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Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM: GANGTOK
(Criminal Appeal Jurisdiction)
D.B.: THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BHASKAR RAJ PRADHAN, JUDGE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma,
S/o Indralall Sharma,
R/o Upper Aho Santi,
Pakyong,
East Sikkim.
At present: Rongyek Jail,
Gangtok, East Sikkim.
… Appellant
versus
State of Sikkim.
... Respondent
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appeal against conviction under Section 374(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Appearance:
Mr. N. Rai, Senior Advocate (Legal Aid Counsel) with Ms.
Tamanna Chhetri and Ms. Malati Sharma Advocates for the
Appellant.
Mr. Karma Thinlay, Additional Public Prosecutor.
Mr. Thinlay Dorjee Bhutia, Additional Public Prosecutor.
Mr. S. K. Chettri and Ms. Pollin Rai, Assistant Public
Prosecutors for the State-Respondent.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------JUDGMENT
(11.10.2018)
Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, J
1.
The process of justice dispensation in a criminal case
mandates a thorough and sincere investigation by the investigating
agency to place the absolute truth-the inflexible reality before the
Court. The Investigating Officer is required to be professional,
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
ethical, unbiased and adept with the laws. The trial of criminal
cases must have the paramount objective to establish the truth.
The object of investigation would be to bring home the offence to
the offender however, without out stepping from the path of truth.
The sole objective of the trial would be to render justice, however
harsh the outcome may be. The ultimate object of both
investigation and trial is to arrive at the truth. The prosecution as
well as the defence lawyers must play a crucial role in the
adversarial proceeding. During trial the trial Judge has a
fundamental duty to ensure fair play and the acceptance of oral as
well as documentary evidence in the manner prescribed by law is
fundamental. The understanding of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
the procedural law as provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (Cr.P.C.) and the ingredients of the offence as defined in the
substantive law is vital in the process of investigation as well as
trial. The Judgment rendered by the Trial Judge must reflect the
deep understanding of these laws and the appreciation of the facts
that have unfolded during trial. There would be no room for
conjectures and surmises or even presumptions save what is
permitted. Cogent evidence must lead to precise answers. It is only
when there is failure in investigation and prosecution that
conjectures and surmises, most unfortunately, are resorted to.
That however, would be not only an incorrect but also an illegal
approach. Prejudging a case inevitably leads to disastrous
consequences. Sound judicial principles must guide the Trial judge
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
while arriving at his conclusion. The adage “innocent until proven
guilty” is the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence.
Conviction must be secured by adducing cogent and conclusive
evidence by due process of the laws.
2.
In re: Ashish Batham v. State of M.P1 the Supreme Court would
once again reiterate:
“8.
Realities
or
truth
apart,
the
fundamental
and
basic
presumption in the administration of criminal law and justice delivery
system is the innocence of the alleged accused and till the charges are
proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of clear, cogent, credible or
unimpeachable evidence, the question of indicting or punishing an
accused does not arise, merely carried away by the heinous nature of the
crime or the gruesome manner in which it was found to have been
committed. Mere suspicion, however strong or probable it may be is no
effective substitute for the legal proof required to substantiate the charge
of commission of a crime and graver the charge is, greater should be the
standard of proof required. Courts dealing with criminal cases at least
should constantly remember that there is a long mental distance between
“may be true” and “must be true” and this basic and golden rule only
helps to maintain the vital distinction between “conjectures” and “sure
conclusions” to be arrived at on the touchstone of a dispassionate judicial
scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all
features of the case as well as quality and credibility of the evidence
brought on record.”
3.
The indictment of the Appellant for the offence of murder of
his wife (deceased) in criminal conspiracy with Chandra Kala
Sharma and thereafter giving false information with the intention
of screening himself
from legal punishment would result in the
impugned judgment of conviction dated 29.02.2016 by the learned
(2002) 7 SCC 317
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
Sessions Judge, Special Division-II at Gangtok, East Sikkim. The
conviction of the Appellant would be under Section 302 and 201
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The impugned order on sentence
dated 29.02.2016 would punish the Appellant to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten
thousand) only under Section 302 IPC and in default of payment of
fine to further undergo six months simple imprisonment. For the
offence under Section 201 IPC the Appellant would be sentenced
to undergo two years simple imprisonment and to pay a fine of
Rs.5000/- (Rupees five thousand) only and in default to further
undergo three months of simple imprisonment. The convictions as
well as the sentences are questioned in the present appeal.
4.
The learned Sessions Judge while convicting the Appellant as
aforesaid would primarily rely upon:(i)
Purported “extra judicial confession” made by the Appellant before
Deepak Sharma (P.W.1), Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2), Pema Chakki
Bhutia (P.W.3) and “confession” made before Ganga Ram Pathak
(P.W.9) and the Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28).
(ii)
Purported “confessional” statement of the Appellant recorded under
Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) by
the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Suraj Chettri (P.W.27).
(iii)
The admission of an affair with Chandra Kala Sharma – the
accused no.2 during the trial in the confession of the Appellant
under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
(iv)
Purported “confession” of Chandra Kala Sharma – the accused
no.2 during the trial, made to Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) and
Mahendra Poudyal (P.W.12) on the ground that when more persons
than one are jointly tried for the same offence, the confession made
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
by one of them, if admissible in evidence, should be taken into
consideration against the other accused.
(v)
Last seen theory as per the evidence of Anand Munda (P.W.10) and
the identification of the Appellant in the Test Identification Parade
conducted.
(vi)
The records of the vehicle movement register at Rangpo check post.
(vii)
Purported Call Detail Record of the calls made by the Appellant
and the deceased and the seizure of the mobile phone of the
Appellant by which the calls were allegedly made showing the
location.
(viii)
The disclosure statement recorded under Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872.
(ix)
The filing of the false missing report by the Appellant, inconsistent
and contradictory statement of the Appellant regarding the
whereabouts of the deceased along with his conduct-tearing of the
deceased face from her photographs, false plea of the Appellant
having lost his wallet along with the key of the box belonging to the
deceased.
(x)
The making of calls to various relatives inquiring about the
whereabouts of the deceased by the Appellant and misleading his
parents, relatives and the police.
(xi)
The
failure
of
the
Appellant
to
satisfactorily
explain
the
circumstances appearing against him during his examination under
Section 313 Cr.P.C.
(xii)
5.
The time of death being closely connected to the date of incident.
Heard, Mr. N. Rai, learned Senior Advocate and legal aid
Counsel for the Appellant as well as Mr. Karma Thinlay, learned
Additional Public Prosecutor for the State-Respondent.
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
6.
Mr. N. Rai would submit that this was a case based on
circumstantial evidence and the prosecution had failed to prove
that the circumstances are wholly consistent with the guilt of the
accused and excludes every other hypothesis of the innocence of
the Appellant and that further the prosecution has also failed to
prove the links in the chain of circumstances beyond reasonable
doubt. He would also submit that the prosecution must stand on
its own strength and it is not permissible to take advantage of the
weakness of the defence. Mr. N. Rai would submit that the
prosecution has failed to prove that the Appellant and the
deceased were together at the time of the incident. He would also
submit that the prosecution failed to prove any motive. He would
submit
that
the
alleged
extra
judicial
untrustworthy
and
tutored.
Delay
in
confessions
registering
the
are
First
Information Report (FIR) and forwarding the same to the
Magistrate is unexplained. He would contend that the very fact the
dead body of the deceased was found in a cave in a sitting position
contrary to the allegation of the prosecution that the Appellant had
disclosed that he had pushed the deceased from “Jalewa Bhir” in
the disclosure statement of the Appellant recorded under Section
27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would falsify the prosecution’s
story. Mr. N. Rai would submit suspicion however strong cannot
substitute legal proof. Mr. N. Rai would question the impugned
judgment as well as the order on sentence as being rendered on
conjectures and surmises without any cogent evidence.
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
7.
Per contra Mr. Karma Thinlay would submit that the
conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge was
perfectly justified in the facts and circumstances of the present
case and that the prosecution had been able to prove the case
based on circumstantial evidence, beyond reasonable doubt. He
would submit that the conduct of the Appellant during the period
as proved by the evidence of Deepak Sharma (P.W.1), Hema
Sharma (P.W.4), Indralall Sharma (P.W.5), Bindu Mati Adhikari
(P.W.8), Pushpa Lal Kafley (P.W.11), Rajesh Prasad Gupta (P.W.14)
and the Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) along with
the vehicle movement register (Exhibit-36) would prove the guilt of
the Appellant. He would submit that the deposition of Anand
Munda (P.W.10) would show that in fact on 19.12.2013 the
Appellant had been to the place of occurrence with the deceased.
He would submit that the disclosure statement of the Appellant
(Exhibit-3) recorded under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 read with the confessional statement of the Appellant
recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. would establish that it was the
Appellant who had committed the crime alleged and none other.
8.
There would be no eye witness to the occurrence. Admittedly,
this would be a case based on circumstantial evidence. The
method for proving a criminal case based on circumstantial
evidence is well settled.
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
9.
The prosecution story in short was that the Appellant had
married the deceased in the year 2010. From June 2013 they
shifted to a rented room in Ranipool. The deceased had joined a
computer class at MIT, Ranipool. Chandra Kala Sharma (the
cousin of the deceased and accused no.2 during trial who stands
acquitted now) started living with the couple. Chandra Kala
Sharma fell in love with the Appellant and developed physical
relation with him. The deceased thus became a hindrance to their
illicit love affair. The Appellant wanted to get rid of his pregnant
wife and hatched a plan to eliminate her and shared it with
Chandra Kala Sharma. On 19.12.2013 morning the Appellant
dropped Chandra Kala Sharma to the tuition class at Gangtok in
his vehicle SK-01P-6697 (Alto) and thereafter persuaded the
deceased to go for a long drive with him to Melli. They left for Melli
in the afternoon and on reaching there they had vegetable
“momos” at a Hotel and thereafter proceeded further on, the
Appellant looking for an opportune moment to commit her murder.
They crossed the Rangpo check post towards the West Bengal side
at around 1335 hours. The Appellant stopped the vehicle at
“Jalewa Bhir” on the West Bengal side about 3 kilometres away
from Sikkim on the pretext of feeding the monkeys there. The
deceased unaware of the ill intention of the Appellant also got out
of the vehicle and loitered around. At around 1710-1740 hours,
the Appellant on the cover of darkness pushed the deceased
towards a treacherous steep cliff of approximately 900/1000 feet
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
and left the spot immediately entering Rangpo check post around
1755 hours. After reaching home the Appellant disclosed the facts
to Chandra Kala Sharma and both craftily decided to file false
missing report at the Ranipool Police Station. The Appellant and
Chandra Kala Sharma even visited the MIT Computer Centre at
Ranipool and enquired as to whether the deceased had come there
knowing that it was a Thursday and the centre would remain
closed. The Appellant also lodged a missing First Information
Report (FIR) on 20.12.2013 at the Ranipool Police Station.
Call
Detail Records of the mobile number of the deceased, the
Appellant and the Appellant’s mobile used by Chandra Kala
Sharma were sought for from the service provider which confirmed
that the Appellant had contacted his wife thrice on 19.12.2013
before 0930 hours on the other hand it was revealed that the
Appellant had contacted Chandra Kala Sharma twice first at 14.44
hours and at 17:07:08 hours and the tower details indicated Melli
and Turuk, South Sikkim. After his arrest the Appellant admitted
to the crime. The Appellant made a disclosure statement in
presence of witnesses. The vigorous search conducted with the
assistance of the relatives and river rafters at the place of
occurrence as per the disclosure statement yielded no result. On
24.12.2013 while proceeding for further extensive search verbal
intimation was received from the Station House Officer, Melli Police
Station, South Sikkim that one unidentified dead body had been
recovered from the banks of river Teesta having similar features as
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
that of the deceased. On reaching the spot the Appellant as well
as Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) recognised the body as that of the
deceased. Magisterial inquest was conducted on the body and
thereafter an autopsy which confirmed that the deceased was
pregnant with 4-5 months old male foetus.
10. The present appeal is filed by the Appellant against his
conviction and sentence. Chandra Kala Sharma the co-accused in
the trial was acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge. The State
has not preferred any appeal against the said acquittal.
11. Mr. N. Rai would illuminate on how a criminal case must be
established on the basis of circumstantial evidence by citing the
locus classicus on the subject rendered by the Supreme Court in
re: Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra2 in which it
would be held:
“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court
we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and
essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial
evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is
Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR
1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] . This case has been uniformly followed and
applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for
instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh
[(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v. State of
Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC 656] . It may be useful to
extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant case [AIR 1952 SC
343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] :
(1984) 4 SCC 116
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
“It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of
a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be
fully established, and all the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.
Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis
but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a
chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and it must be such as to show that within all human
probability the act must have been done by the accused.”
12. On the settled principles of examining a criminal case based
on
circumstantial
evidence
we
venture
to
re-examine
the
circumstances which led the learned Sessions Judge to convict
and sentence the Appellant for murder of his wife – the deceased
as well as giving false information to screen himself. We are
conscious that this is an appeal against conviction. We are also
conscious while hearing an appeal against conviction we must
consider the factual aspects of the case. The power of the Appellate
Court dealing with an appeal from conviction is the same as the
power of the Appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against
acquittal. The appeal against conviction is as of right.
(i)
Purported “extra judicial confession” made by the Appellant
before Deepak Sharma (P.W.1), Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2),
Pema Chakki Bhutia (P.W.3) and “confession” made before
Ganga Ram Pathak (P.W.9) and the Investigating OfficerMahendra Subba (P.W.28).
