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GAHC040006342026
2026:GAU-AP:872
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/196/2026
Smti Godak Yania
Daughter of Late Godak Tabio, resident of Rakap Colony, near Petrol Pump, A Sector,
Naharlagun Circle, Papum Pare District, Arunachal Pradesh 791110
VERSUS
The State of AP and 2 Ors
represented by the Commissioner, Department of Power, Govt of Arunachal Pradesh,
Itanagar.
2:The Executive Engineer (E)
Age: 0
Occupation :
Naharlagun Electrical Division
Nirjuli
Department of Power
Govt of Arunachal Pradesh
Itanagar.
3:The Assistant Engineer (E)
Age: 0
Occupation :
Naharlagun Electrical Sub Division-I
Nirjuli
Department of Power
Govt of Arunachal Pradesh
Itanagar
Advocate for the Petitioner
: Taja Garam, Gichik Kaku,Byabang Mema
Advocate for the Respondent : Lissing Perme, SC(Power)
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BEFORE
Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI
Advocate for the petitioner:
Shri T. Garam
Advocates for the respondents: Shri L. Perme, SC-Power
Date on which judgment is reserved : NA
Date of pronouncement of judgment : 02.09.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the
operative part of the judgment?
: NA
Whether the full judgment has been pronounced? : Yes
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
An order dated 28.11.2025 issued by the Executive Engineer (E),
Naharlagun Electrical Division, Department of Power by which the petitioner has
been dismissed from her service is the subject matter of challenge in the
present writ petition instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2.
As per the facts projected, vide order dated 06.01.2023, the petitioner was
appointed as a casual Meter Reader (Unskilled) and was posted in the
Naharlagun Electrical Sub-Division-I. While discharging her duties, one of the
consumers had submitted an application for issuance of No Objection Certificate
(NOC) from the Power Department that there were no dues pending. The said
applicant was an aspiring candidate for the ensuing Panchayat elections.
Though the said application was addressed to the respondent no. 3, the
petitioner was directed to check the system for issuing NOC. As per the
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petitioner, upon entering the name of the applicant in the server no result was
shown which meant that no pending dues were there. Accordingly, the
petitioner had informed the respondent no. 3 leading to issuance of the NOC.
However, vide the impugned order dated 28.11.2025, the petitioner had
dismissed from her service on account of furnishing wrong information and
misleading the Assistant Engineer (E) for issuing the NOC.
3.
I have heard Shri T. Garam, learned counsel for the petitioner. I have also
heard Shri L. Perme, learned Standing Counsel, Power Department, who has
informed that affidavit-in-opposition has been filed followed by filing of a
rejoinder affidavit.
4.
Shri Garam, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that a bare
perusal of the impugned order dated 28.11.2025 would show that the petitioner
has been dismissed from service on certain misconduct, namely, furnishing
wrong information and misleading the Assistant Engineer (E). He has submitted
that though the service of the petitioner was casual in nature, such services
were being discharged to the best of her abilities and without any blemish. He
has also contended that no wrong information was given to the Assistant
Engineer resulting in issuance of the No Objection Certificate, as the information
was derived from the computer and the petitioner has also given a screenshot
of such findings. He has submitted that though the Department has disputed
this fact by submitting that there were in fact pending dues, the petitioner was
not given any opportunity or scope to explain or defend herself.
5.
In support of his submission that an opportunity is required to be afforded
before taking any adverse action off dismissal from service, he has relied upon
the following case law:
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a. Shamsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab [(1974) 2 SCC 831];
b. Om Prakash Goel Vs. HPTDC [(1991) 3 SCC 291];
c. U.P.S.R.T.C. Vs. Brijesh Kumar [2024 SCC OnLine SC 2282].
6.
In the case of Shamsher Singh (supra), a Constitutional Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the earlier decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court passed in Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. UoI reported in AIR
1958 SC 36 wherein the right of a probationer before being discontinued from
service has been reiterated. In the case of Om Prakash Goel (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, after discussing the law holding the field, has laid down
that even in a case of termination of a temporary employee on the ground of
misconduct, an enquiry in the spirit of Article 311(2) of the Constitution would
be required.
