Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
CGHC010348282022
YOGESH
TIWARI
2026:CGHC:42645
Digitally
signed by
YOGESH
TIWARI
Date:
2026.10.01
18:11:19
+0530
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 4644 of 2022
Smt. Saraswati Sidar W/o Vijay Kumar Sidar Aged About 35 Years R/o
Village Amlibhauna,
Post Taparda,
Pusour,
District
:
Raigarh,
Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner
versus
1 - Chhattisgarh State Information Commission Through State Chief
Information Commissioner, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 1st Floor, Indrawati
Khand, Shashtri Chowk - Motibagh Chowk Rd, Civil Lines, Raipur,
Chhattisgarh 492001.
2 - State Information Commissioner 1st Floor, Indrawati Khand, Shashtri
Chowk - Motibagh Chowk Rd, Civil Lines, Raipur, Chhattisgarh 492001.
3 - First Appeal Officer Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat
Pussore, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh
4 - Akash Bairagi S/o Parasmani Bairagi Aged About 40 Years R/o
Gobarsingha Sariya, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner
: Mr. Pravin Kumar Jain and Ms. Swarnim
S. Kochar, Advocates
For Respondents No.1 & 2 : Dr. Sudeep Agrawal, Advocate
For Respondents No.3 and : None
Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
Order on Board
30.09.2026
1.
By filing the present petition, the petitioner assails the order dated
22.08.2022 passed by the Chhattisgarh State Information
Commission in Second Appeal Case No. A/1824/2019/Raigarh,
whereby a penalty of ₹25,000/- has been imposed upon the
petitioner under Section 20(1) of the Right to Information Act,
2005 (for brevity, “the RTI Act”). The petitioner has prayed for
following relief(s) :“10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to call for the records.
10.2 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to set aside the impugned order
dated 22.08.2022 passed by Respondent no.2
in
the
Second
appeal
case
no.
A/1824/2019/Raigarh (Annexure P/1).
10.3 That this Hon'ble court may be further
pleased to pass any other consequential and
other orders/ writs which this Hon'ble court
deems just and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case.”
2.
Brief facts of the case, in nutshell, are that respondent No.4
submitted an application dated 18.01.2019 under Section 6(1) of
the RTI Act before the petitioner, who was the Public Information
Officer, seeking information regarding the books of income and
expenditure of the Sarpanch, Village Tribhauna, from the date of
his posting till the date of the application. The petitioner supplied
the information by letter dated 11.02.2019. Being dissatisfied,
respondent No.4 preferred a first appeal on 28.02.2019, which
was decided by respondent No.3 vide order dated 28.03.2019,
observing that the information sought was not specific as the
relevant date, year and name of the programme had not been
mentioned. Thereafter, respondent No.4 preferred a second
appeal before the State Information Commission, registered as
Second Appeal Case No. A/1824/2019/Raigarh.
3.
During the pendency of the second appeal, the petitioner
subsequently came to know of the proceedings and, pursuant to
the order dated 06.06.2022, submitted his reply dated 17.08.2022
before the Commission. However, without properly considering
the petitioner's reply and the fact that the information sought in the
original
RTI
application
had
already
been
supplied,
the
Commission, vide impugned order dated 22.08.2022, held the
petitioner responsible for non-supply of information and imposed a
penalty of ₹25,000/- under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. Hence,
the present petition.
4.
Mr. Pravin Kumar Jain and Ms. Swarnim S. Kochar, learned
counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order has
been passed without properly appreciating the facts and material
available on record. They submit that the information sought by
respondent No.4 in his original RTI application dated 18.01.2019
had already been furnished by the petitioner vide letter dated
11.02.2019 and, therefore, there was no wilful or deliberate denial
of information on the part of the petitioner.
5.
Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner was never
served with or otherwise made aware of any subsequent
application allegedly seeking additional information pursuant to
the order dated 28.03.2019. It is contended that no such
application was received by the petitioner and, therefore, the
petitioner could not have been held negligent or responsible for
non-supply of information which was never sought from or brought
to his notice. The Commission, according to learned counsel, has
failed to consider this material aspect while passing the impugned
order.
