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CGHC010495342025
2026:CGHC:41560
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 3610 of 2025
Order Reserved on : 19.08.2026
Order Delivered on : 24.09.2026
1. Smt. Sushila Singh W/o Late Ayodhya Prasad Singh Aged About 69
Years R/o Avinash Capital Homes- 2, Plot 212, Saddu, Mowa,
Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) (Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned
Order As Avinash Capital Homes, Plot 222) (Age Wrongly Mentioned
As 72 Years)
2. Abhishek Singh S/o Late Ayodhya Prasad Singh Aged About 38
Years R/o Avinash Capital Homes- 2, Plot 212, Saddu, Mowa,
Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) (Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned
Order As Avinash Capital Homes, Plot 222) (Age Wrongly Mentioned
As 37 Years)
3. Avinash Singh S/o Late Ayodhya Prasad Singh Aged About 39 Years
R/o Avinash Capital Homes- 2, Plot 212, Saddu, Mowa, Raipur
District- Raipur (C.G.) (Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned Order As
Avinash Capital Homes, Plot 222) (Age Wrongly Mentioned As 45
Years(
4. Smt. Anju Singh W/o Shri Durgesh Singh Aged About 46 Years R/o
Maruti Residency Near Amlidih School, New Rajendra Nagar, Raipur
(C.G.) (Age Wrongly Mentioned As 48 Years)
5. Smt. Alka Singh W/o Shri Nilesh Singh Aged About 44 Years R/o
Green City, Village Pal, Adajan, Surat, District- Surat (Gujrat)
Wrongly Mentioned As Mugda (Gujrat) (Age Wrongly Mentioned As
47 Years)
6. Smt. Anisha Agnivanshi W/o Shri Rajesh Agnivanshi Aged About 40
Years R/o Avinash Capital Homes- 2, Plot 212, Saddu, Mowa,
Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) (Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned
Order As Avinash Capital Homes, Plot 222)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
MANISH
YADAV
Digitally
signed by
MANISH
YADAV
Date:
2026.09.25
11:01:52
+0530
1. Smt. Nirmala Agnivanshi W/o Late Ravindra Singh Agnivanshi Aged
About 67 Years R/o G-5 Rajiv Nagar, Post Shankar Nagar, P.S.
Mowa Raipur, Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.)
2. Ms. Shruti Agnivanshi D/o Late Ravindra Singh Agnivanshi Aged
About 67 Years R/o G-5 Rajiv Nagar, Post Shankar Nagar, P.S.
Mowa Raipur, Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.)
3. State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
:
Ms. Akanksha Singh, Advocate
For Respondent(s) No. 1
and 2
:
Mr. Hemant Gupta, Advocate
For State
:
Mr. Vivek Sharma, Panel Lawyer
Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas
(CAV Order)
1.
The matter is listed on consideration of interim relief, but with the
consent of the parties, the matter is heard finally.
2.
The petitioner No. 6 is daughter-in-law of respondent No. 1,
petitioners No. 2 and 3 are brothers of petitioner No. 6, petitioner No.
1 is elder sister of petitioner No. 6, petitioners No. 4 and 5 are sisters
of petitioner No. 6 who have filed this criminal miscellaneous petition
under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 assailing the cognizance taken by
the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur (C.G.) on the
complaint made under Section 12 of Protection of Women From
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short “Act of 2005”) by the
respondent No. 1 and 2 who are the mother of husband of petitioner
No. 6 Smt. Anisha Agnivanshi and Ms. Shruti Agnivanshi. The
petitioners have also assailed the order dated 25.06.2025 passed by
the learned 9th Additional Sessions Judge Raipur by which their
Criminal Appeal No. 244/2025 has been dismissed against the order
dated 22.03.2023 by which the learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class has rejected the objection filed by the petitioners by recording
its finding that the contentions raised by the petitioners that the
petitioners No. 2 to 6 are not residing in the shared household which
is a matter of evidence and same cannot be decided without
recording of the evidence.
3.
Brief facts, as reflected from the record are that the respondents No.
1 and 2 have filed a complaint under Section 12 of Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short “Act of 2005”) on
11.11.2020 alleging that:
(a) The marriage between son of respondent No. 1 and the
petitioner No. 6 was solemnized on 24.02.2011 and from their
wedlock one daughter was born and after the marriage, the
petitioner No. 6 was residing in joint family with her husband,
whereas the husband of the petitioner No. 6 was working in
Mumbai.
