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CGHC010445412025
2026:CGHC:46240-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
FA(MAT) No. 375 of 2025
Smt. Ritu Shrivas W/o Narendra Singh Darshan Aged About 33 Years R/o
27 Kholi Vikash Nagar, Bilaspur, Police Station - Civil Line, Tehsil And
District - Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Appellant (s)
versus
Narendra Singh Darshan S/o Bhagwat Prasad Shrivas Aged About 42
Years Profession Training Officer ITI Bhilai, Through - Principal Industrial
Training Institute Bhilai, Tehsil And District - Durg (C.G.) Present R/o (Not
Mention In Impugned Order) Ward No. 12 Village Hanfa Tahsil Sakri,
District - Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant
: Mr. Hemant Kesharwani, Advocate with
Mr. Swapnil Keshari, Advocate
For Respondent
: Mr. Rakesh Kumar Thakur, Advocate with
Mr. Satyendra Srivas, Advocate
D.B. : Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu &
Hon'ble Smt. Justice Sushma Sawant
Judgment on Board
02/11/2026
Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J.
1.
This appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is
directed against the judgment and decree dated 08.09.2025 passed by
Digitally
signed by
PRAVEEN
KUMAR
SINHA
Date:
2026.11.05
17:36:19
+0530
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learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur in
Civil Suit No. 556-A of 2023, whereby application preferred by
appellant/applicant (wife) under Section 13(1)(i-a) and 13(1)(i-b) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short, " the Act of 1955"), seeking
dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty
and desertion, has been dismissed.
2.
Facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal are that the
appellant/applicant (wife) filed an application/suit under Sections 13(1)
(i-a) and 13(1)(i-b) of the Act of 1955, before the Family Court, Bilaspur,
seeking dissolution of her marriage with the respondent/non-applicant
(husband) pleading therein that their marriage was solemnized on
21.05.2013 in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals, and a son was
born out of the wedlock on 10.12.2014. She pleaded that after birth of
their son, non-applicant/husband subjected her to mental and physical
cruelty by neglecting her and their son, taunting her for bringing
insufficient dowry, abusing and confining her, restricting her movements
and suspecting her character. She further pleaded that in September
2017, husband and his family members, after harassing her, left her at
her parental home and thereafter made no sincere effort to resume
cohabitation. She also alleged that non-applicant/husband levelled
false allegation regarding her character during the proceedings under
Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., thereby causing her further mental
harassment. On these grounds, she sought dissolution of the marriage
and a decree of divorce.
3.
In
his
written
statement,
non-applicant/husband
denied
all
allegations of cruelty and dowry demand and pleaded that he had
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always maintained the applicant and their son, including payment of
child's school and bus transportation fees, as admitted by the applicant
in her statement under Section 125 Cr.P.C. He pleaded that, soon after
marriage, applicant started quarrelling with him and his elderly parents
over trivial issues, behaved indecently and threatened to implicate
them in false dowry cases. He further denied that his sisters-in-law had
ever harassed the applicant or that he had ever doubted her character.
But it is the applicant herself who mentally harassed the non-applicant
by making derogative remarks about his age and expressing her
unwillingness to continue the marital relationship. He contended that
the applicant had voluntarily left the matrimonial home in September
2017 along with their minor son and, despite his repeated efforts,
refused to return. He further relied upon the proceedings before the
Women's Police Station, Bilaspur, and the applicant's statements in the
proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C., to contend that she had
declined reconciliation and had made no complaint of harassment
before the said authority. In his additional pleadings, non-applicant
further pleaded that the applicant frequently visited her parental home
and, whenever he objected to such visits, she quarrelled with him and
threatened to commit suicide and implicate him and his family
members in false cases. He reiterated that he had never subjected her
to cruelty and pleaded that dissolution of the marriage would adversely
affect the future, welfare and development of their minor son.
Therefore, application/suit filed by the applicant be dismissed.
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4. On the basis of the pleadings made by the parties, learned Family
Court framed following main issues for determination:
“1. Whether the non-applicant subjected the
applicant to physical and mental cruelty?