13. Before we examine the evidence of Deepak Sharma (P.W.1),
Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2) and Pema Chakki Bhutia (P.W.3) it is
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
necessary to keep in mind the principles laid down by the
Supreme Court, discussed hereinafter, while examining evidences
of close relatives and friends of the deceased as admittedly Deepak
Sharma (P.W.1) and Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2) were closely
related to the deceased and Pema Chakki Bhutia (P.W.3) was the
staff of Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2). Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) is the
elder brother of the deceased and the Appellant is his brother-inlaw. The Appellant is the brother-in-law married to Netra Devi
Sharma’s (P.W.2) sister-in-law. Chandra Kala Sharma-the coaccused during trial but acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge
is Netra Devi Sharma’s (P.W.2) younger paternal uncle’s daughter.
Pema Chakki Bhutia (P.W.3) as per the deposition of Netra Devi
Sharma (P.W.2) was her staff who was present when the Appellant
made the alleged confessional statement to the police. The learned
Sessions Judge in spite of evidence to the contrary would hold that
Deepak Sharma (P.W.1), Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2) and Pema
Chakki Bhutia (P.W.3) were independent witnesses. Independent
witness means independent of sources which are likely to be
tainted. The fact that the deceased who was murdered allegedly by
the Appellant was the relative of Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) and Netra
Devi Sharma (P.W.2) and that Pema Chakki Bhutia (P.W.3) was the
staff of Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2) who accompanied her to the
Ranipool Police Station where the alleged extra judicial confession
was made by the Appellant was a factor which ought to have been
considered by the learned Sessions Judge while examining their
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
evidences. The mere fact that the said prosecution witnesses were
relatives of the deceased would not lead to Trial Court throwing
out their depositions but their evidence ought to have been
carefully scrutinised.
14.
In re: Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) the Supreme Court
would caution:
“48. Before discussing the evidence of the witnesses we might
mention a few preliminary remarks against the background of
which the oral statements are to be considered. All persons to
whom the oral statements are said to have been made by Manju
when she visited Beed for the last time, are close relatives and
friends of the deceased. In view of the close relationship and
affection any person in the position of the witness would naturally
have a tendency to exaggerate or add facts which may not have
been stated to them at all. Not that this is done consciously but
even unconsciously the love and affection for the deceased would
create a psychological hatred against the supposed murderer and,
therefore, the Court has to examine such evidence with very great
care and caution. Even if the witnesses were speaking a part of the
truth or perhaps the whole of it, they would be guided by a spirit of
revenge or nemesis against the accused person and in this process
certain facts which may not or could not have been stated may be
imagined to have been stated unconsciously by the witnesses in
order to see that the offender is punished. This is human
psychology and no one can help it.”
(emphasis supplied)
15. Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) would state in his examination-inchief:
“On 22.12.2013, myself, Mahendra Sharma and the accused no.2
came to Ranipool Police Station and we lured the accused No.2
with the promise of a job and asked her about the deceased. On
such promise, the accused No.2 told us that on the evening of
19.12.2013, the accused No.1 told her that he had done away with
the deceased. By the time we reached Ranipool Police Station on
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
22.12.2013, the accused No.1 was already in Police Custody. At
the Police Station, the accused No.1 told the Police that he had
taken the deceased towards Rangpo and pushed her from a cliff
into the River Teesta and lodged a false Police Report at the
Ranipool Police Station on 19.12.2013 stating that the Victim was
missing. He also informed the Police, that the Victim was pregnant
at the time of the incident. On hearing such statements, I lodged
the FIR at the Police Station. Exbt. 1 is the said FIR lodged by me
on 22.12.2013 scribed by my brother Iswhar Prasad on my
instructions. Exbt. 1 (a) is my full signature and Exbt. 1 (b) is my
initial on Exbt. 1. My brother Ishwar Prasad had accompanied me
on 22.12.2013 to the Ranipool Police Station.
Exbt. 2 is the formal FIR drawn up by the Police at the
Ranipool Police Station. Exbt. 2 (a) is my signature on Exbt.2.”
16. Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2) would depose in her examinationin-chief that:
“On 22.12.2013, I again came to Ranipool Thana to know about
the details of Investigation. There the accused No.1 gave a
statement in my presence stating that he had pushed his wife from
one Jalewa Bhir at a distance of three kilometres beyond Rangpo,
into the river Teesta, which was recorded by the Police. He also
said that he had done the above act on 19.12.2013. Pema Chhiki
Bhutia who is my staff, was also present when accused No.1 made
the statement to the Police.”
17. Pema Chakki Bhutia (P.W.3) in her examination-in-chief
would state:
“..... I do not remember the date and the month but it was in the
year 2013, accused Somnath Sharma disclosed to the police at
Ranipool P.S. in my presence to the effect that he was having an
affair with the sister-in-law, Chandra Kala Sharma. He also had
physical relationship with the sister-in-law. That on the date of the
incident, the accused took his wife for a drive to Melli. While
returning back, on reaching between Melli and Rangpo popularly
known as Jalewa Bhir, he stopped his car for a while and at that
point of time, the wife also came out of the car and he pushed her
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Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
from the cliff towards Teesta River (objected as the same is not in
her 161 statement).”
18. Ganga Ram Pathak (P.W.9) was posted in Ranipool Police
Station. On 21.12.2013 he was on plain clothes duty when the
Officer In-charge of Ranipool Police Station had directed him to
keep surveillance of the Appellant. He was the one who brought
the Appellant to the Ranipool Police Station and questioned the
Appellant. As per the deposition of Ganga Ram Pathak (P.W.9):
“At Ranipool P.S., on enquiry to the accused Somnath by me, the
accused pleaded guilty before me stating that he was having
affairs with his sister-in-law and further stated that in collusion
with his sister-in-law, accused Somnath took his wife for a drive in
their Alto car bearing registration No. SK-01-P-6697 towards Melli
in order to kill his wife. While returning back, on reaching in
between Rangpo and Melli, he pushed his wife from the cliff
towards river Teesta.
Thereafter, I handed over the accused to P.I. Sahab
(objected).”
19. The Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28)
would
also depose in his examination-in-chief that:
“Further during interrogation the accused disclosed of the fact in
presence of independent witnesses that he forcefully pushed his
wife towards the cliff along Rangpo-Melli, 31 N.H. Road on
19.12.2013 around 1720 hours approximately while they were on
their way back from Melli Bazar, South Sikkim. Accordingly I
recorded the disclosure statement. Exbt.3 already marked is the
said disclosure statement. Exbt.3(a)
and Exbt.3(b) are the
signatures of the witnesses Netra Devi Sharma and Pema Chhiki
Bhutia respectively on the same which I identify. Exbt.3(c) is the
signature of the accused.”
20. The deposition of Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) that on 22.12.2013
the Appellant made a confessional statement to the police in his
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Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
presence while the Appellant was in custody; The deposition of
Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2) that the Appellant confessed to his
crime in her presence which was recorded by the police at the
Police Station; The deposition of Pema Chakki Bhutia (P.W.3) that
the Appellant confessed before the police which have been
accepted by the learned Sessions Judge as extra judicial
confession would be barred under Sections 25 and 26 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as being confession made to a Police
Officer as well as while in the custody of the Police Officer.
21. In a similar fact situation examined by the Supreme Court in
re: Kishore Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh3 it would hold:
“8.........Therefore, it would be legitimate to conclude that the
appellant was taken into the police custody and while the accused
was in the custody, the extra-judicial confession was obtained
through PW 10 who accommodated the prosecution (sic appellant).
Thereby we can safely reach an irresistible conclusion that the
alleged extra-judicial confession statement was made while the
appellant was in the police custody. It is well settled law that
Sections 25 and 26 shall be construed strictly. Therefore, by
operation of Section 26 of the Evidence Act, the confession made by
the appellant to PW 10 while he was in the custody of the police
officer (PW 27) shall not be proved against the appellant. In this
view it is unnecessary to go into the voluntary nature of the
confession etc.”
22. The deposition of Ganga Ram Pathak (P.W.9) that the
Appellant confessed to his crime at the Police Station after he had
brought the Appellant there while doing his surveillance as per the
(1991) 1 SCC 286
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Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
instructions of the Officer In-charge of the Ranipool Police Station
and the deposition of the Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba
(P.W.28) regarding the confession made by the Appellant to him in
front of independent witnesses would all be barred under Sections
25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as both of the said
witnesses were Police Officers.
23. The learned Sessions Judge ought not to have relied upon the
purported
extra
judicial
confession
and
confession
as
circumstances against the Appellant.
(ii)
Purported “confessional” statement of the Appellant
recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) by the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Suraj Chettri (P.W.27).
(iii)
The admission of an affair with Chandra Kala Sharma–the
accused no.2 during the trial in the confession of the
Appellant under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
24. A full Bench of this Court in Re: State of Sikkim v. Suren Rai4
would hold:
“48. “Confessions” are one species of the genus “admission”
consisting of a direct acknowledgement of guilt by an accused in
a criminal case. “Confessions” are thus “admissions” but all
admissions are not confessions. A confession can be acted upon if
the Court is satisfied that it is voluntary and true. Judgment of
conviction can also be based on confession if it is found to be
truthful, deliberate and voluntary and if clearly proved. An
unambiguous confession, as held by the Supreme Court, if
admissible in evidence, and free from suspicion suggesting its
falsity, is a valuable piece of evidence which possess a high
probative force because it emanates directly from the person
committing the offence. To act on such confessions the Court
must be extremely vigilant and scrutinize every relevant factor to
ensure that the confession is truthful and voluntary. Although
2018 SCC OnLine Sikk 12
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
the word confession has not been defined in the Evidence Act,
1872 the Privy Council in re: Pakala Narayanaswami v. King
Emperor5 has clearly laid down that a confession must either
admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the
facts which constitute the offence. As abundant caution the
Courts have sought for corroboration of the confession though. As
per Taylor’s Treaties on the law of Evidence, Vol. I a confession is
considered highly reliable because no rational person would make
admission against his own interest prompted by his conscience to tell the
truth.
If
the
Court
finds
that
the
confession
was
voluntary, truthful and not caused by any inducement, threat or
promise it gains a high degree of probability. To insulate such
confession
from
any
extraneous
pressure
affecting
the
voluntariness and truthfulness the laws have provided various
safeguards and protections. A confession is made acceptable
against the accused fundamental right of silence. A confession by
hope or promise of gain or advantage is equally unacceptable as a
confession by reward or immunity, by force or fear or by violence
or threat. .........”
25. The purported “confessional” statement of the Appellant
recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. by the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate on 27.10.2015 would state:
“I am a permanent resident of Aho Santi, East Sikkim. Deceased
Nevika Sharma is my wife. I along with my wife used to reside at
Ranipool. In February 2010 I got married with my deceased wife. I also
know Chandra Kala Sharma. She is my sister-in-law. She is the daughter
of the uncle (Kaka) of the deceased wife. On 24.12.2013 police from
Ranipool P.S. took me to Malli, South Sikkim to identify the dead body of
my wife Nevika Sharma. My wife was pregnant at the relevant time.
On 19.12.2013 my deceased wife told me that as she is pregnant
and cannot go to visit any place, she wants to go for a drive. Accordingly,
I drove her up to Malli via Singtam. Rangpo in my Alto car bearing No.
SK01 P-6697. From Malli we came back towards Rangpo. I was having
love affair with my sister-in-law Chandra Kala Sharma and I had told my
deceased wife about my love affair and I want to marry my sister-in-law.
While going to Malli and coming back, me and my deceased wife were
discussing about my love affair with my sister-in-law. As my wife was
pregnant I was driving slowly and we were halting and taking rest on the
66 IA 66
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
way. When we reached 2-3 Kms away from Rangpo towards Malli I
stopped my vehicle on the side of the Road. I got down from my vehicle,
took my cigarette and Rajaniganda from my car and went for short toilet.
At that time also we were discussing about my affair with my sister-inlaw. While I was doing short toilet at the wall side of the road my wife
suddenly jumped towards the river side of the road where there is stiff
cliff. At the time it was about to be dark. I call my wife and looked down
but there was no answer. For about half an hour I remained there as I
was nervous. Thereafter, I came back to Ranipool directly. At that time I
was nervous and was not in the position to think anything. Thereafter, I
called my mother, Hema Devi Sharma. My mother asked for my wife to
which I told her that she is not at home. Thereafter, I started receiving
phone calls from my in-laws and later my uncles (Kaka) also called me
up. Later at night my uncles and co-villagers from Aho came to my rented
room at Ranipool and started asking about the whereabouts of my
deceased wife. As I was afraid I could not tell anyone that my wife
jumped from the road. Thereafter, everybody decided to make a search of
my wife. My uncle lodged missing report at Ranipool P.S. The brother of
my deceased wife was also asking me to lodge missing report
immediately. My uncle L.P. Sharma was writing missing report and it
was later lodged at Ranipool P.S.
On 22.12.2013 I was arrested by Ranipool P.S. in connection with
this case. It is true that I was having love affair with my sister-in-law
Chandra Kala Sharma but I did not kill my wife.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. The purported “confessional” statement recorded under
section 164 Cr.P.C. is evidently not a confession. The fact that the
Appellant states “while I was doing short toilet at the wall side of
the road my wife suddenly jumped towards the river side of the
road where there is stiff cliff” makes it exculpatory. Mr. Karma
Thinlay would ignore the exculpatory statement and submit that
the rest of the statement given by the Appellant under Section 164
Cr.P.C. would unflinchingly prove his guilt. In fact he would rely
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
upon various judgments of the Supreme Court on retracted
confessions which we have perused and found them not to help
the prosecution case any further. He would rely upon State of T.N.
v. Kutty alias Lakshmi Narasimhan6; K.I. Pavunny v. Assistant
Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin7 and N. Somashekar
(Dead) By LRS. v. State of Karnataka8.
27.
In re:
N. Somashekar (supra) the Supreme Court would
observe:
“9.
