The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
08. 09.2016 at about 10.15 hours was going to his uncle’s house and on the way at Ramkrishna Chowdhury Para under Kalyanpur P.S., District- Khowai got electrocuted from a live wire lying on the path. Thereafter, with the help of locals, he was detached from the said electrical wire and was taken to Kalyanpur hospital wherein he was declared dead. At the time of said incident, he was stated to be 28 years old and was by profession a day labour and Bargadar who would cultivate the land of others and in total, he would earn Rs.15,000/- per month. It is alleged that said electricity wire was under the management, control and care of Electricity Department and concerning the said incident, one unnatural death case bearing No. Kalyanpur U/D Case No.14 of 2015 was registered under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The present appellants being the wife, mother and daughter respectively of said deceased instituted the suit. [3] The respondents-Tripura State Electricity Corporation Ltd. [the TSECL in short] in their written statement denied the allegations of lying of live electric wire on the path and electrocution of the deceased therefrom. They also did not admit the age and monthly income of the deceased. By filing an additional written statement, they asserted further facts that after the death of the deceased, the police investigated the matter, recorded statements of loca…
8. If we read this statement along with other evidence and in a harmonious manner, it is clear that what the appellant admitted was that the acquisition in was made by his father on his behalf and the consideration for the same was paid by his father from out of the appellant’s private funds ……” Thus, the Supreme Court has pointed out that “before the right of a party can be considered to have been defeated on the basis of an alleged admission by him, the implication of the statement made by him must be clear and conclusive and there should not be any doubt or ambiguity about the alleged admission and to examine whether there is ambiguity in the admission, it would be necessary for the court to read the other parts of the evidence and the stand taken by him in the pleadings. Considering in that way, as pointed out above, it becomes obvious that the so called admission is not admission at all. It is a statement made out of knowledge. Hence, it does not help the case of the respondent. Thus, we are satisfied, looking into the stand taken by the respondent in the proceeding and the manner in which he has disposed, having least regard for the truth, that the so called admission and suggestions put by the counsel for the petitioner would not render the marriage invalid. The evidences on record are neither clear nor ambiguous nor reliable. Hence, the initial presumption arising from the…
Full Judgment Text
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RFA No.21 of 2022
1.
Smt. Ravaiti Debbarma,
wife of late Bikash Debbarma
2.
Smt. Jagatswari Debbarma,
mother of late Bikash Debbarma
3.
Miss. Elina Debbarma (minor),
daughter of late Bikash Debbarma
-All
are
residents
of
villageRamkrishna Chowdhury Para, P.S.
Kalyanpur, District- Khowai Tripura
[Appellant No.3 being minor is
represented by her mother namely,
Smt. Ravaiti Debbarma i.e. Appellant
No.1 as her legal guardian]
……… Appellant(s)
–Versus–
1.
Tripura State Electricity Corporation Ltd.
represented
by
Chairman-cumManaging Director, Bhuturia near Mara
Chowmuhani, Banamalipur, Agartala,
West Tripura
2.
The Sr. Manager (Electrical)
Electrical Sub-Division- Kalyanpur, PO
& P.S. Kalyanpur, District- Khowai,
Tripura
……. Respondent(s)
For the Appellant (s)
:
Mr. K. Pandey, Adv.
For the Respondent (s)
:
Mr. N. Majumder, Adv.
Date of hearing
:
29.08.2024
Date of delivery of
Judgment & order
:
13.12.2024
Whether fit for reporting
:
YES
√
NO
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA
JUDGMENT & ORDER
[S. Datta Purkayastha, J]
The appeal arises out of the judgment of dismissal dated
25.03.2021 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Court
No.2, West Tripura, Agartala in Money Suit No.21 of 2018 and the
related decree thereof.
[2]
The plaintiffs (the appellants herein) lodged the claim of
Rs.15,00,000/- averring in the suit that one Bikash Debbarma on
08.09.2016 at about 10.15 hours was going to his uncle’s house
and on the way at Ramkrishna Chowdhury Para under Kalyanpur
P.S., District- Khowai got electrocuted from a live wire lying on the
path. Thereafter, with the help of locals, he was detached from the
said electrical wire and was taken to Kalyanpur hospital wherein he
was declared dead. At the time of said incident, he was stated to be
28 years old and was by profession a day labour and Bargadar who
would cultivate the land of others and in total, he would earn
Rs.15,000/- per month. It is alleged that said electricity wire was
under the management, control and care of Electricity Department
and concerning the said incident, one unnatural death case bearing
No. Kalyanpur U/D Case No.14 of 2015 was registered under
Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The present
appellants being the wife, mother and daughter respectively of said
deceased instituted the suit.
