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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RSA No.29 of 2024
1. Smti Aparna Rudra Paul
Aged about 39 years, wife of Sri. Pradip Rudra Paul, resident ofTuichindrai, P.S- Teliamura, District-Khowai, Tripura, Pin-799205
2. Sri Pradip Rudra Paul
aged about 46 years, son of Lt. Kebal Rudra Paul, resident ofTuichindrai, P.S- Teliamura, Dist- Khowai, Tripura, Pin-799205.
Vs.
…….Defendant-Appellants
1. Smti Sipra Das
wife of late Biresh Chandra Das, resident of Tuichindrai, P.S-Teliamura,
District- Khowai, Tripura, Pin-799205
2. Sri. Bishu Das
son of late Biresh Chandra Das, resident of Tuichindrai, P.S-Teliamura,
District- Khowai, Tripura, Pin-799205
Serial Nos. 1 and 2 are represented by their alleged attorney Sri
Swapan Das, son of late Sailesh Chandra Das, resident of
Dharmanagar, Sukantapalli, P.S- Teliamura, District- Khowai, Tripura,
Pin-799205
……Plaintiff-Respondents
For the Appellant(s)
:
Mr. Sankar Lodh, Advocate
Mr. Subham Majumder, Advocate
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. D.K. Biswas, Sr. Advocate
Mr. S.S. Debnath, Advocate
Date of hearing
:
19.03.2025
Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order
:
19.05.2025
Whether fit for reporting
:
Yes
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.D. PURKAYASTHA
JUDGMENT & ORDER
The appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated
20.03.2024, passed by learned Addl. District Judge, Khowai, in
Case No. Title Appeal No.03 of 2023 whereby the appeal of the
defendant-appellants was dismissed.
2.
The suit land comprises of an area of 0.19 acres
under mouja-Tuichindrai, tehsil- Hawaibari recorded in Khatian
No.437 against R.S Plot No.3192 & 3195. According to the
plaintiff-respondents, the original owner of the land was one
Ruhini Kumar Das who transferred the same to Biresh Chandra
Das (now deceased) and Pijush Kanti Das (original plaintiff No.3
and now deceased) jointly, vide registered Sale Deed No. 11481, dated 28.03.1976 (Exbt. A1 to A3). Biresh Chandra Das
died on 27.03.2012, leaving behind him the present respondents
as his legal representatives. In the original plaint, said late Pijush
Kanti Das was plaintiff No.3 who has meanwhile died, but
substitution of his legal representatives was not made.
3.
The plaintiffs also asserted in the plaint that on
request of the mother of present appellant-defendant No.2 on
23.07.2009, they allowed the appellant-defendants to stay within
the suit land for 02 years, but when in the year 2011 they were
requested to vacate the same, the mother of defendant No.2
vacated the same, but the present defendants, who are her
daughter-in-law and son respectively, did not leave the land.
Thereafter,
on
20.06.2016
the
present
defendants
gave
boundary fencing around the suit land and dispossessed the
original plaintiffs therefrom. In that contexts, the suit was filed to
declare the right, title and interest of the original in the suit land
and to recover possession of it. All the plaintiffs appointed one
Swapan Das as their attorney through a Power of Attorney deed
(Exbt.C), authorizing him to institute the suit on their behalf and
accordingly he instituted the same.
4.
The present appellants, i.e. the original defendants in
their written statement state that the original owner of the suit
land was one Jamini Paul and not Ruhini Kumar Das and the ROR
would also stand in his name, but simultaneously they have also
claimed adverse possession of the suit land w.e.f. 05.07.1991.
5.
Both sides led their respective evidences during trial
and learned Trial Court ultimately decreed the suit.
6.
Being aggrieved thereby, the present appellants
preferred Title Appeal No.10 of 2018 and learned First Appellate
Court i.e. the court of learned District Judge allowed the appeal
and remanded the matter back to the learned Trial Court to
decide the suit afresh by giving issue-wise decision. Then, the
present respondents preferred an appeal before the High Court
bearing SAO No.2 of 2020, but it came to the notice that original
plaintiff No.3, namely, Pijush Kanti Das expired in Bangladesh
and challenge was made in this regard by the respondents of that
appeal.
