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2026:CGHC:21879-DB
MANPREET
KAUR
Digitally signed
by MANPREET
KAUR
Date: 2026.05.14
10:49:01 +0530
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 1679 of 2025
Smt. Rameshwari Rajput W/o Late Dhannu Lal Rajput, Aged About 59
Years R/o Gangdwari, Police Station And Tahsil Pathariya, District
Mungeli (C.G.)
--- Appellant(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, District Mungeli
(C.G.)
2 - Doman @ Lalla Rajput, S/o Bhagwanta Rajput, Aged About 20
Years R/o Gangdwari, Police Station And Tahsil Pathariya, District
Mungeli (C.G.)
3 - Bhagwanta Rajput, S/o Kriparam, Aged About 53 Years R/o
Gangdwari, Police Station And Tahsil Pathariya, District Mungeli (C.G.)
--- Respondent(s)
CRA No. 2202 of 2025
Smt. Rameshwari Rajput W/o Late Dhannu Lal Rajput Aged About 59
Years R/o Gangdwari, Police Station And Tahsil Pathariya, Distt.
Mungeli, Chhattisgarh.
---Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, Distt. Mungeli,
Chhattisgarh.
2 - Xyz Nill
--- Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s)
: Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Add. A.G.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
11.05.2026
1.
Heard Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel for the
appellants on I.A. No.01 of 2025 in CRA No. 1679/2025, which is
an application for condonation of delay of 248 days and I.A.
No.01 of 2025 in CRA No. 2202/2025, which is an application for
condonation of delay of 325 days. Also heard Mr. Ashish Shukla,
learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.
2.
Today, the present appeals have been listed as fresh matters for
consideration of I.A. No. 01/2025 filed in each appeal seeking
condonation of delay in preferring the appeals, contending that
the learned trial Court erred in convicting the accused persons for
lesser ofence punishable under Section 304 Part-I read with
Section 34 IPC and that they ought to have been convicted for
the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34
IPC. The same were also listed along with connected Criminal
Appeal Nos. 1906/2024 and 1931/2024 preferred by the
convicted accused persons against the common judgment of
conviction and order of sentence arising out of the very same
Crime No. 220/2022 registered at Police Station- Pathariya. Since
all the appeals emanate from the same occurrence, common
prosecution case and identical impugned judgment, they were
placed together before this Court. After hearing and dismissing
Criminal Appeal Nos. 1906/2024 and 1931/2024 on merits, this
Court proceeded to consider the present appeals on the question
of condonation of delay and, with the consent of learned counsel
appearing for the parties, heard the matters finally.
3.
The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that complainant Mrs.
Rameshwari Rajput lodged a merg intimation alleging that on
21.08.2022, in the morning hours, she along with her husband
Dhannu Lal Rajput had gone to the agricultural field for weeding
work. At about 08:30 A.M., on account of a dispute relating to
putting grass on the embankment of the field, accused
Bhagwanta, Doman and the juvenile accused, acting in
furtherance of their common intention, assaulted deceased
Dhannu Lal Rajput by means of deadly weapons including sickle,
stick, axe and knife, thereby causing grievous injuries resulting in
his death. On the basis of the said information, merg intimation
Ex.P-01 was recorded and merg inquest proceedings Ex.P-02
were initiated. During investigation, the spot map Ex.P-03, spot
panchnama Ex.P-04 and dead body panchnama Ex.P-11 were
prepared. Thereafter, Police Station Patharia registered FIR
bearing Crime No.220/2022 for the offence punishable under
Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and took up the
investigation.
4.
During the course of investigation, the articles allegedly used in
the commission of offence were seized in presence of witnesses,
the accused persons were arrested and sent to judicial remand
and, after completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed
before the competent Court.
5.
The case being exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the
same was committed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Mungeli to the Court of Sessions. After transfer of the
matter by the learned Sessions Judge, Mungeli, charges under
Sections 302/34 IPC were framed against the accused persons,
which were read over and explained to them. The accused
persons abjured guilt and claimed to be tried. Their statements
were also recorded.
6.
In relation to the same incident, the documents and evidence
collected during investigation were also considered in Special
Case (Juvenile Justice) No.01/2023 concerning the juvenile
accused. After completion of prosecution evidence, statements of
the accused persons under Section 313 CrPC were recorded,
wherein they denied all incriminating circumstances appearing
against them, pleaded innocence and contended that they had
been falsely implicated in the case. No defence evidence was
adduced on behalf of the accused persons.
7.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that he has preferred
the instant appeals against the findings and judgment of acquittal
dated 20.09.2024, passed in Sessions Trial No. 56/2022 and
Special Case (Juvenile Court) No.1/2023, by the Court of learned
First Additional Sessions Judge Mungeli, District- Mungeli (C.G.)
whereby convicted the respondents for lessor offence punishable
under Section 304 Part-I/34 of the IPC and convicted the for 10
year R.I. and fine of Rs.100/-, in default of payment of fine,
additional R.I. for 06 months.