It needs first to be noted that merely because the
statement of witness is recorded under Section 164 of the Code,
that does not automatically dilute the worth of his evidence. (See
State of Assam v. Jilkadar Ali and Vishwanath v. State of U.P.)”
28. Mr. Karma Thinlay would draw the attention of this Court to
the afore-quoted sentence from the judgment and submit that the
statement made by an accused to the Magistrate under Section
164 Cr.P.C. would be relevant even if the same is not a confession.
We are afraid the Supreme Court did not say so. In the said case
the Supreme Court was dealing with a statement of a witness
recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and not a purported
“confession” of an accused as in the present case. A perusal of the
rest of the sentences in paragraph 9 of the judgment would reflect
that the witnesses who had earlier given their statement under
164 Cr.P.C. had been examined by the prosecution as witnesses
(2001) 6 SCC 550
(1997) 3 SCC 721
(2004) 11 SCC 334
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
and their evidence recorded. It was in this context that the
Supreme Court would make the above observation.
29. Section 164 Cr.P.C. permits the recording of the statement of
a
witness
or
a
confession.
Confession
must
either
admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the
facts which constitute the offence. The substantive offences alleged
are murder and causing evidence of the commission of the offence
to disappear with the intention of screening the offender from legal
punishment knowing that the offence had been committed. The
purported “confessional” statement of the Appellant recorded
under Section 164 Cr.P.C., therefore, must admit said offences or
at any rate all the facts which constitute the said offences. A
perusal of the entire purported “confessional” statement recorded
under Section 164 Cr.P.C. does not disclose that the Appellant had
admitted having committed murder or at any rate all the facts
which constitute the offence of murder. It also does not disclose
any admission of causing any evidence of the commission of the
offence to disappear with the intention of screening the offender
from legal punishment knowing that the offence had been
committed.
30. Section 164 Cr.P.C. does not prescribe any method to record
admissions of an accused. Section 164 Cr.P.C. does not permit the
recording
of
admission
save
confessions
by
an
accused.
Confessions recorder under Section 164 Cr.P.C. although stricto
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
sensu not evidence however, is considered highly reliable because
no rational person would make admission against his own interest
prompted by his conscience to tell the truth. If the Court finds that
the confession was voluntary, truthful and not caused by any
inducement, threat or promise it gains a high degree of probability.
If a statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. of an accused is
found not to be confessional, its reliability would lose the strength
attached to a confessional statement. In such circumstances no
reliance can be placed on the purported statements of the
Appellant recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., quite incorrectly, as
his confessional statement as it would not be substantial evidence.
31. The prosecution has placed no evidence at all except the
purported “confessional” statement of the Appellant recorded
under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the purported extra judicial confession
made to Pema Chakki Bhutia (P.W.3) and the purported confession
made to Ganga Ram Pathak (P.W.9) to prove the allegation of the
Appellant’s affair with Chandra Kala Sharma as a motive for the
alleged murder. We deem it improper to rely upon such
confessions. Consequently, there would be no evidence to establish
the alleged extra marital affair between the Appellant and Chandra
Kala Sharma. The close relatives of the deceased who were
produced as prosecution witnesses are all silent about it.
(iv)
Purported “confession” of Chandra Kala Sharma-the accused
no.2 during the trial, made to Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) and
Mahendra Poudyal (P.W.12) on the ground that when more
persons than one are jointly tried for the same offence, the
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
confession made by one of them, if admissible in evidence,
should be taken into consideration against the other
accused.
32. The learned Sessions Judge would hold that Chandra Kala
Sharma had confessed about the offence for committing the
murder of the deceased to her brother Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) and
her uncle Mahendra Poudyal (P.W.12) which fact could not be lost
sight of. The learned Sessions Judge would hold that when more
persons than one are jointly tried for the same offence, the
confession made by one of them, if admissible in evidence, should
be taken into consideration against the other accused. Deepak
Sharma (P.W.1) would state that on 22.12.2013 he, Mahendra
Sharma and Chandra Kala Sharma came to Ranipool Police
Station when they lured Chandra Kala Sharma with the promise of
a job and asked her about the deceased and on such promise,
Chandra Kala Sharma told them that in the evening of 19.12.2013
the Appellant told her that he had done away with the deceased. It
is apparent that Chandra Kala Sharma had not confessed to have
committed the crime to Deepak Sharma (P.W.1). Mahendra
Poudyal (P.W.12) did not state anything regarding Chandra Kala
Sharma confessing to him. The deposition of Deepak Sharma
(P.W.1) of what Chandra Kala Sharma had told him after they
lured her with the promise of a job is merely a procured hearsay
statement. It was purportedly heard from an accomplice. The oral
evidence of what the accomplice said is narrated by Deepak
Sharma (P.W.1) a relative of the deceased after she was admittedly
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
induced with a promise of a job. Thus this hearsay statement
would have no evidentiary worth. Illustration (b) of Section 114 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that the Court may
presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is
corroborated in material particulars. There is no corroboration to
the said statement of Chandra Kala Sharma purportedly given to
Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) at the Ranipool Police Station.
33. Chandra Kala Sharma is said to have made a confessional
statement
under
Section
Cr.P.C.
The
said
purported
“confessional” statement (exhibit-27) records:
“On 19.12.2013 I got up in the morning, prepared food and went
tuition. My brother-in-law reached me to Rediant Institute. I
reached back home at around 2.30 pm. The room of my brother-inlaw was locked. After some time my sister, Nevika Sharma called
me and told me the keys of the room are above the door. She also
told me to prepare snacks and to have it. She also told me that her
computer class will be over by 5 pm. At around 5 pm she again
called me that her class will be over at 8 pm only.
At around 7.30 pm by (sic) brother-in-law came home and
asked my about my sister. I told him that she has not come back
and she was telling me that her computer class will be over only at
8 pm. Thereafter, I along with my brother-in-law went to the
computer Institute at Ranipool Bazar from where we came to know
that it was a holiday and the institute was closed on the relevant
day. Thereafter, my brother-in-law called his family members and
asked about my sister. Later at night all the family members of my
brother-in-law came in the rented room of my brother-in-law at
Ranipool. Apart from above I do not know anything about the
present case.”
34. Even the purported “confessional” statement of Chandra Kala
Sharma recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is not a confessional
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
statement and the entire statement is exculpatory. In the
circumstances, we are unable to fathom as to how the learned
Sessions Judge could come to the finding that Chandra Kala
Sharma had confessed to Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) and Mahendra
Poudyal (P.W.12) and used the same to convict the Appellant.
(v)
Last seen theory as per the evidence of Anand Munda
(P.W.10) and the identification of the Appellant in the Test
Identification Parade conducted.
(vi)
The records of the vehicle movement register at Rangpo
check post.
(vii) Purported Call Detail Record of the calls made by the
Appellant and the deceased and the seizure of the mobile
phone of the Appellant by which the calls were allegedly
made showing the location.
35. In re: Rambraksh v. State of Chhattisgarh9 the Supreme Court
would explain the application of the last seen theory in a criminal
case based on circumstantial evidence in this manner:
“12. It is trite law that a conviction cannot be recorded against the
accused merely on the ground that the accused was last seen with
the deceased. In other words, a conviction cannot be based on the
only circumstance of last seen together. Normally, last seen theory
comes into play where the time gap, between the point of time
when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and
when the deceased is found dead, is so small that possibility of
any person other than the accused being the perpetrator of the
crime becomes impossible. To record a conviction, the last seen
together itself would not be sufficient and the prosecution has to
complete the chain of circumstances to bring home the guilt of the
accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
36. A Division Bench of this Court in re: Shri Kharga Bahadur
Pradhan v. State of Sikkim10 would hold:
(2016) 12 SCC 251
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
“11. Apart from the above, we note that the deceased was
allegedly seen alive in the company of the Appellant on 03.08.2009
and her dead body was found in abandoned condition in Budang
jungle on 06.08.2009. Thus, there was a long time gap between the
deceased lastly seen alive and the dead body found and in such
situation, a possibility of any third person coming in between
cannot be fully ruled out. We are of the view in light of the above
facts and circumstances, the Sessions Judge was not justified in
holding that the circumstance of last seen was fully established
against the Appellant. We hold that the said circumstance was not
fully established.”
37. The learned Sessions Judge would examine the evidence of
Anand Munda (P.W.10), entries made in vehicle movement register
of Rangpo check post (Exhibit-36) reflecting the movement of the
Appellant’s Alto car bearing registration no. SK-01-P-6697 and
hold that the Appellant and the deceased were seen and found
together at Melli Bazar at Holiday Hotel where they had vegetable
“momos” and that the place of occurrence also falls within the
periphery from where the dead body of the deceased was recovered
in between Rangpo and Melli establishing the guilt of the
Appellant. The learned Sessions Judge would also opine that from
the call details of the relevant day the Appellant and the deceased
had made calls from their respective mobiles within the reach of
Melli-Turuk-Turung tower and its adjoining area at National
Highway. The evidence of Pushpa Lal Kafley (P.W.11) that when he
went to Ranipool Police Station he received the call details of the
Appellant as well as the deceased from the office of Vodafone,
Gangtok by which it was found that the deceased was within the
2015 SCC OnLine Sikk 53
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
reach of Turuk tower would be accepted. The evidence of
Mahendra Poudyal (P.W.12) stating that they had gone to Ranipool
Police Station where they were handed over the call details and the
location of the tower as per which the deceased had made her last
call from her mobile at 5.07 p.m. as per the network supported by
Turung tower would also be accepted. The seizure of mobile
phones (M.O.I and M.O.II) belonging to the Appellant would be
found proved by the evidence of Hem Raj Gurung (P.W.17), Dhan
Singh Subba (P.W.19). The seizure of a Nokia phone (M.O.V) in the
presence of Sancharaj Subba (P.W.26) from Mahendra Poudyal
(P.W.12) who is said to have snatched it from Chandra Kala Subba
is also accepted. The fact that the Alto car bearing registration no.
SK-01-P-6697 belonged to the Appellant on which the Appellant
and the deceased is said to have travelled to Melli on 19.12.2013
would also be found proved by the evidence of Dilip Shah (P.W.18),
Bindu Mati Adhikari (P.W.8) and Pema Tshering Lepcha (P.W.21).
38. In view of the aforesaid findings it is necessary to revisit the
aforesaid evidences and come to the conclusion whether the
learned Sessions Judge was right in concluding that the last seen
theory pressed by the prosecution stood proved.
39. Bindu
Mati
Adhikari
(P.W.8)
would
depose
that
on
15.11.2013 she sold one Alto car bearing registration no.SK-01-P6697 to the Appellant at a consideration value of Rs.1,45,000/and executed a sale deed. She would also depose that later she
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
learnt that the vehicle had not been transferred in the name of the
Appellant till date. Bindu Mati Adhikari (P.W.8) would depose
before the Court on 18.06.2015. Although sale deed document
(exhibit-40), application for intimation and transfer of ownership of
the said Alto car bearing registration no. SK-01-P-6697 (exhibit41), notice of transfer of ownership of motor vehicle (exhibit-42)
have been exhibited the said documents were not even shown to
Bindu Mati Adhikari (P.W.8) by the prosecution during her
examination.
The
said
documents
were
exhibited
by
the
Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) as having been
seized by him vide property seizure memo (exhibit-13) in the
presence of two witnesses Vinod Mundra (P.W.25) and Dilip Shah
(P.W.18) from one Bimal Neopaney who was not examined. Quite
certainly the Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) was
not the maker of the said documents. Vinod Mundra (P.W.25)
would depose that on 20.03.2014 he was called by Investigating
Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) to stand witness to the seizure
but could not say from whom the documents and key were seized.
He could not even identify the other witness. Dilip Shah (P.W.18)
would state that the aforesaid seizure was effected in his presence
from Bimal Neopaney at Ranipool Police Station. He stated that
the contents of property seizure memo (exhibit-13) were not read
to him nor were the documents seized shown to him. He admitted
that the police told him they had in fact seized the Alto car and
prepared property seizure memo (exhibit-13). The prosecution has
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
failed to prove the contents or the execution of sale deed document
(exhibit-40), application for intimation and transfer of ownership of
the said Alto car bearing registration no. SK-01-P-6697 (exhibit41), notice of transfer of ownership of motor vehicle (exhibit-42).
The “best evidence rule” has been completely given a go by the
prosecution. The makers of the documents have not been
examined. The person, from who the documents were allegedly
seized, although his name is reflected in the property seizure
memo (exhibit-3), has not being produced as a witness. The
investigation has failed to disclose who Bimal Neopaney was, how
the said documents were seized from him and what his connection
to the present prosecution was.
The prosecution has failed to
connect the seizure of the said documents to the Appellant.
40. Through
property
seizure
memo
(exhibit-19)
dated
24.12.2013 the Alto car bearing registration no. SK-01-P-6697, the
RC book of the said vehicle in the name of Bindu Mati Adhikari
(P.W.8), driving license bearing no. SK0120130021416 in the
name of the Appellant, insurance certificate policy ignition key of
the said vehicle and one leather hand bag (black in colour) would
be seized by the Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) in
the presence of one Saroj Lohar and Pema Tshering Lepcha
(P.W.21) in front of the Police Station. The Investigating OfficerMahendra Subba (P.W.28) in his deposition would state that he
effected the seizure at the Ranipool Police Station in the presence
of witnesses whose signatures he identified. Saroj Lohar would not
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
be examined. Pema Tshering Lepcha (P.W.21) would also state that
the aforesaid seizures were effected at the Ranipool Police Station.
Property seizure memo (exhibit-19) does not reflect from whom the
seizures were effected. The Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba
(P.W.28) as well as Pema Tshering Lepcha (P.W.21) the sole seizure
witness examined are both silent about this fact too. The
prosecution has failed to establish from whom items purportedly
seized vide property seizure memo (exhibit-19) were seized from.