6.
It is lastly submitted that the power to impose penalty under
Section 20(1) of the RTI Act is penal in nature and can be
exercised only upon recording the requisite satisfaction regarding
the circumstances contemplated under the said provision and
after affording due opportunity of hearing. Relying upon the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Manohar S/o Manikrao
Anchule v. State of Maharashtra and another, (2012) 13 SCC
14, learned counsel submits that the proceedings before the
Information Commission are quasi-judicial in nature and are
required to conform to the principles of natural justice. It is
therefore contended that, in the facts of the present case, the
imposition of the maximum penalty of ₹25,000/- is unsustainable
and the impugned order deserves to be set aside.
7.
Per contra, Dr. Sudeep Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for
respondents No.1 and 2 opposes the submissions advanced by
learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the petitioner,
being the Public Information Officer, was under a statutory
obligation to furnish the information sought by respondent No.4
within the prescribed period. It is submitted that the information
sought by respondent No.4 was not furnished in its entirety and,
despite the order passed by the First Appellate Authority, the
petitioner failed to provide the requisite information. The State
Information Commission, upon considering the material available
on record, has rightly arrived at the conclusion that there was
failure on the part of the petitioner to discharge his statutory
obligation under the RTI Act.
8.
Learned counsel further submits that the impugned order has
been passed after affording due opportunity to the petitioner and
upon considering his reply dated 17.08.2022. The Commission,
being vested with statutory power under Section 20(1) of the RTI
Act, has rightly imposed the penalty upon finding that the
petitioner failed to furnish the information without reasonable
cause. It is, therefore, submitted that no interference with the
impugned order is warranted in exercise of the extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, and the present petition deserves to be dismissed.
9.
Despite service of notice, respondents No. 3 and 4 have not
appeared before this Court. However, a return has been filed on
behalf of respondent No.3, wherein it has been stated that the
order
dated
28.03.2019
was
passed
by
the
respondent
authorities, in the capacity of First Appellate Authority, after
considering the RTI Act, the applicable Rules and administrative
instructions. It is contended that respondent No.4 had sought
information relating to profit and loss and Rokad Bahi for several
years, which constituted different subject matters, and therefore,
respondent No.4 was directed to submit a clear and specific
application.
10.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents
available on record.
11.
The material available on record indicates that respondent No.4
submitted an application dated 18.01.2019 under Section 6(1) of
the RTI Act seeking certified copies of the cash book relating to
the income and expenditure of the Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat
Tribhauna, from the date of his posting till the date of the
application. The petitioner, being the then Public Information
Officer, responded vide communication dated 11.02.2019, stating
that under the applicable Rules, the information sought was
required to be specified with reference to a particular financial
year and subject matter, and called upon respondent No.4 to
submit a fresh and specific application. Aggrieved thereby,
respondent No.4 preferred a First Appeal on 28.02.2019, which
was disposed of by the First Appellate Authority vide order dated
28.03.2019, upholding the action of the Public Information Officer
and directing submission of a clear application.
12.
Thereafter, respondent No.4 preferred the Second Appeal before
the State Information Commission. During the pendency of the
proceedings, the petitioner was called upon to submit his
response and, pursuant thereto, submitted his reply dated
17.08.2022. The Commission, however, by the impugned order
dated 22.08.2022, held that the petitioner had failed to properly
deal with the RTI application, directed the existing Public
Information Officer to furnish the information within 30 days and
imposed a penalty of ₹25,000/- upon the petitioner under Section
20(1) of the RTI Act, alleging negligence and indifference in
dealing with the application.
13.
The question, therefore, which falls for consideration is whether, in
the facts and circumstances of the present case, particularly when
the petitioner had responded to the original RTI application within
the prescribed period and had called upon respondent No.4 to
submit a specific application, the petitioner could have been
subjected to the maximum penalty of ₹25,000/- under Section
20(1) of the RTI Act without recording a specific finding that he
had deliberately or mala fidely denied the information or had failed
to furnish the same without reasonable cause.
14.
