences
punishable under sections 353/186/504/506/120B and 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, as continuation thereof would amount to
an abuse of process of law and cause serious prejudice to the
Petitioners by saddling them with a criminal record and adversely
affecting their prospects of employment.
10.
Learned Advocate representing this State has opposed the
instant writ petition. Ld. Advocate has argued that the petition is
not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed.
11.
I have heard the learned advocates representing the
petitioner and the State.
12.
The power of the High Court to quash an FIR may be
exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as well as
under its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. In
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, which
itself arose from a proceeding under Article 226, the Supreme
Court, after considering R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960
SC 866, laid down in paragraph 102 the following categories of
cases in which such power may be exercised either to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice:
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order
of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support
of
the
same
do
not
disclose
the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only
a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint
are
so
absurd
and
inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted
in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding
is instituted) to the institution and continuance of
the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
13.
In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful
Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 (paragraphs 8 to 11), the Court
reiterated that the inherent power is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice. The Court would be
justified in quashing a proceeding if its initiation or continuance
amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court; and that, when
a proceeding is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into
the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and
whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are
accepted in toto. At the same time, the Court cautioned that the
High Court ought not to embark upon an enquiry into the
reliability of the allegations, nor analyse the case in the light of
probabilities to determine whether a conviction would be
sustainable.
14.
In
Neeharika
Maharashtra,
(2021)
Infrastructure
SCC
(P)
401,
Ltd.
the
v.
State
Supreme
of
Court
summarised the position in paragraph 33. The police have the
statutory right and duty to investigate a cognizable offence and
courts would not thwart any investigation into cognizable
offences. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence
of any kind is disclosed in the FIR that the Court will not permit
the investigation to go on. The Court, having regard to the
parameters in R.P. Kapur and Bhajan Lal, has the jurisdiction to
quash the FIR but, while examining an FIR, it has to consider
only whether the allegations disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence, and not the merits of the allegations.
15.
It is a well-settled principle of law that if the FIR does not
disclose the commission of an offence, the Court would be
justified in quashing the proceedings to prevent the abuse of
process of law (Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P., (2012) 10 SCC
741).
16.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Chanchalpati Das v. State
of West Bengal, 2023 INSC 554, in paras 12, 13, observed that
except for bald allegations made in the complaint, no material
was produced by the complainant to substantiate the allegations
and considered it rightly to quash the proceedings to prevent the
abuse of process of law and to secure ends of justice.
17.
Further, when it is alleged that the proceedings are
vexatious or frivolous or instituted with an ulterior motive, then it
the duty of the court to look at the attending circumstances and
read between the lines with due care and circumspection, and not
confine itself merely to the bare words of the FIR (Mohammad
Wajid v. State of UP, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951, paras 36-38;
Mahmood Ali v. State of UP, (2023) 15 SCC 488, paras 12, 13).
18.
The Madras High Court in Ramamoorthy V Inspector of
Police, 2020 SCC online Mad,
2020, the Petitioners were
situated in a similar factual position, wherein they took part in a
protest against the ruling Government, and were charged with
Sections 353, 506 of IPC. Madras High Court, vide Order dated
07.12.2020 quashed the FIR holding that the allegations in the
FIR do not disclose any act of violence or happening of any
untoward incident. Relevant
portion of the Judgement is
reproduced hereunder:
“6. The above judgment is squarely applicable to the
present facts and circumstances of the case. Though, there
are prima facie materials to justify the registration of the
First Information Report, I am of the view that its
continuance is not warranted. This is because no untoward
incident had taken place. The country had witnessed
protests all over by different sections of people against
various amendments. Since the protest was conducted in a
peaceful manner and even the First Information Report does
not disclose any act of violence or happening of untoward
incident, I am of the view that the continued prosecution is
not warranted. Quashing the same will secure the ends of
justice.”
19.
