The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
23. 04.2024 Whether fit for reporting : _B_E_ F_O_R_E_ HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA _J_ U_ D_ G_ M_E_N_T_ The appeal arises out of the judgment dated 23/03/2023 and consequent decree thereof passed by Ld. District Judge, Khowai in Title Appeal No.12 of 2019 whereby the suit of the predecessor of plaintiff-appellants was dismissed. [2] Original plaintiff Rohini Kr. Rudra Paul (hereinafter referred as Plaintiff) who is the predecessor of present appellants filed the suit bearing Title Suit No.10 of 2017 in the Court of Ld. Civil Judge (Jr. Division) Khowai, Khowai Judicial District stating that his father Lt. Barada Charan Rudra Paul purchased “A” Schedule land of the plaint on 09.09.1987 from Lt. Radha Ranjan Acharjee who was the predecessor of original defendant- respondent Nos.1 & 2. On the same date, the plaintiff also purchased “B” Schedule land from said Lt. Radha Ranjan Acharjee by a separate registered sale deed. Thereafter in the year 2016, the plaintiff purchased “C” Schedule land from one Ratna Acharjee which is situated adjacent to Khowai-Teliamura Road on the western side of that road. [3] Admittedly, there is also a pathway (D- Schedule land) running from said Khowai-Teliamura Road towards west nearby the “B” Schedule land bearing plot No.2258 on its northern side. The Plaintiff i.e. predecessor of present appellants alleged that when he had purchased said “…
7. In the result, the appeal preferred by the appellants is allowed. The Judgment and decree passed by the trial court in Title Suit No.10 of 2017 is hereby set aside.” [7] In the second appeal, following substantial questions of law was formulated by this Court: “(i) Whether the findings of learned first appellate court are in accordance with the established principles of law of easement? (ii) Whether the findings of learned first appellate court suffer from perversity?” [8] Mr. Sisir Chakraborty, learned counsel representing the appellants submitted that all the purchased deeds and relevant Khatians were proved into evidence and Paschim Chebri Gram Panchayet also did certain maintenance work in the said disputed path by investing government money through MGNREGA scheme as it was being used by the general public and therefore, said fact amply suggested that “D” Schedule land was a public pathway. Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel further argued that there was no alternative pathway for the plaintiffs for the use of “A” Schedule land. [9] Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel also contended that the sketch map as was annexed with the plaint was not challenged by the defendants in their written statement and same would reflect that the said pathway was necessary for the use of “A” Schedule of land by the plaintiffs. According to Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel, sufficient evidences were…
Full Judgment Text
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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RSA No.16 of 2023
1. Smti Maya Rani Rudra Paul
W/o:- Lt. Rohini Kumar Rudra Paul
2. Smti Ruma Rani Rudra Paul
D/o:- Lt. Rohini Kumar Rudra Paul
3. Smti Jhuma Rani Rudra Paul
D/o:- Lt. Rohini Kumar Rudra Paul
4. Sri Rajat Kanti Rudra Paul
S/o:- Lt. Rohini Kumar Rudra Paul
All are resident of Chebri, P.O:- Chebri
Sub-Division:- Khowai, District:- Khowai Tripura.
……………Appellant(s).
Versus
1. Smti Sephali Acharjee
W/o:- Lt. Radha Ranjan Acharjee
2. Smti Subhra Acharjee
D/o:- Lt. Radha Ranjan Acharjee
3. Sri Rajat Acharjee
S/o:- Lt. Ranjit Acharjee
4. Sri Raktim Acharjee
S/o:- Lt. Rabindra Acharjee.
All are resident of Chebri, P.O:- Chebri
Sub-Division:- Khowai, District:- Khowai Tripura.
…………Respondent(s).
For Appellant(s)
:
:
Mr. Sisir Chakraborty, Advocate.
Mr. U. Das, Advocate.
For Respondent(s)
:
:
Mr. D.R. Chowdhury, Senior Advocate.
Mr. S. Sarkar, Advocate.
Date of Hearing
:
26.02.2024
Date of Judgment
:
23.04.2024
Whether fit for reporting :
NO
_B_E_ F_O_R_E_
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA
_J_ U_ D_ G_ M_E_N_T_
The
appeal
arises
out
of
the
judgment
dated
23/03/2023 and consequent decree thereof passed by Ld. District
Judge, Khowai in Title Appeal No.12 of 2019 whereby the suit of
the predecessor of plaintiff-appellants was dismissed.
[2]
Original plaintiff Rohini Kr. Rudra Paul (hereinafter
referred as Plaintiff) who is the predecessor of present appellants
filed the suit bearing Title Suit No.10 of 2017 in the Court of Ld.