[3]
The respondents-Tripura State Electricity Corporation
Ltd. [the TSECL in short] in their written statement denied the
allegations
of
lying
of
live
electric
wire
on
the
path
and
electrocution of the deceased therefrom. They also did not admit
the age and monthly income of the deceased. By filing an additional
written statement, they asserted further facts that after the death
of the deceased, the police investigated the matter, recorded
statements of local people and relatives of the deceased and
submitted the final report stating that on the alleged date of
incident, the deceased went to the house of one Santosh Debbarma
of Ramkrishna Chowdhury Para for working purpose and when he
was trying to start operation of one shallow motor by pressing the
switch, he was electrocuted and died on the spot and therefore,
they were not responsible for any payment.
[4]
During trial, the plaintiff No.1, Smt. Ravaiti Debbarma
examined herself as PW-1 and proved certain documents into the
evidence. She also examined one co-villager, namely Sri Subal
Debbarma as PW-2. From the side of the TSECL, the Sr. Manager of
Kalyanpur Electrical Sub-Division, namely Sri Mrinal Kanti Das was
examined as DW-1 and he also proved certified copy of the final
report of said police investigation [Exbt.A] and certified copy of one
FIR [Exbt.B] of that case.
[5]
Finally, the learned trial court dismissed the suit mainly
on the ground that the final report submitted by the police revealed
that the investigating officer had examined the relatives of the
deceased and it transpired that on the alleged date at about 8.30
hours, the deceased went to the house of his uncle, namely
Santosh Debbarma of Ramkrishna Chowdhury Para and when he
pressed
the
switch
of
shallow
motor
connection,
he
was
electrocuted and died on the spot. Therefore, according to the
learned trial court, the deceased did not die from any accident
occurred on account of any negligence on the part of the
defendant-respondents.
[6]
Mr. K. Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the
appellants argues that the learned trial court has misread and
misinterpreted the evidences as adduced by the plaintiffs and took
exceptions of the facts that during cross-examination, PW-1 stated
that in connection with death of her husband, police personnel had
made an investigation and many persons of their locality were
asked about the incident and those persons made statements to
the investigating officers relating to the death of her husband as to
how the accident had occurred and further stated that whatever the
investigating officer had opined in the final investigation report was
true about the death of her husband. According to Mr. Pandey,
learned counsel, such replies given in the cross-examination itself
do not establish that the death was not for any negligent act on the
part of the defendants. According to him, the investigating officer
was not examined in this case and therefore, there was no scope
for the plaintiffs to cross-examine him. Mr. Pandey, learned counsel
also submits that one eyewitness of the incident was examined as
PW-2 who categorically stated that from the live wire, the deceased
was electrocuted and such substantive piece of evidence concerning
the alleged incident was ignored by Ld. Trial Court.
[7]
Mr. N. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the
TSECL replies that the final report of the police was proved into
evidence by both sides and as per said report, the deceased was
electrocuted while using a motor pump and not from any live wire
and therefore, the TSECL bears no responsibility to make any
payment and the learned trial court was completely justified in
dismissing the suit for suppression of material facts by the
plaintiffs.