2. Whether the non-applicant deserted the applicant
without reasonable cause ?
3. Whether the applicant is entitled to obtain a
decree of divorce from the non-applicant? ”
5. Learned Family Court upon appreciation of the pleadings and oral as
well as documentary evidence adduced by the parties, answered the
aforesaid issues in negative and held that the applicant/wife failed to prove
the allegation of cruelty and desertion against the non-applicant/husband.
Consequently, the application filed under Section 13(1)(i-a), 13 (1) (i-b) of
the Act of 1955 was dismissed by the impugned judgment which is under
challenge by the appellant/applicant in the present appeal.
6.
Assailing legality, validity, and correctness of the impugned judgment
and decree, learned counsel for the appellant/wife (applicant), submits
that learned Family Court committed manifest illegality and perversity in
rejecting the application filed by the appellant/applicant for decree of
divorce. He submits that learned Family Court passed the impugned
judgment
and
decree
without
properly
appreciating
the
facts,
circumstances and evidence available on record. It is contended that the
Family Court failed to consider the applicant’s testimony regarding
repeated demands for money and dowry, as well as physical assault by
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her husband and in-laws, resulting in injuries. It is further argued that the
Family Court overlooked the order dated 24.12.2024 passed in Misc.
Criminal Case No. 281/2022 under Section 125 Cr.P.C., whereby
maintenance was granted to the appellant, recognizing sufficient grounds
for her separate residence. Learned counsel submitted that the testimony
of the appellant/applicant (AW-1) was not properly appreciated and that
she had sufficient reasons to live separately, particularly when the nonapplicant/husband made no sincere effort to bring her back to the
matrimonial home. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree are
liable to be set aside.
7.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/husband (non-
applicant) would submit that the learned Family Court, after proper
appreciation of the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence available on
record, has rightly dismissed the divorce petition, as the appellant/wife
(applicant) failed to establish the grounds of cruelty and desertion under
Section 13(1)(i-a) and 13(1)(i-b) of the Act of 1955. It is contended that the
allegations of dowry demand, physical assault and mental harassment are
vague, unsubstantiated and unsupported by any cogent evidence. Merely
because maintenance was awarded to the appellant/applicant under
Section 125 Cr.P.C., it cannot be presumed that the respondent/husband
had subjected her to cruelty or that she was justified in withdrawing from
his company. It is further submitted that the appellant/applicant voluntarily
left the matrimonial home in September 2017 along with their minor son
and, despite repeated efforts made by the respondent for reconciliation,
she refused to resume cohabitation. Her refusal to return to the
matrimonial home is also evident from the counselling proceedings before
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the Women's Police Station and her statements recorded in the
maintenance proceedings. Learned counsel would further submit that the
appellant has failed to establish any legally sustainable ground warranting
dissolution of marriage. Learned Family Court has committed no illegality
or perversity in passing the impugned judgment and decree. Accordingly,
the appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.
8. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for
the parties and have carefully perused the record of the Family Court.
9. The appellant/wife has challenged the impugned judgment and decree
whereby learned Family Court dismissed the application filed by her under
Section 13(1)(i-a) and Section 13 (1) (i-b) of the Act of 1955 seeking
decree of divorce from respondent/husband on the ground of cruelty and
desertion. The factum of marriage is not in dispute. It is an admitted
position that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on
21.05.2013 in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals.
10. Section 13 of the Act of 1955 provides for grant of decree of divorce in
certain cases. It enacts that any marriage solemnized whether before or
after the commencement of the Act may be dissolved on a petition
presented either by the husband or by the wife on any of the grounds
specified therein. Clause (i-a) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 envisages
that a decree of divorce may be passed by a Court on the ground that
after solemnization of marriage, opposite party has treated the petitioner
with cruelty. Expression ‘cruelty’ includes both (i) physical cruelty; and (ii)
mental cruelty. Cruelty is not defined in the Act of 1955. Physical cruelty
can be proved by oral and documentary evidence. As far as mental cruelty
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is concerned, the same has to be decided based on the facts and
circumstances of each case taking into consideration the social standing of
the parties.
11. Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Act of 1955 provides desertion as a legal
ground for divorce. It allows either spouse to file for the dissolution of
marriage if the other party has deserted them for a continuous period of at
least two years right before filing the petition.
12. In order to examine the act of cruelty, the principles laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh reported in
(2007) 4 SCC 511, would be a relevant guideline wherein the Court has
indicated certain illustrative instances at para 101 whereby the inference
of mental cruelty can be drawn. Para 101 reads as under :“101. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for
guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate
some instances of human behaviour which may be
relevant in dealing with the cases of “mental cruelty”.
The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs
are only illustrative and not exhaustive:
(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the
parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as
would not make possible for the parties to live with
each other could come within the broad parameters of
mental cruelty.
(ii)
On
comprehensive
appraisal
of
the
entire
matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly
clear that situation is such that the wronged party
cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such
conduct and continue to live with other party.
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(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount
to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of
manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a
degree that it makes the married life for the other
spouse absolutely intolerable.
(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of
deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one
spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time
may lead to mental cruelty.
(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating
treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render
miserable life of the spouse.
(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of
one spouse actually affecting physical and mental
health of the other spouse. The treatment complained
of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be
very grave, substantial and weighty.
(vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect,
indifference or total departure from the normal
standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental
health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to
mental cruelty.
(viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy,
selfishness,
possessiveness,
which
causes
unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset
may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground
of mental cruelty.
(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and
tear of the married life which happens in day-to-day life
would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the
ground of mental cruelty.
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(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and
a few isolated instances over a period of years will not
amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent
for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has
deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and
behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it
extremely difficult to live with the other party any
longer, may amount to mental cruelty.
(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of
sterilisation without medical reasons and without the
consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly, if the
wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical
reason or without the consent or knowledge of her
husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to
mental cruelty.
(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse
for considerable period without there being any
physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to
mental cruelty.
(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after
marriage not to have child from the marriage may
amount to cruelty.
(xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous
separation, it may fairly be concluded that the
matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage
becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By
refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does
not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it
shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of
the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to
mental cruelty.”
10 / 20
13. In
support
of
her
case
before
the
learned
Family
Court,
appellant/applicant (wife) examined herself as AW-1, whereas, nonapplicant/husband examined himself as NAW-1.
14. In the present case, appellant/wife (applicant) has alleged several
instances
of
physical
and
mental
cruelty
on
the
part
of
respondent/husband. In her affidavit filed under Order 18 Rule 4 of the
CPC, she reiterated the allegations made in her plaint/application.
However, during her cross-examination, particularly in paragraph- 15
thereof, she admitted that she had not lodged any complaint regarding the
alleged harassment pleaded in paragraph -3 of her affidavit. She further
admitted that she had not produced any evidence in support of her
allegations that, after the birth of their son, respondent neglected her care
and treatment; criticised her for not performing household work properly;
taunted her for having brought insufficient dowry; deprived her of food and
other necessities; confined her in a room; or that her sisters-in-law taunted
her and the respondent abused and behaved indecently with her, thereby
causing her mental and physical harassment. Further, in paragraph- 16 of
her cross-examination, applicant (AW-1), admitted that she is an educated
woman and holds qualifications of B.Com., M.Com., B.Ed. and M.A. in
English. She also admitted that the respondent/husband had initiated
reconciliation proceedings before the Women's Police Station, Bilaspur.
Copy of the proceedings conducted before the Women's Police Station,
Bilaspur, has been exhibited as Ex. D-1.
15. Thus, the testimony of the appellant/applicant/wife Ritu Srivas (AW-1),
particularly her admissions made during cross-examination, indicates that
she did not lodge any complaint against the respondent/husband or his
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family members in respect of the alleged acts of cruelty. Although she
sought to explain the absence of any such complaint by stating that she
had refrained from taking recourse to legal proceedings in order to protect
her family, the explanation does not inspire confidence, particularly when
she has admittedly been living separately from the respondent since 2017.