Civil Judge (Jr. Division) Khowai, Khowai Judicial District stating
that his father Lt. Barada Charan Rudra Paul purchased “A”
Schedule land of the plaint on 09.09.1987 from Lt. Radha Ranjan
Acharjee
who
was
the
predecessor
of
original
defendant-
respondent Nos.1 & 2. On the same date, the plaintiff also
purchased “B” Schedule land from said Lt. Radha Ranjan Acharjee
by a separate registered sale deed. Thereafter in the year 2016,
the plaintiff purchased “C” Schedule land from one Ratna Acharjee
which is situated adjacent to Khowai-Teliamura Road on the
western side of that road.
[3]
Admittedly, there is also a pathway (D- Schedule land)
running from said Khowai-Teliamura Road towards west nearby
the “B” Schedule land bearing plot No.2258 on its northern side.
The Plaintiff i.e. predecessor of present appellants alleged that
when he had purchased said “A” Schedule land, said pathway was
the only way of ingress and egress on that plot and he used said
pathway till January of 2017, but when “C” Schedule land was
purchased by him in the year 2016, an opening passage was made
through “C” Schedule land for access to “A” Schedule land through
said opening passage from Khowai-Teliamura Road and in January,
2017 suddenly, the defendant-respondents or their representatives
started claiming that said pathway under Schedule D was on their
jote land and thereby they closed down the gate of the plaintiff
abutting to said pathway by giving fence. Along with the plaint, the
plaintiff also submitted one sketch map indicating location of each
schedule of land and said path under “D” Schedule land and also
location of lands of some other persons in the vicinity.
[4]
The defendant-respondents, in their written statement,
however, challenged the assertion of the original plaintiff that “C”
Schedule land was situated adjacent to Khowai-Teliamura Road
rather, according to them,
it was the “B” Schedule land of the
plaint through the middle portion of which there was/is a passage
connecting to said Khowai-Teliamura Road and the same was
being used by the plaintiff since his purchase of “A” Schedule land
as the pathway for access to the “A” Schedule land. Plaintiff
claimed that pathway as public pathway and sought for a
declaration that the pathway under “D” Schedule was the pathway
for public use and the plaintiff could not be prevented from using
the same, but the defendants denied the said claim of the plaintiff
that the pathway under “D” Schedule was a public pathway rather
it was their jote land and said pathway was being used for access
to “C” Schedule land of plaintiff which was located far way from
“A” Schedule land.
[5]
During trial, from the side of plaintiff, total 5(five)
witnesses including the original plaintiff were examined and some
documents were also proved into evidence but the defendants did
not adduce any evidence either oral or documentary. Ld. Trial
Court decreed the suit by declaring said pathway under “D”
Schedule to be public pathway and mandatory injunction was
issued directing the defendants to remove the obstruction created
by them raising the fence and closing the gate of the plaintiff
meant for going to “D” schedule land from “A” Schedule land. The
relevant portion of the observations and decisions of Ld. Trial
Court regarding issue Nos.(iii),(iv) & (v) are extracted below for
useful reference.
“Issue No.iii
On perusal of the plaint, the examination-inChief of the PWs it appears that the plaintiff is the
owner and in peaceful possession of the three plots of
lands Schedule A,B and C in the same vicinity which is
also supported by documentary evidence in the form of
Ext.2, Ext 3, Ext 5, Ext 6 and Ext.7 and this is also
admitted by the defendants in their W/S. It further
appears that the Khowai-Teliamura road is on the
eastern border of the schedule C land, and from the said
Khowai Teliamura Road passes a pathway towards the
west
connecting
as
many
as
twelve/thirteen
houses/families. Until 2016 (when the schedule – C
land was purchased) the plaintiff had only one opening
from the schedule A land i.e. one pathway in the north.
Only from 2016 after the purchase of the schedule land
there has been one opening through the Schedule C
land in the east. The plaintiff, for egress and ingress of
the schedule A land until 2016 use the only path
opening on the pathway on the north of the plot. It is
only after the acquisition of the Schedule C land the
plaintiff
can
use
the
other
way
opening
on
the
Teliamura road. The opening of Schedule A land on the
pathway has been used by the plaintiff since 1987.
Further, it is also evident from the Settlement Map of
Mouja Chebri (Ext.4) that the plaintiff uses the pathway
mentioned in D schedule of the plaint to ingress and
egress into his home stead.
Further, nothing material emerged which can
prevail over the documentary evidence adduced by
the plaintiff.