[8]
We have given our thoughtful consideration in the
matter. Though both sides have proved the police investigation
report into the evidence but such investigation report is not
substantive piece of evidence regarding the alleged incident. Postmortem report of the deceased was proved as Exbt.4 from the side
of the plaintiffs wherefrom it appears that the Autopsy Surgeon had
opined about the cause of the death of the deceased to be
secondary asphyxia due to electric current. The defendants are not
disputing said post-mortem report. Therefore, it is not disputed that
the deceased died due to electrocution. The Sr. Manager, Mr. Mrinal
Kanti Das though examined himself in the trial but from his
evidence it appears that he was not present at the time of said
incident rather he went to the spot later on. The Investing Officer in
his police report did not divulge the names of persons from whom
he came to learn the above said fact of electrocution of the
deceased in the house of Santosh Debbarma nor he had attached
the statements of such witnesses along with his report. Said
Santosh Debbarma was also not examined by the defendants. No
site map of the place of occurrence was also annexed with the
report. Therefore, such report does not bear much significant value
regarding said incident. On the other hand, PW-2, a resident of
Ramkrishna Chowdhury Para stated that on 08.09.2016 when said
Bikash Debbarma was going from his house towards his uncle’s
house on the way of Ramkrishna Chowdhury Para, he came in
contact with a live wire lying on the way. Thereafter, he along with
other local people detached Bikash Debbarma from said electric
wire with the help of bamboo and he was sent to Kalyanpur
Hospital for treatment. In his cross-examination, he however
admitted that he did not witness the alleged incident but after the
incident, he went and saw the deceased, Bikash Debbarma. He
further admitted that the police visited their locality and inquired
about the incident from him and others and he informed the police
about the said incident. He categorically denied the suggestion that
while
pressing
electrocuted.
the
switch
of
electric
water
pump,
he
got
Nothing is there in the evidence that he was an
interested or partisan witness and we do not find any reason to
disbelieve him. He in his cross-examination also stated that he had
told the police about such incident, but there is no whisper in the
police report about his name therein and how the police officer has
discarded his statement given to him. Though said witness in his
cross-examination also stated that the deceased had gone to the
house of Santosh Debbarma on that day for work, but said fact
alone does not establish that the incident occurred in that house.
[9]
PW-1 is a rustic tribal lady also similarly deposed that
the electric wire was detached from the electric pole installed by
the power department and due to negligence and carelessness of
the TSECL that wire was lying on the path. She did not claim to be
an eyewitness of the incident and just because she in her crossexamination stated that the opinion of the investigating officer was
true, neither her entire evidence can be discarded nor any extra
importance can be given to the said police investigation report. PW1 also categorically denied the suggestion that her husband while
going to start the electrical motor in the house of Santosh
Debbarma was electrocuted therein. It appears that the learned
trial court has given over emphasis on the said investigation report
of unnatural death case. The defendants to fortify such report of
the investigating officer did not examine any witness of the incident
including said Santosh Debbarma to show that such report was
correctly submitted by the police.
[10]
It is settled position of law that final investigation report
forms a mere opinion of the Investigating Officer on the materials
collected by him. The Investigating Officer filed the final report
before the Court under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. It being a
report is not a substantive piece of evidence. The truthfulness of
the report will only be decided by the court.
[11]
In the case in hand, the statements in the plaint are
very clear as to how the husband of the plaintiff No.1 got
electrocuted. More so, PW-1, the wife of the deceased has
categorically deposed in her chief examination that her deceased
husband on his way to Ramkrishna Chowdhury Para, came in
contact with a live wire lying on the way though she was not the
eyewitness to the incident. However, PW-2, a resident of the same
locality, reiterating and supporting the statement of PW-1 deposed
that he along with other local people detached Bikash Debbarma,
the deceased, from the said electric wire with the help of bamboo
and the deceased was sent to Kalyanpur hospital for treatment.
Though PW-2 was not an eyewitness to the incident, but, he stated
that after the incident he went there and saw the deceased. It is
true that non-examination of the investigating officer is not always
fatal, but, in the nature of the present case, the examination of the
Investigating Officer is very much necessary. We find that no
explanation has been offered as to why the Investigating Officer
was not brought to the witness box. There is yet another important
aspect of the case that the learned trial Judge has failed to
appreciate the settled law that mere exhibiting a document by a
person does not mean that the contents of such document are
proved, unless and until such contents are proved by the
maker/author of the said document. According to the learned trial
Judge, since the final investigation report was brought on record
and exhibited at the instance of the plaintiff No.1, Smt. Ravaiti
Debbarma herself, it amounts to an admission of the contents of
the report. It is settled proposition that admission must be clear
and explicit. In the instant case, we find that PW-1, the wife of the
deceased, is a rustic villager. Neither the learned trial Judge nor the
defendants narrated the contents of the police report during
deposition before the court, to say it otherwise, she was not aware
of the contents made in the final police report submitted by the
Investigating Officer. According to us, mere statement of PW-1 in
her cross-examination that ‘whatever the Investigating Officer had
opined in the final investigation report was true about the death of
her husband’, will not throw out the evidence given by her in her
chief examination.