The prosecution has also failed to connect the seizures with the
present prosecution against the Appellant.
41. The Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) would
depose that the movement of the vehicle bearing registration no.
SK-01-P-6697 was also found entered in the register maintained at
Rangpo check post having passed at around 1335 hrs towards
Bengal side and returned at around 1755 hrs on 19.12.2013
which matched with the time given by the Appellant in his
disclosure statement. He also exhibited loose sheets of paper as
the said entries made in the Rangpo check post in two pages and
identified the signatures of second officer in-charge-Sub-Inspector
Pema Rana as (exhibit-36). Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 provides that an entry in any public or other official book,
register or record or an electronic record, stating a fact in issue or
relevant fact, and made in performance of a duty especially
enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or
record or an electronic record is kept, is itself a relevant fact. Sub-
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
Inspector Pema Rana was not examined. The purported entries
from the purported vehicle movement register have not been seized
through any seizure memo. The vehicle movement register has
also not been placed before the Court. The maker of the entries
has also not been examined. The Investigating Officer-Mahendra
Subba (P.W.38) is definitely not the person who had any personal
knowledge about the entries. The loose sheet of pages (exhibit-36)
cannot be accepted as evidence. The prosecution has failed to
prove the entries.
42. A perusal of the list of documents exhibited by the
prosecution as reflected in the impugned judgment does not show
that call detail records as adverted to by the learned Sessions
Judge had been exhibited and proved.
43. Puspa Lal Kafley (P.W.11) a Government employee under the
Energy and Power Department would depose that:
“... Thereafter on the next day, I came back to Ranipool at the
rented room or accused No.1 and we received the call details of
accused No.1 and Nebika Sharma from the office of Vodafone,
Gangtok. On the basis of call details, it was found that missing
Nebika was within the reach of Turuk tower. Accordingly, went to
Turuk but we could not find Nebika and returned back to
Ranipool.”
44.
In cross-examination Puspa Lal Kafley (P.W.11) would admit:
“... It is true that as per the call details of Nebika, it was within the
reach of Turuk tower but not of West Bengal side.”
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
45. Puspa Lal Kafley (P.W.11) would also admit in crossexamination that the deceased was his sister-in-law.
46. Mahendra Poudyal (P.W. 12) son of Kedarnath Sharma
(P.W.15) is a Government servant who would state in his
deposition that:
“ On the following day, at around 9 a.m., SHO, Ranipool P.S.
informed us stating that tower location and call details has been
received by his office. Accordingly, we went to police station and
there we were handed over the call details and the location of the
tower. On going through the call details, it was found that missing
Nebika Sharma had made a last call from her mobile phone at
around 5:7 p.m. as per the network supported by Turung tower, On
our enquiry to SHO, Ranipool, he told us that Turung tower
provides network to areas in between Melli, Rangpo and
surrounding areas including 31A National Highway.”
47. In cross-examination the said Mahendra Poudyal (P.W. 12)
could admit:
“It is true that the information in connection with the call details of
the mobile of Nebika Sharma supported by Turung tower was given
to me by SHO, Ranipool. It is true that I do not remember to which
company, said tower belong to.”
48. Thus as per Mahendra Poudyal (P.W. 12) the call detail
records was handed over to him by the Station House Officer of
Ranipool Police Station. Mahendra Poudyal (P.W. 12) however, also
didn’t produce it.
49. As per Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) the deceased’s brother,
Kedarnath Sharma (P.W.15) is his younger paternal uncle and that
on 21.12.2013 he along with Kedarnath Sharma (P.W.15) and his
son Mahendra Sharma had gone to the Ranipool Thana and
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
inquired about the call records of the mobile phone of the victim if
so procured by the police. The police inspector informed them that
the call detail records had shown the location of the deceased
within reach of Turung tower at around 5.15 p.m. on 19.12.2013
from her mobile.
50. The Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) would
state:
“I also received the call details from (sic) of phone Nos.
0974959259 of the accused Som Nath Sharma and 09593782036
of the deceased Nabika Sharma in seven pages from the office of
Vodafone at Gangtok i.e. from 18.12.2013 to 20.12.2013 which
showed the tower details of Melli, Turuk and Turung adjacent to
31A-National Highway (P.O).........
It also shown in the call details that the accused had contacted
deceased Nabika Sharma on 19.12.2013 thrice over her phone and
as well the accused also contacted the accused Chandra Kala
Sharma twice at around 14.44 hours and 17.07.08 hours which
indicates the tower which covers between Melli and Taruk,
adjoining National Highway.”
51. The Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) in crossexamination admitted that he had not cited the employees of
Vodafone and Reliance Company as witness in the present case.
52. Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that the
contents of documents may be proved either by primary or
secondary evidence. Section 62 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
provides that primary evidence means the document itself
produced for the inspection of the Court. Section 62 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 states what secondary evidence means and
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
includes. Apparently the prosecution has not produced either the
primary evidence or the secondary evidence of the purported call
detail records. Section 64 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
provides that documents must be proved by primary evidence
except in the cases mentioned in Section 65 thereof. No case to
bring it within the exceptions enumerated in Section 65 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has been made out by the prosecution.
In such circumstances, no amount of oral evidence regarding the
call detail records can be accepted since the prosecution failed to
exhibit and prove the call detail records. This circumstance cannot
also be taken against the Appellant.
53.
The learned Sessions Judge would hold that the seizure of
the two mobile phones i.e., Micromax (M.O.I) and Spice (M.O.II) as
well as the fact that the said mobile phones were not of the
Appellant could not be demolished by the defence. The learned
Sessions Judge would also hold that the Appellant also could not
demolish the fact that he had made calls within the reach of Melli
Turuk and Turung tower and adjoining area of National Highway
which has been corroborated by the call detail records vide
exhibit-37 and 38.
54. In so far as the finding regarding the call detail records, as
held above, there was no documentary evidence to establish the
same. The learned Sessions Judge, unfortunately and in the most
callous manner, without even perusing exhibits-37 and 38 would
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
hold that the said exhibits corroborated that the Appellant had
made calls. Exhibit-38 is a communication dated 13.01.2014
forwarding
the
water
discharge
data
w.e.f.
19.12.2013
to
25.12.2013 of Teesta-V Power Station from NHPC Limited and
exhibit-37 is the said hourly water discharge data. We cannot but
express our anguish on such reasoning.
55. Property seizure memo (exhibit-12) is dated 22.12.2013. It
would reflect that one mobile phone (Micromax), black in colour,
having red border with SIM no. 7407375856 (Vodafone) and SIM
no.9749592159 (Reliance) and another mobile phone (Spice) white
and black in colour without SIM card were seized from the
Appellant at the Ranipool Police Station in the presence of Dhan
Singh Subba (P.W.19) and Hem Raj Gurung (P.W.17).
56. Hem Raj Gurung (P.W.17) is the seizure witness of the said
mobile phones and in his deposition he would state:
“I know the accused No.1 present in the Court today. That on
22.12.2013, at around 1 p.m., SHO, Ranipool P.S. seized 2 Nos. of
mobile of different make, i.e., Micromax mobile phone and Spice
Mobile phone in my presence at Ranipool P.S. Thereafter, police
prepared the seizure memo for the same wherein I signed as one of
the attesting witnesses to the same. Exhibit-12 is the said seizure
memo and Exhibit-12(a) is my signature. (At this stage, the sealed
packet containing material exhibit has been opened by the
prosecution in the presence of defence and the witness is
confronted with the same) M.O.I is the said Micromax mobile phone
and M.O.II is the said Spice mobile phone.”
57. In the cross-examination of Hem Raj Gurung (P.W.17) he
would admit:
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
“.... It is true that when I reached Ranipool Thana, M.O. I and II
were already kept at the table of P.O. Sahab. It is true that I do not
know as to from whom, M.O.I and II were seized by the police. It is
true that police did not pack and seal M.O.I and II in my presence. I
is true that the seal cover of M.O.I and II does not bear my
signature as well as any identification mark. It is true that police
did not read over and explain the contents of Exhibit-12 to me. It is
true that the other witness who signed on Exhibit-12 did not put
his signature in my presence. It is not a fact that I am deposing
falsely.”
58. Dhan Singh Subba (P.W.19) is the other seizure witness to
the seizure of the said mobile phones. He would state:
“I know the accused No.1 as he is my co-villager. I do not
remember the date and the month but it was in the year 2013,
police seized two mobile phones in my presence from accused
Somnath. Thereafter, police prepared seizure memo for the same
wherein I signed as one of the attesting witnesses to the same.
M.O.I and II already marked are the said mobile phones. Exhibit-12
(already marked) is the said seizure memo prepared in respect of
M.O. I and II. Exhibit-12(b) is my signature on the same.”
59. In the cross-examination of Dhan Singh Subba (P.W.19) he
would admit:
“ It is true that on the relevant day, I had gone to Ranipool thana
as I was called by P.I. Mahendra Subba. It is true that on the
relevant day, I went to Ranipool Thana as I was approached by the
uncle of the deceased Nebika Sharma. It is true that when I
reached Ranipool Thana, I saw M.O.I and II on the table of P.I.
Sahab. It is true that I do not know as to from where the police had
seized or recovered the M.O. I and II which I saw lying on the table
of P.I. Mahendra Subba. It is not a fact that M.O. I and II were not
packed and sealed in my presence. It is true that when M.O. I and
II were sealed, my signature was not put on it. It is true that
contents of Exhibit-12 was not read over to me. I am not sure
whether another witness signed on Exhibit-12 in my presence or
not. It is true that police did not record my 161 statement in
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
connection with this case. It is true that I cannot say for sure as to
whether M.O.I and II shown to me in the Court are the same
articles which I had seen at Ranipool Thana or not. It is not a fact
that I am deposing falsely.”
60. The Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) would
depose about the seizure of the two mobile handsets in this
manner:
“I seized
two
nos.
of
mobile
handsets
having
duel
SIM
No.7407375856 ( Vodafone ) make Micromax and SIM No.
9749592159 ( Reliance ) and one Spiece (sic) phone without SIM
card from the possession of the accused in presence of the
witnesses. Thereafter I prepared a seizure memo for the same.
M.O.I already marked is the said mobile handsets having duel SIM
No.7407375856 ( Vodafone ) make Micromax and SIM No.
9749592159 (Reliance ) and M.O. II already marked is the said
mobile phone (spiece) (sic) without SIM. Exbt.12 already marked is
the seizure memo prepared in respect of M.O.I and M.O.II
Exbt.12(a) and Exbt.12(b) are the signatures of the seizure
witnesses Hemraj Gurung and Dhan Singh Subba respectively on
the same which I identity. Exbt.12(c) is my signature on the same.”
61. The evidence brought forth by the prosecution does not
convincingly establish the seizure of the said mobile phones from
the Appellant. Both the seizure witnesses would depose that the
mobile phones were already at the table of the Investigating
Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) and therefore didn’t know from
whom they were seized. The prosecution has led no evidence to
establish the said mobile phones belonged to the Appellant. The
finding of the learned Sessions Judge that the Appellant could not
demolish that the two mobile phones was his and that calls were
made from the said mobiles by him within the reach of Melli Turuk
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
and Turung tower and adjoining area of National Highway is
perverse. It is evident that the learned Sessions Judge has in
blatant disregard to the fundamentals of criminal jurisprudence
and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 put the entire burden of proof
to establish his innocence upon the Appellant.
62. Property seizure memo (exhibit-24) dated 23.12.2013 would
reflect seizure of one Nokia mobile phone with battery bearing SIM
no.8145153105 from Mahendra Poudyal (P.W.12) at the Ranipool
Police Station in the presence of a solitary seizure witness Sancha
Raj Subba (P.W.26).
63. Mahendra Poudyal (P.W.12) did not speak a word about the
property seizure memo (exhibit-24) or the seizure.
64. The Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) would
however state:
“Further during investigation it is found that one Nokia Mobile
phone bearing SIM No 8145153105 IMEI No.356930033143544
belonging to the accused Som Nath was given to Chandra Kala
Sharma. The same was seized from the possession of Shri
Mahendra Poudyal as it was snatched from the Chandra Kala
Sharma by him. Accordingly I prepared a seizure memo for the
same. M.O.V already marked is the said Nokia mobile phone.
Exbt.24 already marked is the said seizure memo prepared in
respect of M.O.V Exbt.24 (a) already marked is the signature of
witness Sancha Raj Subba which I identify. Exbt.24(b) is my
signature on the same. On checking the text message in M.O.V it
was found that on 19.12.2013 at around 1600 hours Chandra
Kala Sharma had sent text message “Amoi Lai ajai site lagako” to
the accused.”
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
65. In cross-examination the Investigating Officer-Mahendra
Subba (P.W.28) would admit:
“... It is true that one mobile phone of Nokia bearing SIM No.
8145153105, IMEI No.569300 33143544 was not seized from the
possession of Chandra Kala Sharma. It is true that Mahendra
Poudyal has not stated in his 161 statement that the aforesaid
Nokia mobile had given to him by Chandra Kala Sharma.”
66. The evidence of the Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba
(P.W.28) that during investigation it was found that one Nokia
mobile phone belonging to the accused Som Nath was given to
Chandra Kala Sharma cannot be accepted as evidence as it is the
result of investigation by him. The best evidence of what
Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) stated regarding
the seizure of the said Nokia mobile phone from Mahendra
Poudyal (P.W.12) would have been the said Mahendra Poudyal
(P.W.12). Admittedly, Mahendra Poudyal (P.W.12) said nothing
about the seizure. The fact that the Investigating Officer-Mahendra
Subba (P.W.28) admitted that Mahendra Poudyal (P.W.12) had not
stated that the Nokia mobile phone was given to Chandra Kala
Sharma by the Appellant even in his statement recorded under
Section 161 Cr.P.C makes his evidence not only doubtful but also
unbelievable.
