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Page No.# 1/32
GAHC040001462025
2026:GAU-AP:802-DB
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/45/2025
Smti Ponung Radeng Saring and 2 Ors
Councilor, Ward No.5, Pasighat Municipal Council (PMC), Pasighat, East Siang
District, Arunachal Pradesh.
2: Smti Yalop Nyigang Yomso
Age:
Occupation :
Councilor
Ward No.01
Pasighat Municipal Council (PMC)
Pasighat
East Siang District
Arunachal Pradesh.
3: Smti Rebeka Panyang
Age:
Occupation :
Deputy Chief Councilor cum Councilor
Councilor
Ward No.04
Pasighat Municipal Council (PMC)
Pasighat
East Siang District
Arunachal Pradesh
VERSUS
The State of AP and 2 Ors
represented by Chief Secretary, Govt of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar.
2:The Commissioner/ Secretary
Age: 0
Occupation :
Urban Local bodies
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Govt of Arunachal Pradesh
Itanagar.
3:The State Election Commission
Age: 0
Occupation :
represented through its Secretary
Itanagar
Advocate for the Petitioner : T T Tara, Sr. Adv, Pondit Ronya,Kirmani Lollen,Terji Kamchi,Taba
Tokur,Khoda Apa,Gamken Bam
Advocate for the Respondent : GA (AP), S/C State Election Commission,Ajin Apang, Sr. Advocate
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KARDAK ETE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BUDI HABUNG
Date on which judgment is reserved
:
21.07.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment
:
18.08.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the
Operative part of the judgment
:
No
Whether the full judgment has been
Pronounced
Yes
:
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
(K. Ete, J)
Heard Mr. T. T. Tara, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. G. Bam, learned
counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. I. Chowdhury, learned Advocate
General assisted by Ms. P. Sangeeta, learned Government Advocate for the
State respondents and Ms. N. Anju, learned counsel for the State Election
Commission for the respondent No. 3.
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2.
The challenge made in this writ petition is to the constitutional validity of
sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 6 of the Arunachal Pradesh Urban Local
Bodies (Disqualification on Grounds of Defection) Act, 2014 (hereinafter referred
to as "the Act of 2014"), whereby an appeal against the decision of the State
Election Commission in matters relating to disqualification on the ground of
defection lies before the Chief Secretary of the State and, in the event the Chief
Secretary also functions as the State Election Commissioner, before the Ministerin-Charge of Urban Local Bodies.
3.
The petitioners are elected Councillors of the Pasighat Municipal Council,
East Siang District, Arunachal Pradesh. It is the case of the petitioners that they
have approached this Court in view of the notice dated 11.12.2024 issued by
the Chief Secretary, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, requiring them to
appear in Appeal No. 01/2024 preferred under Section 6(1) of the Act of 2014.
The petitioners have specifically pleaded that they are not challenging the said
notice or any proceedings initiated pursuant thereto, but have confined the
present writ petition only to the constitutional validity of sub-sections (1) and
(2) of Section 6 of the Act of 2014.
4.
The State Election Commission, Arunachal Pradesh, functions within the
constitutional provisions contained in Part IX and Part IX-A of the Constitution of
India. While Article 243K provides for the constitution of the State Election
Commission, Article 243ZA vests in the State Election Commission referred to in
Article 243K(1) the superintendence, direction and control of elections to
Municipalities. The petitioners contend that the State Election Commission, apart
from conducting elections to Urban Local Bodies, has also been entrusted under
the Act of 2014 with the adjudication of disputes relating to disqualification of
members of such bodies.
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5.
The Act of 2014 provides for disqualification of members of Urban Local
Bodies on the ground of defection. Section 6 thereof provides for an appeal
against the decision of the State Election Commissioner before the Chief
Secretary and, where the Chief Secretary also functions as the State Election
Commissioner, before the Minister-in-Charge of Urban Local Bodies. The
petitioners assail the said provision on the ground that it places a quasi-judicial
determination rendered by the State Election Commissioner under the appellate
scrutiny of authorities belonging to the executive branch, thereby affecting the
independence and impartiality of the adjudicatory process and being contrary to
the principles of separation of powers and the constitutional safeguards under
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
6.
Mr. T. T. Tara, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, submits
that the present writ petition involves a substantial constitutional question
relating to the validity of the appellate mechanism created under Section 6(1)
and (2) of the Act of 2014. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the impugned
provisions create an arrangement whereby orders passed by the State Election
Commissioner, while exercising quasi-judicial jurisdiction in matters relating to
disqualification on the ground of defection, are subjected to appellate
examination by an executive authority, namely, the Chief Secretary of the State
and, in the circumstances contemplated under the proviso to Section 6(1), by
the Minister-in-Charge of Urban Local Bodies. It is submitted that such an
arrangement runs contrary to the constitutional requirement that adjudicatory
functions must
be
discharged by authorities
possessing the requisite
independence and impartiality.
7.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that the State Election Commission is not
an ordinary statutory authority but a constitutional body constituted under
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Article 243K read with Article 243ZA of the Constitution of India. It is submitted
that the Constitution has entrusted the State Election Commission with the
superintendence, direction and control of preparation of electoral rolls and
conduct of elections to Municipalities and that the independence of such
constitutional authority is an essential requirement for ensuring free and fair
elections. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the constitutional status of the
State Election Commission cannot be diluted by a statutory provision which has
the effect of subjecting its decisions, rendered while exercising quasi-judicial
functions, to the control or supervision of the executive branch of the State
Government.
