The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
10. The impugned order, on its own showing, does not record the satisfaction mandated under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. Far from recording such satisfaction, the High Court has gone on to observe that 'the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial.' Such an approach is plainly contrary to the settled law laid down by this Court and deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. The right to speedy trial, rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution, is undoubtedly a precious Constitutional right. That said, in matters governed by a special enactment such as the NDPS Act, particularly where the recovery is of commercial quantity, the said right under Article 21 must be exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed into service solely on the ground of delay to override it. The constitutional right under Article 21 and the special provision of law under Section 37, NDPS Act are to be read harmoniously and not placed in opposition to each other. The High Court, by failing to record its satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37, has in this Court’s view, committed an error. [10] The Court has considered the submissions of both sides and has also gone through the relevant records. [11] Mr. Sharma, learned counsel in support of his application for bail, heavily relies on the said decision of Hon’b…
22. However, we note that recently this Court in Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, Crl.A.@ SLP(Crl.) No.2867 of 2026 has referred the question concerning the approach of constitutional Courts in bail matters under special statutes, where “Article 21, prolonged incarceration and statutory restrictions intersect”. In view of the said reference, we do not wish to deliberate on this issue further, save and except that in our view paramount consideration is nothing but interest of justice for all. Should there be any conflict between the sovereignty of country and personal liberty, undoubtedly, the former shall prevail, particularly, when a war is waged against the nation, be it in the form of supply of drugs, which vitally affects the national economy and health of the people. [18] Now, so far the present case is concerned, the accused person is in judicial custody from 14.05.2025. Charges have been framed in this case against the accused person under sections 20(b)(ii)(C) and 25 of NDPS Act. Maximum prescribed punishment under section 20(b)(ii)(C) of NDPS Act is twenty years of imprisonment. Meanwhile, out of total 21 cited witnesses, 09 witnesses are already examined. Therefore, it cannot be said that the accused person has suffered substantial part of the prescribed sentence or that the trial will continue for uncertain period. Therefore, it is not a fit case to extend t…
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TRHC010008252026
2026:THC:733
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
B.A. No.103 of 2026
Smt. Jaya Rani Debbarma
wife of Sri Bishu Kumar Tripura, resident
of Rampadapara (Larmai), P.S. Melaghar,
District- Sepahijala, PIN-799103
……… Petitioner(s)
On behalf of:
Shri Bishu Kumar Tripura,
son Sri Malindra Kumar Tripura, resident
of Rampadapara (Larmai), P.S. Melaghar,
District- Sepahijala, Tripura, PIN-799103
…… Accused person(s)
–Versus–
The State of Tripura
represented by the Secretary, Home
Department, Government of Tripura,
Agartala
…… Respondent(s)
For the petitioner(s)
For the respondent(s)
Date of hearing
Date of delivery of order
:
:
:
:
Whether fit for reporting
:
Mr. S. Sharma, Adv.
Mr. R. Datta, P.P.
21.05.2026
03.06.2026
Yes
✔
No
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA
ORDER
This application praying for bail of the accused, Bishu Kumar
Tripura, is filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, (in short, BNSS) 2023 in connection with Melaghar P.S. Case
No.2025/MLG/002, subsequently renumbered as Special (NDPS) 42 of
2025 pending in the court of the learned Special Judge, Sonamura,
Sepahijala, Tripura.
[2]
On 10.01.2025, an FIR was lodged by S.I. Uttam Paul of
Melaghar P.S. to the effect that a written information was received by
them from sub-zonal Office Guwahati of ED, Ministry of Finance that
while they had conducted a search in the house of the accused in
connection with another case, they found some suspected psychotropic
substances in the said residence of the accused. Therefore, they
requested Melaghar P.S. authority to assist them in search and seizure
of said suspected psychotropic substances. Thereafter, as authorized by
SDPO, Sonamura, the informant went there and recovered one number
of blue colour plastic drum and two numbers of while colour sacks
containing Ganja of total weight 66 Kg. The father of the accused
informed them that the accused had stored all these contraband items for
selling it in the market. Accordingly, FIR was lodged against the present
accused petitioner. He could not be apprehended at that time.
Subsequently, he was arrested on 13.05.2025.
[3]
On two occasions, earlier he filed applications for bail in this
Court and a coordinate Bench of this Court rejected the same on
28.08.2025 in B.A. No.70 of 2025 and on 20.03.2026 in B.A. No.42 of
2026. Now again, the present bail application has been filed seeking this
bail.
[4]
Mr. S. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the accused
petitioner submits that the accused is in custody for 373 days and trial
has not progressed further. Out of total 22 charge-sheet cited witnesses,
only 9[nine] witnesses have been examined and according to the learned
counsel, the fundamental right of the accused as enshrined in Article 21
of the Constitution for such delayed trial is being infringed and therefore,
he prays for bail. He also submits that the items were recovered from a
land which was a forest land.