Section 20 of the RTI Act empowers the Central or State
Information Commission to impose penalty where the Public
Information Officer, without any reasonable cause, has refused to
receive an application for information, has not furnished the
information within the time specified under Section 7(1) of the RTI
Act, has malafidely denied the request for information, has
knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information,
or has destroyed information or obstructed furnishing of
information. The provision thus requires consideration of the
explanation furnished by the Public Information Officer and the
circumstances leading to the alleged delay or non-supply of
information before the penal consequence is imposed.
15.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Manohar (supra) has held that
the power to impose penalty under Section 20 of the RTI Act is
not to be exercised mechanically and that the authority is required
to consider whether there was reasonable cause for the failure on
the part of the Public Information Officer.
16.
The Division Bench of this Court in
Nitin Singhvi v.
Chhattisgarh State Information Commission, 2023 SCC
OnLine Chh 6061, while considering the scope of Section 20 of
the RTI Act and the imposition of penalty upon the Public
Information Officer, after considering the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Manohar (supra), has held that the provisions relating to
penalty and penal consequences are required to be construed
strictly, having regard to the serious civil consequences which
follow from imposition of such penalty. The Division Bench, in this
regard, observed as under:
“15.
……...Since
their
Lordships
of
the
Supreme Court in Manohar (supra), have
clearly held that the provisions relating to
penalty or penal consequences have to be
construed strictly as it has drastic civil
consequences upon the Public Information
Officer who is entrusted with supplying the
relevant information and in absence of any
aforesaid specific finding, we are of the
considered opinion that it was not mandatory
on
the
part
Commission
of
to
the
State
impose
a
Information
penalty
of
Rs.16,500/- upon respondent No.2 without
recording a specific finding that negligence on
the part of respondent No.2 was persistent
and without reasonable cause. As such,
Section 20(1) of the Act of 2005 cannot be
held to be mandatory and in view of the
aforesaid discussion, we do not find any merit
in this writ appeal and we hereby affirm the
order passed by learned Single Judge.”
17.
The aforesaid principle has subsequently been considered by this
Court in T.A. Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 SCC OnLine
Chh 8128. While examining the exercise of power under Section
20 of the RTI Act, this Court, after considering the judgment in
Nitin Singhvi (supra), has reiterated that the power to impose
penalty is not automatic and that the statutory conditions
contemplated under Section 20 of the RTI Act must be duly
established before such penal consequences can follow. The
relevant observations contained in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the
said judgment are extracted hereinbelow for ready reference:
“11. It is noted that the Hon'ble Division Bench
of this Court, while considering a similar issue
in Nitin Singhvi (supra), has elaborately
examined the scope and ambit of imposition
of penalty under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act.
The Division Bench has held that the power to
impose
penalty
is
not
automatic
or
mechanical, but is conditioned upon the
existence of cogent material demonstrating
that the Public Information Officer has, without
reasonable cause, either refused to furnish
information, caused undue delay, or acted in a
malafide manner. It has been further held that
mere delay or inability to furnish certain
information,
particularly
when
such
information is not available on record or lies
with another authority, would not ipso facto
attract penal consequences. The Court has
emphasized that before imposing penalty, the
Information Commission is under a statutory
obligation to record a clear and reasoned
finding with respect to the existence of
malafide intent or lack of reasonable cause,
and must also afford an effective opportunity
of hearing to the concerned officer. The
burden cast upon the Public Information
Officer under the proviso to Section 20(1) is to
establish that he acted reasonably and
diligently; however, once such explanation is
furnished and remains uncontroverted, the
Commission
cannot
proceed
to
impose
penalty in a routine manner.