8.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that the independence of electoral bodies
from political and executive interference has been recognized by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court as an essential component of the democratic structure of the
Constitution. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in T. N. Seshan, Chief Election Commissioner of India v. Union of
India & Others, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 611, wherein the Apex Court
observed that democracy being a basic feature of the constitutional scheme,
free and fair elections are indispensable and that the responsibility of conducting
elections has been entrusted to an independent body which must remain
insulated from political and executive interference. Learned Senior Counsel
submits that the principle laid down in the said judgment would equally apply to
the State Election Commission, which performs constitutional functions in
relation to elections to local bodies.
9.
Learned Senior Counsel further places reliance upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kishan Singh Tomar v. Municipal Corporation of
the City of Ahmedabad, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 352, wherein the Apex
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Court
emphasized
the
constitutional
requirement
of
maintaining
the
independence of the State Election Commission and held that the State Election
Commission must be allowed to function independently while discharging its
constitutional responsibilities. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the power
conferred upon the Chief Secretary or the Minister-in-Charge under Section 6 of
the Act of 2014 has the effect of subjecting the decision-making process of the
State Election Commission to executive scrutiny, thereby undermining the
constitutional independence attached to the Commission.
10.
Learned
Senior
Counsel
submits
that
proceedings
relating
to
disqualification on the ground of defection are adjudicatory in nature and
involve determination of valuable rights attached to an elected office. It is
submitted that the authority deciding such questions is required to act judicially,
after providing an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned, considering
the material placed before it and arriving at a reasoned conclusion. Learned
Senior Counsel submits that once the State Election Commissioner exercises
such quasi-judicial jurisdiction, the decision rendered by such authority cannot
be subjected to appellate review by an executive authority and can only be
examined in exercise of judicial review by the constitutional courts.
11. In support of the aforesaid submission, learned Senior Counsel places
reliance upon the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, reported in 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651, wherein
the Apex Court held that the authority deciding questions relating to
disqualification on the ground of defection performs a judicial function and acts
as a Tribunal. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the ratio laid down in the
said judgment is that determination of disqualification questions involves
adjudicatory functions and, therefore, the decision of such authority must
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remain subject to scrutiny by superior constitutional courts and cannot be
subjected to appellate control by an executive authority. It is submitted that
Section 6 of the Act of 2014 creates an impermissible statutory hierarchy by
placing an executive officer above an authority exercising quasi-judicial
functions.
12. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the constitutional remedy available
against an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority is judicial review by the
High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Reliance is
placed upon the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India , reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261, wherein
it has been held that the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts
under Articles 226 and 227 and in the Supreme Court under Article 32 forms
part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be excluded or
substituted. Learned Senior Counsel submits that although the legislature may
create statutory forums for adjudication, such forums cannot replace or dilute
the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. It is submitted that the
impugned provisions, by creating an executive appellate mechanism, seek to
interpose an authority which is neither judicial nor independent between the
State Election Commission and the constitutional courts.
13. Learned Senior Counsel submits that Section 6 of the Act of 2014 creates a
reverse hierarchy by placing an executive authority in an appellate position over
an authority exercising quasi-judicial functions. It is submitted that while the
Executive is entrusted with the implementation of laws and policies framed by
the Legislature, it cannot assume the role of an appellate authority over
decisions rendered in the exercise of adjudicatory functions. Learned Senior
Counsel submits that the distinction between administrative and adjudicatory
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functions is a fundamental aspect of the constitutional scheme and that
permitting an executive officer to examine, modify or set aside a quasi-judicial
determination would amount to an impermissible encroachment upon the
adjudicatory domain.
14. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the impugned provisions
violate the doctrine of separation of powers, which forms part of the basic
structure of the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed upon the constitutional
principles recognized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, including in Kesavananda
Bharati v. State of Kerala, reported in (1973) 4 SCC 225, wherein the
principles forming part of the basic structure of the Constitution have been
recognized. It is submitted that the adjudicatory functions entrusted to the State
Election Commissioner under the Act of 2014 cannot be subjected to review by
authorities who are themselves part of the executive branch of the State
Government. Learned Senior Counsel submits that such an arrangement
disturbs the constitutional balance between the Executive and the adjudicatory
authorities.
15. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act
of 2014 creates an additional constitutional infirmity by providing that where the
Chief Secretary also functions as the State Election Commissioner, the appeal
shall lie before the Minister-in-Charge of Urban Local Bodies. It is submitted that
a Minister, being a political functionary and a member of the elected executive,
cannot be vested with appellate jurisdiction over disputes relating to electoral
disqualification. Learned Senior Counsel submits that disputes relating to
defection are inherently political in nature and, therefore, entrusting appellate
jurisdiction in such matters to a political authority gives rise to a reasonable
apprehension of bias and compromises the requirement of institutional
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impartiality.
16. Learned Senior Counsel places reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India , reported in (1969) 2 SCC
262, wherein the Apex Court held that the test for determining bias is not
actual bias but whether there exists a reasonable ground for believing that the
authority is likely to be biased. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the
principle of nemo judex in causa sua is attracted to the present case, as the
appellate mechanism under Section 6 permits authorities closely connected with
the
executive
government
to
adjudicate
disputes
involving
elected
representatives and political parties. It is submitted that the reasonable
apprehension of bias is sufficient to render such an adjudicatory arrangement
inconsistent with the requirement of institutional independence.