(b) It is also the case of the complainant that the husband of
respondent No. 1 - Ravindra Singh Agnivanshi was suffering
from kidney problem, therefore, he was not keeping good health,
as such respondent No. 1 was looking after her husband and
also requested petitioner No. 6 to take care of husband of
respondent No. 1, but she has not shown any interest to look
after her husband which has caused dispute between them.
Thereafter, the husband of petitioner No. 6 made an attempt to
console her and took respondent No. 1 and her husband to
Mumbai. Since the husband of petitioner No. 6 was unable look
properly her father, he has called his sister complainant No. 2 to
look after their father, which was not appreciated by the
petitioner No. 6 and she was continuing her rude behavior with
all the family members. This attitude of petitioner No. 6
compelled him to leave Mumbai and stay at Raipur, but the
petitioner No. 6 was not ready for this adjustment also and left
the matrimonial house on 10.05.2018.
(c) It is also the case of the respondents No. 1 and 2 that her son
made all attempts to settle the dispute, but the petitioners have
started creating pressure upon her son for divorce and lodging of
the false case under the Dowry Act and all other charges have
been levelled against the petitioners. Thereafter, the petitioners
started creating pressure upon them and abused them. On
11.08.2020 they telephoned the son of respondent No. 2, abused
her and created pressure to isolate with the family. It is also the
case of the respondents No. 1 and 2 that the petitioners No. 1
and 2 used to beat and threaten and misbehave with them
causing mental torture and agony to them. Accordingly, they
have prayed for grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.
15,00,000/- each and other reliefs.
4.
Learned trial Court taking cognizance of that complaint has issued
notice to the petitioners wherein they have raised objection
regarding the maintainability of the complaint which has been
rejected by the trial Court vide its order dated 22.03.2023 as the
issue with regard to shared household is a matter of evidence which
can be decided only after recording of the evidence of the parties.
Being aggrieved with the registration of the complaint, the petitioners
have preferred present criminal misc. petition which was rejected by
learned 9th Additional Sessions Judge vide judgment dated
25.06.2025. Both these orders have been assailed by the petitioners
by filing present criminal misc. petition.
5.
Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that they are not
the family members as they never lived in shared household,
therefore, the complaint filed by them is not maintainable. She would
further submit that even respondents No. 1 and 2 will not fall within
the ambit of aggrieved persons as defined under Section 2(a) of the
Act of 2005 and any alleged act done by the petitioner No. 6 or
family members does not fall within the domestic violence as per
Section 3 of the Act of 2005. Thus, she would submit that the
cognizance taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class is
without authority of law and it is an abuse of process of law. She
would further submit that from perusal of the complaint, it cannot be
said that they are having domestic relationship in absence of any
specific pleadings made by them in the complaint and even they
have not pleaded that they are having shared household, thus, the
complaint is not maintainable and would pray for quashing of the
complaint as well as the order passed by the appellate Court. To
substantiate her submission, she would refer to the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Prabha Tyagi vs. Kamlesh Devi
reported in 2022 (8) SCC 90, Sunny Mathew and Others vs. State
of Kerala and Another reported in 2024 SCC Online Ker 7182.
6.
She would further submit that since registration of complaint under
Section 12 of the Act of 2005 is nothing, but it is an abuse of process
of law, as such, this Court can very well quash the entire
proceedings as per law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
case of Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi vs. Vidhi Rawal reported in
2025 SCC Online SC 1158 and would also refer to the judgment of
High Court of Delhi in case of Vijay Verma vs. State of N.C.T. of
Delhi & Another reported in 2010 (118) DRJ 520.
7.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2
opposing the submission would submit that the complaint filed by the
mother-in-law of the petitioner No. 6 as well as sister of husband of
petitioner No. 6 is very much maintainable as they have clearly
pleaded that the husband of petitioner No. 6 due to illness of his
father has called upon his sister to look after and being mother of
husband, she has legally right to live in house of husband and it has
also been stated that the complainant and petitioner No. 6 were
living together in a joint family as per the averments made in the
complaint and the respondents No. 1 and 2 are suffering from mental
torture and agony by the petitioner, therefore, they are aggrieved
persons as defined under Section 2(a) of the Act of 2005.
8.