Then
without
causing
any
substitution
of
legal
representatives there, the present respondents withdrew the
appeal, and as a consequence thereof, the remand order as was
passed by learned First Appellate Court became final.
7.
by
On 09.12.2021, a petition was filed in the Trial Court
the
attorney
of
the
plaintiffs
to
substitute
the
legal
representatives of plaintiff No. 3, late Pijush Kanti Das, namely
his wife, Smt. Arati Rani Das, and son, Sri Jiban Krishna Das,
residing at North Harishyama, Madhbpur, Habiganj, Bangladesh.
Along with the said petition, photocopy of one deed of Power of
Attorney in favour of one Attorney Swapan Das by the said two
legal representatives on 03.01.2021 before the Notary Public at
Bangladesh and one photocopy of Legal Heirship Certificate
issued by one Chairman of 5, Andiura Union Council, Madhapur
standing in the name of said Arati Rani Das and Jiban Krishna
Das as legal representatives of Pijush Kanti Das, son of Late
Dinesh Chandra Das of Harishyama, Madhapur, were also
submitted. When said petition was pending before the learned
Trial Court, again on 03.02.2022, two further petitions were
submitted on behalf of the said plaintiffs; one for condoning the
delay in filing the petition for setting aside of abatement and
another petition for setting aside of abatement. Defendants also
filed another petition on the same day under Section 151 CPC
asserting that said Pijush Kanti Das had left 3(three) daughters
and the wife as his legal representatives and therefore the names
which were mentioned in the certificate as legal representatives
of Pijush Kanti Das were not correct and thus an enquiry was
required for verification of the authenticity of the said certificate
and simultaneously, they also prayed for a direction to the
plaintiffs to supply the annexed documents with the Passport and
Visa of the Attorney for verification of the survival certificate and
alleged deed of Power of Attorney and also for verification of
Passport and Visa of the Attorney to show as to how he had gone
to Bangladesh to get the said deed of Power of Attorney
executed.
8.
On 25.08.2022, the learned Trial Court rejected the
said two petitions filed on 03.02.2022, seeking condonation of
delay and for setting aside of abatement being not moved and
consequently, the court
also
rejected the petition of the
defendants seeking a direction for verification of said Legal
Heirship Certificate, Passport and Visa of the plaintiffs’ Attorney,
as purpose of the said petition was frustrated due to rejection of
said two petitions submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs. At that
time and prior thereto, the petition for substitution of legal
representatives filed by the plaintiffs were not rejected, rather
same was rejected on 05.11.2022 holding that the suit was
abated against plaintiff No.3.
9.
Thereafter, learned Trial Court proceeded to hear the
arguments of both sides and finally passed the judgment on
17.12.2022 by decreeing the suit in favour of two plaintiffs i.e.
present respondents declaring their right, title and interest in
respect of whole portion of the suit land and also allowing their
prayer for recovery of possession by evicting the defendants from
the suit land. Against the said judgment, the appeal bearing T.A
No.03 of 2023 was preferred by the defendants before the
learned District Judge, Khowai which is also dismissed by Ld.
Addl. District Judge, Khowai by the impugned judgment.
10.
Now in this appeal, the primary question that arises
for consideration is as to whether learned Trial Court and learned
First Appellate Court were justified in granting decree in respect
of the whole portion of the suit land in favour of the two plaintiffs
when third plaintiff was already dead and when the suit was
decided without the substitution of legal representatives of
plaintiff No.3.
11.
At the time of admission of this second appeal,
following substantial questions of law have been formulated by
this Court:“(i) Whether right to sue survived in favour of the
plaintiff-respondents alone after the death of
Pijush Kanti Das.
(ii) Whether the judgment of both the learned trial
court and the first appellate court are perverse at
law.”
12.
During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the
appellants, Mr. Sankar Lodh submits that the approach taken by
the learned Trial Court and as affirmed by the learned First
Appellate Court by decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiffs
was wholly perverse, as all the 3(three) plaintiffs were the joint
owners of the suit land and their ownership was inseparable from
each other, and thus, when the suit was abated against the
deceased plaintiff, it resulted in abatement of the whole suit.