17.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that the Chief Secretary, being the
highest-ranking administrative officer of the State Government and functioning
within the administrative control of the elected executive, cannot be considered
an independent appellate authority in matters where the State Election
Commissioner has exercised quasi-judicial powers. Similarly, it is submitted that
the Minister-in-Charge, being a political executive, cannot be entrusted with the
power to decide appeals concerning electoral disqualification. Learned Senior
Counsel submits that the mere possibility of executive influence is sufficient to
undermine public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the adjudicatory
process.
18. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the impugned provisions
violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as they permit an arbitrary and
unreasonable procedure whereby decisions rendered by an independent
authority exercising quasi-judicial functions are subjected to appellate review by
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executive authorities without any rational basis. It is submitted that there is no
discernible legislative purpose in creating an executive appellate mechanism
when the orders of the State Election Commissioner are otherwise amenable to
judicial review before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
19. Learned Senior Counsel submits that Section 6(2) of the Act of 2014, which
provides for a "summary procedure" for disposal of appeals, suffers from further
constitutional infirmity as it does not prescribe a structured appellate procedure
or adequate safeguards for ensuring a fair adjudication. It is submitted that the
provision does not lay down any detailed mechanism relating to appreciation of
evidence, recording of reasons, or procedural safeguards required in
proceedings affecting the right of an elected representative to continue in office.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that the deprivation of such valuable rights
through a summary procedure before an executive authority fails to satisfy the
constitutional
requirement
of
fairness,
reasonableness
and
procedural
safeguards guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
20. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the requirement of an independent
and impartial adjudicatory mechanism has been repeatedly emphasized by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court while examining the functioning of tribunals and bodies
exercising judicial functions. Reliance is placed upon the judgment in State of
Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners' Association , reported in (1998)
2 SCC 688, wherein the Apex Court recognized that bodies exercising judicial
functions must possess the necessary independence from executive control.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that the principle laid down therein is equally
applicable in the present case, where an executive authority has been
designated as an appellate authority over a quasi-judicial determination.
21. Learned Senior Counsel further places reliance upon the judgment of the
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Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amrik Singh Lyallpuri v. Union of India , reported
in (2011) 6 SCC 535, and submits that the said decision recognizes the
impermissibility of permitting an executive authority to sit in appeal over
decisions rendered by quasi-judicial bodies. Learned Senior Counsel submits
that ratio laid down in the said judgment applies to the present case, as Section
6 of the Act of 2014 similarly authorizes executive authorities to examine and
decide appeals against determinations made by the State Election Commissioner
while exercising quasi-judicial jurisdiction.
22. Learned Senior Counsel also places reliance upon the judgments of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras
Bar Association, reported in (2010) 11 SCC 1 and Madras Bar Association
v. Union of India, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 1, to submit that institutional
independence and impartiality are indispensable requirements wherever
adjudicatory functions are entrusted to an authority. Learned Senior Counsel
submits that the transfer or vesting of judicial functions in any authority cannot
be accompanied by a mechanism which subjects such functions to executive
control, as such an arrangement would defeat the very purpose of creating an
independent adjudicatory forum.
23. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the constitutional infirmity in Section
6 of the Act of 2014 is also evident from the legislative framework prevailing in
other States. It is submitted that in States such as Kerala, Karnataka and West
Bengal, decisions of the State Election Commission in matters relating to
disqualification of elected representatives are not subjected to appellate review
before executive authorities and remain open only to judicial review before the
constitutional courts. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the statutory
arrangement prevailing in Arunachal Pradesh is inconsistent with the
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constitutional scheme, as it creates an executive appellate mechanism over the
State Election Commission.
24.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that the absence of such executive
appellate provisions in other States indicates that there is no administrative
necessity or compelling State interest in creating such a mechanism. It is
submitted that the only effect of Section 6(1) and (2) of the Act of 2014 is to
subordinate the decision-making process of the State Election Commission to
executive
authorities,
thereby
compromising
the
independence
of
the
constitutional body and weakening public confidence in the electoral process.
25. Learned Senior Counsel, therefore, submits that sub-sections (1) and (2) of
Section 6 of the Act of 2014 are constitutionally invalid, being contrary to the
principles of separation of powers, judicial independence, natural justice and the
guarantees contained under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that the impugned provisions are liable to be
struck down as unconstitutional and that the orders passed by the State Election
Commissioner in exercise of powers under the Act of 2014 ought to remain
subject only to the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
26.
Mr. I. Chowdhury, Learned Advocate General appearing for the State
respondents, at the very outset, submits that, the present writ petition has been
filed challenging the constitutional validity of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section
6 of the Act of 2014. Learned Advocate General submits that the petitioners
have themselves categorically stated that they are not challenging the notice
dated 11.12.2024 issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Arunachal
Pradesh, in Appeal No. 01/2024 or any proceedings initiated pursuant thereto
and have confined their challenge only to the constitutional validity of the
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aforesaid statutory provisions.
27. Learned Advocate General submits that in the aforesaid circumstances, no
constitutional or legal right of the petitioners has been affected and no prejudice
whatsoever has been caused to them. It is submitted that the present
proceedings, being a writ petition and not a Public Interest Litigation, cannot be
entertained merely on the basis of an apprehension of possible consequences.
He submits that undertaking adjudication on the constitutional validity of the
impugned provisions in the absence of any actual infringement of rights would
amount to an academic exercise, particularly when the proceedings initiated
under the Act of 2014 have not been assailed.
28.
Learned Advocate General submits that the challenge made by the
petitioners to Section 6(1) and (2) of the Act of 2014 is without any legal
foundation, inasmuch as the said enactment has been made by the competent
Legislature in exercise of its legislative competence under Entry 5 of List II of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Learned Advocate General
submits that Entry 5 empowers the State Legislature to enact laws relating to
local government including municipalities and matters connected with their
functioning.