No material has been brought on record to demonstrate that, during the
prolonged period of separation, she made any attempt to report or
otherwise substantiate the alleged acts of cruelty. Further, the appellant
has admitted the proceedings conducted before the Family Counselling
Centre, Women's Police Station, Bilaspur, which have been exhibited as
Ex. D-1. A perusal of the said proceedings reveals that no allegation of
physical or mental cruelty against the respondent or his family members
was made by her during the counselling proceedings. Though the
appellant/applicant stated in paragraph-18 of her cross-examination that
she had apprised the Mahila Police Station of the alleged harassment, no
such allegation finds mention in Ex. D-1, which bears her signature. Thus,
her admission regarding non-filing of any complaint, coupled with the
absence of any reference to the alleged acts of cruelty in the relevant
counselling proceedings, assumes significance while assessing the
credibility of her allegations. These circumstances, when considered
cumulatively, create a serious doubt regarding the veracity of the
allegations of cruelty subsequently made by the appellant against the
respondent and his family members.
16. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we find that the allegations of
physical and mental cruelty levelled by the appellant/wife against the
respondent/husband and his family members have not been established
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by any cogent and reliable evidence. Accordingly, we are of the
considered opinion that the appellant/wife has failed to discharge the
burden of proving cruelty as contemplated under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the
Act of 1955.
17. So far as the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Act of
1955 is concerned, applicant/wife (AW-1), in paragraph 5 of her affidavit
filed in evidence, stated that in September 2017, the respondent/husband
and his family members subjected her to harassment and left her at her
parental home situated at 27, Kholi, Vikas Nagar, Bilaspur, against her
wishes. She further alleged that, thereafter, the respondent made no effort
to bring her back to the matrimonial home or resume cohabitation.
However, during his cross-examination, particularly in paragraph-15
thereof, when respondent/husband (NAW-1) was questioned as to why he
had not lodged any complaint with the police if the appellant had left the
matrimonial home in September 2017, he stated that the applicant had left
the matrimonial home on the pretext that she intended to pursue her B.Ed.
studies and, therefore, he did not consider it necessary to lodge any police
complaint. Thus, the testimony of the respondent/husband indicates that,
according to him, the appellant had left the matrimonial home on her own
volition for the purpose of pursuing her studies.
18. Further, perusal of the proceedings recorded by the Family Counselling
Centre, Women's Police Station, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, exhibited as Ex.
D-1, does not disclose any assertion on the part of the appellant that she
had been forcibly sent to or left at her parental home by the respondent in
September 2017. On the contrary, the said proceedings indicate that the
appellant/applicant expressed her unwillingness to return to the
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matrimonial home on the grounds that she had completed her B.Ed.
qualification, the respondent was unable to provide her with suitable
residential accommodation and the house did not have the requisite
facilities. She also expressed her desire to reside at Bilaspur. These
statements, recorded during the counselling proceedings, assume
significance while examining the circumstances in which the parties
started living separately and the question as to which of them withdrew
from the matrimonial relationship.
19. Thus, the material available on record, particularly the testimony of the
respondent/husband (NAW-1) and the proceedings exhibited as Ex. D-1,
does not substantiate the appellant's/applicant’s assertion that she was
forcibly sent to her parental home against her wishes by the respondent in
September 2017. Rather, the aforesaid material indicates that the
appellant/applicant was unwilling to return to the matrimonial home and
had expressed her preference to reside separately at Bilaspur on account
of
her
educational
and
residential
comforts
and
considerations.
Consequently, the appellant's version that the respondent had driven her
out of the matrimonial home and thereafter deserted her is not supported
by the evidence on record. These circumstances are, therefore, relevant in
determining whether the essential ingredients of desertion, including the
factum of separation and the requisite intention to bring cohabitation
permanently to an end by the respondent/non-applicant, have been
established in the present case.
20. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the evidence available on
record, we find that the appellant/wife has failed to establish that the
respondent/husband had driven her out of the matrimonial home or left her
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at her parental home against her wishes in September 2017, as alleged by
her. Rather, the material on record indicates that she was unwilling to
return to the matrimonial home and had expressed her preference to
reside separately at Bilaspur. Thus, the appellant's assertion that the
respondent had compelled her to live separately and thereby deserted her
is not borne out by the evidence on record. Consequently, the appellant
has failed to establish that the respondent/husband had deserted her
within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Act of 1955.
21. It is well settled that matrimonial life necessarily involves certain
differences, disagreements and adjustments between spouses. Mere
differences relating to residence, financial circumstances or day-to-day
household affairs, in the absence of conduct of sufficient gravity and
persistence, cannot by themselves constitute cruelty within the meaning of
Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act of 1955.
22. In the present case, the appellant/wife (applicant) has made several
allegations against the respondent/husband (non-applicant). However, the
material on record does not establish, by cogent and reliable evidence,
that the respondent's/non-applicant’s conduct was of such a grave and
persistent nature as to render the continuation of matrimonial life
impossible or to make it unreasonable to expect the appellant to continue
cohabitation with him.
23. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain
reported in (2009) 10 SCC 415 observed thus :
“27. In all the subsequent cases, the Supreme Court
invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of
15 / 20
the Constitution of India in order to do complete justice
to the parties when faced with a situation where the
marriage ties had completely broken and there was no
possibility whatsoever of the spouses coming together
again. In such a situation, this Court felt that it would be
a travesty of justice to continue with the marriage ties.
28. It may, however, be indicated that in some of the
High Courts, which do not possess the powers vested
in the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution, this question had arisen and it was held in
most of the cases that despite the fact that the marriage
had broken down irretrievably, the same was not a
ground for granting a decree of divorce either under
Section 13 or Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955.
29. In the ultimate analysis the aforesaid discussion
throws up two propositions. The first proposition is that
although irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not one
of the grounds indicated whether under Sections 13 or
13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for grant of
divorce, the said doctrine can be applied to a
proceeding under either of the said two provisions only
where the proceedings are before the Supreme Court.
In exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 142
of the Constitution the Supreme Court can grant relief
to the parties without even waiting for the statutory
period of six months stipulated in Section 13-B of the
aforesaid Act. This doctrine of irretrievable breakdown
of marriage is not available even to the High Courts
which do not have powers similar to those exercised by
the
Supreme
Court
under
Article
of
the
Constitution. Neither the civil courts nor even the High
Courts can, therefore, pass orders before the periods
16 / 20
prescribed under the relevant provisions of the Act or
on the grounds not provided for in Sections 13 and 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.”
24. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Savitri Pandey Vs. Prem Chandra
Pandey reported in (2002) 2 SCC 73, while dismissing the appeal filed by
appellant-wife seeking decree of divorce under Section 13 (1) (i-b) and 23
(1) of the Act of 1955, observed thus :
“11. There is another aspect of the matter which
disentitles the appellant from seeking the relief of
divorce on the ground of desertion in this case. As
desertion in matrimonial cases means the withdrawal
of one party from a state of things i.e. the marital
status of the party, no party to the marriage can be
permitted to allege desertion unless he or she admits
that after the formal ceremonies of the marriage, the
parties had recognised and discharged the common
obligation of the married life which essentially requires
the cohabitation between the parties for the purpose of
consummating the marriage. Cohabitation by the
parties is an essential of a valid marriage as the object
of the marriage is to further the perpetuation of the
race by permitting lawful indulgence in passions for
procreation of children. In other words, there can be no
desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties.
The basis for this theory is built upon the recognised
position of law in matrimonial matters that no one can
desert who does not actively or wilfully bring to an end
the existing state of cohabitation. However, such a rule
is subject to just exceptions which may be found in a
case on the ground of mental or physical incapacity or
other peculiar circumstances of the case. However, the
party seeking divorce on the ground of desertion is
17 / 20
required to show that he or she was not taking the
advantage of his or her own wrong. In the instant case
the appellant herself pleaded that there had not been
cohabitation between the parties after the marriage.
