The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
17. 01.2019 and 03.10.2019 delivered in Title Suit (Divorce) 158/2018 passed by the Addl. Judge, Family Court, Agartala. [2] From the reading of the impugned judgment it appears that the appellant did not appear in the proceeding at all and she did not therefore contest the allegations made in the petition filed by the respondent under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. [3] In the memorandum of appeal it has been stated that no notice was served on the appellant. Even the appellant has raised the ground that the plea of cruelty has not been proved by evidence, as placed unilaterally. [4] When we scrutinized the records, it appeared before us that the father of the respondent received the notice for and on behalf of the appellant who was the respondent in the suit. Even the report of the process-server dated 25.05.2018 has reflected that the appellant herein did not accept the notice by stating that she has no dispute with her husband and they are living together. Even after such statement by the appellant, the said notice was received by Krishna Prasad Ghosh, the father of the respondent herein [the petitioner in Title Suit (Divorce) 158/2018]. It appears that the Addl. Judge, Family Court has accepted that service of notice was complete, as we are persuaded to believe, as there was refusal by the appellant and that was treated as substantive service under Order V, …
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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Mat. App. No. 25 of 2019
Smt. Smita Majumder (Ghosh)
……..Appellant(s)
Versus
Sri Poushasis Ghosh
……..Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s)
:
Ms. S. Deb (Gupta), Adv.
Ms. S. Nandy, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. P.K. Ghosh, Adv.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. TALAPATRA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G. CHATTOPADHYAY
Order
24/03/2022
[S. Talapatra, J.]
Heard Ms. S. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel appearing for
the appellant as well as Mr. P.K. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for
the respondent.
[1]
This is an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts
Act, 1984 against the ex-parte judgment and decree respectively dated
17.01.2019 and 03.10.2019 delivered in Title Suit (Divorce) 158/2018
passed by the Addl. Judge, Family Court, Agartala.
[2]
From the reading of the impugned judgment it appears that
the appellant did not appear in the proceeding at all and she did not
therefore contest the allegations made in the petition filed by the
respondent under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
[3]
In the memorandum of appeal it has been stated that no
notice was served on the appellant. Even the appellant has raised the
ground that the plea of cruelty has not been proved by evidence, as
placed unilaterally.
[4]
When we scrutinized the records, it appeared before us that
the father of the respondent received the notice for and on behalf of the
appellant who was the respondent in the suit. Even the report of the
process-server dated 25.05.2018 has reflected that the appellant herein
did not accept the notice by stating that she has no dispute with her
husband and they are living together. Even after such statement by the
appellant, the said notice was received by Krishna Prasad Ghosh, the
father of the respondent herein [the petitioner in Title Suit (Divorce)
158/2018]. It appears that the Addl. Judge, Family Court has accepted
that service of notice was complete, as we are persuaded to believe, as
there was refusal by the appellant and that was treated as substantive
service under Order V, Rule 9 of the CPC. We are constrained to
observe
that the Addl. Judge, Family Court has failed to discharge his
duties by not minutely reading the statement that has been made
claiming to be the statement of the appellant, which has been referred
in the process-server’s report. Else, it would have appeared to him that
she refused to accept the fact that her husband could institute a suit
against her. She was definitely bewildered and which has been reflected
in the report of the process-server. It was the duty of the Court to resend the notice so that the appellant could have been alive to the
circumstances that her husband has indeed instituted the suit for
divorce. It is the duty of the Family Court as it is special court created
by the Family Courts Act, 1984 to look into the each relevant aspects of
cases. It may not decide cases going by strict technical rules of service.
We could have on that ground alone set aside the impugned judgment
and decree. But, on 22.03.2022, the respondent filed an additional
affidavit before this Court stating that he has remarried on 14.10.2019
whereas, the judgment and decree was passed on 17.01.2019 in Title
Suit (Divorce) 158/2018.
[5]
Mr. P.K. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
has submitted that the said marriage has taken place after the period of
appeal and therefore, there is no illegality. In support of the contention
the certificate from the Registrar of Marriage under the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955 has been produced. We had afforded opportunity to the
appellant to verify the statement and the registration and to file the
appropriate response but, that has not been filed.