67. The seizure witness Sancha Raj Subba (P.W.26) would state:
“That on 23.12.2013 police seized one Nokia mobile phone of
accused Somnath Sharma from the possession of Mahendra
Poudyal in my presence at Ranipool P.S. Thereafter police prepared
the seizure memo for the same. (At this stage, the sealed packet
containing material exhibits has been opened by the prosecution in
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
the presence of defence and the witness is confronted with the
same) M.O.V is the said mobile phone. Exhibit-24 is the said
seizure memo prepared in respect of M.O.V. and Exhibit-24(a) is my
signature on the same.”
68. In the cross-examination of Sancha Raj Subba (P.W.26) he
would admit:
“It is true that on the relevant day I went to Ranipool Thana as I
was called by the brother of the deceased Mahendra Poudyal. It is
true that when I reached Ranipool Thana, M.O.V was already at
the table of P.I. Mahendra Subba. It is true that I do not know from
where the police had recovered and seized the said mobile phone
which was lying at the table of P.I. Mahendra Subba. It is true that
M.O.V. does not bear any identification mark not does it bear my
signature. It is true that M.O.V was not packed and sealed in my
presence. It is true that apart from me, no other person had signed
in Exhibit-24 in my presence. It is true that contents of Exhibit-24
was not read over and explained to me by the police. It is true that
police did not record my 161 statement in the present case. It is not
a fact that I am deposing falsely.”
69. The solitary seizure witness has quite candidly admitted that
he does not know from whom and where the police recovered the
said Nokia mobile phone which was lying on the table of the
Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28).
Evidently the
prosecution had failed to establish that the said Nokia mobile
phone was seized from Mahendra Poudyal (P.W. 12) leave alone
the fact that the said mobile phone belonged to the Appellant and
that it was snatched from Chandra Kala Sharma by him. The
learned Sessions Judge would quite correctly disbelieve the
evidence of the Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28)
regarding the text message sent from the said mobile phone but
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
would go on to hold that the evidence tendered by him against the
Appellant had remained firm and could not be demolished despite
lengthy cross-examination. The learned Sessions Judge failed to
appreciate that the Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28)
was not a witness to the crime and he was in fact the Investigating
Officer of the case. The learned Sessions Judge thus failed to
appreciate that the result of investigation can never be accepted as
substantive evidence. It would be trite to reiterate what the
Supreme Court had held in re: Vijender v. State of Delhi11.
“25. We are constrained to say that the above observations have
been made by the trial Judge casting away the basic principles
regarding reception and appreciation of evidence, and misreading
the evidence. ............. The reliance of the trial Judge on the result
of investigation to base his findings is again patently wrong. If the
observation of the trial Judge in this regard is taken to its logical
conclusion it would mean that a finding of guilt can be recorded
against an accused without a trial, relying solely upon the police
report submitted under Section 173 CrPC, which is the outcome of
an investigation. The result of investigation under Chapter XII of
the Criminal Procedure Code is a conclusion that an Investigating
Officer
draws
on
the
basis
of
materials
collected
during
investigation and such conclusion can only form the basis of a
competent court to take cognizance thereupon under Section
190(1)(b) CrPC and to proceed with the case for trial, where the
materials collected during investigation are to be translated into
legal evidence. The trial court is then required to base its conclusion
solely on the evidence adduced during the trial; and it cannot rely
on the investigation or the result thereof. Since this is an
elementary principle of criminal law, we need not dilate on this
point any further. Equally unsustainable is the trial Judge's
reliance upon the statement made by Jeetu (PW 2) before the police
in view of the express bar of Section 162 CrPC, which we have
(1997) 6 SCC 171
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
discussed earlier. Indeed, we find, the trial Judge placed strong
reliance on the purported statement made by Jitender before the
police that they (the appellants) were hiding and that they were
involved in kidnapping and murder of Khurshid to convict them.”
70. Anand Munda (P.W.10) would be the star witness of the
prosecution. Great emphasis would be given to his evidence by Mr.
Karma Thinlay during the course of the final arguments. Anand
Munda (P.W.10) would depose:
“I know the accused Somnath Sharma present in the Court today.
That on 19.12.2013, accused Somnath Sharma and one girl came
to our Hotel Holiday at Melli Bazar, Sikkim. The accused Somnath
Sharma ordered two plates of vegetable momos. Accordingly, I
served the momos. After having momo, they paid the money and
left the Hotel.
Thereafter, I was called to Jail to identify the accused.
At Jail, I identified accused Somnath Sharma. Before identifying
the accused, I was examined by the officer there and signed one
document. Exhibit-9 is the said document which I signed and
Exhibit-9(a) is my signature on the same.”
71. In cross-examination the said Anand Munda (P.W.10) would
admit:
“......It is true that accused No.2 Chandra Kala Sharma did not
come to our Hotel on that relevant day. It is not a fact that the
accused was not accompanied by a lady but I cannot remember
her face as of now. ......”
72. Exhibit-9 identified by Anand Munda (P.W.10) was the
questionnaire put by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
(P.W.27) to him before conducting the Test Identification Parade on
03.02.2014. The then learned Chief Judicial Magistrate (P.W.27)
who conducted the Test Identification Parade on 03.02.2014
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
pursuant to the application for the same on 01.02.2014 (exhibit33)
would
exhibit
and
prove
the
memorandum
of
Test
Identification Parade (exhibit-34). As per the said memorandum
and the deposition of Suraj Chettri (P.W.27) the said Anand
Munda (P.W.10) positively identified the Appellant on three
occasions. The identification of the Appellant by Anand Munda
(P.W.10) was after 1 month and 15 days.
73. The identification of the Appellant by Anand Munda (P.W.10)
as the person who had on 19.12.2013 come to Hotel Holiday at
Melli Bazar, Sikkim with one girl, ordered two plates of vegetable
“momos” and after having the said “momos” paid and left the hotel
cannot be doubted. However, the prosecution has failed to
establish the identity of the girl who had accompanied the
Appellant on 19.12.2013. The prosecution has also failed to
establish whether after leaving the said hotel the Appellant along
with the said girl proceeded towards the place of occurrence or
otherwise. “Suspicion, however grave, cannot be a satisfactory
basis for convicting an accused person”. This is a settled principle.
74. In re: Datar Singh v. State of Punjab12 the Supreme Court
would hold:
“3. It is often difficult for courts of law to arrive at the real truth in
criminal cases. The judicial process can only operate on the firm
foundations of actual and credible evidence on record. Mere
suspicion
(1975) 4 SCC 272
or
suspicious
circumstances
cannot
relieve
the
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
prosecution of its primary duty of proving its case against an
accused person beyond reasonable doubt. Courts of justice cannot
be swayed by sentiment or prejudice against a person accused of
the very reprehensible crime of patricide., They cannot even act on
some conviction that an accused person has committed a crime
unless his offence is proved by satisfactory evidence of it on record.
If the pieces of evidence on which the prosecution chooses to rest
its case are so brittle that they crumble when subjected to close
and critical examination so that the whole superstructure built on
such insecure foundations collapses, proof of some incriminating
circumstances, which might have given support to merely defective
evidence cannot avert a failure of the prosecution case.
4. After having been taken through the evidence on record we have
come to the conclusion that the superstructure of the prosecution
case is based on the testimony of two alleged eyewitnesses whose
evidence is not only of an inherently unreliable nature but the
artificial and incredible versions of the shooting put forward by
them are too unnatural to be accepted. It seems to us to be quite
unsafe to convict the appellant on their testimony despite some
circumstances which raise grave suspicion against the appellant.
Suspicion, however grave, cannot be a satisfactory basis for
convicting an accused person. We will, therefore, examine the
evidence of these two witnesses and set out our reasons for finding
them quite unreliable and deal with other questions mentioned
above in the course of an examination of evidence the credibility of
which is assailed.”
75. To apply the last seen theory it is necessary to establish that
the Appellant was last seen with the deceased. The evidence put
forth by the prosecution falls short of establishing the fact. The
oral evidence of Anand Munda (P.W.10) corroborated by the Test
Identification of the Appellant by him although establishes that
the Appellant was seen with a girl at the Hotel Holiday, Melli on
19.12.2013 it is not established that he was seen with the
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
deceased.
The Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28)
admits in cross-examination that:
“It is true that there is no witness to prove that the accused
Som Nath Sharma and his wife deceased Nabika Sharma had
proceeded beyond Rangpo Checkpost. It is true that witness Anand
Munda had not stated in his 161 statement where the accused and
his deceased wife Nabika Sharma had proceeded after having
momos from his hotel.”
76. The learned Sessions Judge failed to appreciate that the
prosecution had not been able to legally prove that the Appellant
had in fact travelled through Rangpo check post towards the place
of occurrence by producing legally tenable evidence. The learned
Sessions Judge finding about call detail records showing the
Appellant’s location within the reach of Melli-Turuk-Turung tower
was made solely on the oral evidence of the relatives of the
deceased which was not permissible in law. The prosecution has
not even been able to prove conclusively the seizure of the mobile
phones or the said vehicle bearing registration no.SK-01-P-6697
from the Appellant leave alone prove that the said mobile phones
and the said vehicle were used by the Appellant on the relevant
day.
77. The alleged incident is of 19.12.2013. The learned Sessions
Judge has due to the positive identification of the Appellant by
Anand Munda (P.W.10) as the one who had eaten vegetable
“momos” along with the girl at Hotel Holiday in Melli and the
recovery of the dead body of the deceased invoked the last seen
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
theory and found the Appellant guilty. Contrarily, as held above,
Anand Munda (P.W.10) did not identify the deceased as the same
girl who was with the Appellant on 19.12.2013 at Melli. Normally,
last seen theory comes into play where the time gap, between the
point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last
alive and when the deceased is found dead, is so small that
possibility of any person other than the accused being the
perpetrator of the crime becomes impossible. The time gap
between 19.12.2013 and 24.12.2013 is five days. There is no
explanation as to what transpired in the interregnum. Sajan
Tamang who first saw the dead body and informed the police not
being examined it cannot be safely concluded that in between the
period there was no possibility of any person other than the
Appellant being the perpetrator of the crime. The circumstance of
last seen theory cannot therefore be pressed against the Appellant.
(viii) The disclosure statement recorded under Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
78. In re: Pulukuri Kottaya and others v. The King Emperor13 the
Privy Council would hold:
“10. Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides
an exception to the prohibition imposed by the preceding section,
and enables certain statements made by a person in police custody
to be proved. The condition necessary to bring the section into
operation is that the discovery of a fact in consequence of
information received from a person accused of any offence in the
1946 SCC OnLine PC 47
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
custody of a Police officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so
much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered may be proved. The section seems to be based on the
view that if a fact is actually discovered in conesquence of
information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the
information was true, and accordingly can be safely allowed to be
given in evidence; but clearly the extent of the information
admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered
to which such information is required to relate. Normally the section
is brought into operation when a person in police custody produces
from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body,
a weapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of
which the informant is accused. Mr. Megaw, for the Crown, has
argued that in such a case the “fact discovered” is the physical
object produced, and that any information which relates distinctly
to that object can be proved. Upon this view information given by a
person that the body produced is that of a person murdered by
him, that the weapon produced is the one used by him in the
commission of a murder, or that the ornaments produced were
stolen in a dacoity would all be admissible. If this be the effect of
section 27, little substance would remain in the ban imposed by
the two preceding sections on confessions made to the police, or by
persons in police custody. That ban was presumably inspired by
the fear of the legislature that a person under police influence
might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But
if all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the
confession of information relating to an object subsequently
produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive
powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in
practice the ban will lose its effect. On normal principles of
construction their Lordships think that the proviso to section 26,
added by section 27, should not be held to nullify the substance of
the section. In their Lordships' view it is fallacious to treat the “fact
discovered” within the section as equivalent to the object produced;
the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is
produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the
information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as
to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not
related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered.
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a
knife concealed in the roof of my house” does not lead to the
discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It
leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the
house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved
to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact
discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be
added “with which I stabbed A” these words are inadmissible
since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of
the informant.”
79. In re: Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan14 and Salim Akhtar v.
State of U.P.15
the Supreme Court would reiterate the same
principle.
80. In re: Aslam Parwez v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi16 the Supreme Court
would hold:
“11. Aslam Parwez has been convicted under Section 5 of
the TADA on the ground that he made a disclosure statement on 35-1988 to the effect that A-1 had given him a revolver on 8-9-1989
which he had concealed near the building which was being
constructed opposite the factory and that the said revolver was
recovered by him after digging out the earth. It may be stated at
the very outset that the evidence on record does not show that any
effort was made by the police party to have any public witness
with them when A-4 took them to the spot on 3-5-1988, where the
revolver is alleged to have been recovered. Only two witnesses,
namely, PW 10 Ram Narain, Head Constable and PW 14 Surinder
Kumar, SI, who are both police personnel, have deposed about the
aforesaid recovery. The recovery has been made after 8 months
and that too from an open place which was by the side of a
building under construction. The recovery has not been made from
any closed or concealed place but from an open place which is
(2004) 10 SCC 657
(2003) 5 SCC 499
(2003) 9 SCC 141
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
accessible to all and everyone including those who were engaged
in the construction of the building.”
81. In re: State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu17 the Supreme Court
would advert to all the previous decisions and restate the legal
position thus:
“121. The first requisite condition for utilising Section 27 in
support of the prosecution case is that the investigating police
officer should depose that he discovered a fact in consequence of
the information received from an accused person in police custody.
Thus, there must be a discovery of fact not within the knowledge of
police officer as a consequence of information received. Of course, it
is axiomatic that the information or disclosure should be free from
any element of compulsion. The next component of Section 27
relates to the nature and extent of information that can be proved.