7.
In the recent case of U.P.S.R.T.C. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has laid down that even for a contractual employee who has been terminated
from service, the principles of natural justice are required to be followed.
8.
Per contra, Shri Perme, learned Standing Counsel, Power Department has
submitted that the very appointment of the petitioner had categorically stated
that his services were liable to be terminated at any point of time and without
any notice. He has defended the action by submitting that on a verification from
the system, dues were found against the applicant and the NOC was issued on
wrong information furnished by the petitioner. He has submitted that since the
petitioner was in casual service, there is no requirement to give him further
notice and the principles of natural justice would not apply in all cases. He has
submitted that such principles cannot be an unruly horse which can be applied
in all cases. He has further submitted that the petitioner was not entrusted to
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give the information and the same was actually entrusted to other staff.
9.
Shri Garam, learned counsel for the petitioner, in his rejoinder, has denied
the allegation that the petitioner had intentionally given wrong information. He
has reiterated that on verification from the system, as no dues were found
against the name of the applicant seeking such certificate, information was
given to the authority leading to issuance of the NOC.
10.
The rival submissions advanced in the Bar have been duly considered and
the materials placed before this Court have been carefully examined.
11.
As to whether the petitioner, while giving the information, had acted bona
fide or mala fide, would be in the realm of disputed questions of fact. However,
what is seen from the impugned order of the dismissal dated 28.11.2025 is that
the same was passed without giving any scope or opportunity to the petitioner
in the form of a show-cause notice or a hearing. While the Department has
taken a stand that some wrong information was given by the petitioner, taking
into account the projected case of the petitioner that such information, as
gathered by the petitioner did not reflect any dues, this Court is of the opinion
that the petitioner ought to have been given an opportunity before the
impugned order was passed. A bare perusal of the impugned order would show
that it is not a termination simpliciter, but an order of dismissal on certain
misconduct with the allegation of furnishing wrong information and misleading
the authorities. Such order of dismissal could definitely have adverse
consequences on the means of livelihood of the petitioner and also for his future
employment.
12.
As regards the position of law connected to this case is concerned, from
the case laws relied upon by the petitioner, it is clear that an opportunity is
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required to be given even for a casual employee. In the case of Shamsher
Singh (supra), the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
reiterated the principles made earlier, which were applicable even for a
probationer. In the subsequent case of Om Prakash Goel (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has made the following observations:
“4.
From the above decisions it can be seen that it is well settled that in
a case of an order of termination even that of a temporary employee the
court has to see whether the order was made on the ground of
misconduct if such a complaint was made and in that process the court
would examine the real circumstances as well as the basis and foundation
of the order complained of and if the court is satisfied that the termination
of services is not so innocuous as claimed to be and if the circumstances
further disclose that it is only a camouflage with a view to avoid an
enquiry as warranted by Article 311(2) of the Constitution, then such a
termination is liable to be quashed. In the abovementioned decisions, the
impugned termination order was accordingly quashed.”
13.
In the case of UPSRTC (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt
with the case of a contractual employee in the following manner:
“19. The services of the respondent have been determined solely on the
ground of misconduct as alleged but without holding any regular inquiry
or affording any opportunity of hearing to him. The termination order has
been passed on the basis of some report which probably was not even
supplied to the respondent. No show cause notice appears to have been
issued to the respondent. Therefore, the order of termination of his
services, even if on contractual basis, has been passed on account of
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alleged misconduct without following the Principles of Natural Justice. The
termination order is apparently stigmatic in nature which could not have
been passed without following the Principles of Natural Justice.”
14.