12. It has further been observed that where
the Public Information Officer has taken steps
in compliance with the provisions of the Act,
such as transferring the application to the
concerned department under Section 6(3) of
the RTI Act or furnishing such information as
is available on record, the same would
constitute a reasonable and sufficient cause,
insulating him from penal action. The Division
Bench has cautioned that the penal provisions
under the Act, being quasi-criminal in nature,
must be invoked with due care and only in
cases where the conduct of the officer is
found to be contumacious or deliberately
obstructive. In light of the aforesaid principles,
the Division Bench set aside the penalty
imposed therein, holding that in the absence
of any finding of malafide or deliberate lapse,
the order of penalty could not be sustained by
observing as follows :"12. The Supreme Court in the matter of
Manohar v. State of Maharashtra, (2012)
13 SCC 14 has held that the State
Information Commission has been vested
with wide powers including Imposition of
penalty or taking of disciplinary action
against the employees and the provisions
relating
to
consequences
penalty
have
or
to
to
be
penal
construed
strictly. While dealing with Section 20(2) of
the Act of 2005, their Lordships have
observed in para 16 as under:"16. The State Information Commission
has been vested with wide powers
including imposition of penalty or taking
of
disciplinary
action
against
the
employees. Exercise of such power is
bound to adversely affect or bring civil
consequences to the delinquent. Thus,
the provisions relating to penalty or to
penal
consequences
have
to
be
construed strictly. It will not be open to
the Court to give them such liberal
construction that it would be beyond the
specific language of the statute or would
be in violation to the principles of natural
justice."
13. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court
have
further
held
while
dealing
with
initiation of departmental proceeding that
the case of default must strictly fall within
the specified grounds of the provisions of
Section 20(2). This provision has to be
construed and applied strictly. Its ambit
cannot be permitted to be enlarged at the
whims of the Commission. It has also been
held that "negligence" per se is not a
ground
on
which
proceedings
under
Section 20(2) of the Act can be invoked
and the Commission must return a finding
that such negligence, delay or default is
persistent (meaning: continuing for a long
time or happening often, especially in a
way that is unpleasant or annoying) and
without reasonable cause. Paras 31 and 33
of the report state as under:
"31. It appears that the facts have not
been correctly noticed and, in any case,
not
in
their
Information
entirety
by
the
negligent
and
had
State
not
performed the duty cast upon him. The
Commission. It had formed an opinion
that the appellant was Commission
noticed that there was 73 days delay in
informing the duties. If one examines the
provisions of Section 20(2) in their
applicant
and,
thus,
there
was
negligence while performing entirety then
it becomes obvious that every default on
the
part
of
recommendation
for
disciplinary action. The case must fall in
any the concerned officer may not result
in Issuance of a of the specified defaults
and reasoned finding has to be recorded
by the Commission while making such
recommendations. 'Negligence' per se is
not a ground on which proceedings
under Section 20(2) of the Act can be
invoked. The Commission must return a
finding that such negligence, delay or
default
is
persistent
and
without
reasonable cause. In our considered
view, the Commission, in the present
case, has erred in not recording such
definite finding. The appellant herein had
not failed to receive any application, had
not failed to act within the period of 30
days (as he had written a letter calling for
information), had not malafidely denied
the request for information, had not
furnished any incorrect or misleading
information,
had
not
destroyed
any
information and had not obstructed the
furnishing of the information. On the
contrary, he had taken steps to facilitate
the providing of information by writing the
stated letters. May be the letter dated 114-2007 was not written within the period
of 30 days requiring Respondent 2 to
furnish details of the period for which
such information was required but the
fact remained that such letter was written
and Respondent 2 did not even bother to
respond to the said enquiry. He just kept
on filing appeal after appeal. After 4-42007, the date when the appellant was
transferred
to
Akola,
he
was
not
responsible for the acts of omissions
and/or commission of the office at
Nanded.