Learned counsel, Mr. Lodh, relied on the decisions of Hon’ble
Apex
court,
in
Representatives
case
vs.
of
Hemareddi
Ramachandra
through
Yallappa
Legal
Hosmani
reported
in
(2019)
SCC
and
Sunkara
Lakshminarasamma vs. Sagi Subba Raju and Ors. reported
in (2019) 11 SCC 787. Mr. Lodh, learned counsel also relied on
another decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Executive
Officer,
Arulmigu
Chokkanatha
Swamy
Koil
Trust,
Virudhunagar vs. Chandran and Ors reported in (2017) 3
SCC 702 wherein at para 29, it was observed that one of the
issues framed in that suit was whether the suit was bad for nonjoinder of parties, and said issue was answered against the
plaintiff, but, without adverting to the said findings of the Trial
Court and the First Appellate Court, the High Court decreed the
suit in favour of the plaintiff. Hon’ble Supreme Court in that
perspective observed that such finding of the High Court was
erroneous and ultimately upset the judgment of the High Court.
The above-said decision, in my considered opinion, is not much
relevant for the issues involved in the present case.
13.
Learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
plaintiff-
respondents, Mr. S.S. Debnath, argues that after the suit was
decreed by learned Trial Court, on the basis of the same, an
execution petition was filed by the plaintiffs and the decree was
already executed during pendency of the first appeal in the first
round, but the appellants have suppressed the said fact before
the Court. To justify the decision of learned First Appellate Court,
learned counsel, Mr. Debnath relies on a decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court rendered in A. Viswanatha Pillai and Ors vs.
The Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition No.IV and Ors.,
(1991) 4 SCC 17. According to him, after completion of the
execution process, all rights of the defendants in respect of the
suit land have been extinguished. Ld. Counsel also submits that
the plaintiff No.3 died after the execution. Mr. Lodh, learned
counsel in this regard replies that the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court rendered in A. Viswanatha Pillai (supra) is
misplaced.
14.
Before adverting to the points as argued by the
learned counsel of both sides, some important evidences and
materials placed on record by the parties require some reference.
Though
learned
counsel,
Mr.
S.S.
Debnath
submits
that
execution was completed on 23.08.2019, but no such document
is placed in the record. Anyway, as per the petition for
substitution as submitted by the plaintiffs, the date of death of
plaintiff No.3, Pijush Kanti Das is not mentioned by them. Even in
the annexed documents submitted with said petition also, no
such date was mentioned. Therefore, the point as raised by
learned counsel, Mr. Debnath that during the pendency of the
first appeal in the first round of litigation, said Pijush Kanti Das
expired, requires no further discussion and consideration.
15.
The plaintiffs proved the original purchase deed
bearing number 1-1481 dated 28.03.1976 which shows that late
Biresh Chandra Das (predecessor of plaintiff Nos.1 and 2) and
late Pijush Kanti Das purchased 0.19 acre of land with two
different boundaries from one Ruhini Kumar Das. Said Biresh
Chandra Das and Pijush Kanti Das appear to be two brothers.
The khatian No.437 (Ext.B) was subsequently mutated based on
the said deed in the names of the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs namely
Sipra Das and Bishnu Das, according to the Khatian, are having
25% share each in the suit land and said Late Pijush Kanti Das
was having 50% share therein. Khatian creates the impression
that the suit land still remains in jointness of all the owners. It is
also not the claim of the plaintiffs that said land was partitioned
among the said two brothers or between the plaintiffs.
16.
Keeping in mind said facts of jointness of ownership
as co-sharers, we may now examine the relevant provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, ‘CPC’) applicable in the
related dispute. Order 22 Rule 3 of CPC deals with the matter of
substitution in case of death of one of several plaintiffs or of sole
plaintiff, and the relevant provision is extracted hereunder:
“3. Procedure in case of death of one of several
plaintiffs or of sole plaintiff.-(1) Where one of two or
more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to
the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or a sole plaintiff
or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives,
the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall
cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to
be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.