Accordingly issue No.iii is decided in the affirmative.
Issue No.iv & v
On perusal of the pleadings, the examination-inChief of the PWs it appears that the pathway (D
Schedule land) although constructed in the jote land but
it has been used as a public pathway. As many as 12/13
families used the said pathway to reach their respective
houses from the Khowai-Teliamura road. Moreover, in
August 2015 Government spent more than Rs.71,000/on
the
development
of
the
pathway
by
engaging
MGNREGA workers. This assertion of the plaintiff is also
supported by all the P/Ws and also by the documentary
evidence in the form of Exbt.1 (original copy of RTI
information dated 07.03.2017) where it is found that for
the formation of T.K. road to Maloy Acharjee‟s house,
word No.2 under Paschim Chebri GP Rs.71074/- was
spent. Further, it is evident from Exbt.8 (Certified copy
of Khatian No.652/1-4) that the said Maloy Acharjee
and the defendants are the relatives and they were the
joint owners of the land. It also appears from record
that In January 20017, Suddenly, the defendants and
their representatives and associates claimed that the
pathway is on their jote land and shall not be allowed to
be used by the plaintiff through the opening from the
Schedule A land and in order to stop the use on the
opening, the defendants and their family members have
closed the gate by raising a fencing. Though the
pathway is constructed on the jote land but it has been
used as a public pathway. As many as 12/13 families
use the said pathway to reach their respective houses
from the Khowai-Teliamura road. Thus, the defendants
cannot obstruct or prevent the plaintiff and his family
from using the pathway for their free movement. The
plaintiff and his family have been using the pathway for
their movement from Schedule A and to Schedule C land
for more than 30 years continuously
without any
obstruction. The pathway in spite of being a part of the
jote land it virtually becomes a public pathway for
common use. When all can use it and which is also
admitted by the defendants in their w/s and hence the
use by the plaintiff shall not create any difficulty for the
defendants and hence, they have no right to obstruct
the movement of the plaintiff through the pathway
using the opening from Schedule A.”
[6]
In appeal, Ld. First Appellate Court, however, set aside
the said judgment and decree based on the following observations:
“The key word under Section 39 of Specific
Relief Act is “Obligation”. Section 2 (a) of Specific Relief
Act, speaks of Obligation. Primarily it means every duty
enforceable by law. In the instant case the plaintiffrespondents has to show that the defendant-appellants
has a legal obligation to allow free movements from
scheduled “A” land. “Convenience” of any party and
„legal obligation‟ as define under Section 2 (a) of
Specific Relief Act are two separate issues. May be the
raising of the fencing as alleged by the plaintiffrespondents caused inconvenience and hardship to the
plaintiff-respondents
but
he
is
to
show
that
the
respondents have legal obligation to allow him to use
the path-way through the opening of “A” scheduled land
of the plaintiff-respondents. The plaintiff-respondent
admitted that the path-way is a jote land. From Exbt.4
i.e. the map it appears that the suit land (the path-way)
is far away from “C” scheduled land of the plaint, which
was purchased in 2016.
The plaintiff-respondent could not adduce any
convincing evidence which shows that the appellantdefendants are duty bound i.e. has a legal obligation to
allow
the
respondents
to
use
the
opening
on
a
scheduled “A” land towards the path-way (scheduled
“D”). So, the respondents cannot get a decree of
mandatory injunction U/s. 39 of the Specific Relief Act.
ORDER
7.
In the result, the appeal preferred by the
appellants is allowed.
The Judgment and decree passed by the trial
court in Title Suit No.10 of 2017 is hereby set aside.”
[7]
In the second appeal, following substantial questions of
law was formulated by this Court:
“(i)
Whether the findings of learned first appellate
court are in accordance with the established principles
of law of easement?
(ii)
Whether the findings of learned first appellate
court suffer from perversity?”
[8]
Mr. Sisir Chakraborty, learned counsel representing the
appellants submitted that all the purchased deeds and relevant
Khatians were proved into evidence and Paschim Chebri Gram
Panchayet also did certain maintenance work in the said disputed
path by investing government money through MGNREGA scheme
as it was being used by the general public and therefore, said fact
amply suggested that “D” Schedule land was a public pathway.
Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel further argued that there was no
alternative pathway for the plaintiffs for the use of “A” Schedule
land.