It is only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact
thereby discovered that can be proved and nothing more. It is
explicitly clarified in the section that there is no taboo against
receiving such information in evidence merely because it amounts
to a confession. At the same time, the last clause makes it clear
that it is not the confessional part that is admissible but it is only
such information or part of it, which relates distinctly to the fact
discovered by means of the information furnished. Thus, the
information conveyed in the statement to the police ought to be
dissected if necessary so as to admit only the information of the
nature mentioned in the section. The rationale behind this provision
is that, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the
information
supplied,
it
affords
some
guarantee
that
the
information is true and can therefore be safely allowed to be
admitted in evidence as an incriminating factor against the
accused. As pointed out by the Privy Council in Kottaya case [AIR
1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] : (AIR p. 70, para 10)
“clearly the extent of the information admissible must
depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered”
and the information must distinctly relate to that fact.
(2005) 11 SCC 600
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
Elucidating the scope of this section, the Privy Council
speaking through Sir John Beaumont said: (AIR p. 70, para 10)
“Normally the section is brought into operation when a
person in police custody produces from some place of concealment
some object, such as a dead body, a weapon, or ornaments, said to
be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
We have emphasised the word “normally” because the
illustrations given by the learned Judge are not exhaustive. The
next point to be noted is that the Privy Council rejected the
argument of the counsel appearing for the Crown that the fact
discovered is the physical object produced and that any and every
information which relates distinctly to that object can be proved.
Upon this view, the information given by a person that the weapon
produced is the one used by him in the commission of the murder
will be admissible in its entirety. Such contention of the Crown's
counsel was emphatically rejected with the following words: (AIR
p. 70, para 10)
“If this be the effect of Section 27, little substance would
remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding sections on
confessions made to the police, or by persons in police custody.
That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the legislature
that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by
the exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the
ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an
object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that
the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion,
and that in practice the ban will lose its effect.”
Then, Their Lordships proceeded to give a lucid exposition of
the expression “fact discovered” in the following passage, which is
quoted time and again by this Court: (AIR p. 70, para 10)
“In Their Lordships' view it is fallacious to treat the ‘fact
discovered’ within the section as equivalent to the object produced;
the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is
produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the
information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as
to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not
related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered.
Information supplied by a person in custody that ‘I will produce a
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
knife concealed in the roof of my house’ does not lead to the
discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It
leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the
house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved
to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact
discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be
added ‘with which I stabbed A’ these words are inadmissible since
they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the
informant.”
(emphasis supplied)
122. The approach of the Privy Council in the light of the
above exposition of law can best be understood by referring to the
statement made by one of the accused to the police officer. It reads
thus: (AIR p. 71, para 13)
“… About 14 days ago, I, Kottaya and people of my party lay
in wait for Sivayya and others at about sunset time at the corner of
Pulipad tank. We, all beat Beddupati China Sivayya and Subayya,
to death. The remaining persons, Pullayya, Kottaya and Narayana
ran away. Dondapati Ramayya who was in our party received
blows on his hands. He had a spear in his hands. He gave it to me
then. I hid it and my stick in the rick of Venkatanarasu in the
village. I will show if you come. We did all this at the instigation of
Pulukuri Kottaya.”
The Privy Council held that: (AIR p. 71, para 14)
“14. The whole of that statement except the passage ‘I hid it
(a spear) and my stick in the rick of Venkatanarasu in the village. I
will show if you come’ is inadmissible.”
(emphasis supplied)
There is another important observation at para 11 which
needs to be noticed. The Privy Council explained the probative force
of the information made admissible under Section 27 in the
following words: (AIR p. 71)
“Except in cases in which the possession, or concealment, of
an object constitutes the gist of the offence charged, it can seldom
happen that information relating to the discovery of a fact forms the
foundation of the prosecution case. It is only one link in the chain of
proof, and the other links must be forged in manner allowed by
law.”
xxxxxxxxxxxx
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Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
125. We are of the view that Kottaya case [AIR 1947 PC 67 :
48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] is an authority for the proposition that
“discovery of fact” cannot be equated to the object produced or
found. It is more than that. The discovery of fact arises by reason
of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the
knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its
existence at a particular place.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
127. The crux of the ratio in Kottaya case [AIR 1947 PC 67 :
48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] was explained by this Court in State of
Maharashtra v. Damu [(2000) 6 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1088] .
Thomas J. observed that: (SCC p. 283, para 35)
“The decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya v.
Emperor [AIR 1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] is the most
quoted authority for supporting the interpretation that the ‘fact
discovered’ envisaged in the section embraces the place from
which the object was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to
it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect.”
In Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra [(1976) 1 SCC
828 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 199] , Sarkaria, J. while clarifying that the
expression “fact discovered” in Section 27 is not restricted to a
physical or material fact which can be perceived by the senses,
and that it does include a mental fact, explained the meaning by
giving the gist of what was laid down in Pulukuri Kottaya case
[AIR 1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] . The learned Judge,
speaking for the Bench observed thus: (SCC p. 832, para 13)
“Now it is fairly settled that the expression ‘fact discovered’
includes not only the physical object produced, but also the place
from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to
this (see Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor [AIR 1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ
533 : 74 IA 65] ; Udai Bhan v. State of U.P. [1962 Supp (2) SCR 830
: AIR 1962 SC 1116 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 251] ).”
128. So also in Udai Bhan v. State of U.P. [1962 Supp (2)
SCR 830 : AIR 1962 SC 1116 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 251] J.L. Kapur, J.
after referring to Kottaya case [AIR 1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74
IA 65] stated the legal position as follows: (SCR p. 837)
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
“A discovery of a fact includes the object found, the place
from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to
its existence.”
The above statement of law does not run counter to the
contention of Mr Ram Jethmalani, that the factum of discovery
combines both the physical object as well as the mental
consciousness of the informant accused in relation thereto.
However, what would be the position if the physical object was not
recovered at the instance of the accused was not discussed in any
of these cases.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
141. We need not delve further into this aspect as we are of
the view that another ingredient of the section, namely, that the
information provable should relate distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered is not satisfied, as we see later, when we refer to the
circumstances against some of the accused.
142. There is one more point which we would like to discuss
i.e. whether pointing out a material object by the accused
furnishing the information is a necessary concomitant of Section
27. We think that the answer should be in the negative. Though in
most of the cases the person who makes the disclosure himself
leads the police officer to the place where an object is concealed
and points out the same to him, however, it is not essential that
there should be such pointing out in order to make the information
admissible under Section 27. It could very well be that on the basis
of information furnished by the accused, the investigating officer
may go to the spot in the company of other witnesses and recover
the material object. By doing so, the investigating officer will be
discovering a fact viz. the concealment of an incriminating article
and the knowledge of the accused furnishing the information about
it. In other words, where the information furnished by the person in
custody is verified by the police officer by going to the spot
mentioned by the informant and finds it to be correct, that amounts
to discovery of fact within the meaning of Section 27. Of course, it
is subject to the rider that the information so furnished was the
immediate and proximate cause of discovery. If the police officer
chooses not to take the informant accused to the spot, it will have
no bearing on the point of admissibility under Section 27, though it
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Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
may be one of the aspects that goes into evaluation of that
particular piece of evidence.”
(emphasis supplied)
82. In re: Charandas Swami v. State of Gujarat18 the Supreme
Court would examine its various pronouncement on Section 27 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the said case the Courts below
had held that the accused therein had been last seen with the
deceased and that the deceased was not seen thereafter till his
dead body was found. This finding of the Courts below would be
upheld by the Supreme Court. The dead body of the deceased was
found in a burnt condition in a ditch behind a house. This fact was
revealed by the accused in his disclosure statement. Till the
disclosure was made by the accused the dead body which was
discovered was noted as that of an unknown person. The Supreme
Court would hold that if the accused had not disclosed about the
location of the dead body dumped by him to the Investigating
Officer then the investigation would not have made any headway.
83. Exhibit-3 is the disclosure statement of the Appellant. It is
recorded in Nepali. The date of the disclosure statement is
22.12.2013 and the time 1400 hours. It is recorded at the
Ranipool Police Station. The said disclosure statement bears the
signature of the Appellant as well as the signature of two witnesses
to the disclosure i.e. Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2) and Pema Chakki
Bhutia (P.W.3). Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2), as seen above, is
related to the deceased and Pema Chakki Bhutia (P.W.3) is Netra
(2017) 7 SCC 177
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Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
Devi Sharma’s (P.W.2) staff and thereafter their evidence must be
carefully examined although admissible. The confession of the
Appellant recorded in the disclosure statement (exhibit-3) heavily
relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge in the impugned
judgment to hold the Appellant guilty of murder is not admissible.
What is admissible is provided in Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in
consequence of information received from a person of any offence,
in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information,
whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to
the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Thus, for the
application of Section 27 the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 the
disclosure statement (exhibit-3) must be split into its components
to separate the admissible portion if duly proved. Only those
components or portions which were the immediate cause of the
discovery may be proved. The rest of the portions must be
eliminated from consideration. In so doing the only portion of the
disclosure statement (exhibit-3) which may be proved is, as
translated “I can show the place I pushed my wife and I can also
show the body of my wife if it has not been carried away by the
river” after discarding the underlined portion. The words in the
above disclosure statement “I pushed my wife” are inadmissible
since they do not relate to the discovery of the body of the
deceased. Now it would be relevant to examine whether the fact
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
was discovered pursuant to the purported disclosure statement
dated 22.12.2013 made by the Appellant.
84. Both Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2) and Pema Chakki Bhutia
(P.W.3) would depose that the Appellant gave a statement to the
police in their presence that he had pushed his wife from “Jalewa
Bhir”. This statement of the Appellant that he pushed his wife from
“Jalewa Bhir” is not recorded in the disclosure statement (exhibit3). Even the Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) would
not depose about “Jalewa Bhir”. Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2) and
the Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) would all
depose that when, pursuant to the disclosure statement (exhibit3), they went to “Jalewa Bhir” they could not discover the body
there. Pema Chakki Bhutia (P.W.3) would admit that she did not
visit the place of occurrence and had no idea as to where the police
recovered the body from. Neither Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2) nor
the Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) deposed that
the Appellant had in fact disclosed that he could show the place
from where he had pushed the deceased.
85. The Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) would not
depose that he discovered the dead body in consequence of the
information received from the Appellant when he was in police
custody which is the first ingredient of Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872.
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Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
86. The dead body was recovered on 24.12.2013 two days after
the
recording
of
the
disclosure
statement
(exhibit-3)
on
22.12.2013. The Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28)
would also candidly state that on the basis of the disclosure
statement of the Appellant they made a thorough search with
constable man power and river rafters in the river Teesta but could
not recover the dead body of the deceased. Mr. N. Rai would thus
submit that the requirements of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 had not been satisfied by the prosecution as no
discovery of the dead body of the deceased was admittedly made
on 22.12.2013 when pursuant to the purported disclosure
statement the Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28)
proceeded to “Jalewa Bhir” at Melli.
87. The disclosure statement which is in “Nepali” does not
mention “Jalewa Bhir” anywhere. The said disclosure statement
does however disclose that the Appellant had proceeded from Melli
Sikkim towards the West Bengal side where he pushed the
deceased towards the Teesta river. The disclosure statement also
records that the Appellant had stated that he could show the place
as well as the body of the deceased if it had not been carried away
by the river.
88. The dead body of the deceased would be stated to have been
discovered on 24.12.2013 at 8.40 a.m. by one Sajan Tamang of
Melli Bazar, South Sikkim. Two inquests would be conducted on
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Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
the dead body. One pursuant to the FIR and the other pursuant to
a purported UD case registered. As per the inquest report (exhibit21) dated 24.12.2013 conducted at 12.30 p.m. the dead body
would be found in a “cave at the river bank of Teesta river”. No
further details regarding the exact location of the dead body are
available in the said inquest report (exhibit-21). The second
inquest report (Exhibit-4) would record that the dead body was
found in “cave on the river bank of river Teesta below power colony
dara, South direction from the P.S.”. There would be two witnesses
named in both the inquests i.e. Bishnu Neopaney and Lachuman
Bhattarai. Both the said witnesses would not be examined. In fact
they have not even been named in the final report. Both the
inquest reports (exhibit-4 and exhibit-21) would record that the
information regarding the finding of the dead body would be given
by Sajan Tamang. Strangely again Sajan Tamang would not be
examined. The inquest report (exhibit-4) would record that the
dead body was inspected and identified by Deepak Sharma (P.W.1)
and the Appellant. Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) would say nothing
about it in his deposition. Neither the documents relating to UD
Case no. 16/2013 except the inquest report (exhibit-4) nor Police
Inspector-Karma Chedup Bhutia who is set to have registered the
said UD case would be produced before the Court. Both the
inquest reports (exhibit-4 and exhibit-21) would bear the same
time and date although Sub-Inspector-Santosh Kumar Rai (P.W.7)
who conducted the inquest (exhibit-21) would state in his
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Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
deposition that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Jorethang, Tenzing
Dorjee (P.W.24) who had conducted the inquest (exhibit-4) had
come to the spot after he conducted the inquest.
89. Sub-Inspector-Santosh Kumar Rai (P.W.7) would state that
when he reached the spot where he conducted the inquest and
saw the dead body he realized that it matched the description of
the deceased given in the hue and cry message dated 23.12.2013
from the Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28). The hue
and cry message dated 23.12.2013 has, however, not been
exhibited neither by Sub-Inspector-Santosh Kumar Rai (P.W.7) nor
by Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28). He would admit
that he did not know as to how the dead body was lying at the
bank of river Teesta and that his entry in column of the inquest
report (exhibit-4) stating: “fall from a height” was only on his
assumption.