This Court is unable to accept the submissions advanced on behalf of the
Department that for a casual employee, no such opportunity is required to be
given in view of the terms of the employment. This Court is of the opinion that
though there may be a term in the appointment that such appointment can be
discontinued at any time without giving any notice, since the present
discontinuation is in the form of dismissal on account of misconduct, an
opportunity would be mandatorily required to be given to the delinquent
petitioner, which has admittedly not been done.
15.
In this connection, one may gainfully refer to the case of Manager Govt.
Branch Press &. Anr Vs. D. B. Belliawpa reported in AIR 1979 SC 429
wherein a three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has made the
following observations pertaining to the dismissal of the termination of
temporary employees:
“18. Mr. Veerappa's first contention is that Articles 14 and 16(1) of the
Constitution have no application, whatever, to the case of a temporary
employee whose service is terminated in accordance with the terms and
conditions of his service because the tenure or the duration of the
employment of such an employee is extremely precarious being
dependent upon the pleasure and discretion of the employer-State. In our
opinion, no such generalisation can be made. The protection of Articles
14 and 16(1) will be available even to such a temporary Government
servant if he has been arbitrarily discriminated against and singled out for
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harsh treatment in preference to his juniors similarly circumstanced. It is
true that the competent authority had a discretion under the conditions of
service governing the employee concerned to terminate the latter's
employment without notice. But, such discretion has to be exercised in
accordance with reason and fair play and not capriciously. Bereft of
rationality and fairness, discretion degenerates into arbitrariness which is
the very anti-thesis of the rule of law on which our democratic polity is
founded. Arbitrary invocation or enforcement of a service condition
terminating the service of a temporary employee may itself constitute
denial of equal protection and offend the Equality clause in Article
14 and 16(1). Article 16(1) guarantees "equality of opportunity for all
citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office
under the State". Moreover, according to the principle underlying Section
16 of the General Clauses Act, the expression "appointment" used
in Article 16(1) will include termination of or removal from service, also.
25. Another facet of Mr. Veerappa's contention is that the respondent had
voluntarily entered into a contract of service on the terms of employment
offered to him. One of the terms of that contract, embodied in tile letter
of his appointment is that his service was purely temporary and was liable
to termination at the will and pleasure of the appointing authority, without
reason and without notice. Having willingly accepted the employment on
terms offered to him, the respondent cannot complain against the
impugned action taken in accordance with those mutually agreed terms.
The argument is wholly misconceived. It is borrowed from the archaic
common law concept that employment was a matter between the master
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and servant only. In the first place, this rule in its original absolute form is
not applicable to Government servant. Secondly, even with regard to
private employment, much of it has passed into the fossils of time. "This
rule held the field at the time when the master and servant were taken
more literally than they are now and when, as in early Roman Law, the
rights of the servant, like the rights of any other member of the
household, were not his own, but those of his pater familias". The
overtones of this ancient doctrine are discernible in the Anglo-American
jurisprudence of the 18th century and the first half of the 20th century,
which rationalised the employer's absolute right to discharge the
employee. "Such a philosophy", as pointed out by K. K. Mathew J. (vide
his treatise: "Democracy, Equality and Freedom", page 326), "of the
employer's dominion over his employee may have been in tune with the
rustic simplicity of bygone days. But that philosophy is incompatible with
these days of large, impersonal, corporate employers." To bring it in tune
with vastly changed and changing socio-economic conditions and mores
of the day, much of this old antiquated and unjust doctrine has been
eroded by judicial decisions and legislation, particularly in its application to
persons in public employment, to whom the Constitutional protection
of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 is available. The argument is therefore
overruled.”
16.
In the conspectus of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order dated
28.11.2025 issued by the Executive Engineer (E), Naharlagun Electrical Division,
Department of Power is unsustainable in law and accordingly set aside.
Consequently, petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service. The respondent
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authorities however, would be at liberty to hold an inquiry by giving an
opportunity to the petitioner and take appropriate action in accordance with law,
if so advised.
17.
The writ petition accordingly stands allowed, in the manner, indicated
above.
18.
Cost made easy.
JUDGE
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