Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
MAT APP. NO.22 OF 2024
Smt. Kanika Datta Chowdhury
……Appellant(s)
Versus
Sri Biswajit Chowdhury.
.......Respondent(s)
For the Appellant(s)
: Mr. Ratan Datta, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s)
: None.
Date of hearing and delivery of
Judgment & Order
: 11.02.2025
Whether fit for reporting : No.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
J U D G M E N T & O R D E R(ORAL)
(T. AMARNATH GOUD, J)
This present appeal has been filed under Section 28
of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, read with Section 19(1) of the
Family Courts Act, 1984, challenging the Judgment and Order dated
06.04.2024, passed in T.S(Div) No. 136/2021 by the learned Judge,
Family Court, Belonia, South Tripura, whereby the learned Court
below dismissed the suit filed by the appellant-wife against the
respondent-husband seeking dissolution of marriage under Section
13(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
2.
The brief facts of the case are that on 26.04.2011, the
appellant married the respondent as per Hindu rites and customs at
Owangchara, Belonia. Out of their wedlock, a girl child, namely
Adrija Chowdhury, was born. They lived together as husband and
wife until 07.01.2020, when her husband and in-laws started to
physically
assaulted
her.
It
is
also
alleged
that
after
the
solemnization of marriage, her husband hit her on the face and
back and subjected her to physical abuse multiple times, treating
her with cruelty. Furthermore, the appellant claimed that she was
entitled
to
the
return
of
her
jewellery
and
accessories.
Subsequently, she filed the aforementioned petition i.e., T.S.(Div)
No. 136/2021, under Section 13(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955, on 17.11.2021 before the learned Court below. However, the
suit was dismissed. Being aggrieved by the impugned Judgment and
Order dated 06.04.2024, the appellant has preferred this instant
appeal.
3.
When the case is called, Mr. Ratan Datta, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant, is present. The respondentcounsel is called absent. It is seen from the record that, despite
effective service of notices, the sole respondent has not appeared
before this court. Despite the issuance of notice on 05.08.2024, the
respondent remained unrepresented on 04.02.2025 and again
today, i.e., 11.02.2025, the respondent remained unrepresented. In
view of the urgency pressed by the appellant-counsel, and as the
matter has been listed for final hearing today, the same is heard.
4.
Mr. Ratan Datta, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, submits that the Court below failed to appreciate that,
within a few days of marriage, the appellant was subjected to
consistent physical violence, assault, and other harmful behavior by
the respondent. This treatment had reached such an extent that the
appellant could not reasonably be expected to continue living with
the respondent. The learned trial Court also failed to consider that
the concept of mental cruelty is subjective and depends on the facts
and circumstances of each case.
To substantiate his argument, the learned counsel for the
appellant referred to paragraphs 16, 17, and 18 of the Judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in [2023] 3 SCR 552,
bearing No. Civil Appeal No. 2012 of 2023, titled as Sh. Rakesh
Raman Vs. Smt. Kavita, decided on 26th April 2023. The same is
produced hereunder:
“16. Matrimonial cases before the Courts pose a
different challenge, quite unlike any other, as we are dealing with
human relationships with its bundle of emotions, with all its faults
and frailties. It is not possible in every case to pin point to an act
of “cruelty” or blameworthy conduct of the spouse. The nature of
relationship, the general behaviour of the parties towards each
other, or long separation between the two are relevant factors
which a Court must take into consideration. In Samar Ghosh v.
Jaya Ghosh6 a three judge Bench of this Court had dealt in detail
as to what would constitute cruelty under Section 13 (1) (ia) of
the Act. An important guideline in the above decision is on the
approach of a Court in determining cruelty. What has to be
examined here is the entire matrimonial relationship, as cruelty
may not be in a violent act or acts but in a given case has to be
gathered from injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations,
taunts, etc. The Court relied on the definition of cruelty in
matrimonial relationships in Halsbury‟s Laws of England (Vol 13,
4th Edn, Para 1269, Pg 602) which must be reproduced here:
“The general rule in all cases of cruelty is that the entire
matrimonial relationship must be considered, and that rule is of
special value when the cruelty consists not of violent acts but of
injurious reproaches, complaints, 6 (2007) 4 SCC 511 accusations
or taunts. In cases where no violence is averred, it is undesirable
to consider judicial pronouncements with a view to creating
certain categories of acts or conduct as having or lacking the
nature or quality which renders them capable or incapable in all
circumstances of amounting to cruelty; for it is the effect of the
conduct rather than its nature which is of paramount importance
in assessing a complaint of cruelty. Whether one spouse has been
guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact and
previously decided cases have little, if any, value. The court
should bear in mind the physical and mental condition of the
parties as well as their social status, and should consider the
impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse on the mind
of the other, weighing all incidents and quarrels between the
spouses from that point of view; further, the conduct alleged must
be examined in the light of the complainant's capacity for
endurance and the extent to which that capacity is known to the
other spouse. Malevolent intention is not essential to cruelty but it
is an important element where it exists.” The view taken by the
Delhi High Court in the present case that mere filing of criminal
cases by the wife does not constitute cruelty as what has also to
be seen are the circumstances under which cases were filed, is a
finding we do not wish to disregard totally, in fact as a pure
proposition of law it may be correct, but then we must also closely
examine the entire facts of the case which are now before us.