[5]
Learned counsel also refers to the statement of PW-8, Sri
Narayan Ch. Shil, Tehshildar of Durlabnarayan Tehshil, who deposed
before the learned trial Court that as per order of SDM, Sonamura, he
had verified the location of the house of the accused, Bishu Kumar
Tripura and found that the same was recorded in Khatian No.01/21 under
plot No.892/p, Mouja- Toxapara area of 0.19 acres of viti class of land
and the said Khatian stood in the name of the Government of Tripura.
Thereafter, he submitted the report. He also stated that he heard that the
said house was occupied by the accused, Bishu Kumar Tripura. Learned
counsel, therefore, submits that it is a subsequent event and such
evidence shows that the land was a Government Khash land and
therefore, according to learned counsel, the alleged ganja was recovered
from an abandoned land and not from the house of the accused.
[6]
Mr. Sharma, learned counsel relies on a decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Pawar vs. State of
Chattisgarh & Anr., Criminal Appeal No.4833 of 2025 [@ SLP (CRL.)
No.12368/2025, decided on 14.11.2025, wherein it was observed that
the appellant in that case was only a cleaner of the vehicle. He was
under incarceration for about 19 months and the trial was just started. In
view of the matter, the rigour of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would not be
a bar for considering the case of the appellant for bail as early completion
of the trial, was not happening in that case. There were no criminal
antecedents of the accused and bail was ultimately granted.
[7]
Mr. Sharma, learned counsel further relies on a recent
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Iftikhar
Andrabi vs. National Investigating Agency, Jammy, 2026 INSC 503,
which will be discussed in later paragraphs.
[8]
Mr. R. Datta, learned P.P appearing for the State opposes
the prayer for bail and submits that incarceration for a considerable
period cannot be a sole ground to release the accused on bail unless
rigour of Section 37 of the NDPS Act are mitigated. In this regard, he
relies on a decision of 3 Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Narcotics Control Bureau vs. Mohit Agarwal, 2022 18 SCC
374 wherein at paragraph No.19, it is observed by the Hon’ble Court that
the length of the period of his custody or the fact that the charge-sheet
has been filed and the trial has commenced are by themselves not
considerations that can be treated as persuasive grounds for granting
relief to the respondent under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
[9]
Mr. Datta, learned P.P further relies on a recent decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab vs.
Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 671, wherein at
paragraph No.10, the followings were observed:
10. The impugned order, on its own showing, does not record
the satisfaction mandated under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS
Act. Far from recording such satisfaction, the High Court has
gone on to observe that 'the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS
Act can be diluted bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial.'
Such an approach is plainly contrary to the settled law laid down
by this Court and deserves to be set aside on this ground alone.
The right to speedy trial, rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution,
is undoubtedly a precious Constitutional right. That said, in
matters governed by a special enactment such as the NDPS Act,
particularly where the recovery is of commercial quantity, the
said right under Article 21 must be exercised within the
framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed into service
solely on the ground of delay to override it. The constitutional
right under Article 21 and the special provision of law under
Section 37, NDPS Act are to be read harmoniously and not
placed in opposition to each other. The High Court, by failing to
record its satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37,
has in this Court’s view, committed an error.
[10]
The Court has considered the submissions of both sides and
has also gone through the relevant records.
[11]
Mr. Sharma, learned counsel in support of his application for
bail, heavily relies on the said decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case
of Syed Iftikhar Andrabi (supra). The accused person in said case was
charged for the offences both under the provisions of Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short-UAPA Act) and NDPS Act. He was
suffering from incarceration of about 5 years and 9 months. Charge-sheet
was submitted in the month of December, 2020 and trial was moving at a
very slow pace. There were more than 350 witnesses still to be examined
and only 38 witnesses were examined so far. One of the issues cropped
up in said case is about the intersection between stringent conditions of
bail in special legislations like UAPA Act or NDPS Act and the Art.21 of the
Constitution which now confirms that right of speedy trial is a fundamental
right.
[12]
While dealing with the issues, the Hon’ble Apex Court refers to
a decision of a three Judge Bench of the Court in case of Union of India
v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713. In K.A. Najeeb (supra), and as
observed in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi (supra), it was held that such statutory
restrictions would not come in the way of a constitutional court from
granting bail to an accused if it finds that the right of the accused under
Art.21 has been infringed. The relevant discussions made in K.A. Najeeb
(supra), are also reproduced hereunder:
“15. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the
liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution would cover
within its protective ambit not only due procedure and
fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial.
In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing
Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India [Supreme Court Legal
Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of
India, (1994) 6 SCC 731, para 15 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 39] , it was
held that undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending
trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences
of his acts unless the same is established before a neutral
arbiter. However, owing to the practicalities of real life where
to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the risk to society
in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, the
courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to
be released pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a
timely trial would not be possible and the accused has
suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the
courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail.”
[13]
Subsequent thereto, taking note of K.A. Najeeb (supra),
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sk. Javed Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2024) 8 SCC
293, held thus:
“42. This Court has, time and again, emphasised that right to life
and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct. A
constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an
accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal
statute if it finds that the right of the accused-undertrial under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that
event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way.
Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever
stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of
constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an
intrinsic part. In the given facts of a particular case, a
constitutional court may decline to grant bail. But it would be
very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be
granted. It would run counter to the very grain of our
constitutional jurisprudence. In any view of the matter, K.A.
Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713] being
rendered by a three-Judge Bench is binding on a Bench of two
Judges like us.”
In this case, the accused appellant was in custody for more
than 09 years and the charge-sheet against him was submitted under
sections 489-B and 489-C of Indian Penal Code and under section 16 of
UAP Act. The Apex Court ultimately granted bail to the said accused with
above said observations.
[14]
However, the decision of K.A. Najeeb (supra) has further
been explained in above said Syed Iftikhar Andrabi (supra) in paragraph
No.27.11 observing that holding in Najeeb was never that mere passage of
time automatically entitles the accused to bail. Instead, the larger Bench
recognized that where incarceration becomes unduly prolonged and the
trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time, the continued
application of Section 43-D(5) becomes constitutionally suspect given the
mandate of Article 21 and in that sense Najeeb articulated a constitutional
limitation on the operation of the statutory embargo. It has also been
further observed in paragraph no.30 that no reading of Najeeb suggests
that mere passage of time, divorced from all surrounding circumstances,
mechanically entitled an accused to release. The Apex Court further
observes that the Court in Najeeb was concerned with the manner in
which Section 43-D(5) was, in practice, being deployed as an almost
conclusive basis for denial of bail notwithstanding extraordinary delay in
trial and prolonged incarceration. It is precisely for that reason that the
Court observed that the ‘rigours’ of Section 43-D(5) would ‘melt down’
where there is no likelihood of the trial being completed within a
reasonable time and where the period of incarceration undergone has
already exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence.
[15]
At paragraph no.31 of Syed Iftikhar Andrabi (supra), the
Apex Court further explains that in K.A. Najeeb (supra), the Bench was
clear and unequivocal in holding that once it is obvious that a timely trial
would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a
significant period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to
enlarge the accused on bail.
[16]
In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi (supra), the Hon’ble two Judge Bench of
the Apex Court distinguished with other two decisions of coordinate
Benches in case of Gulfisha Fatima vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi),
2026 SCC Online SC 10 and in case of Gurwinder Singh vs. State of
Punjab, (2024) 5 SCC 403. Recently, in Tasleem Ahmed vs. State
Government of NCT of Delhi, [Cri. Appeal No…… of 2026 @ SLP
(CRL) No.2867 of 2026 decided on 22.5.2026], another Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of equal strength taking note of the views taken in
Syed Iftikhar Andrabi (supra) regarding the earlier decision of Gulfisha
Fatima (supra), has referred the matter to the larger Bench to decide as to
how Article 21 is to be applied in a statutory field where Parliament has
consciously imposed restrictions on bail in respect of offences alleged to
affect the security of the State and the stability of civic life, and to settle the
correct approach to bail under special statutes where Art.21, prolonged
incarceration and statutory restrictions intersect. The decision is yet to be
received.
[17]
Very recently, Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of State
of Punjab vs. Barlaj Singh @ Billa, in Criminal Appeal No…… of 2026
@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.896 of 2026, decided on 02.06.2026
has observed the followings:
22. However, we note that recently this Court in Tasleem Ahmed v.
State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, Crl.A.@ SLP(Crl.) No.2867 of 2026 has
referred the question concerning the approach of constitutional
Courts in bail matters under special statutes, where “Article 21,
prolonged incarceration and statutory restrictions intersect”. In view
of the said reference, we do not wish to deliberate on this issue
further, save and except that in our view paramount consideration is
nothing but interest of justice for all. Should there be any conflict
between the sovereignty of country and personal liberty,
undoubtedly, the former shall prevail, particularly, when a war is
waged against the nation, be it in the form of supply of drugs, which
vitally affects the national economy and health of the people.
[18]
Now, so far the present case is concerned, the accused
person is in judicial custody from 14.05.2025. Charges have been framed
in this case against the accused person under sections 20(b)(ii)(C) and 25
of NDPS Act. Maximum prescribed punishment under section 20(b)(ii)(C)
of NDPS Act is twenty years of imprisonment. Meanwhile, out of total 21
cited witnesses, 09 witnesses are already examined. Therefore, it cannot
be said that the accused person has suffered substantial part of the
prescribed sentence or that the trial will continue for uncertain period.
Therefore, it is not a fit case to extend the benefit of bail by applying the
principle laid down in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi (supra) as relied on by
learned counsel of the petitioner.
Considering thus, the bail prayer is rejected.
Learned Special Judge is however directed to take endeavour to
dispose of the case at the earliest.
Reconsign the trial Court records with a copy of this order
immediately.
Interim application(s), if any stands disposed of.
JUDGE
signed by SUJAY GHOSH
SUJAY GHOSH Digitally
Date: 2026.06.03 19:17:38 +05'30'
Sujay
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