29. Learned Advocate General further submits that Part IX-A of the Constitution
of India provides the constitutional provisions governing Municipalities and
enables the State Legislature to make laws relating to the composition,
functioning and disqualification of members of Urban Local Bodies. It is
submitted that the provisions contained in Section 6(1) and (2) of the Act of
2014 form part of a duly enacted statutory scheme and carry with them a
presumption of constitutional validity. Learned Advocate General submits that
the allegations that the impugned provisions are unconstitutional, arbitrary or
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violative of the doctrine of separation of powers are therefore liable to be
rejected.
30. Learned Advocate General submits that the primary contention advanced
on behalf of the petitioners emanates from the doctrine of separation of powers
and the alleged impermissible vesting of appellate powers in an executive
authority. It is submitted that the Constitution of India does not contemplate a
rigid separation of powers but adopts a flexible constitutional scheme wherein
certain functions may overlap amongst different organs of the State.
31. Learned Advocate General submits that the Executive, when empowered by
statute, can exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions and the mere conferment
of such statutory power upon an authority belonging to the Executive would not
render the provision unconstitutional. Learned Advocate General places reliance
upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya
Kapur & Ors. v. State of Punjab , reported in AIR 1955 SC 549, wherein the
constitutional position relating to the doctrine of separation of powers has been
considered. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:
“...12. It may not be possible to frame an exhaustive definition of what executive
function means and implies. Ordinarily the executive power connotes the residue of
governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken
away.
The Indian Constitution has not indeed recognised the doctrine of separation if
powers in its absolute rigidity but the functions of the different parts or branches of
the Government have been sufficiently differentiated and consequently it can very
well be said that our Constitution does not contemplate assumption, by one organ or
part of the State, of functions that essentially belong to another. The executive indeed
can exercise the powers of departmental or subordinate legislation when such powers
are delegated to it by the legislature.
It can also, when so empowered, exercise judicial functions in a limited way. The
executive Government, however, can never go against the provisions of the
Constitution or of any law. This is clear from the provisions of Article 154 of the
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Constitution but, as we have already stated, it does not follow from this that in order
to enable the executive to function there must be a law already in existence and that
the powers of the executive are limited merely to the carrying out of these laws.”
32. Learned Advocate General submits that the contention of the petitioners
proceeds on an incorrect assumption that merely because the Legislature has
designated the Chief Secretary as the appellate authority under Section 6 of the
Act of 2014, such authority would be exercising jurisdiction in his administrative
capacity as the Chief Secretary. Learned Advocate General submits that while
exercising powers under Section 6 of the Act of 2014, the Chief Secretary does
not act in his administrative capacity but acts as an appellate authority created
by the Legislature and exercises jurisdiction strictly in accordance with the
statutory provisions.
33. Learned Advocate General submits that the appellate authority performs a
quasi-judicial function and is required to consider the relevant materials, provide
an opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties and pass orders in
accordance with law and principles of natural justice. It is therefore submitted
that the statutory arrangement cannot be said to amount to executive
interference with the functioning of the State Election Commission.
34.
Learned Advocate General submits that the contention raised by the
petitioners that the impugned provisions result in ouster of judicial review is
wholly misconceived. It is submitted that the appellate mechanism provided
under Section 6 of the Act of 2014 does not exclude or restrict the constitutional
jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
of India.
35.
Learned Advocate General submits that the reliance placed upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), is
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misplaced. It is submitted that the said judgment arose in the context of Articles
323-A and 323-B of the Constitution and dealt with the establishment of
administrative tribunals and the continued availability of judicial review by the
High Courts. Learned Advocate General submits that the said judgment only
recognizes that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227
cannot be excluded and does not lay down that every statutory appellate
authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must necessarily be a judicial
authority.
36. Learned Advocate General further submits that the reliance placed by the
petitioners upon the judgment in Kihoto Hollohan (supra), does not advance
the case of the petitioners. It is submitted that the said judgment, in fact,
supports the submission of the State respondents that a statutory authority
empowered by law may perform adjudicatory functions. It is submitted that in
the present case, the Chief Secretary while exercising powers under Section 6 of
the Act of 2014 does not act as the Chief Secretary in an administrative capacity
but acts as an appellate authority empowered by the State Legislature. Under
the proviso to Section 6(1), where the Chief Secretary also functions as the
State Election Commissioner, the Legislature has provided that the appeal shall
lie before the Minister-in-Charge of Urban Local Bodies. It is submitted that the
Minister, being a constitutional authority, while exercising jurisdiction under the
Act, acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and is required to decide the matter in
accordance with the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice.
37.
Learned Advocate General submits that the challenge based on
apprehension of bias and violation of principles of natural justice is also without
merit. It is submitted that there can be no dispute with the legal proposition laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak (supra). However, learned
Page No.# 17/32
Advocate General submits that the said principle has no application in the
present case, as the petitioners are challenging the constitutional validity of a
statutory provision itself. Learned Advocate General submits that the possibility
of abuse or improper exercise of a statutory power cannot be a ground for
declaring a statutory provision unconstitutional. It is submitted that a statutory
provision cannot be struck down merely on the basis of an apprehension that
the power conferred under the statute may be misused.