90.
The dead body of the deceased would be found lying
underneath a big boulder in sitting position, both legs half bent,
hands lying straight, face towards right facing the Teesta river and
both eyes closed. Rigor mortis would have developed. Two teeth
would be missing. The left side of the skull would be cracked about
two inches above left eye, the mouth would be semi open. There
would be no injuries on the neck or the chest. The shoulder and
right hand would have scratch marks. The skin layer, two inches
below the left elbow would be removed. The right leg would be
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
fractured below the knee. The left leg would have fractured ankle
and skin abrasion. There would be punctured injury one inch deep
and seven inches in diameter on the back. There would also be
injury on the left buttock. Some sand particles would be attached
to the dead body which would be discovered in semi deteriorated
condition.
91. Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) who has been named in the inquest
report (exhibit-4) as one of the person who identified the dead body
as that of the deceased spoke nothing about it in his deposition.
The other person named therein is the Appellant-the accused.
92. Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2) who was not named in either of
the inquest reports (P.W.2) would state that on 24.12.2013 she
was informed that the dead body of a girl was found on the river
bank below Melli PHC and she went with her husband-Ishwar
Prasad Sharma, Kedar Nath Sharma (P.W.15) (her younger
paternal uncle) and Mahendra Sharma (her husband’s elder
brother). Ishwar Prasad Sharma has neither been named in the
final report nor examined by the prosecution. Kedar Nath Sharma
(P.W.15) also didn’t throw any light on this aspect. One Mahendra
Poudyal (P.W.12) son of Kedar Nath Sharma has been examined by
the prosecution. There is no evidence that he is the same person
named by Netra Devi Sharma (P.W.2) as Mahendra Sharma. In any
case Mahendra Poudyal (P.W.12) also didn’t say a word about the
identification of the dead body.
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Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
93. Pema Chakki Bhutia (P.W.3), staff of Netra Devi Sharma
would state in her deposition that the dead body was recovered
from the bank of river Teesta. However, in cross-examination she
would admit that she had not visited the place of occurrence
personally and had no idea from where the police had recovered
the dead body. She also admitted that she came to know that the
dead body was of the deceased through the relatives.
94. The prosecution case that after completion of the post
mortem examination the dead body was handed over to the
relatives for disposal would sought to be proved by the handing
and taking memo of dead body (exhibit-5). Sub-Inspector-Santosh
Kumar Rai (P.W.7) would exhibit the said handing and taking
memo (exhibit-5) and state that after the post mortem he along
with the Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) had
handed over the dead body of the deceased to Indralall Sharma
(P.W.5) and their relatives. Indralall Sharma (P.W.5) would state
nothing about the handing over of the body of the deceased to him.
The said handing and taking memo would be purportedly signed
by seven persons in token of having received the dead body. Four
out of the seven would not be examined by the prosecution. The
rest of the prosecution witnesses would not identify their
signatures or prove the handing and taking memo (exhibit-5).
Deepak Sharma (P.W.1), Puspa Lal Kafley (P.W.11) and Indralall
Sharma (P.W.5) would not even speak about the handing and
taking over of the dead body of the deceased.
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
95.
Puspa Lal Kafley (P.W.11) would state that on 24.12.2013
he received a call from the police personnel of Ranipool Police
Station stating that one dead body was found near the river bank
near Yuksom Breweries, Melli and accordingly they rushed to the
place and found the dead body lying near the river bank of the
river Teesta below Yuksom Breweries and identified it to be of the
deceased. As per his deposition the Appellant also identified the
dead body. In cross-examination he would admit that he did not
know as to how the dead body of the deceased was lying on the
river bank of Teesta.
96. The Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) would
depose that on 24.12.2013 at around 800 hours he received
information from the Station House Officer, Melli Police Station
informing about the unidentified female dead body recovered at the
bank of river Teesta below Yuksom Breweries. He would also state
that the brother of the deceased Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) and the
relatives were informed and then he went to the place where he
found the dead body. According to Investigating Officer-Mahendra
Subba (P.W.28) it was the brother of the deceased-Deepak Sharma
(P.W.1) who along with the Appellant identified the dead body as
that of the deceased at the place of occurrence.
97. The evidence of a vital witness who is said to have seen the
dead body first lying near the bank of river Teesta near Melli,
South Sikkim
has been withheld from the Court with no
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Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
explanation. Police Inspector-Karma Chedup Bhutia who is said to
have registered the UD Case No. 16 of 2013 was also not
examined. The fact that the investigation for the search of the dead
body of the deceased was directed towards Melli after the
disclosure statement would have been relevant. However, Sajan
Tamang the most crucial witness who had admittedly discovered
the dead body having not been examined how and under what
circumstances the dead body was discovered by him remains
unexplained. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the
dead body of the deceased was discovered in consequence of
information received from the Appellant.
98. The evidence of the prosecution fall short of the quality of
evidence required in a criminal case. The only person who
identified the dead body found at bank of river Teesta was Puspa
Lal Kafley (P.W.11). The inquest reports do not name him as the
person who identified the dead body. The Investigating Officer
(P.W.28) also throws no light upon this evidence. Even if this Court
were to believe the evidence of Puspa Lal Kafley (P.W.11) to be true
it is certain that there is no evidence to show that the discovery of
the dead body at the bank of river Teesta near Yuksom Breweries,
Melli on 24.12.2013 was in consequence of the information
received from the Appellant in custody of a police officer as
required under the mandate of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 to make it provable and held against the Appellant.
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
(ix)
The filing of the false missing report by the Appellant,
inconsistent and contradictory statement of the Appellant
regarding the whereabouts of the deceased along with his
conduct-tearing
of
the
deceased
face
from
her
photographs, false plea of the Appellant having lost his
wallet along with the key of the box belonging to the
deceased.
(x)
The making of calls to various relatives inquiring about
the whereabouts of the deceased by the Appellant and
misleading his parents, relatives and the police.
(xi)
The failure of the Appellant to satisfactorily explain the
circumstances appearing against him during his
examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
99. The learned Sessions Judge would hold that the Appellant
was liable to be convicted for lodging false missing report despite
the knowledge that he had committed the murder of his wife and
mislead the police and relatives of the deceased with the intention
of screening himself under Section 201 IPC and also sentenced
him to undergo simple imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs.5000/(Rupees five thousand) only and in default to further undergo three
months of simple imprisonment.
100. Section 201 IPC provides:
“201. Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or
giving false information to screen offender. - whoever, knowing or
having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, causes any
evidence of the Commission of that offence to disappear, with the
intension of screening the offender from legal punishment, or with the
intention gives any information respecting the offence which he knows or
believes to be false.”
101. The ingredient of the offence of giving false information would
be the knowledge of commission of the offence and thereafter
giving false information respecting the offence.
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Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
102. Exhibit-10 is the General Diary (G.D.) extract taken from
Ranipool Police Station General Diary page no. 016 serial number
147 dated 19.12.2013 at 2100 hours. The entry records that:
“At this noted hours, on missing diary report received from Som
Nath Sharma of upper Aho A/P near Tendong Petrol Pump Ranipool
E/Sikkim, mentioning that his wife Nebika Sharma, having falling
description is missing since today on 19.12.2013 from his
residence.
D/R. Name Nebikak Sharma, age 25 years, height 5 ft,
complexion fair. Accordingly same detailed has been informed to
Rangpo checkpost and 32 no. police booth for N/A.
Noted.
Sd/- Kesar Bdr. Basnett
NK 2128”
103. Exhibit-11 is the General Diary extract taken from Ranipool
Police Station General Diary page no. 30 serial number 152 dated
20.12.2013 at 0850 hours. The entry records that:
“A written missing report was received from one Som Nath Sharma
of Aho Busty A/P Ranipool Bazar mentioning that her (sic) wife
having following descriptions is missing since 19/12/2013 from
home. D/R name Nebika Sharma age 25 years, height 5 ft,
complexion fair, accordingly hue and cry msg. flashed to all S.H.O.
and ICS, Talash system made and despatched.
Noted in G.D.
Sd/-
H/C Tshering Topgay Bhutia.”
104. Keshar Bahadur Basnett (P.W.16) was examined. He would
depose that on 19.12.2013 at around 9.00 p.m. the Appellant
came to Ranipool P.S. and verbally informed him that his wife had
been missing since morning. He deposed that he had asked the
Appellant for a photograph of the missing person and as he did not
have it he asked the Appellant to bring the photograph the next
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
day and accordingly he made the G.D. entry.
Keshar Bahadur
Basnett (P.W.16) would further depose that on the next day at
around 8.30 p.m. the Appellant came to the police station with the
details of the missing person and the photograph of the missing
person and accordingly G.D. entry was made and thereafter hue
and cry messages were sent. He exhibited the G.D. entry dated
19.12.2013 (exhibit-10) as well as G.D. entry dated 20.12.2013
(exhibit-11). Tshering Topgay Bhutia whose name is reflected as
the one who made the G.D. entry dated 20.12.2013 (exhibit-11)
was not examined. It must be noticed that the two G.D. entries
(exhibit-10 and exhibit-11) are in the same handwriting although
G.D. entry dated 20.12.2013 (exhibit-11) mentions the name of
Tshering Topgay Bhutia as the signatory to the said entry. Keshar
Bahadur Basnett (P.W.16) did not clarify anything about G.D.
entry dated 20.12.2013 (exhibit-11) and about Tshering Topgay
Bhutia. The purported written missing report made by the
Appellant made to Tshering Topgay Bhutia on 20.12.2013
pursuant to which Tshering Topgay Bhutia is said to have made
the General Diary entry is not placed before the Court. The failure
of the prosecution to produce and prove the purported written
missing report purportedly made by the Appellant would leave only
the two G.D. extract of the entries (exhibit-10 and exhibit-11) for
considering the correctness of the said extracts made by Police
Officers in the General Diary which diary was also not produced.
The person who is said to have made the entry (exhibit-11) was
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
also not examined. The prosecution has thus failed to cogently
prove that the Appellant had lodged a false missing report
intentionally to screen himself from legal punishment after
commission of the alleged offence of murder. The prosecution has
also failed to cogently prove that the Appellant had made
inconsistent and contradictory statements.
105. Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) the brother of the deceased would
depose that on 20.12.2013 he had visited the house of the
Appellant after being informed that on 19.12.2013 the deceased
had not returned home. He would also depose that when he
inquired the Appellant had stated that the deceased had no
misunderstanding with him. He would state that he went with his
uncle Kedarnath to the Ranipool Police Station and when they
returned they looked for photographs of the deceased for printing
it in the newspaper to publish a missing report and had found 1314 photographs of the deceased with her face torn off. As per his
deposition they would ask the Appellant as to why the face was
torn off from the photographs. The Appellant would feign
ignorance.
He would further depose that on the next day i.e.
21.12.2013 Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) along with Kedarnath Sharma
(P.W.15) and his son Mahendra Sharma had first gone to the
Ranipool Police Station after which they went to the Appellant’s
house and demanded the torn photographs from the Appellant.
Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) would depose that the Appellant had
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
already concealed the same and refused to give it to them and even
denied having seen the said photographs.
106. Kedarnath Sharma (P.W.15) would depose nothing about the
torn photographs.
107. Mahendra Poudyal (P.W.12) would depose that on 20.12.2013
after receiving a call from Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) he had gone to
the Appellant’s house at Ranipool and while searching the house
they found 7-8 numbers of single photographs of the deceased
which were all torn in two pieces inside the photograph album. He
would also depose that on the following day after returning from
the Ranipool Police Station they had gone back to the room of the
Appellant and had found to their utter surprise that the
photographs of the deceased including the torn photographs were
missing from the album. This fact was objected to by the defence
as the said fact was not stated in the statement recorder under
Section 161 Cr.P.C.
108. Whereas Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) would state that they had
seen 13-14 photographs of the deceased with her face torn off
Mahendra Poudyal (P.W.12) would state that they found 7-8
numbers of single photographs of the deceased which were all torn
in two pieces. The investigation however, did not go beyond this
and no attempt seems to have been made to recover the said
photographs or to find the truth regarding the same. In such
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
circumstances the story of the photographs of the deceased with
the face torn off would fail to be established by the prosecution.
109. Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) would also state that when they
returned from Turung to the house of the Appellant he told them
that he had broken open the box of the deceased on the night of
20.12.2013 and he had found that money was missing from there
along with some clothes and a pair of sandals belonging to the
deceased. Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) would further depose that when
he asked the Appellant as to who kept the keys of the box the
Appellant stated that both of them did but however, he had lost
the wallet where he had kept the key. The prosecution has led no
evidence to establish the falsity of the alleged statements said to
have been made by the Appellant to the relative of the deceased.
These statements if proved may have helped the prosecution to
corroborate
the
other
circumstances.
However,
the
other
circumstances not being proved as detailed above on its own, we
are afraid, these oral evidences would not help the prosecution in
establishing the guilt of the Appellant. More so when admittedly
they are oral evidences from the mouth of the relatives of the
deceased who attribute these admissions on the Appellant when
the Court is kept in the dark about the truth and veracity of these
statements of the Appellant. There is no evidence that the
purported statements made by the Appellant to the prosecution
witnesses were contradictory and inconsistent.
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
110. Deepak Sharma (P.W.1) would depose that the Appellant had
told him that he had left the house at around 10.00 a.m. and
therefore he did not know what time thereafter the deceased had
left.
111. Hema Sharma (P.W.4) is the mother of the Appellant.
According to her on 19.12.2013 at around 7.30 p.m. the Appellant
phoned her and inquired about his wife (the deceased) as to
whether she had come to the house or not to which she replied
that she had not. The Appellant also told her that after going for
her computer class at Ranipool she had not returned home.
