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Serial No. 01
Supplementary
List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 70 of 2017
Date of Decision: 28.06.2022
Smti. Bernadeth S. Sangma & Anr.
Vs.
G.H.A.D.C. & 3 Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
For the Respondent(s)
:
:
Mr. A.G. Momin, Adv.
Mr. S. Dey, Adv. for R 1-3.
Mr. K.Ch. Gautam, Adv. for R 4.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
This writ petition was preferred by the petitioner herein being
aggrieved by the order dated 29.02.2016 passed by the respondent No. 3
and the judgment and order dated 13.02.2017 passed by the respondent No.
2 relating to a dispute between the petitioner and the respondent No. 4
herein.
2.
The present dispute between the petitioner and the respondent No.
4 started with an application dated 03.11.2013 filed by one Shri Benon Ch.
Marak before the Executive Member, In-charge Revenue, Garo Hills
Autonomous District Council(GHADC), Tura seeking appointment of Smti
Wenalish Ch. Marak daughter of late Jingrin Sangma as Nokma of the
Sangsang- Nawalgre II-16 Akhing. On receipt of notice, the predecessorin-interest of the petitioner has filed the written statement with a
preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the said application on the
principles of resjudicata, waiver and acquiescence. In the meantime, the
predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner expired and was duly substituted
by the petitioner herein as Opposite Party.
3.
It is further averred that the learned Executive Member heard the
parties on the issue of maintainability, however, vide the impugned order
dated 29.02.2016, the case was decided on merits in its entirety in favour of
the respondent No 4.
4.
Being aggrieved by the said order dated 29.02.2016, the petitioner
then preferred an appeal before the learned Chief Executive Member, who
after hearing the parties has upheld the same and has dismissed the appeal
vide judgment and order dated 13.02.2017. Hence this petition.
5.
The background story leading to the present dispute according to
the petitioners is in respect of the Sangsanggiri II-16(5) Akhing. About a
century back, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent No. 4 herein,
Late Jingrin Nokma had mortgaged a portion of the said Akhing the
predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, Late Asansing Mouzadar for a sum
of ₹ 300/-(Rupees three hundred) only. Having failed to repay the said loan,
the said Akhing was then divided into four parts by the then Deputy
Commissioner, vide order dated 22.05.1920 and by such order, the land
which was mortgaged to Asansing being plot A was allotted to him. Jingrin
Nokma was allotted plot B.
6.
The predecessor-in-interest of the respondent No. 4 not being
satisfied with the said order dated 22.05.1920 in Case No. 58 Misc. of 191920 has approached the Deputy Commissioner, N.E. Perry for review of the
same which was rejected vide order dated 30.04.1921. Yet again, the
predecessor-in-interest of the respondent No. 4 filed a complaint before the
new Deputy Commissioner L.S. Bingeman who vide order dated
10.05.1923 has held that since the case was decided 2 years ago and
Asansing obtained the land, the petitioner (Jingrin Nokma) must pay the
Awil. As a last attempt, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent No. 4
once again raised up the issue before Mr. G.D. Walker, the Deputy
Commissioner in the year 1929, who has rejected the same holding that the
order dated 22.05.1920 cannot be appealed against due to lapse of time.
7.
Mr. A.G. Momin, learned counsel for the petitioners has
submitted that after a lapse of 84 years, the said application was filed before
the learned Executive Member, In-charge Revenue to register the name of
the respondent No. 4 as Nokma of the Sansang Nawalgre II-16 Akhing,
which is nonexistence.
8.
It is also submitted that notice was issued upon the petitioners
calling for filing of show cause against the said application dated
03.11.2013 and on the petitioner challenging the maintainability of the
ground that it is hit by the principle of resjudicata, waiver and acquiescence,
although the learned Executive Member heard the parties on the issue of
maintainability, yet while passing the impugned order, the case was decided
on merits without framing of issues and recording of evidence of the
witnesses.
9.
It is further submitted that the learned Executive Member having
given a go by to the proposition of law expounded in the case of Smti Dore
Sangma & Ors v. The Chief Executive Member, Garo Hills District
Council, Tura & Ors: (1988) 2 GLR 120 has occasioned a miscarriage of
justice which warrants the impugned orders to be set aside and quashed.
