The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
29. The record shall be consigned to the Record Room after due compliance.” [6] Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the same, the appelalnts have preferred the present appeal before this Court for reconsideration. [7] Mrs. P. Dhar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the learned Court below while passing the preliminary decree went beyond the pleadings and evidences led by the parties and held that the suit does not suffer from the defect of partial partition as the same is allowed under the Dayabhaga school of Hindu Law thereby failing to understand the consequence of partial partition of the properties of the original land holder which would result in the respondent plaintiff to continue enjoying the possession and usufructs from the other landed estate of the common predecessor-in-interest but would oust the appellant defendants from the homestead which has been the residence of the appellant No. 1 and also home and permanent address of the other appellants. [8] The learned Court below while passing the preliminary decree failed to take into account the fact that the plaintiffs have not stated anywhere in their plaint regarding the entire land holdings of late Jagneshwar Das and Late Hiran Prava Das, wife of Late Jagneshwar Das from whom they have inherited other properties which they hold jointly as co-sharers and the specific reason and purpose…
Full Judgment Text
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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
_A_G_A_R_T_A_L_A_
RFA. No.24 of 2022
Smti. Pranati Roy (Das) and 3 Others.
.....Appellants
_V_E_R_S_U_S_
Smti. Biva Das and 12 Others
.....Respondents
For Appellant(s)
For Respondent(s)
:
:
Mrs. P. Dhar, Advocate.
Mr. P. Chakraborty, Advocate.
Ms. S. Debnath, Advocate.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
_O_ R_ D_ E_ R_
04/10/2023
Heard Mrs. P. Dhar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants
also heard Mr. P. Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
[2]
The present appeal has been filed under Section-96 of Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 against the judgment dated 30.04.2022 and preliminary
decree dated 07.05.2022 passed in T.S. (P) 25 of 2015 by the Court of the learned
Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No.2, Khowai Tripura.
[3]
The facts in brief are that the plaintiffs had filed a suit for partition
of joint landed property measuring 0.51 acres of their predecessor in interest
Jagneswar Das who died on 28.02.1973 and the defendants No.1 to 4 in the suit
were the successors of Shyamal Kanti Das (now deceased), the eldest son of
Jagneshwar Das. The suit was registered as TS. (P) 25 of 2015 and the appellants
herein had filed a coutner claim registered as counter claim 01 of 2019 which has
been dismissed for default on 29.09.2021.
[4]
The appellants’ claim is that the all the landed property owned by
the plaintiffs and defendants (appellants) jointly were not included in the partition
suit and further Shyamal Kanti Das, the predecessor of the defendants No.1 to 4
being the eldest son of Jagneshwar Das and elder brother of the plaintiffs took the
charge of the family and maintained the entire suit land with his own expense and
effort after the death of the original owner Jagneshwar Das. The partition suit was
decreed in favour of the plaintiffs vide judgment dated 30.04.2022 and
preliminary decree dated 07.05.2022 passed in T.S. (P) 25 of 2015 by the Court
of learned Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Court No.2 Khowai, Tripura.
[5]
The learned counsel below after hearing the parties and appreciation
of the material evidence on record, the learned Court below has observed as
under:
“26. In the result, the suit of the plaintiffs is decreed on contest against the
defendants No. 1 and 3 and without contest against rest of the defendants. It
is declared that the plaintiffs are entitled to 1/7th share each in the suit
schedule land and the defendants No. 1 to 4 are jointly entitled to 1/7th share
therein.
27. The parties are accordingly directed to partition the suit land amicably by
metes and bounds as per the respective shares declared above within a period
of 45 days. In the event of their failure, any of the parties may approach this
court for drawal of final decree by appointment of partition commissioner.
28. Sheristadar is to prepare a preliminary decree accordingly and place
before me for my signature within 15 days from today.
29. The record shall be consigned to the Record Room after due compliance.”
[6]
Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the same, the appelalnts
have preferred the present appeal before this Court for reconsideration.
[7]
Mrs. P. Dhar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has
submitted that the learned Court below while passing the preliminary decree went
beyond the pleadings and evidences led by the parties and held that the suit does
not suffer from the defect of partial partition as the same is allowed under the
Dayabhaga school of Hindu Law thereby failing to understand the consequence of
partial partition of the properties of the original land holder which would result in
the respondent plaintiff to continue enjoying the possession and usufructs from
the other landed estate of the common predecessor-in-interest but would oust the
appellant defendants from the homestead which has been the residence of the
appellant No. 1 and also home and permanent address of the other appellants.
[8]
The learned Court below while passing the preliminary decree
failed to take into account the fact that the plaintiffs have not stated anywhere in
their plaint regarding the entire land holdings of late Jagneshwar Das and Late
Hiran Prava Das, wife of Late Jagneshwar Das from whom they have inherited
other properties which they hold jointly as co-sharers and the specific reason and
purpose for which the homestead land is solely sought to be partitioned. Rather
the plaintiffs have chosen to present a case whereupon it appears that late
Jagneshwar Das had left behind only the suit land and even though the appellants
in their written statement have made a prayer for inclusion of the other properties
which they jointly hold in the hotchpots there was no change in the stance of the
plaintiffs.
[9]
The learned Court below has failed to take into account the fact that
the appellants in their written statement in paragraph No. 25.2 have brought on
record the entire land holdings of late Jagneshwar Das and late Hiran Prava Das
and that it was the duty of the learned Court below in the partition suit where the
interest of the plaintiffs and defendants being alike, to take into account all the
properties in the hotchpot such as to pass a decree ensuring an equitable
distribution of land among the co-sharers of the property.