38. In support of the aforesaid submission, learned Advocate General places
reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pannalal Binjraj
and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1957 SC 397, wherein
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the possibility of improper or
discriminatory exercise of a statutory power cannot, by itself, invalidate the
legislation and that where there is an abuse of such power, it is the exercise of
the power which may be subjected to judicial scrutiny. Learned Advocate
General further relies upon the judgment in D. K. Trivedi & Sons vs. State of
Gujarat, reported in 1986 (Supp) SCC 20, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that the validity or constitutionality of a statutory provision conferring
discretionary power upon the Executive or an administrative authority cannot be
judged on the assumption that such power would be exercised arbitrarily and
that the mere possibility of abuse or arbitrary exercise of power cannot
invalidate the statute conferring such power. Reliance is also placed upon the
judgment in Natural Resource Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of
2012, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 1, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reiterated that a statutory provision cannot be declared unconstitutional merely
on the ground of the possibility of its abuse or improper exercise and that the
Court is required to examine the constitutional validity of the provision on the
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basis of its legal character and operation rather than on the basis of
hypothetical possibilities of misuse.
39. Learned Advocate General submits that the provisions of Section 6(1) and
(2) of the Act of 2014 do not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is
submitted that the statutory mechanism applies uniformly to all members of
Urban Local Bodies and forms part of a structured legislative framework
governing disqualification matters arising from defection. Learned Advocate
General submits that the provisions have been enacted for maintaining discipline
and stability in the functioning of Urban Local Bodies and there is no
arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the statutory arrangement.
40.
Learned Advocate General submits that the reliance placed by the
petitioners upon the statutory schemes prevailing in other States is wholly
misplaced. It is submitted that Article 14 does not authorize striking down a law
enacted by one State merely because another State has adopted a different
legislative arrangement on the same subject. Learned Advocate General places
reliance upon the judgment Sant Lal Bharti vs. State of Punjab, reported in
(1988) 1 SCC 366, in support of the proposition that difference in statutory
provisions enacted by different States cannot by itself constitute discrimination
under Article 14 of the Constitution. The relevant paragraph is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“...5. Article 14 does not authorise the striking down of a law of one State on the
ground that in contrast with a law of another State on the same subject its
provisions are discriminatory or different. Nor does it contemplate a law of the
Centre or of the State dealing with similar subjects being held to be
unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the provisions of two
enactments. The source of authority for the two statutes being different, Art. 14
can have no application.”
41.
Learned Advocate General submits that the reliance placed by the
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petitioners upon the judgments in Labour Law Practitioners’ Association
(supra), Amrik Singh Lyallpuri (supra) and Madras Bar Association
(supra), is wholly misconceived and misplaced. It is submitted that the said
judgments were rendered in the context of the specific issues involved therein
and cannot be applied mechanically to the facts of the present case. Learned
Advocate General submits that the judgment in Madras Bar Association
(supra), was rendered in the context of creation of the National Tax Tribunal and
transfer of jurisdiction relating to questions of law which were earlier exercised
by the High Courts. It is submitted that the facts and circumstances of the
present case have no connection or correlation with the issues considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment.
42. Learned Advocate General submits that a judgment is an authority for what
it actually decides and that the observations made therein cannot be read
independently of the factual context in which such observations were made.
Learned Advocate General submits that the principles laid down in a judgment
have to be understood in the backdrop of the facts and issues which arose for
consideration before the Court and cannot be mechanically applied to cases
involving a different factual and legal matrix.
43. In support of the aforesaid submission, learned Advocate General places
reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Divisional
Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty and Anr., reported in (2003) 7 SCC
197, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that the scope and
authority of a precedent should not be expanded beyond the principle upon
which the case was decided. Learned Advocate General further relies upon the
judgment in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Ors. ,
reported in (2003) 2 SCC 111, wherein it was held that a decision is an
Page No.# 20/32
authority for what it decides and not for what may be logically deduced
therefrom and that even a slight difference in facts or additional facts may have
a significant bearing on the precedential value of a decision. Reliance is also
placed upon the judgment in Haryana Financial Corporation and Anr. v.
Jagdamba Oil Mills and Anr., reported in (2002) 3 SCC 496, wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that judicial observations must be understood in
the context in which they are made and that judgments cannot be read as
statutes by separating the observations from the factual background in which
they are rendered.
44. Learned Advocate General submits that Section 6(1) and (2) of the Act of
2014 constitute a valid statutory mechanism enacted by the competent
Legislature within its legislative competence. It is submitted that the appellate
authority exercises jurisdiction in accordance with the statutory scheme and
principles of natural justice, and any order passed thereunder remains subject
to judicial scrutiny under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
Learned Advocate General further submits that the impugned provisions do not
interfere with the constitutional functions or independence of the State Election
Commission, as the appellate mechanism operates in a distinct field relating to
adjudication of disqualification disputes arising under the Act of 2014.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the challenge raised by the petitioners is
without merit and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
45. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties
and also carefully perused the authorities cited at the Bar as well as browsed
through the Act of 2014.
46. The petitioners challenge the constitutional validity of Section 6 of the Act
of 2014 on the ground that a decision rendered by the State Election
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Commissioner, a constitutional authority entrusted with the conduct and
supervision of elections to local bodies, cannot be made subject to an appeal
before an authority forming part of the Executive. It is, therefore, necessary to
examine the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the State Election
Commissioner under the Act of 2014 and the character of the appellate
jurisdiction conferred by Section 6, particularly in the light of the constitutional
scheme governing the State Election Commission and the principles laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decisions relied upon by the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioners.