He would further submit that the act committed by the petitioners will
fall within the ambit of domestic violence as defined under Section 3
of Act of 2005 and to substantiate his submission he has referred to
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Hiral P. Harsora
and Others v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and Others reported
in 2016 (10) SCC 165 and would pray for dismissal of the present
criminal misc. petition.
9.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record
with utmost circumspection.
10.
From the submissions made by the parties, the point emerged for
determination by this Court is:
“whether the learned trial Court was justified in taking
cognizance of the complaint filed under the Act of 2005 by the
mother-in-law of the petitioner No. 6 and sister of husband of
petitioner No. 6 and the appellate Court was justified in
dismissing the appeal against cognizance taken by the learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class under the Act of 2005.”
11.
To appreciate this point, it is expedient for this Court to extract the
relevant provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “Act of 2005”), which
reads as under:
“2(a) Aggrieved person means any woman who is, or has
been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who
alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence
by the respondent;
2(f) Domestic Relationship means a relationship between two
persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in
a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity,
marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage,
adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;
2(s) Share Household: shared household means a household
where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a
domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent
and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted
either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or
owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either
the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly
have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a
household which may belong to the joint family of which the
respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the
respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or
interest in the shared household.
Section 3. Definition of domestic violence
For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission
or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence
in case it
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limp or
well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person
or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual
abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or
(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved
person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to
her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other
property or valuable security; or
(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any
person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or
clause (b); or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or
mental, to the aggrieved person.”
12.
Further considering the aims and objects of Act of 2005 which
provides that this Act has been enacted to protect the woman from
being victim of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of
the domestic violence has been enacted by the parliament. This Act
covers those women who are or have been in a relationship with the
abuser with both parties have lived together in shared household
and are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship
with the family members living together as a joint family or also
included even those women who are sisters, widows, mothers,
single woman or living with the abuser or entitled to legal protection
under the Act of 2005. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while examining
the constitutional validity of Section 2(q) of the Act of 2005 in case of
Hiral P. Harsora (Supra) has held in paragraphs 16 to 18 as under:
“16. A cursory reading of the Statement of Objects and
Reasons makes it clear that the phenomenon of domestic
violence against women is widely prevalent and needs
redressal. Whereas criminal law does offer some redressal,
civil law does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. The
idea therefore is to provide various innovative remedies in
favour of women who suffer from domestic violence, against
the perpetrators of such violence.”
13.
Further considering Section 2(a) of the Act of 2005, it is quite vivid
that the respondents No. 1 and 2 fall within the category of
aggrieved persons as they are in a domestic relationship with the
petitioner No. 6 and they are alleged to have been subjected to any
act of domestic violence by the petitioners. Section 3 of the Act of
2005 also defines domestic violence which includes physical abuse,
sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse. The verbal and
emotional abuse includes insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling
and insult, repeated threat, caused physical pain to any person in
whom the aggrieved persons is interested.
14.
Thus, from the perusal of the complaint, it is quite vivid that the
respondents No. 1 and 2 have alleged domestic violence by the
petitioners and also stated that the petitioner No. 6 was residing with
the respondent No. 1 in shared household at Raipur and Mumbai. As
such, prima facie the complainants are able to demonstrate that they
are sufferers of domestic violence committed in a shared household,
as such being aggrieved persons, they have lodged complaint under
the Act of 2005.
15.
Considering the prima facie material available with the learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class, it cannot be held that the learned trial
Court has committed any illegality in taking cognizance and rejecting
the objection regarding the maintainability of the complaint before it.
The learned trial Court has rightly observed while rejecting the
objection that the submissions raised by the petitioners required
evidence which can be appreciated during the trial. Consequently,
rejection of the objection by the trial Court and dismissal of the
appeal filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2 is in accordance with
the aims and object of Act of 2005.
16.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has examined the provisions of Act of
2005 in case of Prabha Tyagi (Supra) and has held in paragraphs
32, 39, 40 and 41 as under:
“32. The Expression “shared household” in relation to the
definition of "domestic relationship" as per the definition in
Section 2(s) means a household where the person aggrieved
lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either
singly or along with the respondent and includes such a
household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the
aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted
by either of them in respect of which d either the aggrieved
person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any
right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household
which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is
a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the
aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the "shared
household". The definition of shared household is thus an
inclusive one.
39. As already noted, a domestic relationship means a
relationship between two persons who live or have at any
point of time, lived together in a shared household. The
relationship may be by: (i) consanguinity, (ii) marriage or, (iii)
through a relationship in the nature of a marriage, (iv) adoption
or (v) are family members living together as a joint family. The
expression "domestic relationship" is a comprehensive one.