14. Their Lordships further held that the
word "shall" appearing in Section 20(2) of
the Act of 2005 before 'recommend' has to
be read as "may" and their Lordships
observed as under: 33. All the attributable defaults of a
Central
or
State
Officer
have
Public
to
be
Information
without
any
reasonable cause and persistently. In
other words, besides finding that any of
the stated defaults have been committed
by such officer, the Commission has to
further record its opinion that such
default in relation to receiving of an
application
or
not
furnishing
the
information within the specified time was
committed persistently and without a
reasonable cause. Use of such language
by the legislature clearly shows that the
expression
'shall'
appearing
'recommend'
has
to
be
before
read
and
construed as 'may'. There could be
cases where there is reasonable cause
shown
and
the
officer
is
able
to
demonstrate that there was no persistent
default on his part elther in receiving the
application or furnishing the requested
Information. In such circumstances, the
law does not require recommendation for
disciplinary proceedings to be made. It is
not
the
Irrespective
legislative
mandate
that
of
facts
and
the
circumstances of a given case, whether
reasonable cause is shown or not, the
Commission
must
recommend
disciplinary action merely because the
application was not responded to within
30 days. Every case has to be examined
on its own facts. We would hasten to add
here that wherever reasonable cause is
not shown to the satisfaction of the
Commission and the Commission is of
the opinion that there is default in terms
of
the
section
it
must
send
the
recommendation for disciplinary action in
accordance with law to the concerned
authority. In such circumstances, it will
have
no
choice
but
to
send
recommendatory report. The burden of
forming an opinion in accordance with
the provisions of Section 20 (2) and
principles of natural justice lies upon the
Commission.”
18.
Reverting to the facts of the present case, the record reveals that
respondent No.4 submitted an RTI application dated 18.01.2019
seeking certified copies of the cash book relating to the income
and expenditure of the Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Tribhauna,
from the date of his posting till the date of the application. The
petitioner, being the Public Information Officer, responded vide
letter dated 11.02.2019, informing respondent No.4 that the
information sought was required to be specified with reference to
the relevant financial year and subject matter. Aggrieved thereby,
respondent No.4 preferred a First Appeal, which was disposed of
vide order dated 28.03.2019, wherein the First Appellate Authority
also directed submission of a clear and specific application.
19.
During the proceedings before the State Information Commission,
the petitioner submitted her reply dated 17.08.2022 pursuant to
the direction issued by the Commission. However, vide impugned
order dated 22.08.2022, the Commission held the petitioner
responsible for not properly dealing with the RTI application and
imposed a penalty of ₹25,000/- under Section 20(1) of the RTI
Act. The question, therefore, is whether the maximum penalty
could have been imposed without recording the specific statutory
findings necessary for exercise of power under Section 20(1) of
the RTI Act.
20.
Section 20(1) contemplates penalty upon satisfaction of the
specified statutory contingencies, including mala fide denial of
information,
knowingly
furnishing
incorrect,
incomplete
or
misleading information, or failure to furnish information without
reasonable cause. In the present case, the petitioner had
responded to the original application within the prescribed period
and had disclosed the reason for requiring a specific application.
The impugned order does not record any categorical finding that
the petitioner deliberately or mala fidely denied the information,
knowingly furnished incorrect or misleading information, or
obstructed its furnishing.
21.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manohar (supra), has held that
the power to impose penalty under the RTI Act, having civil
consequences, is required to be exercised strictly in accordance
with the statutory requirements. Applying the said principle, this
Court finds that mere dissatisfaction with the manner in which the
RTI application was dealt with cannot, by itself, constitute
sufficient ground for imposing the maximum penalty under Section
20(1), particularly in the absence of the requisite finding regarding
deliberate or mala fide conduct or absence of reasonable cause.
22.
The aforesaid principle has also been reiterated by this Court in
Nitin Singhvi (supra) and T.A. Khan (supra), holding that the
power under Section 20 of the RTI Act is penal in nature and
cannot be exercised mechanically. Before imposing penalty, the
Information Commission is required to record a clear finding
regarding the existence of the statutory default and absence of
reasonable cause. Mere negligence or an erroneous appreciation
of the manner in which the information was dealt with, by itself,
would not justify imposition of penalty unless the conduct of the
Public
Information
Officer
is
brought
within
the
specific
parameters of Section 20(1) of the RTI Act.
23.
Accordingly, the impugned order dated 22.08.2022 passed by the
Chhattisgarh State Information Commission in Second Appeal
Case No. A/1824/2019/Raigarh, insofar as it imposes a penalty of
₹25,000/- upon the petitioner under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act,
is hereby quashed and set aside. The penalty shall stand annulled
and no recovery pursuant thereto shall be effected.
24.
It is made clear that this Court has examined only the legality of
the penal action under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act.
25.
The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid terms.
There shall be no order as to costs.
/-
Sd/(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review