[10]
The learned Court below while passing the preliminary decree
failed to consider the fact that the partition of a part of the landed estates jointly
held by the plaintiffs and the defendants would be inequitable and unfair to some
of the co-sharers thereby causing miscarriage of justice. The learned Court below
while passing the preliminary decree failed to take into consideration the settled
principle of law that all the joint properties are to be included in the partition suit
and only properties which are not held in common by the co-sharer defendants
along with the plaintiffs are to be left out.
[11]
In the present suit the appellant defendants have stated in their
written statement all the joint properties which they as co-sharers along with the
plaintiffs have inherited from their predecessor-in-interest but, the learned Court
below completely ignored the same while passing the decree for partition of the
suit land as described in the plaint only.
[12]
In view of above, this Court is of the opinion that the Ext. A khatian
is a public document and has been admitted in evidence without any objection
whatsoever from the plaintiffs' side. Further, in the written statement of the
contesting defendants they specifically referred to that khatian and also had filed
a copy of the same.
[13]
The Suit land have relied on Khatian No, 1500 and proved the same
as Ext. P/1. Similarly, the contesting defendants have relied on khatian No. 178
(Ext. D/A) in support of their claim as to joint tile and ownership of the plaintiffs
and the defendants No. 1 to 4 over the 0.49 acres of land covered by that khatian
standing in the name of Hiran Prava Das. If that argument is accepted the very
foundation of the case of the plaintiffs will also be shaken as they also relied on
khatian in proof of title. Thus, the argument of the defence that the Ext. D/A
khatian does not prove title to property cannot be appreciated. More so, the Ext.
D/A is a copy of finally published khatian and carries a presumption of its
correctness in terms of Section-43 of the TLR & LR Act. The plaintiffs totally
failed to bring any evidence on record to rebut such presumption of correctness.
[14]
Further, it is admitted fact that Hiran Prava Das was the mother of
the plaintiffs and the predecessor of the defendants No. 1 to 4. It is also not in
dispute that said Hiran Prava Das died on 06.03.2014 (Ref. Ext. P/2). Thus, by
operation of law of succession, after death of Hiran Prava Das the land under
Khatian No. 178 devolved upon the plaintiffs and the defendants No. 1 to 4
jointly. Above discussion of evidence on record makes it abundantly clear that the
plaintiffs have excluded the joint property appertaining to Khatian No. 178 from
this suit. Now the question that comes for consideration is whether the suit is
maintainable in absence of inclusion of a part of joint property.
[15]
It has been argued that the suit property has not been denied and
disputed by the contesting defendants in their written statement and in view of
that admission of fact nothing remains further to prove by the plaintiffs. The stand
of the contesting defendants that the predecessor of the defendants No. 1 to 4 has
contribution in maintaining and developing the suit land and making additional
constructions is false and baseless. They also failed to adduce any evidence to
support that plea. It has been specifically stated that after death of the original
owner Jagneswar Das the mother of the plaintiffs maintained the suit property.
The predecessor of the defendants No. 1 to 4 admittedly was serving in a bank
and had been out from the suit land in connection with his job. The defendant
No.1 also admitted in her cross-examination that she remained out of the suit land
for most of the period in connection with her service in bank. Such evidence on
record remained uncontroverted.
[16]
Pleading of the parties and the arguments addressed by their learned
counsels sufficiently show that there is not dispute with regard to the fact that
Jagneswar Das was the original owner of the suit land and that the plaintiffs and
the predecessor of the defendants No. 1 to 4 are the daughters and sons of said
Jagneswar Das. There is also no dispute about death of the original owner
Jagneswar Das and that the plaintiffs and the defendants No. 1 to 4 are his sole
legal heirs. However, except oral evidence of the defendant No.1 no other
evidence is adduced from the contesting defendants to support their stand that
their predecessor made any improvement in the suit land by using his own fund.
[17]
The oral evidence of the defendant No.1 with that regard is
neutralised by the statements of the P.Ws. 1 and 2 who with equal force denied
the suggestions that the predecessor of the defendants No. 1 to 4 spent money
from his fund for embankment of pond and renovation, extension and
maintenance of home standing in the suit land. On the other hand, it is found that
the mother of the parties died on 2014 and that the assertion of the plaintiffs that
the suit land fetches income from rent has not been controverted. Thus, in the
given facts and circumstances the plea of the defence as to contribution of the
predecessor of the defendants No. 1 to 4 in improvement of the suit land does not
inspire confidence.
[18]
From the above admitted position of fact and the materials on
record it is clear that the suit land is joint property of the plaintiffs and the
defendants No. 1 to 4 where the plaintiffs have 1/7th share each and the
defendants No. 1 to 4 having 1/7th share jointly. That being the position, I hold
that the plaintiffs are entitled to an order of partition according to the above
shares. Section-181 of the TLR & LR Act bars partition of holdings only which
results in fragmentation i.e. creation of a holding of less than 0.80 standard
hectare area. Section-179 defines, holding as aggregate area of land held by a
person as 'riyat'. Again the term 'riyat' is defined in Section-2(s) of the TLR & LR
Act as a person who owns land for purposes of agriculture. A cumulative reading
of the above provisions makes it clear that such bar applies in respect of
agricultural land only.
[19]
It is a settled legal proposition that as a rule, relief not founded on
the pleadings should not be granted. Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be
based outside the pleadings of the parties. Ordinarily, the reliefs are drawn on the
basis of pleadings. Even in some cases, on the basis of pleadings, the court can
mould the reliefs. But the foundation of such relief must have its anchor in the
pleadings. It is always the creditor who has final call in the matter, unless
contrary of law and is provided otherwise by lawful agreement.
[20]
In the result, the appeal stands dismissed. As a sequel,
miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. Draw the decree
accordingly and send down the LCRs thereafter.
JUDGE
A. Ghosh
ANJAN
GHOSH
ANJAN GHOSH
Date: 2023.10.10
10:44:57 +05'30'
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