Hence, every woman in a domestic relationship in whatever
manner the said relationship may be founded as stated above
has a right to reside in a shared household, whether or not she
has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Thus, a
daughter, sister, wife, mother, grandmother or great
grandmother, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law or any woman
having a relationship in the nature of marriage, an adopted
daughter or any member of joint family has the right to reside
in a shared household.
40. Further, though, the expression "shared household" is
defined in the context of a household where the person
aggrieved lives or has lived in a domestic relationship either
singly or along with the respondent, in the context of subsection (1) of Section 17, the said expression cannot be
restricted only to a household where a person aggrieved
resides or at any stage, resided in a domestic relationship. In
other words, a woman in a domestic relationship who is not
aggrieved, in the sense that who has not been subjected to an
act of domestic violence by the respondent, has a right to
reside in a shared household. Thus, a mother, daughter, sister,
wife, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law or such other
categories of women in a domestic relationship have the right
to reside in a shared household dehors a right, title or
beneficial interest in the a b same.
41. Therefore, the right of residence of the aforesaid
categories of women and such other categories of women in a
domestic relationship is guaranteed under sub-section (1) of
Section 17 and she cannot be evicted, excluded or thrown out
from such a household even in the absence of there being any
form of domestic violence. By contrast, sub-section (2) of
Section 17 deals with a narrower right inasmuch as an
aggrieved person who is inevitably a woman and who is
subjected to domestic violence shall not be evicted or
excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the
respondent except in accordance d with the procedure
established by law. Thus, the expression "right to reside in a
shared household" has to be given an expansive
interpretation, in respect of the aforesaid categories of women
including a mother-in-law or a daughter-in-law and other
categories of women referred to above who have the right to
reside in a shared household.”
17.
So far as submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that
this Court while hearing the petition under Section 528 of BNSS,
2023 can very well quash the proceedings. So far as this preposition
of law is concerned, there is no quarrel with regard to power and
authority of this Court, but this power has to be exercised by this
Court when there is abuse of process of law or to otherwise to
secure the ends of justice as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
case of Shaurabh Kumar (Supra) in paragraphs 32 and 39 as
under:
“32. The second part of Section 482 saves the inherent power
of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of any
Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, in
a given case where a learned Magistrate is dealing with an
application under Section 12(1), the High Court can exercise
the power under the second part of Section 482 to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of
justice. Hence, the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the CrPC to quash proceedings of an
application under Section 12(1) or orders passed in
accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.
39. To conclude, the view taken in the impugned order of the
High Court that a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC for
challenging the proceedings emanating from Section 12(1) of
the DV Act, 2005 is not maintainable, is not the correct view.
We hold that High Courts can exercise power under Section
482 of CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS) for quashing the
proceedings emanating from the application under Section
12(1) of the DV Act, 2005, pending before the Court of the
learned Magistrate. However, considering the object of the
DV Act, 2005, the High Courts should exercise caution and
circumspection when dealing with an application under
Section 12(1). Normally, interference under Section 482 is
warranted only in the case of gross illegality or injustice.”
18.
Thus, from the preamble of the Act of 2005 and also considering the
relevant provisions of Act of 2005, law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that the perpetrators and abetters of
such violence can in given situation be women themselves, as such
cognizance of the complaint by the respondents No. 1 and 2 under
the Act of 2005 cannot be held as without jurisdiction or not
maintainable in the present form before the trial Court.
19.
In the present case the petitioners are unable to meet out any
exception case for interference or to quash the proceedings pending
before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class. Even otherwise,
considering the well settled position of law that the objection
regarding aggrieved persons, shared household and relationship is a
matter of evidence which can be adjudicated or determined only
after appreciating the material and evidence placed by the parties
and in fact these are the defense of the petitioners which cannot be
considered by this Court at this stage in absence of any foundation
led or evidence brought on record by the petitioners.
20.
Consequently, the criminal misc. petition is dismissed. However,
liberty is granted to the petitioners to raise all their defense which
have been canvassed by the petitioners before this Court and the
learned Judicial magistrate First Class will decide the same after
appreciating the evidence and material placed before it without being
influenced from dismissal of present CRMP on its own merit.
Sd/(Narendra Kumar Vyas)
Judge
Manish
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