10.
Mr. K.Ch. Gautam, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 in
his reply has submitted that the actual historical background of this case is
that the Sangsanggiri II-16(5) Akhing belonged to the Chambugong clan
since time immemorial with the first Nokma being Kilpang Nokma and
Chri Mechik and the last recorded Nokma being Jingrin Sangma and Dijak
Ch. Marak. On the other hand, Manoda S. Sangma and Debonsing Marak
were the Nokma of Amindagre Akhing which belonged to the Singsang
Giri clan.
11.
It is however admitted that in the year 1920, the predecessor of
late Jingrin Nokma had mortgaged his land to Late Kanjing Koch who is
the father of late Asansing Marak, but the same was paid back in the year
1920 itself. However, even after repayment of the same, Late Kanjing Koch
refused to return the mortgaged Akhing land to Jingrin Sangma.
12.
Another contention raised by the learned counsel is that though
Late Asansing, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners was the Nokma
of Amindagre Akhing, yet he claimed to be the Nokma of Sangsanggiri
Akhing II-16(5) when it is well settled that as per the customary law and
practice of the Garos, no person can become the Nokma of two Akhing.
This was also held by the then Deputy Commissioner G.D. Walker vide his
order dated 02.04.1929 which reads as follows:
“Asansingh may be the Nokma of Amindagiri or he may be the
Nokma of Sangsangiri but he cannot be the Nokma of both.
He had better choose which A’king he wants”.
13.
Even otherwise, the fact that the predecessor of the respondent
No. 4, Jingrin Nokma had mortgaged his land, such mortgage is invalid
since according to Garo customs and practices, Akhing land cannot be
mortgaged without the consent of the mother of the house, Charchis and
prominent female members of the mother’s Machong.
14.
Finally, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 has
submitted that the petitioners have failed to adduce any evidence in support
of their claim of Nokmaship of Sangsanggiri II-16(5) and since they cannot
bring anything on record that their predecessor-in-interest was the
registered Nokma of the said Akhing, raising the issue of resjudicata and
estoppel would not come to their aid. The impugned orders passed by the
learned Executive Member and the learned Chief Executive Member
respectively are therefore valid and the same may not be disturbed by this
Court.
15.
Mr. S. Dey, learned Standing counsel, GHADC in support of the
impugned orders has virtually endorsed the submission made by the learned
counsel for the respondent No. 4, inasmuch as, he has reiterated that Late
Asansing Marak has approached the then Deputy Commissioner for
approval as Nokma of Sangsang- Nawalgre II 16(5), but vide order dated
06.04.1956, the Deputy Commissioner has rejected the claim on the ground
that as per Garo customary law, no person can be the Nokma of two
Akhings. The Akhing in question belongs to the respondent No. 4 clan.
16.
As to the effect of the said mortgage of Late Jingrin Sangma, it is
submitted that the same was done contrary to Garo customary law since
there is no consent of the Chras (clan members) to the said transaction and
since an Akhing land is a community land, there is no practice that such
Akhing can be switched to other clan or Maharis.
17.
The petitioners have also failed to raise their grievance as per law
and inspite of having been given sufficient time for submitting their claim
over the said Akhing land, they could not adduce evidence in support of
their claim, except to produce document pertaining to the Amindagre
Akhing and not for Sangsanggiri- Nawalgre Akhing.
18.
In conclusion, the learned Standing counsel has submitted that
there is no illegality or irregularity in the impugned orders and this writ
petition may be dismissed as devoid of merits.
19.
This Court upon hearing the argument of the parties have given
due consideration to the submissions made. The facts as detailed above may
not be repeated, however what is apparent is that an application dated
03.11.2013 for registration of Smti. Wenalish Ch. Marak, the respondent
No. 4 herein as the Nokma of Sangsanggiri-Nawalgre II-16(5) Akhing was
filed before the learned Executive Member, In-Charge, Revenue, GHADC.
The petitioners herein were issued notices calling upon them to show cause
against the said application.
20.
Accordingly, from the records of the proceedings before the
learned Executive Member, which was registered as Rev A.King Case No.