Thus, this Court is empowered under Article 226 to quash
the proceedings in cases where there are mere bald allegations,
which do not disclose the commission of an offence. It is the duty
of this Court to have a meaningful reading of the FIR as a whole,
and the Court must be able to find who is alleged to have
committed the act, what was the act, and how it satisfies each
ingredient of the offence charged.
20.
In light of the above settled position of law with regard to
quashing of investigation of a case, it is necessary to examine the
allegations which are forming the subject matter ofHirapur Police
Station Case No. 244 of 2022, registered for investigation into the
offences punishable under sections 353/186/504/506/120B and
34 of the Indian Penal Code. The allegations contained in the FIR
must be examined and accepted on their face value and believed
to be true. This court is not required to look into the defense of
the petitioners. The limited question that may be looked into is
whether the conduct attributed to the petitioners discloses the
essential ingredients of the offences charged.
21.
The FIR proceeds on the allegations that on 28.06.2022,
during the public meeting of the Hon‟ble Chief Minister at Asansol
Stadium Ground, four women in ladies block stood up and
started shouting that they have been selected in SLST 2016, but
were not appointed. They then displayed posters demanding a
meeting with the Hon‟ble Chief Minister.It is further alleged that
when the lady police officers requested the petitioners to keep
calm, the petitioners obstructed the police officers in discharging
their public functions by displaying aggressive body language and
gestures, and intentionally insulted and provoked the public, and
disrupted the meeting. On such allegations Sections 353, 186,
504, 506, 120B and 34 IPC have been invoked.
22.
In order to attract the penal provisions of Section 353 of the
Indian Penal Code, it must be alleged that the accused has
assaulted or used criminal force on a public servant while such
public servant was executing its duty, or such assault must be
with intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his duty.
„Assault‟isa gesture or preparation made, intending or knowing it,
to be likely that it will cause a person present to apprehend that
criminal force is about to be used against him. "Criminal force"
under Section 350 requires the intentional use of force on a
person. In B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 INSC 4, the
Supreme Court has held that when no assault or criminal force is
disclosed, and there is mere allegation of “disturbance” without
any specific act of assault or criminal force, the same does not
attract Section 353 IPC. Relevant portion of the
judgement is
reported hereunder:
“44. In the present case, however, what can be seen from a
perusal of the contents of the FIR, is that no such allegation
of assault or use of criminal force has been made. The
aforesaid FIR is based on the complaint filed by the District
Probation Officer, which has already been quoted above, and
the same has been reproduced verbatim in the said FIR in
which only the allegation of creating disturbance has been
made.
59. If “disturbance” has to be construed as “assault” or
“criminal force” without there being specific acts attributed to
make such “disturbance” as “assault” or “criminal face”
within the scope of Section 353IPC, it would amount to abuse
of the process of law. While “disturbance” could also be
caused by use of criminal force or assault, unless there are
specific allegations with specific acts to that effect, mere
allegation of “creating disturbance” cannot mean use of
“criminal force” or “assault” within the scope of Section
353IPC.
60. As noted and discussed above, nothing was mentioned
in the complaint/FIR of any specific acts apart from alleging
that the appellant and his party were creating disturbance.
Nothing has been mentioned how disturbance was created
because of assault or use of criminal force. Thus, the
contents of the statements recorded later under Section
161CrPC clearly appears to be an afterthought and the
allegation of assault/attack was introduced later on, which
is inconsistent with the contents of the original FIR.”
23.
Even if the allegations in the present FIR are accepted in
their entirety, they fall short of these requirements. No actual use
of criminal force against a public servant is alleged. Nor does the
FIR describe any gesture or preparation indicating that criminal
force was about to be used against an officer. The general
reference to “aggressive body language and gestures”, without
particulars disclosing such apprehension, does not supply the
essential ingredient of assault. The conduct described therefore
does not attract Section 353 IPC.
24.