47. There can be no dispute that Articles 243K and 243ZA of the Constitution
confer upon the State Election Commission the superintendence, direction and
control of the preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of elections to
Panchayats and Municipalities, respectively. The constitutional object behind
incorporation of the said provisions is to ensure that elections to local bodies are
conducted by an independent constitutional authority and that such authority
remains insulated from executive or political interference while discharging the
constitutional functions entrusted to it.
48. At the same time, the constitutional status of an authority and the source
of power under which such authority exercises a particular jurisdiction are
distinct considerations. The mere fact that a constitutional authority has been
entrusted by the Legislature with a statutory function would not, by itself, result
in such statutory function acquiring the character of a constitutional function.
The nature and source of the power exercised by the authority have to be
examined for determining the character of the jurisdiction and the constitutional
limitations applicable thereto.
49. In the present case, the power exercised by the State Election
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Commissioner while deciding questions relating to disqualification of members
of Urban Local Bodies on the ground of defection is not a power traceable to
Articles 243K or 243ZA of the Constitution of India but from the Entry 5, List II
of Seventh Schedule. The said jurisdiction has been created by the State
Legislature under the Act of 2014. Articles 243K and 243ZA specifically relate to
the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls
and the conduct of elections to Panchayats and Municipalities. Adjudication of
questions relating to disqualification on the ground of defection is not a function
specifically conferred by the said constitutional provisions but is a statutory
jurisdiction created by the Legislature.
50. Once the Legislature has created such a statutory jurisdiction and entrusted
the same to the State Election Commissioner, the question necessarily arises
whether the Legislature is constitutionally precluded from prescribing the
manner in which such jurisdiction is to be exercised or from providing a remedy
against a decision rendered in exercise thereof. In the considered opinion of this
Court, no such absolute prohibition can be read into Articles 243K or 243ZA. The
question, therefore, is not whether the State Election Commissioner, being a
constitutional authority, can exercise statutory jurisdiction, but whether the
appellate mechanism provided by Section 6 of the Act of 2014 is inconsistent
with any constitutional limitation.
51. Thus, the reliance placed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioners upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.N. Seshan,
Chief Election Commissioner of India (supra), does not advance the case of
the petitioners. There can be no dispute with the proposition that the Election
Commission, being a constitutional authority, is required to remain independent
and free from executive or political interference while discharging the
Page No.# 23/32
constitutional functions entrusted to it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
considering the scheme of Article 324, also recognised that the Election
Commission
may
discharge
administrative,
adjudicatory
and
legislative
functions. The said principle, however, has to be understood in the context of
the constitutional scheme governing the Election Commission and cannot be
read to mean that every statutory function entrusted by the Legislature to a
constitutional authority necessarily acquires the character of a constitutional
function and becomes insulated from legislative regulation. The question in the
present case is not one of interference with the constitutional functions of the
State Election Commission but the validity of an appellate mechanism created in
respect of a statutory jurisdiction under the Act of 2014.
52. The reliance placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Kishan Singh Tomar (supra), also does not advance the case of the
petitioners. The said judgment emphasised the constitutional responsibility of
the State Election Commission to ensure timely elections to local bodies and
recognised the importance of its independence in discharging the functions
entrusted to it under the constitutional scheme. The said decision, however, was
concerned with the constitutional powers and responsibilities of the State
Election Commission in relation to the conduct of elections and does not deal
with the question whether a statutory appellate remedy can be provided against
an adjudicatory decision rendered by the State Election Commissioner under a
State enactment relating to disqualification on the ground of defection.
53. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the
decision of the State Election Commissioner can only be subjected to judicial
review and cannot be made subject to a statutory appeal cannot be accepted in
such absolute terms. Judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Page No.# 24/32
Constitution and a statutory appeal operate in different fields. Judicial review is
concerned with the legality of the decision-making process, jurisdictional errors,
violation of principles of natural justice and other recognised grounds of judicial
review, whereas an appeal is a statutory remedy for examining the correctness
of the decision within the limits prescribed by the Legislature. The existence of a
statutory appeal does not, by itself, exclude or dilute the constitutional
jurisdiction of this Court, and any order passed by the appellate authority would
continue to remain subject to the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution.
54. The reliance placed by the learned Senior Counsel upon the Constitution
Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan (supra), also
does not advance the case of the petitioners. In the said judgment, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that, while deciding questions of disqualification under the
Tenth Schedule, the Speaker or Chairman acts as a Tribunal and performs an
adjudicatory function, and that the decision rendered by such authority is
subject to judicial review. The principle emerging therefrom is that the decision
on a question of disqualification is adjudicatory in nature and must conform to
the requirements of fairness and remain subject to judicial scrutiny. However,
the judgment does not lay down that every adjudicatory decision rendered by a
statutory authority is, merely by reason of its adjudicatory character,
constitutionally incapable of being subjected to a further statutory appellate
remedy. The availability of judicial review by the constitutional courts cannot,
therefore, be equated with a prohibition against a statutory appellate remedy.
55. The reliance placed upon the celebrated judgement in Kesavananda
Bharati (supra) is also misplaced. The said judgment is principally concerned
with the limits of the constituent power under Article 368 and holds that the
Page No.# 25/32
power of constitutional amendment cannot be exercised so as to alter or destroy
the basic structure of the Constitution. It does not lay down any general
proposition that an authority discharging a judicial or quasi-judicial function is
constitutionally immune from a statutory appellate mechanism. Likewise, the
principle affirmed in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) is that the jurisdiction of the
High Courts under Articles 226 and 227, being part of the basic structure,
cannot be excluded or ousted; it does not render every adjudicatory decision
statutorily final or prohibit the Legislature from prescribing a hierarchy of
adjudication and appeal. In the present case, Section 6 of the Act of 2014
neither amends the Constitution nor excludes or curtails the jurisdiction of this
Court under Articles 226 and 227; it merely provides a statutory mechanism for
further consideration of an adjudicatory decision. The mere existence of such a
statutory appellate remedy, therefore, cannot, without more, be characterised
as an alteration of the basic structure or as constitutionally impermissible.
56. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amrik Singh Lyallpuri
(supra), relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, has also
been considered. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was concerned
with a provision under which an appeal from an order of an Appellate Tribunal,
which was manned by a judicial officer and possessed the trappings of a Civil
Court, lay before the Administrator, namely, the Lieutenant Governor, who was
an executive authority. The Court, in that institutional setting, held that an
executive authority could not sit in appeal over a decision of a judicial or quasijudicial authority having the trappings of a court. The ratio of the said judgment
cannot be viewed independently from the nature of the authority whose
decision was subjected to executive appellate review and the statutory
framework under consideration therein. In the present case, the State Election
Page No.# 26/32
Commissioner exercises a statutory jurisdiction created under the Act of 2014
and Section 6 provides an appellate remedy within the same statutory scheme.
The present case, therefore, cannot be decided merely by describing the Chief
Secretary as an executive authority; the character of the underlying jurisdiction
and the nature of the appellate power created by the Legislature have also to be
examined. Unlike the provision considered in Amrik Singh Lyallpuri (supra),
Section 6 does not confer a general administrative power upon the Executive to
supervise, modify or set aside the functioning of the State Election Commission,
nor does it exclude the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court.
57. The other judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel, including
Labour Law Practitioners’ Association (Supra), R. Gandhi, President,
Madras Bar Association (Supra) and Madras Bar Association (Supra),
undoubtedly emphasise the importance of independence and impartiality where
judicial functions traditionally exercised by courts are entrusted to tribunals or
other adjudicatory bodies, particularly where such tribunals are constituted as
substitutes for, or in substantial replacement of, the jurisdiction exercised by
courts. Those decisions, however, arose in the context of tribunalisation and the
constitutional safeguards required when adjudicatory jurisdiction ordinarily
exercised by courts is transferred to tribunals. The present case does not involve
the creation of a tribunal in substitution of the constitutional courts, nor does
Section 6 exclude, curtail or otherwise affect the jurisdiction of this Court under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The appellate authority exercises only
the limited statutory jurisdiction expressly conferred upon it by the Act of 2014
and does not replace the jurisdiction of the constitutional courts. The principles
laid down in the aforesaid decisions must, therefore, be applied having regard to
the nature, source and extent of the jurisdiction conferred upon the appellate
Page No.# 27/32
authority in the present case.
58. The contention that the Chief Secretary, being an officer of the Executive,
cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over a decision rendered by the State
Election Commissioner also cannot be accepted merely on the basis of the
doctrine of separation of powers. The Constitution of India does not recognise a
rigid and absolute separation of powers between the Legislature, Executive and
Judiciary. The constitutional scheme is based upon functional separation and
permits, in appropriate circumstances, overlapping of functions, subject to
constitutional limitations. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rai Sahib Ram
Jawaya Kapur (supra), has recognised that the doctrine of separation of
powers does not operate in India with absolute rigidity and that the Executive
may, in appropriate circumstances, exercise functions which are not exclusively
reserved to the Judiciary. Consequently, the mere fact that the appellate
authority is an officer of the Executive would not, by itself, render the
conferment of appellate jurisdiction upon such authority constitutionally
impermissible.
59. Therefore, the mere fact that the Chief Secretary belongs to the Executive
establishment
cannot,
by
itself,
be
a
ground
to
declare
Section
unconstitutional. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 6 of the Act of
2014, the Chief Secretary does not act merely in his administrative capacity or
exercise administrative control over the State Election Commissioner. He acts
pursuant to the appellate jurisdiction specifically conferred upon him by the
Legislature and is required to exercise that jurisdiction within the limits
prescribed by the Act. Section 6(2) further requires the appellate authority to
follow the prescribed procedure and the principles of natural justice. The
statutory designation of the Chief Secretary as appellate authority, therefore,
Page No.# 28/32
cannot by itself be equated with executive interference with the functioning of
the State Election Commission.
60. This Court is conscious of the fact that proceedings relating to
disqualification on the ground of defection involve serious consequences, as
they affect the right of an elected representative to continue in office. The
authority exercising such jurisdiction is, therefore, required to act fairly,
objectively and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The
seriousness of the consequence, however, cannot by itself determine the
constitutional character of the jurisdiction or render every statutory appellate
remedy impermissible. What is required is that the appellate authority remains
confined to the jurisdiction conferred by the statute and act in accordance with
law.
61. The position, however, requires separate consideration insofar as the
proviso to Section 6(1) is concerned. The said proviso provides that where the
Chief Secretary also functions as the State Election Commissioner, the appeal
shall lie before the Minister-in-Charge of Urban Local Bodies in the State. The
legislative object behind the proviso appears to be to provide an alternative
appellate authority in a situation where the ordinary appellate authority, namely,
the Chief Secretary, is unavailable by reason of holding the office of the State
Election Commissioner. The question, however, is whether the alternative forum
so created satisfies the constitutional requirement of fairness and institutional
impartiality.
62.