5 A.C of 2013, the matter was first taken up on 24.09.2013 with a direction
to the parties to file the written statement. It is assumed that the written
statement has been filed since the matter has proceeded for filing of
suggested issues and the same was accordingly filed as was indicated vide
order dated 28.05.2015 which reads as follows:
“28-5-2015
Both the parties are present and represented. Both the
parties has filed suggested issue suggested by the parties are
accordingly framed.
Fix on 18-6-2015 for hearing on issues of law.”
Again, vide order dated 15.12.2015, the learned Executive
Member heard the submission of both the parties from both sides and
accordingly, fixed the matter for order. Eventually, the impugned order
dated 29.02.2016 was passed deciding the matter in favour of the
respondent No. 4 herein.
21.
At this juncture, it would be prudent to consider the relevant
provision of ‘The Garo Hills Autonomous District (Social Customs and
Usages) Validating Act, 1958’, the preamble which reads as follows:
“Whereas some doubts have arisen as to the legal force of the
social customs and usages now prevalent in the District of
Garo Hills.
It is therefore expedient that an Act should be made to
validate these social customs and usages which are not against
morality or public policy”.
What is now understood is that all disputes relating to issues
regarding customs and usages in the Garo Hills, including disputes relating
to or connected with any Akhing as provided under Section 8 of the said
Act has to be preferred before the Revenue Member and on appeal before
the Chief Executive Member of the District Council.
22.
As to the procedure to be adopted by the District Council, more
particularly by the learned Executive Member, Revenue, the issue is well
settled by a judicial pronouncement in the case of Smti. Dore Sangma &
Ors (supra) wherein at para 20 of the same, the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court
has held as follows:
“20. For all those reasons, we would hold that the Revenue
Member alone has jurisdiction to decide the types of disputes
at hand. But then while doing so, the Revenue Member has to
follow the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; these
being: (1) framing of issues which has been regarded as
necessary for courts to get the grip of the case. (2) Opportunity
to lead evidence on the issues framed-the evidence given could
be recorded in full or summary of the same could be noted;
and (3) hearing of the parties themselves or through their
lawyers if engaged. This apart, some other accepted principles
of sound judicial procedure like not allowing a document to be
used in a case without the other side having been given
opportunity to rebut the same should also be followed when
the case is taken up by the Revenue Member in the first
instance or by the Chief Executive Member on appeal”.
23.
Coming back to the case in hand, as noticed above, the matter
between the parties before the learned Executive Member has reached to a
point where suggested issues have been forwarded by both the parties.
However, nothing from the record shows that issues have been framed and
further, that the lists of witnesses have been sought from the parties so as to
enable the learned Executive Member to record the evidence.
24.
It could be presumed that the learned Executive Member has
taken up the issue of maintainability at the first instance, however the
manner in which the impugned order was passed does not reveal that any
point of law was considered and any conclusion arrived at as to whether the
application and prayer of the respondent No. 4 as applicant therein is
maintainable or not. Rather, what is evident is that the learned Executive
Member has passed the impugned order and has decided the merits of the
case between the parties.
25.
Viewed in the light of the established procedure which was
required to be followed by the learned Executive Member, it can be seen
that the procedure as prescribed in the case of Smti Dore Sangma & Ors
(supra) at paragraph 20 was not followed. This has vitiated the trial and has
left the parties, especially the aggrieved party without any means to prove
their case through evidence and documents.
26.
Irrespective of the conclusion reached by the learned Executive
Member as well as the learned Chief Executive Member in the impugned
orders, since a procedural defect has occurred, this Court has no option, but
to discard validity of the impugned orders.
27.
The said impugned orders dated 29.02.2016 and 13.02.2017
respectively are hereby set aside and quashed.
28.
The matter is remanded to the learned Executive Member, In-
Charge, Revenue, GHADC with a direction to frame the issues and to allow
the parties to adduce evidence and thereafter, to hear the parties and to pass
necessary orders in accordance with law and procedure.
29.
It is made clear that the learned Executive Member, In-Charge,
Revenue, GHADC is not to be influenced by the impugned order which has
been set at naught.
30.
In view of the above, this petition is hereby disposed of. No costs.
31.
Registry is directed to return the records duly produced before this
Court.
Judge
Meghalaya
28.06.2022
“D. Nary, PS”
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