In order to attract the penal provisions of Section 186 of the
Indian Penal Code it must be alleged that the accused voluntarily
obstructed a public servant in the discharge of his public
functions.Although the FIR alleges the petitioners conduct as
obstruction, it does not describe how their conduct prevent it the
officers in performing those functions. The acts described are that
the
petitioners
voiced
their
grievance,
displayed
posters
demanding a meeting with the Hon‟ble Chief Minister and showed
aggressive body language when asked to stay calm. Their failure
to heed that request, without further allegations disclosing
obstruction of the officers public functions, does not satisfy the
essential ingredients of Section 186 IPC.
25.
On the above allegations it is necessary to to further
examine whether the essential ingredients of Section 504 IPC or
Section 506 IPC is attracted. In order to attract the penal
provision of Section 504, Indian Penal Codethe accused must
intentionally insult a person and thereby give that person
provocation, intending or knowing it to be likely that the
provocation will cause him to break the public peace or commit
any other offence. It is necessary that there should have been an
act amounting to intentional insult and mere fact that the
accused abused the complainant is not sufficient by itself to
warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC. (Fiona Shrikhande
v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44). Relevant portion
of the judgement is reproduced hereunder:
“13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following
ingredients viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must
be such as to give provocation to the person insulted,
and (c) the accused must intend or know that such
provocation would cause another to break the public
peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional
insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a
person to break the public peace or to commit any
other offence. The person who intentionally insults
intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give
provocation to any other person and such provocation
will cause to break the public peace or to commit any
other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of
Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential
elements constituting the offence is that there should
have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional
insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the
complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to
warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC.”
26.
Similarly, Section 506 IPC is attracted when the accused
must threaten another with injury to his person, reputation or
property, with intent to cause alarm to that person or to cause
him to do an act which is not legally bound to, or omit to do an
act, which he is legally entitled to do. (See, Manik Taneja v.
State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423).The FIR does not
describe any such threat by the petitioners. The essential
ingredients of criminal intimidation are therefore not disclosed.
27.
It is a well-settled position of law that right to assemble
peaceably and without arms, and to express their voice, is
guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b), subject to reasonable
restrictions. In plethora of judgements, including the decision of
the Madras High Court in J. Jayaraj (supra) and the Supreme
Court in Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, (2024)
4 SCC 156, it was held that the right to dissent, criticise and
peacefully protest against the Government, in a legitimate and
lawful manner is integral and essential part of democracy in view
of
Articles
19(1)
and
of
the
Constitution.
Thus,
a
demonstration does not become an offence merely because it was
unwelcome to those in authority.
28.
As regards Section 120B, the allegation that the women had
a plan can only be inferred only from the use of phrase “chaos on
the part of aforesaid women”. However, the four women had
merely voiced their shared grievance, which cannot be said to be
an agreement to commit an offence.
29.
Thus, a bare reading of FIR does not disclose the
ingredients of any of the offences invoked in the FIR, and no
prima facie case is made out against the Petitioners. It is an
unavoidable inference that the Petitioners are being punished for
the protest, making it a vexatious and frivolous proceeding. Thus,
the present case clearly falls within the category (1), (3) and (7) of
Bhajan Lal (supra).
30.
In view of the settled principle of law that when commission
of any offence is not disclosed on a careful and constructive
reading of the FIR as a whole, the court is empowered to quash
such proceedings to prevent any further abuse of process of law
and in order to meet the ends of justice.
31.
In view of the foregoing, Hirapur Police Station Case No.244
of 2022 dated 28th June, 2022, registered under Sections 353,
186, 504, 506 and 120B read with Section 34 IPC, and all
consequential proceedings arising therefrom, including G.R. Case
No.2171 of 2022 pending before the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Paschim Bardhaman at Asansol, are quashed.
32.
Let a copy of this judgement be communicated forthwith to
the concerned criminal court and the Officer-in-Charge, Hirapur
Police Station by the petitioner.
33.
WPA 25795 of 2023 is allowed. There shall be no order as
to costs.
34.
Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied
for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite
formalities.
(Anuj Singh J.)
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