In this regard, the distinction between the Chief Secretary and the
Minister-in-Charge assumes significance. The Chief Secretary, while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 6, acts pursuant to a statutory mandate and is
required to adjudicate the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the
Page No.# 29/32
enactment and the principles of natural justice. The Minister-in-Charge, on the
other hand, is a member of the elected political executive and is responsible for
the administration of the concerned department. The appellate jurisdiction
conferred by the proviso concerns proceedings relating to disqualification of
elected representatives on the ground of defection. Conferment of such
jurisdiction upon a member of the political executive, in the circumstances
contemplated by the proviso, creates a reasonable apprehension regarding the
institutional impartiality of the appellate forum.
63. The defect in the proviso is not based upon any assumption that a
particular Minister would necessarily act unfairly or that the power conferred
upon him would necessarily be abused. The issue is one of institutional design.
An adjudicatory mechanism must not only be fair in fact but must also be
structured in a manner which inspires confidence in its independence and
impartiality. Where the subject matter of the adjudication concerns the electoral
status of elected representatives and the appellate jurisdiction is vested in the
political executive responsible for the concerned department, the apprehension
of institutional bias cannot be regarded as unrealistic or remote.
64.
The principle of institutional impartiality assumes greater significance
where the dispute concerns disqualification on the ground of defection. Such
proceedings directly affect the continuance of elected representatives in office
and may have consequences upon the composition and functioning of elected
local bodies. The appellate forum must, therefore, be so constituted that the
parties are assured that the dispute will be determined on the basis of the
statutory provisions and the material placed before the authority and not by
considerations arising from the political or administrative relationship of the
appellate authority with the subject matter.
Page No.# 30/32
65. This Court is also conscious of the settled principle that while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court must exercise
restraint while examining the constitutional validity of a statutory provision as
there is always presumption of constitutionality in favour of the Enactment. The
Legislature enjoys considerable discretion in framing laws and creating statutory
mechanisms for achieving the object sought to be accomplished by the
enactment. A statutory provision cannot be declared unconstitutional merely
because another legislative arrangement may appear to be more appropriate or
because the Court may consider a different mechanism to be preferable.
However, where the mechanism created by the Legislature itself transgresses
the constitutional requirement of fairness and impartiality, the constitutional
court cannot decline to examine such infirmity.
66. The question of severability also arises for consideration. If a particular part
of a statutory provision is found to suffer from constitutional infirmity, the Court
would ordinarily preserve the remaining portion if the valid and invalid parts are
capable of being separated and the remaining statutory scheme is capable of
meaningful operation. The present case is one where the ordinary appellate
mechanism under Section 6(1) and the procedural safeguards contained in
Section 6(2) can operate independently of the proviso which confers appellate
jurisdiction upon the Minister-in-Charge.
67. In the present case, this Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that
the infirmity, if any, is confined only to the proviso to Section 6(1). The
remaining portion of Section 6(1), providing for an appeal before the Chief
Secretary, and Section 6(2), prescribing the procedure to be followed by the
appellate authority, are capable of independent operation and do not suffer from
any constitutional infirmity. The doctrine of severability consequently requires
Page No.# 31/32
that only the offending portion of the provision be struck down while preserving
the remaining statutory scheme.
68.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court is unable to accept the challenge
raised by the petitioners to the entirety of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 6
of the Arunachal Pradesh Urban Local Bodies (Disqualification on Grounds of
Defection) Act, 2014. This Court is unable to hold that the Legislature was
constitutionally precluded from providing an appellate remedy against a decision
rendered by the State Election Commissioner in exercise of the statutory
jurisdiction conferred by the Act of 2014. The said jurisdiction does not, merely
by reason of being entrusted to the State Election Commissioner, become
identical with the constitutional functions assigned to the State Election
Commission under Articles 243K and 243ZA of the Constitution of India.
69. However, insofar as the proviso to Section 6(1) is concerned, the position
has to be examined separately. The provision, to the extent it provides for an
appeal before the Minister-in-Charge of Urban Local Bodies where the Chief
Secretary also functions as the State Election Commissioner, creates an
appellate mechanism before a member of the political executive in matters
concerning electoral disqualification. Such an arrangement does not sufficiently
safeguard the requirement of an independent and impartial adjudicatory forum
and, to that limited extent, cannot be sustained.
70. Accordingly, the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Arunachal Pradesh Urban
Local Bodies (Disqualification on Grounds of Defection) Act, 2014, to the extent
it provides that the appeal shall lie before the Minister-in-Charge of Urban Local
Bodies in the State, is hereby declared unconstitutional and is struck down.
71. The remaining portion of Section 6(1) and Section 6(2) of the Arunachal
Page No.# 32/32
Pradesh Urban Local Bodies (Disqualification on Grounds of Defection) Act, 2014
are upheld. The appellate mechanism provided therein shall continue to operate
in accordance with law, subject to the observations made hereinabove.
72. It is made clear that this Court has not examined the legality, correctness
or merits of the proceedings arising out of Appeal No. 01/2024 or the notice
dated 11.12.2024 issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Arunachal
Pradesh, as the petitioners have consciously chosen not to challenge the said
proceedings and have confined their challenge only to the constitutional validity
of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 6 of the Act of 2014.
73.
Consequently, the writ petition stands partly allowed to the extent
indicated hereinabove. The challenge to Section 6(1) and Section 6(2) of the Act
of 2014 is rejected except to the limited extent of the proviso to Section 6(1),
which provides for “an appeal before the Minister-in-Charge of Urban Local
Bodies”. The parties shall bear their own costs.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
JUDGE
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