(2) Where within the time limited by law no
application is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate
so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned, and, on the
application of the defendant, the Court may award to him
the costs which he may have incurred in defending the
suit, to be recovered from the estate of the deceased
plaintiff.”
17.
As per sub-Rule (1) of Rule 3, when one or more
plaintiffs dies (as applicable in the instant case) and the right to
sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone,
the Court, on an application made in that behalf shall cause the
legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party
and shall proceed with the suit. As per sub-Rule (2), if no
application is made within the prescribed period of limitation
under sub-Rule (1), the suit shall abate, so far the deceased
plaintiff is concerned.
(Emphasis Supplied).
18.
Rule 9(1) of Order 22 envisages that where a suit
abates or is dismissed under this order, no fresh suit shall be
brought on the same cause of action. As per sub-rule (2) of rule
9,
the
plaintiff
or
the
person
claiming
to
be
the
legal
representative of a deceased plaintiff may apply for an order to
set aside the abatement or dismissal and if it is proved that he
was prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the suit,
the Court shall set aside the abatement or dismissal upon such
terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit.
19.
There is no dispute in this case that no substitution of
legal representatives of said plaintiff No.3 (Pijush Kanti Das) was
made in the suit and therefore, the suit abated in respect of him.
Now, the question falls for consideration whether such abatement
in respect of deceased Plaintiff No.3 disentitle the other plaintiffs
from getting the decree in their favour, more particularly when
they are owners of the suit land to the extent of 50%.
20.
Before delving upon the issue as involved in this
appeal, reference is required to be made of the decision to the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hemareddi (supra), as relied on by
Mr. Lodh, Ld. Counsel. In that case, Govindareddi was propositus
who died leaving behind him two sons and a daughter. The
plaintiffs were children of one son and the defendant No.2 was
the wife of another son. Suit property was joint family property
of said Govindareddi. The plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration
that defendant No.1 was not the adopted son of defendant No.2
and therefore he had no interest in the suit property. Another
suit was also filed by the plaintiff, bearing number O.S. No.66 of
1990, against defendant No.2 for declaration that she had no
right in the property. There also some allegations were made
that she had created false document of adoption, adopting the
defendant No.1 as her son. The Trial Court dismissed the suit and
upheld the adoption. Then first appeal was preferred before the
High Court and during pendency of the appeal, the second
plaintiff died, but his legal representatives were not substituted,
and the appeal abated qua the second appellant. The High Court
took the view that having regard to the decree that had been
passed, the appeal could not abate only qua the second appellant
but as a whole. Against the said decision, the parties came
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In that background, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: –
“14. Admittedly, steps were not taken for substitution in
regard to the second appellant. The appeal, therefore,
abated qua him as is declared by Order 22 Rule 3(2).
Though this is all that Order 22 Rule 2 declares, the
principle has evolved that in certain kinds of litigation, the
consequences of abatement qua a party are not limited to
the deceased party alone but it affects all the other parties
and the litigation itself. In other words, a suit or an appeal
as the case may be, would suffer an untimely demise by
the proceeding abating as a whole.
15. The question which we are called upon to answer is
whether this is such a case? The allegation in the plaint as
we have noticed is that the suit properties are joint
properties and the second defendant had no exclusive right
to the property. She had created a false document
described as an adoption deed by which she has purported
to adopt the first defendant. The first defendant cannot
claim any right to the suit property as an adopted son. On
the alleged date of adoption, the husband of the second
defendant was alive. He had died on 16-4-1987, in
jointness with the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were the joint
owners of the suit land and also other property. When
Basavareddi, the husband of the second defendant was
alive, she has no right to take the first defendant on
adoption. Defendant 1 cannot claim any title interest or
right over the suit property
16. In this case having noted pleadings and the relief
sought we can proceed on the basis that it was the
appellant's case that the plaintiff's property was the joint
family
property
belonging
to
the
appellant
and
his
deceased brother. The trial court dismissed the suit. The
result is that the adoption of the first defendant by the
second defendant which was challenged by the appellant
and his late brother was upheld.