112. Indralall Sharma (P.W.5) is the father of the Appellant.
According to him on 19.12.2013 at around 7.30 p.m. while they
were having dinner the Appellant phoned his wife Hema Sharma
(P.W.4). Hema Sharma (P.W.4) told him that the Appellant was
inquiring about whether his wife (the deceased) had come to the
house. Hema Sharma (P.W.4) also told him that the Appellant had
informed her that the deceased had not returned after her
computer class at Ranipool.
113. Puspa Lal Kafley (P.W.11) would depose that in the evening of
19.12.2013 at around 8.30 or 9.30 p.m. he received a call from the
Appellant asking whether the deceased had come to his house or
not and he had replied that she had not. Puspa Lal Kafley (P.W.11)
asked the Appellant as to where she had gone and in reply he told
him that he had gone to attend a computer class at Ranipool.
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
114. The aforesaid oral evidences would reflect that the Appellant
had made inquiries about the whereabouts of the deceased from
the said prosecution witnesses.
115. Mahendra Poudyal (P.W.12) would depose that on 20.12.2013
at around 7.30 a.m. or 8.00 a.m. he received a call from Deepak
Sharma (P.W.1) stating that the deceased had been missing since
19.12.2013. Hearing about it he went to the rented room of the
Appellant and inquired about the deceased. The Appellant told
them that the deceased had gone to attend a computer class on
19.12.2014 and thereafter she had not returned home.
116. Rajesh Prasad Gupta (P.W.14) is the sole witness examined
by the prosecution regarding the computer class. He would depose
that on 19.12.2013 at around 6.30 or 7.00 p.m. one person had
come to the computer institute at Ranipool to inquire whether the
deceased had come to attend her computer class or not and in
reply to the same he had told that person that the computer class
remains closed on Thursday and nobody had come to the institute.
Rajesh Prasad Gupta (P.W.14) did not disclose who had come to
inquire about the deceased. The evidence of Rajesh Prasad Gupta
(P.W.14) would not assist the prosecution to establish the
allegation that the Appellant and Chandra Kala Sharma had gone
to the MIT Computer Centre inquiring about the deceased knowing
fully well that the Appellant had already pushed the deceased into
the river Teesta and murdered her.
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
117. In re: Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) the Supreme Court
would expound on how false defence may be called into aid in a
case based on circumstantial evidence and hold:
“150. The High Court has referred to some decisions of this Court
and tried to apply the ratio of those cases to the present case
which, as we shall show, are clearly distinguishable. The High
Court was greatly impressed by the view taken by some courts,
including this Court, that a false defence or a false plea taken by
an accused would be an additional link in the various chain of
circumstantial evidence and seems to suggest that since the
appellant had taken a false plea that would be conclusive, taken
along with other circumstances, to prove the case. We might,
however, mention at the outset that this is not what this Court has
said. We shall elaborate this aspect of the matter a little later.
151. It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the weakness of
the defence. This is trite law and no decision has taken a contrary
view. What some cases have held is only this: where various links
in a chain are in themselves complete, then a false plea or a false
defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court.
In other words, before using the additional link it must be proved
that all the links in the chain are complete and do not suffer from
any infirmity. It is not the law that where there is any infirmity or
lacuna in the prosecution case, the same could be cured or supplied
by a false defence or a plea which is not accepted by a court.”
118. In re: State of Karnataka v. Suvarnamma19 the Supreme Court
would hold:
“10. The court dealing with a criminal trial is to perform the task of
ascertaining the truth from the material before it. It has to punish
the guilty and protect the innocent. Burden of proof is on the
prosecution and the prosecution has to establish its case beyond
reasonable doubt. Much weight cannot be given to minor
discrepancies which are bound to occur on account of difference in
(2015) 1 SCC 323
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
perception, loss of memory and other invariable factors. In the
absence of direct evidence, the circumstantial evidence can be the
basis of conviction if the circumstances are of conclusive nature
and rule out all reasonable possibilities of the accused being
innocent. Once the prosecution probabilises the involvement of the
accused but the accused takes a false plea, such false plea can be
taken as an additional circumstance against the accused. Though
Article 20(3) of the Constitution incorporates the rule against selfincrimination, the scope and the content of the said rule does not
require the court to ignore the conduct of the accused in not
correctly disclosing the facts within his knowledge. When the
accused takes a false plea about the facts exclusively known to
him, such circumstance is a vital additional circumstance against
the accused.”
119. The learned Sessions Judge would hold that there was
sufficient
corroborative
and
clinching
evidence
against
the
Appellant and that while examining the Appellant under Section
313 Cr.P.C. he failed to explain the circumstances satisfactorily.
He would further hold that simply answering “I do not know” was
not sufficient to prove his innocence unless he properly explained
the facts and circumstances as to how and under what
circumstances the death of the deceased wife occurred or had been
killed by someone else or committed suicide. The learned Sessions
Judge would hold that the relevance and significance of subsection (4) of Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be lost sight of and
admissions and confessions made by an accused in the said
statement can be given due weight age and considered along with
other admissible evidence. The learned Sessions has however, not
pointed out any such question or such answers for us to examine
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
its relevance. It may therefore, be significant to draw attention and
appreciate the scope of Section 313 Cr.P.C.
120. In re: Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Rajasthan20 the Supreme
Court would summarise the purpose of recording a statement of
an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as under:
“41. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised
to the effect that statement under Section 313 CrPC is recorded to
meet the requirement of the principles of natural justice as it
requires that an accused may be given an opportunity to furnish
explanation of the incriminating material which had come against
him in the trial. However, his statement cannot be made a basis for
his conviction. His answers to the questions put to him under
Section 313 CrPC cannot be used to fill up the gaps left by the
prosecution witnesses in their depositions. Thus, the statement of
the accused is not a substantive piece of evidence and therefore, it
can be used only for appreciating the evidence led by the
prosecution, though it cannot be a substitute for the evidence of the
prosecution. In case the prosecution evidence is not found sufficient
to sustain conviction of the accused, the inculpatory part of his
statement cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. The
statement
under
Section
CrPC
is
not
recorded
after
administering oath to the accused. Therefore, it cannot be treated
as an evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act,
though the accused has a right if he chooses to be a witness, and
once he makes that option, he can be administered oath and
examined as a witness in defence as required under Section 315
CrPC. An adverse inference can be taken against the accused only
and only if the incriminating material stood fully established and
the accused is not able to furnish any explanation for the same.
However, the accused has a right to remain silent as he cannot be
forced to become a witness against himself.”
(2013) 5 SCC 722
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
121. There is no evidence produced by the prosecution to establish
that the filing of the missing report, even if it was true and the
various calls made to various relatives by the Appellant inquiring
about the deceased and her whereabouts or that his statement
that the deceased had gone to attend her computer class was to
screen himself from the offence committed by him.
(xii) The time of death being closely connected to the date of
incident.
122. The evidence of Dr. O. T. Lepcha (P.W.23) the Medico Legal
Specialist at the STNM Hospital who conducted the autopsy over
the dead body of the deceased is an opinion. He approximates the
time since death as more than 48 hours in his medical autopsy
report (exhibit-20) in which he also opined that the cause of death,
to the best of his knowledge and belief was due to fractured skull
with intracranial haemorrhage as a result of blunt force injury.
There is no approximation of any time beyond 48 hours. Although
the learned Sessions Judge would reason that the evidence of the
said Dr. O. T. Lepcha (P.W.23) would connect the time of death
and the time of incident we are afraid the medical opinion alone
cannot help the prosecution in establishing the fact beyond
reasonable doubt.
123. The chain of circumstances required to be proved in a
criminal prosecution establishing the guilt of the accused has not
been cogently proved. In fact none of the circumstances stands
proved save the fact that the Appellant had eaten vegetable
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
“momos” with an unknown girl on the date of the alleged incident
i.e.19.12.2013 at Melli. This may create a serious doubt upon the
Appellant. However, it is shockingly obvious that the prosecution
did not deem it important to conduct the investigation in such a
manner that would eliminate all possibility about the innocence of
the Appellant. The prosecution seem to have rested its case on
procuring statements of the Appellant and Chandra Kala Sharma
under Section 164 Cr.P.C. without even realising that both had not
confessed to their alleged crimes, a statement of the Appellant
under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and evidence
regarding some investigation done by the relatives of the deceased
themselves. No effort has been made to prove vital documentary
evidences. Material witnesses to the making of the said documents
have been left out. Sajan Tamang the first informant about the
recovery of the dead body has also been left out by the
Investigating Officer-Mahendra Subba (P.W.28) without even an
explanation. The offence of murder having not been proved the
bare fact that the Appellant went and lodged a missing report after
the deceased went missing or that he gave some statement under
Section 313 Cr.P.C would not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that
the said report was false. In the present case the alleged links,
save one, in the chain are in themselves not proved and therefore
incomplete. Even if the prosecution allegation of a false plea or a
false defence is accepted it cannot be called into aid to saddle the
Appellant with culpability. The charges have not been proved
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of clear, cogent, credible or
unimpeachable evidence. In such circumstances the question of
indicting or punishing an accused does not arise, merely being
carried away by the presumed heinous nature of the crime or the
gruesome manner in which it was presumed to have been
committed. Mere suspicion, however strong or probable it may be
cannot substitute legal proof required substantiating the charge of
commission of a crime and graver the charge greater ought to be
the standard of proof required. The criminal Courts should etch
the words of the Supreme Court, so often reiterated, in their
memory that there is a long mental distance between “may be true”
and “must be true” and this basic and golden rule only helps to
maintain the vital distinction between “conjectures” and “sure
conclusions” to be arrived at on the touchstone of a dispassionate
judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive
appreciation of all features of the case as well as quality and
credibility of the evidence brought on record.
124. Before parting, as a reminder, it may be useful to quote the
words of the Supreme Court in re: Jose alias Pappachan v. SubInspector of Police, Koyilandy & Anr.21 :
“58. The inalienable interface of presumption of innocence and the
burden of proof in a criminal case on the prosecution has been succinctly
expounded in the following passage from the treatise The Law of
Evidence, 5th Edn. by Ian Dennis at p. 445:
“The presumption of innocence states that a person is
presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. In one sense this
(2016) 10 SCC 519
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
simply restates in different language the rule that the burden of
proof in a criminal case is on the prosecution to prove the
defendant's guilt. As explained above, the burden of proof rule has
a number of functions, one of which is to provide a rule of decision
for the factfinder in a situation of uncertainty. Another function is to
allocate the risk of misdecision in criminal trials. Because the
outcome of wrongful conviction is regarded as a significantly worse
harm than wrongful acquittal the rule is constructed so as to
minimise the risk of the former. The burden of overcoming a
presumption that the defendant is innocent therefore requires the
state to prove the defendant's guilt.”
(emphasis supplied)
59. The above quote thus seemingly concedes a preference
to wrongful acquittal compared to the risk of wrongful conviction.
Such is the abiding jurisprudential concern to eschew even the
remotest possibility of unmerited conviction.
60. This applies with full force particularly in fact situations
where the charge is sought to be established by circumstantial
evidence. These enunciations are so well entrenched that we do
not wish to burden the present narration by referring to the
decisions of this Court in this regard.
61. Addressing this aspect, however, is the following extract
also from the same treatise The Law of Evidence, 5th Edn. by Ian
Dennis at p. 483:
“Where the case against the accused depends wholly
or partly on inferences from circumstantial evidence, fact
finders cannot logically convict unless they are sure that
inferences of guilt are the only ones that can reasonably be
drawn. If they think that there are possible innocent
explanations for circumstantial evidence that are not “merely
fanciful”, it must follow that there is a reasonable doubt
about guilt. There is no rule, however, that judges must
direct juries in terms not to convict unless they are sure that
the evidence bears no other explanation than guilt. It is
sufficient to direct simply that the burden on the prosecution
is to satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt, or so that
they are sure.
The very high standard of proof required in criminal
cases minimises the risk of a wrongful conviction. It means
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
that someone whom, on the evidence, the factfinder believes
is “probably” guilty, or “likely” to be guilty will be acquitted,
since these judgements of probability necessarily admit that
the factfinder is not “sure”. It is generally accepted that some
at least of these acquittals will be of persons who are in fact
guilty of the offences charged, and who would be convicted if
the standard of proof were the lower civil standard of the
balance of probabilities. Such acquittals are the price paid for
the safeguard provided by the “beyond reasonable doubt”
standard against wrongful conviction.”
(emphasis supplied)
125. The investigation of the present case is unfortunately
lethargic and the prosecution half hearted. The learned Sessions
Judge in such circumstances has ventured to ignore settled
principles of criminal jurisprudence and fastened the burden of
proving his innocence upon the Appellant. Fanciful exposition of
law to give an impression of studied scrutiny has been devised to
convict the Appellant in a case where no cogent evidence had been
brought forth by the investigation to prove a grave accusation of
murder. We have no hesitation to express our displeasure on the
quality of investigation and prosecution in the present case. In the
circumstances we deem it proper to give the benefit of doubt to the
Appellant.
126. The appeal is allowed. Resultantly, the impugned judgment
as well as the order on sentence both dated 29.02.2016 rendered
by the learned Sessions Judge in Sessions Trial Case No. 14 of
2014 are set aside and the Appellant is acquitted of the charges
under Section 302 and 201 IPC. The fines of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees
Crl. Appeal No. 14 of 2016
Somnath Sharma v. State of Sikkim
ten thousand) only under Section 302 IPC and Rs.5000/- (Rupees
five thousand) only under Section 201 IPC imposed by the learned
Sessions Judge, if paid by the Appellant shall be consequently
returned. The Appellant be set at liberty forthwith.
( Bhaskar Raj Pradhan )
Judge
11.10.2018
to/
Approved for reporting: yes.
Internet: yes.
( Meenakshi M. Rai )
Acting Chief Justice
11.10.2018
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