When we take into consideration the facts as they exist today, we
are convinced that continuation of this marriage would mean
continuation of cruelty, which each now inflicts on the other.
Irretrievable breakdown of a marriage may not be a ground for
dissolution of marriage, under the Hindu Marriage Act, but cruelty
is. A marriage can be dissolved by a decree of divorce, inter alia,
on the ground when the other party “has, after the solemnization
of the marriage treated the petitioner with cruelty”7. In our
considered opinion, a marital relationship which has only become
more bitter and acrimonious over the years, does nothing but
inflicts cruelty on both the sides. To keep the façade of this
broken marriage alive would be doing injustice to both the
parties. A marriage which has broken down irretrievably, in our
opinion spells cruelty to both the parties, as in such a relationship
each party is treating the other with cruelty. It is therefore a
ground for dissolution of marriage under Section 13 (1) (ia) of the
Act.
17. Cruelty has not been defined under the Act. All the same, the
context where it has been used, which is as a ground for
dissolution of a marriage would show that it has to 7 Section 13
(1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955be seen as a „human
conduct‟ and „behavior” in a matrimonial relationship. While
dealing in the case of Samar Ghosh (supra) this Court opined that
cruelty can be physical as well as mental: “46…If it is physical, it
is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the enquiry must
begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment and then as to the
impact of such treatment on the mind of the spouse. Whether it
caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or
injurious to live with the other, ultimately, is a matter of inference
to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and
its effect on the complaining spouse.
Cruelty can be even unintentional: …The absence of intention
should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in
human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded
as cruelty. Intention is not a necessary element in cruelty. The
relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has
been no deliberate or wilful illtreatment.” This Court though did
ultimately give certain illustrations of mental cruelty. Some of
these are as follows:
(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties,
acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make
possible for the parties to live with each other could come within
the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (xii) Unilateral decision
of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without
there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to
mental cruelty.
(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage
not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty.
(xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous
separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond
is beyond repair.
The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie.
By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve
the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard
for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like
situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.(emphasis supplied)
18. We have a married couple before us who have barely stayed
together as a couple for four years and who have now been living
separately for the last 25 years. There is no child out of the
wedlock. The matrimonial bond is completely broken and is
beyond repair. We have no doubt that this relationship must end
as its continuation is causing cruelty on both the sides. The long
separation and absence of cohabitation and the complete
breakdown of all meaningfulbonds and the existing bitterness
between the two, has to be read as cruelty under Section 13(1)
(ia) of the 1955 Act. We therefore hold that in a given case, such
as the one at hand, where the marital relationship has broken
down irretrievably, where there is a long separation and absence
of cohabitation (as in the present case for the last 25 years), with
multiple Court cases between the parties; then continuation of
such a „marriage‟ would only mean giving sanction to cruelty
which each is inflicting on the other. We are also conscious of the
fact that a dissolution of this marriage would affect only the two
parties as there is no child out of the wedlock.”
5.
Heard and perused the evidence on record.
6.
The
learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
appellant
submitted that the respondent had subjected the appellant to
continuous mental and emotional cruelty, making cohabitation
impossible. Furthermore, in Sh. Rakesh Raman v. Smt. Kavita
(supra), it was held that ‘cruelty’ needs not always be violent;
prolonged separation, the nature of the relationship, and the
general behavior of the parties toward each other are also relevant
factors that a Court must consider when determining ‘cruelty’. In
the present case, the appellant endured physical abuse and
emotional distress, leading to the irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage. Keeping such a broken marriage intact would only
perpetuate suffering for both parties.
7.
Accordingly, in terms of the submissions made by
the learned counsel for the appellant, as well as the principles and
reasoning given in Sh. Rakesh Raman Vs. Smt. Kavita (supra),
this present appeal stands allowed. The impugned Judgment and
Order dated 06.04.2024 is set aside, and the divorce as prayed for
by the appellant herein is granted. Let the decree be drawn
accordingly.
8.
With the above observations and directions, this present
appeal stands disposed of. As a sequel, any stay, if in force, stands
vacated. Pending application(s), if any, also stand closed.
B. PALIT, J
suhanjit
RAJKUMAR
SUHANJIT
SINGHA
SUHANJIT SINGHA
Date: 2025.02.13 11:09:52
+05'30'
T. AMARNATH GOUD, J
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review