17. The said judgment was called in question in a single
appeal by the appellant and his late brother. It is while the
appeal was so pending that the late brother passed away.
The appeal having abated in regard to the late brother, the
decree of the trial court has become final qua the deceased
brother of the appellant. The effect of the same is that the
adoption is found legal. The result of the appellant being
allowed to proceed further and succeed in the appeal
would be the passing of a decree by the High Court. The
said decree would be to the effect that the adoption is
invalid. The suit which was jointly filed by the appellant
and his late brother would have to be decreed whereas the
suit filed by the appellant and his late brother stands
dismissed by the trial court. Both the decrees cannot stand
together. There would be irreconcilable conflict. The
defendants are common. They would be faced with two
decrees regarding the same subject-matter which are
irrevocably conflicting.”
21.
In that case, another decision of Hon’ble Supreme
Court rendered in State of Punjab vs. Nathu Ram, AIR 1962
SC 89 was also referred wherein at para 6, the test to determine
whether in case of a death of party will result in abatement of the
whole suit was discussed. Said paragraph is reproduced here
under:
“6. The question whether a court can deal with such
matters or not, will depend on the facts of each case and
therefore no exhaustive statement can be made about the
circumstances when this is possible or is not possible. It
may, however, be stated that ordinarily the considerations
which weigh with the court in deciding upon this question
are whether the appeal between the appellants and the
respondents other than the deceased can be said to be
properly constituted or can be said to have all the
necessary parties for the decision of the controversy
before the court. The test to determine this has been
described in diverse forms. Courts will not proceed with an
appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the
court's coming to a decision which be in conflict with the
decision
between
the
appellant
and
the
deceased
respondent and therefore which would lead to the court's
passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree
which had become final with respect to the same subjectmatter
between
the
appellant
and
the
deceased
respondent; (b) when the appellant could not have
brought the action for the necessary relief against those
respondents alone who are still before the court; and (c)
when the decree against the surviving respondents, if the
appeal succeeds, be ineffective, that is to say, it could not
be successfully executed.”
22.
In case of Hemareddi (supra), finally the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that the decree, which the appellant, if
successful in the appeal, would obtain, would be absolutely
contrary to the decree that has also attained finality between his
late
brother
and
the
defendants
and
they
are
mutually
irreconcilable and totally inconsistent, and accordingly, the
decision of the High Court that the appeal was abated not only in
respect of the second appellant/plaintiff, but as a whole, was
affirmed. In Sunkara Lakshminarasamma (supra) as relied
on by learned counsel Mr. Lodh, at para 12, it was held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court that under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC, if no
application is made to implead the legal representatives of the
deceased defendant, the suit shall abate as against a deceased
defendant and not as a whole. If the interest of co-defendants
are separate, as in case of co-owners, the suit will abate only as
regards the particular interest of deceased party, but if the case
is of such a nature that the absence of the legal representatives
of the diseased respondents prevents the court from hearing the
appeal as against other respondents, then the appeal abates in
toto, otherwise the abatement takes place only in respect of the
interest of the respondent who has died. In that case also it was
observed that the test which is often adopted in such cases is
whether, in the event of an appeal being allowed as against the
remaining respondents there would or would not be two
contradictory decrees in the same suit with respect to the subject
matter.
23.
In A. Viswanatha Pillai (supra), as relied upon by
learned
counsel,
Mr.
Debnath,
the
coparceners’
property
devolved upon four brothers on the death of the propositus.
Thereafter, four brothers also partitioned certain properties, but
one Chalai Anicut was kept as common stock which was acquired
by Government and said property before acquisition was under
management of the eldest brother. The LA Collector made award
to all the four brothers at 1/4th share each. The eldest brother
sought reference, being dissatisfied with the award. The question
for determination that arose in this case was whether, in a
reference sought by one of the co-owners, other co-owners who
did not express the said reference are entitled to enhance
compensation on pro-rata basis. While discussing said point,
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that it is settled law that one of
the co-owners can file a suit and recover the property against
stranger and the decree would enure to all the co-owners. It was
further observed that no co-owner has a definite right, title and
interest in a particular item or a portion thereof, on the other
hand, he has right, title and interest in every part and parcel of
joint property or coparcenery property under Hindu law by all the
coparceners. Finally, Hon’ble Supreme Court held in that case
that the claimants were entitled to payment of enhanced award
on pro-rata basis of their 1/4th share each.