[12]
In case of Chikkam Koreswara Rao vs. Chikkam
Subba Rao and Ors., reported in AIR 1971 SC 1542, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed thus:
“7. This admission must be read along with the evidence given by him in his
chief-examination ……
8. If we read this statement along with other evidence and in a harmonious
manner, it is clear that what the appellant admitted was that the acquisition
in was made by his father on his behalf and the consideration for the same
was paid by his father from out of the appellant’s private funds ……”
Thus, the Supreme Court has pointed out that “before
the right of a party can be considered to have been defeated on the
basis of an alleged admission by him, the implication of the
statement made by him must be clear and conclusive and there
should not be any doubt or ambiguity about the alleged admission
and to examine whether there is ambiguity in the admission, it
would be necessary for the court to read the other parts of the
evidence and the stand taken by him in the pleadings. Considering
in that way, as pointed out above, it becomes obvious that the so
called admission is not admission at all. It is a statement made out
of knowledge. Hence, it does not help the case of the respondent.
Thus, we are satisfied, looking into the stand taken by the
respondent in the proceeding and the manner in which he has
disposed, having least regard for the truth, that the so called
admission and suggestions put by the counsel for the petitioner
would not render the marriage invalid. The evidences on record are
neither clear nor ambiguous nor reliable. Hence, the initial
presumption arising from the facts of the case is not at all rebutted
by the respondent. Hence, we are constrained to hold that the
marriage is legal and valid and that the petitioner has the status of
wife of the respondent.”
[13]
Keeping in mind the aforesaid principle, if we evaluate
and assess the evidence of PW-1 in the present case, we find that
the contents of the report were not disclosed to her [as we stated
earlier]. This type of admission, without knowing the contents, by
PW-1
suffers
from ambiguity
and
cannot
be
considered as
conclusive. Furthermore, this so-called admission is not admission
at all. Hence, we are constrained to hold that the statement made
by PW-1 during her cross-examination admitting the police report
about the factum of death of her husband has no evidentiary value,
being neither clear nor unambiguous and reliable. Such isolated
statement cannot have any evidential value for deciding the suit.
[14]
The learned trial Judge has committed serious error in
dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs simply on the basis of such
ambiguous statement without considering the other parts of the
evidence led by the plaintiffs’ side and the stand taken by the
plaintiffs in their pleadings.
[15]
It is not disputed that all the electrical poles of public
distribution system of power supply to the private individuals lies
with said TSECL and therefore, it is their duty to maintain each and
every electrical line properly and carefully so that no mishap occurs
from such electrical connection. In case any person is electrocuted
resulting to his death or injury, for want of such proper care and
caution, the department shall obviously be held responsible on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In Ravi Kapur vs. State of
Rajasthan, (2012) 9 SCC 284, the Apex Court has observed that
the court is required to adopt one parameter of ‘reasonable care’ in
determining the question of negligence or contributory negligence.
The doctrine of reasonable care imposes an obligation or a duty
upon a person (for example a driver) to care for the pedestrian on
the road and this duty attains a higher degree when the
pedestrians happen to be children of tender years. It was also
further observed that while driving a vehicle on a public way, an
implicit duty cast on the drivers to see that their driving does not
endanger the life of the right users of the road, may be either
vehicular users or the pedestrians.
[16]
While
describing
the
general
principles
of
law
of
negligence, the Apex Court in that case also cited reference of
Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.), Vol. 34, Para 1 (p.3)
in the following terms:
―9......1. General principles of the law of negligence.—
Negligence is a specific tort and in any given
circumstances is the failure to exercise that care which the
circumstances demand. What amounts to negligence
depends on the facts of each particular case. It may
consist in omitting to do something which ought to be
done or in doing something which ought to be done either
in a different manner or not at all. Where there is no duty
to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no
legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care,
reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions
which can be reasonably foreseen to be likely to cause
physical injury to persons or property. The degree of care
required in the particular case depends on the surrounding
circumstances, and may vary according to the amount of
the risk to be encountered and to the magnitude of the
prospective injury. The duty of care is owed only to those
persons who are in the area of foreseeable danger; the
fact that the act of the defendant violated his duty of care
to a third person does not enable the plaintiff who is also
injured by the same act to claim unless he is also within
the area of foreseeable danger. The same act or omission
may accordingly in some circumstances involve liability as
being negligent, although in other circumstances it will not
do so. The material considerations are the absence of care
which is on the part of the defendant owed to the plaintiff
in the circumstances of the case and damage suffered by
the plaintiff, together with a demonstrable relation of
cause and effect between the two.‖
[17]
In the case in hand, the evidence from the defendants
side is lacking on the point that they were vigilant and took
reasonable care of the electricity line extended by them for such
electrical power supply in that locality. They have not even
produced any register of their office maintained for day to day
business regarding the entry made therein in respect of receipt of
the information of the said electrical incident and the result of their
inquiry, if any. In fact, the DW.1 categorically stated in his crossexamination that on being informed he had visited the spot, which
indicates that they had information of such incident and therefore,
it is obvious that they had maintained certain records of the same.