8.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Trial
Court as well as the learned Juvenile Court have committed
grave error in law and on facts by convicting the respondents for
the lesser offence punishable under Section 304 Part-I read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code instead of convicting them
for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC, despite
overwhelming evidence available on record clearly establishing
the intention and participation of the accused persons in
committing the murder of deceased Dhannu Lal Rajput. It is
contended that the appellant, being the undisputed eye-witness
to the fateful incident, categorically deposed that respondent
along with the juvenile accused brutally assaulted her husband
with deadly weapons including stick, iron rod (Shabbal), Tangiya
and knife, causing multiple injuries on the vital parts of his body,
which ultimately resulted in his death. Learned counsel submits
that the nature of weapons used, the manner of assault and the
injuries inflicted unmistakably establish the common intention and
murderous assault committed by the accused persons, which is
further corroborated by the testimony of the PW-1 in paragraphs
9, 10, 12 and 14 of her deposition. It is further submitted that the
findings recorded by the learned Courts below, particularly the
conclusions contained in paragraphs 47 and 48 of the impugned
judgments, are perverse, contrary to the evidence available on
record and based upon erroneous appreciation of material
evidence. According to learned counsel, the learned Courts below
failed to properly appreciate that the assault was intentional,
premeditated and directed towards vital parts of the body with
deadly weapons and, therefore, all ingredients constituting the
offence under Section 302/34 IPC stood fully proved. It is thus
submitted that the alteration of offence from Section 302/34 IPC
to Section 304 Part-I/34 IPC and the imposition of lesser
sentence upon the respondents are wholly unjustified, inadequate
and unsustainable in the eyes of law and deserve to be set aside.
9.
It has been contended by the appellant that so far as the delay in
filing the present appeals is concerned, learned counsel for the
appellant submits that the appellant is an illiterate village lady
having no proper knowledge about the legal proceedings and
was under the bona fide impression that the matter was being
properly pursued by the prosecution before the competent
Courts. It is submitted that only in the month of September, 2025,
when the appellant happened to see respondents in the market of
Village- Gangdwari, she became suspicious regarding the status
of the criminal case and thereafter made enquiry through her
counsel, upon which she came to know for the first time that
respondent No. 2 had already been convicted by the learned
Juvenile Court, Mungeli and that Criminal Appeal No. 1931/2024
had also been preferred before this Court. Immediately thereafter,
the appellant took necessary legal steps for filing the present
appeals. Thus, the delay occurred neither intentionally nor
deliberately, but due to lack of knowledge and bona fide
circumstances beyond the control of the appellant, and therefore
the same deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice.
10.
The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of
1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to appeals for
enhancement of sentence.
11.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of P.K. Ramachandran
V. State of Kerala, reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556, has
reaffirmed that courts cannot condone delays in filing appeals
unless sufficient and bona fide reasons are shown, underscoring
the principle that limitation periods must be strictly observed.
12.
Further, Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh (2010) 8 SCC 685 is a
landmark judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had
dealt the interpretation of procedural delays and the principles of
condonation of delay under the Limitation Act, 1963. Decided in
2010, the case clarified the extent of judicial discretion in
accepting delayed appeals and applications.
13.
Further, though Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to
criminal appeals against acquittal/enhancement of sentence in
view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Mohd. Abaad Ali & Anr. v. Directorate of Revenue
Prosecution Intelligence (2024 INSC 125), nevertheless, the
appellant is required to establish sufficient cause explaining the
delay satisfactorily. Mere plea of ignorance of proceedings or
general assertions without due diligence cannot constitute
sufficient cause for condonation of an inordinate delay of 248
days and 325 days respectively.
14.
Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for
the parties and upon perusal of the material available on record,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellant has
failed to furnish any cogent, satisfactory and convincing
explanation for condonation of the inordinate delays of 248 days
and 325 days respectively in preferring the present appeals. The
explanation offered by the appellant is founded primarily upon
alleged lack of knowledge regarding the status of the criminal
proceedings and the plea that she came to know about the
judgment only upon seeing the respondents in the market in
September, 2025. However, except making bald and general
assertions, no material has been placed on record to establish
that the appellant had acted with due diligence or had taken
reasonable steps to ascertain the status of the proceedings within
the prescribed period of limitation.
15.
It is well settled that though the expression “sufficient cause”
occurring under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is required to
receive liberal construction in appropriate cases, nevertheless
such
liberal
approach
cannot
be
extended
to
condone
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of a litigant.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.K. Ramachandran (Supra), has
categorically held that the law of limitation has to be applied with
all its rigor and courts cannot extend limitation on equitable
grounds alone. Similarly, in Balwant Singh (supra), it has been
held that a party seeking condonation of delay must establish
bona fide reasons coupled with reasonable diligence and that
casual or fanciful explanations cannot constitute sufficient cause.
16.
In the present case, the explanation furnished by the appellant
does not inspire confidence and fails to satisfactorily explain the
entire period of delay. The appellant has also failed to
demonstrate any circumstance beyond her control which
prevented her from approaching this Court within the prescribed
limitation period. Mere ignorance of legal proceedings or lack of
legal knowledge, in absence of due diligence, cannot by itself
constitute sufficient cause for condonation of substantial delay.
17.
Consequently, this Court is not inclined to condone the delays of
248 days and 325 days in filing the present appeals. Accordingly,
I.A. No.01 of 2025 in CRA No.1679/2025 and I.A. No.01 of 2025
in CRA No.2202/2025 are hereby dismissed. As a consequence
thereof, the appeals also stand dismissed as barred by limitation.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Manpreet
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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