24.
Now, in the case at hand, as already discussed above,
said late Pijush Kanti Das was a joint owner with present
respondents having 50% share therein. It is also not disputed
that present appellants are stranger in the property and their
claim of adverse possession failed in absence of any satisfactory
evidence in this regard. Now, the Trial Court has passed decree
declaring ownership of present respondents in respect of the
whole suit land whereas they have only 50% share therein, and
therefore, a manifest error has been committed by learned Trial
Court by granting decree of declaration of right, title and interest
of the respondents in respect of the whole property and said
mistake has been carried over by subsequent affirmation of said
judgment and decree by learned First Appellate Court. The
decree of such declaration of ownership ought to have been
restricted only to the extent of 50% share of the respondents
therein by moulding the relief in view of non-impleadment of
legal representative of said Lt. Pijush Kanti Das.
25.
So far the prayer for decree of recovery of possession
is concerned, as discussed above, law is fairly settled that every
co-owner has his right, title and interest in every part and parcel
of the joint property unless the same is partitioned and
possession of one co-owner represents possession of all the coowners in such property. It is also settled that one co-owner can
maintain a suit for recovery of property against the stranger to
the benefit of other co-owners.
26.
Now the issue which is required to be examined is-
whether due to non-impleadment of Pijush Kanti Das, the suit
abated as a whole. In the light of the test as laid down in Nathu
Ram (supra), said issue may be examined now. Here, in the
written
statement,
though
the
appellants
claimed
adverse
possession of the suit land, but no counter claim or cross suit
was instituted by them in this regard and therefore, there is no
scope of any conflicting decree if the present suit is decreed in
favour of the appellants. In the present case, such information of
death of plaintiff no.3 was brought before the High Court when
the Court was hearing an appeal against an order of remand of
original suit for fresh decision by Ld. Trial Court and on
withdrawal of the appeal, said order of remand of the suit
became final. Therefore, at that time there was no decree passed
by Ld. Trial Court which could bind the deceased plaintiff and
could give a scope for creating a situation of existence of two
conflicting decrees. In fact, the first decree was passed at the
lowest grade when already plaintiff no.3 was dead. Therefore,
there is no scope of having a situation of existence of two
conflicting decrees in the instant suit. The present case is also
not a case of such nature where the plaintiffs could not have
brought the action for necessary relief against the stranger
appellants alone without substitution of the legal representatives
of late Pijush Kanti Das. It is the specific case of the respondents
that respondent No.1, Smt. Sipra Das herself, allowed the
appellants to stay inside the suit land and not said late Pijush
Kanti Das. As to the third test, it can also be said that it is not
such a case that the decree cannot be executed effectively
against the defendant-appellants and moreover, it is also not a
case of substitution of legal representative of any deceased
defendant. Therefore, the instant suit qualifies all the three tests.
Thus, practically, the suit abates only against the deceased
plaintiff no.3 and not as a whole.
27.
In view of above discussions and the conclusion as
finally arrived, the appeal is partly allowed. The decree of the
learned Trial Court is modified partially in the manner that the
right, title and interest of the plaintiff-respondents, Smt. Sipra
Das and Sri Bishu Das in the suit property is declared to the
extent of 50% share therein subject to partition in due course.
The decree of recovery of possession as granted by Ld. Trial
Court is affirmed.
28.
The appeal is disposed of with the above said terms
and the substantial questions of law as framed are answered
accordingly. No cost is awarded to any of the parties.
29.
Registry is directed to prepare the decree and re-
consign the records of learned courts below with the copies of
this judgment and decree.
Interim application(s) or any order, if any, shall also
stand disposed of.
JUDGE
signed by
SATABD Digitally
SATABDI DUTTA
Date: 2025.05.19
I DUTTA 17:57:56 +05'30'
Rohit
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