Withholding of such vital documents creates a space for drawing
adverse inference.
[18]
In view of the above said discussions, it is held that the
plaintiff-appellants
are
entitled
to
get
some
compensation.
According to the plaintiffs, the deceased was aged about 28 years
of old, earning Rs.15,000/- per month being a day labour and also
being a Bargadar. No document regarding Bargadarship is proved
by them. Even there is no concrete evidence adduced from the side
of the plaintiffs regarding the age and monthly income of the
deceased. However, in the post-mortem report, his age is reflected
to be 28 years which is supported by the police investigation report
too and in absence of any other concrete evidence on that point, his
age is taken to be 28 years.
[19]
Mr. Pandey, Ld. Counsel relies on a general guideline
regarding settlement of compensation of MAC cases in Lok Adalat
issued by the High Court on 04.08.2023 in the administrative side
wherein it was reflected that monthly income of unskilled workers
was to be taken as Rs.8,000/- per month in absence of any income
proof for the purpose of determination of compensation where the
accident had taken place on or before 31.12.2015. Originally
another such notification was issued on 09.01.2017 after a meeting
was held with all the concerned Insurance Companies, with their
agreement and in modification of the same, second notification
dated 04.08.2023 was issued. Such notifications were therefore
issued in different contexts.
[20]
In absence of any satisfactory evidence led by the
plaintiffs, per day income of the deceased as a day labour living in
a interior rural area is taken to be Rs.250/- during the year 2016.
Even if it is presumed that he would get job for 22 days in a month,
his monthly income comes to be Rs.5,500/-. One third is deducted
therefrom for his personal and living expenses and loss of
dependency per month is counted to be Rs.3,667/-.
Considering
the age of the deceased, multiplier 17 is required to be applied.
Therefore, the compensation is assessed at (Rs.3667 X 12 X17) =
Rs.7,48,068/-
rounded
off
to
Rs.7,50,000/-
taking
into
consideration of funeral expenses and other rituals. Therefore, total
compensation is calculated at Rs.7,50,000/- [Rupees Seven lakh
Fifty thousand] only.
[21]
The appeal is accordingly allowed and disposed of on
contest.
It
is
held
that
the
plaintiffs
are
entitled
to
get
compensation of Rs.7,50,000/- [Rupees Seven lakh Fifty thousand]
only along with interest @6% per annum from the date of filing of
the suit i.e. 04.07.2018 till payment. The defendants are jointly and
severally held responsible for making such payment with interest at
the earliest.
After such amount is paid or deposited, one fourth shall
be distributed to the plaintiff No.2, Jagatswari Debbarma and rest
shall be equally distributed between the plaintiff No.1, Smt. Ravaiti
Debbarma and the plaintiff No.3, Miss. Elina Debbarma. The entire
share of the plaintiff No.3, Miss. Elina Debbarma shall be kept in a
fixed deposit till she attains the age of 18 years, however plaintiff
no.1 will be entitled to draw periodical interest therefrom for her
up-brining. 50% portion of the compensation payable to the
plaintiff No.1, Ravaiti Debbarma shall be kept in fixed deposit for
05[five] years in any nationalised bank and rest amount shall be
disbursed to her through her bank account. Plaintiff no.1 will also
be entitled to draw periodical interest from her own fixed deposit
for her living expenses.
No order as to costs.
Return the trial court’s records.
Registry is to prepare the decree accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
JUDGE
signed by SUJAY GHOSH
SUJAY GHOSH Digitally
Date: 2024.12.17 13:37:34 +05'30'
Sujay
JUDGE
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