[6]
Today, Ms. Deb(Gupta), learned counsel has submitted that
the incidence of marriage cannot be denied as the incidence has been
verified. The Court is now in a serious difficulty. In one hand to protect
the right of the appellant to have the fair opportunity to contest the
allegations as made in the petition filed under Section 13(1)(ia) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and on the other hand, the second marriage
which the respondent has contracted cannot be declared illegal. As
such, setting aside of the decree of divorce, would create a serious
illegal consequence.
[7]
Hence, we asked Ms. S. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel
appearing for the appellant to ask the appellant to appear through
virtual mode so that we can gather her opinion. Today, we have
interacted with the appellant by the virtual mode. She has categorically
stated that she has read the statement but, she did not deny the fact of
marriage but she has at the same time stated that after the decree of
divorce
was
obtained
by
stage-managing
the
procedure,
no
maintenance whatsoever has been provided by the respondents to her
or to their son who is now aged about 12 years. Being in such
mitigating circumstances, the appellant has instituted a proceeding for
getting maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C in the Court of
Hojai and she has instituted another complaint under the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
[8]
We have adequately interacted with the parties and the
counsel and now, we think that it would not be wise, even though the
same is legally permissible, to disturb the decree of divorce. But, the
respondent is under legal obligation to maintain the appellant and her
son. So far, the respondent has refused to maintain the appellant and
their son. As it has been stated by the appellant in person, by virtual
mode, that she has received no maintenance so far even the
respondent is not participating in the proceeding before the Court of
Hojai for maintenance.
[9]
We have taken the information regarding the resource and
income of the respondent from the appellant. She has categorically
stated before this Court that respondent earns at least Rs.50,000/- per
month as he works under a multi-national corporation. However, as
expected, Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel has refused to accept the
statement and proposed to give maintenance of Rs.5,000/- to the
appellant and their son.
[10]
Ms. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel has contended that the
respondent
has
contracted
the
second
marriage
and
has
been
maintaining his life comfortably according to the instruction received
from the appellant. The respondent has been earning by working under
a multi-national corporation. Under such circumstances, it is useless to
re-visit the evidence and the plea that has been raised. It has not been
examined by us that whether the inadequate evidence to hold that
cruelty
has
been
established
on
evidence.
Persuaded
by
the
development as stated, we affirm the decree but, without taking into
cognizance the evidence of cruelty, it has been so done following the
doctrine of necessity. But, this decree of divorce is not unconditional as
made by the Addl. Judge, Family Court, Agartala. This decree of divorce
will be subjected to payment of the maintenance per month. The
respondent shall pay a sum of Rs.12,000/- per month to the appellant
for her maintenance and presently, for maintenance of their son.
[11]
It
is
made
clear
that
we
are
passing
this
order
of
maintenance pursuant to the provision of Section 25 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955. We are not giving any arrear maintenance, but the
payment of the maintenance shall start from 01.03.2022 and the first
maintenance shall be paid by 7th day of April, 2022 and thus, in every
month, the maintenance shall be paid by 7th day of every English
calendar month without any discontinuation. The discontinuation would
bring about a serious and strict action from the Court.
[12]
With this observation, the appeal stands partly allowed.
[13]
Prepare the decree accordingly. Send down the records
thereafter.
[14]
Before parting with the records, we are persuaded to observe
as under:
The said amount shall be paid by money order and the
charges for money order will be borne by the respondent in the address
given in the memorandum of appeal. But, we direct Ms. S. Deb(Gupta),
learned counsel appearing for the appellant to furnish the bank details
to Mr. P.K. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent so
that, the said amount of monthly maintenance
can be transferred to
the said account of the appellant. It is directed that in view of that
provision of maintenance has been made under this order, the appellant
shall make an application before the appropriate Court by informing
about this direction as regards the maintenance so that the said case
can be decided on the basis of this direction.
[15]
It has been stated by Ms. Deb(Gupta), learned counsel
appearing for the appellant that return of the Streedhan is one of the
reliefs, as urged by the appellant in the said proceeding under the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. We make it clear that
on that issue the said proceeding shall continue because it may be
required to record the evidence, if the parties do not agree on
returnable properties.
JUDGE
Sabyasachi G.
JUDGE
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