She neither assigned any reason nor attributed the
non-resumption of cohabitation to the respondent.
From the pleadings and evidence led in the case, it is
apparent that the appellant did not permit the
respondent to have cohabitation for consummating the
marriage. In the absence of cohabitation between the
parties, a particular state of matrimonial position was
never permitted by the appellant to come into
existence. In the present case, in the absence of
cohabitation and consummation of marriage, the
appellant was disentitled to claim divorce on the
ground of desertion.
12. No evidence was led by the appellant to show that
she was forced to leave the company of the
respondent or that she was thrown away from the
matrimonial home or that she was forced to live
separately and that the respondent had intended
animus deserendi. There is nothing on record to hold
that the respondent had ever declared to bring the
marriage to an end or refused to have cohabitation
with the appellant. As a matter of fact the appellant is
proved to have abandoned the matrimonial home and
declined to cohabit with the respondent thus forbearing
to perform the matrimonial obligation.
13. In any proceedings under the Act whether
defended or not the court would decline to grant relief
to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner was
taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability
for the purposes of the reliefs contemplated under
Section 23(1) of the Act. No party can be permitted to
carve out the ground for destroying the family which is
18 / 20
the basic unit of the society. The foundation of the
family rests on the institution of a legal and valid
marriage. Approach of the court should be to preserve
the matrimonial home and be reluctant to dissolve the
marriage on the asking of one of the parties.”
25. In case of Gurbux Singh v. Harminder Kaur, reported in (2010) 14
SCC 301, Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering an appeal arising out
of the dismissal of an application filed by a spouse under Section 13 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking a decree of divorce, observed as
under:
“16. The married life should be assessed as a whole and
a few isolated instances over certain period will not
amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be precedent for a
fairly
lengthy
period
where
the
relationship
has
deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and
behaviour of a spouse, one party finds it extremely difficult
to live with the other party no longer may amount to
mental cruelty. Making certain statements on the spur of
the moment and expressing certain displeasure about the
behaviour of elders may not be characterised as cruelty.
Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of
married life which happens in day to day life in all families
would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground
of cruelty. Sustained unjustifiable and reprehensible
conduct affecting physical and mental health of the other
spouse may lead to mental cruelty. Both the appellant and
the respondent being highly qualified persons, the
appellant being Principal in ITI College, the respondent
working as a Librarian in a government institute, an
isolated friction on some occasion like festival of lohri
even in the presence of others cannot be a valid ground
for dissolving the marriage.”
19 / 20
26. The burden of establishing the allegations of cruelty was upon the
appellant/applicant-wife. Apart from the oral assertions made by the
appellant/applicant, no cogent and reliable documentary evidence has
been brought on record to substantiate the allegations of “cruelty” as well
as “desertion” against the respondent/non-applicant-husband.
27. The appellate Court, while considering an appeal against a judgment
based upon appreciation of evidence by the Family Court, is required to
examine whether the findings recorded by the trial Court are supported by
the evidence on record and whether such findings suffer from perversity,
illegality or any material error of law.
28. Upon consideration of the entire material available on record, we find
that the learned Family Court has considered the pleadings as well as the
oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties and has recorded
a reasoned finding that the appellant/applicant failed to establish the
allegations of “cruelty” and “desertion” against the respondent/nonapplicant.
29. The findings recorded by the learned Family Court are based upon
proper appreciation of the evidence on record and cannot be said to be
perverse or contrary to the evidence. No material illegality or error of law
has been demonstrated warranting interference by this Court in exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction.
30. In view of the foregoing discussions and having regard to the principles
laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions referred to
20 / 20
hereinabove, we are of the considered view that the appellant/applicant
failed to establish that she was treated with “cruelty” and “deserted” by the
respondent /non-applicant (husband).
31. Accordingly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. Impugned
judgment and decree is hereby affirmed.
32. Let a decree be drawn accordingly.
S
Sd/(Parth Prateem Sahu)
Judge
Praveen
Sd/(Sushma Sawant)
Judge
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