[9]
Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel also contended that
the sketch map as was annexed with the plaint was not challenged
by the defendants in their written statement and same would
reflect that the said pathway was necessary for the use of “A”
Schedule of land by the plaintiffs. According to Mr. Chakraborty,
learned counsel, sufficient evidences were led by the plaintiffs to
establish their claim and the plaintiffs had their easementary right
to use of said pathway for proper utilisation of “A” Schedule land
which was sold to the plaintiff by the predecessor of the defendant
nos. 1 & 2 and, therefore, they had their obligation to provide all
the facilities to the appellants or their predecessor for convenient
enjoyment of said property under “A” Schedule. Mr. Chakraborty,
learned counsel also relied on one decision of Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in Sree Swayam Prakash Ashramam & Anr. Versus G.
Anandavally Amma & Ors., (2010) 2 SCC 689 wherein at para
28 Hon‟ble Supreme Court referred one paragraph of another
decision of Calcutta High Court and the relevant paragraph is as
below:
“...
There could
be
no implied
grant
where the
easements are not continuous and non-apparent. Now
a right of way is neither continuous nor always an
apparent easement, and hence would not ordinarily
come under the rule. Exception is no doubt made in
certain cases, where there is a „formed road‟ existing
over one part of the tenement for the apparent use of
another portion or there is „some permanence in the
adaptation of the tenement‟ from which continuity may
be inferred, but barring these exceptions, an ordinary
right of way would not pass on severance unless
language is used by the grantor to create a fresh
easement.”
[ 10 ]
Mr. D R Chowdhury, learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents, however, contended in vehemence that in the
purchase deed of the plaintiff in respect of
“A” Schedule land,
there was no mention that said pathway was sacrificed for the use
of public or for the plaintiff and ROR regarding “D” Schedule land
itself mentioned that it was a „Ejmali‟ pathway and generally
„Ejmali‟ pathway signified that same was used jointly by the cosharers or their successors. Mr. Chowdhury, learned Senior
Counsel also argued that there were also other purchasers of lands
from the defendants or their predecessors adjacent to “A”
Schedule land but none of them had turned up to lodge any claim
over said pathway as public pathway. Learned Senior Counsel
further contended that both in the purchased deeds regarding “A”
Schedule land and “B” Schedule land there was no mention that
said pathway would be used by the plaintiff. According to him, the
First Appellate Court was completely justified in dismissing the suit
by way of setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial
Court.
[ 11 ]
On consideration of all the materials as available in the
record, specially the plaint and the document like the map, it is
found that there is mis-description of property in the plaint itself.
The defendants have rightly asserted that “C” Schedule land is not
adjacent to “A” Schedule land and, therefore, the assertion of the
plaintiffs that after purchase of “C” Schedule land he got one
opening way for access to Khowai-Teliamura Road from “A”
Schedule land through said “C” Schedule land is completely
incorrect. As per the hand sketch map as annexed with the plaint,
“A” Schedule land is shown to be located just to the west of “B”
Schedule land (and not “C” Schedule land) and as per the map of
the Revenue Department (Ext.4), the “A” Schedule plot No.2259
itself is located just adjacent to Khowai-Teliamura Road on the
southern side of “B” Schedule land (and not on western side)
intervened by another small plot. Similarly, plot No.2260 (not
involved in this suit) is situated on the contiguous west of plot
No.2258 of “B” Schedule land. There is no challenge by the
plaintiff regarding any sort of incorrect preparation of map by
revenue department. As per said Revenue Map, the plot No.2259
of “A” Schedule is not situated adjacent to said disputed path (DSchedule land) and, therefore, there is no question of claiming any
easementary right over the said path with reference to the use of
“A” Schedule land. Wrong assertions have also been made in the
plaint that “C” land is situated on the adjacent west of KhowaiTeliamura Road and that till said “C” schedule land was purchased,
the plaintiffs had only one passage through said path from “A”
schedule land. “C” schedule plot is located far away from “A”
schedule land and said road. The sketch map as annexed with the
plaint does also not coincide with the plaint‟s assertions. Moreover,
admitted position is that at present there is an alternative passage
of the plaintiff to go from “A” schedule land to said KhowaiTeliamura Road through said plot No.2258 under “B” Schedule
land. As per the Khatian(Exbt.8), said suit path has been shown as
„Ejmali‟ in the remark column and not any public pathway.
Therefore, Ld. First Appellate Court committed no err in up-setting
the judgment of the Trial Court.
In view of above, it is held that the appeal is devoid of
any merit and accordingly, same is dismissed with cost in favour of
the respondents.
Registry is to prepare the decree accordingly and to
send back the LCR with copy of this judgment and decree.
Pending
application(s),
if
any,
shall
also
stands
disposed of.
JUDGE
SATABDI DUTTA
Riki
DUTTA
Date: 2024.04.26 12:08:55 +05'30'
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