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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
B.A. No.63 of 2026
Smt. Gauri Saha,
W/O- Lt. Nihar Ranjan Saha,
R/O- Durgapur, Gandachara,
ICDS Center, P.O.- Sarma,
P.S.- Gandacherra, Dist.- Dhalai Tripura,
PIN-799284.
…. Applicant
On behalf of1.
Sri Dipak Chandra Saha,
S/O- Lt. Nakul Chandra Saha,
R/O- Durgapur,
Gandacherra, P.S.- Gandacherra,
Dist.- Dhalai Tripura,
PIN-799284.
2.
Smt. Debika Saha,
W/O- Sri Dipak Chandra Saha,
R/O- Durgapur, Gandacherra,
P.S.- Gandacherra, Dist.- Dhalai Tripura,
PIN- 799284.
…. Accused Persons
Versus
The State of Tripura
…….Respondent
For Applicant(s)
:
Mr. Ratan Datta, Adv.
Mr. Ankan Tilak Paul, Adv.
Mr. Aditya Baidya, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
Date of Hearing
:
:
Mr. Sankar Lodh, Spl. P.P.
08.04.2026
Date of delivery of
Judgment and Order
:
13.04.2026
Whether fit for
Reporting
:
YES
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
This bail application under Section 483 of BNSS is filed
on behalf of the accused persons-in-custody namely, Sri Dipak
Chandra Saha and Smt. Debika Saha for releasing them on bail in
connection with ST(T-1) No.96/2025 arising out of NCC P.S. Case2025/NCC/032
registered
under
Sections
140(1)/3(5)/103(1)
/238(b)/61(2)(a) of BNS, 2023 now pending before the Court of
Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Court
No.02, West
Tripura,
Agartala.
2.
Heard Learned Counsel, Mr. Ratan Datta appearing on
behalf of the accused persons-in-custody and also heard Learned
Special P.P., Mr. Sankar Lodh appearing on behalf of the Staterespondent.
3.
Taking part in the hearing, Learned Counsel for the
accused persons-in-custody drawn the attention of the Court that
initially on behalf of the said accused persons-in-custody a bail
application was moved to this Court and this Court by order dated
03.11.2025 rejected bail application of the said accused persons.
By this time some situation has been changed and due to the
changed circumstances this bail application is again moved by the
accused persons.
4.
Learned Counsel, Mr. R. Datta appearing for the
accused persons-in-custody thereafter drawn the attention of the
Court referring the contents of the FIR and submitted that these
accused persons-in-custody are not FIR named. Although during
investigation their names were revealed and they were taken into
custody and finally the I/O laid charge-sheet against them along
with others.
5.
Learned Counsel, Mr. R. Datta for the accused persons-
in-custody at this stage further drawn the attention of the Court
the relevant paras of the chage-sheet which were revealed in
course of investigation. The relevant paras of the charge-sheet are
quoted herein below:“From the disclosure statement of a/p
Nabanita Das it has revealed out that she has a love
relation with a/p Dibakar Saha and after completion
of MBBS from Bangladesh Dibakar started living at
Agartala. After death of his uncle namely Lt. Ripak
Saha Dibakar started living in his uncle‟s (father of
Souramita) house at Bankumari and during living
their house a doubt had been arises between their
brother-sister relationships (Souramita & Dibakar).
Once she has come to know as stated by Dibakar
that Souramita has a love affair with a Muslim Boy
namely Sarifull Hosan (now deceased) and Dibakar
told them to break up their (Souramita & Sarifull)
love relation otherwise their family reputation will
be damage but every time both of deny his proposal
then Dibakar planned to eliminate Sarifull Hosan at
anyhow. Few days ago before the incident a/p
Nabanita purchased one black colour trolley bag
(which is used concealing the dead body) by a/p
Dibakar Saha and kept it in the house room of
Joydeep Das. On 08.06.2025 a/p Dibakar informed
her that Sarifull will come at Indranagar, in the
house of Joydeep Das evening time. Accordingly
a/p Nabanita come to house of Joydeep evening at
about 1800 hrs. Consequently on 08.06.2025 a/p
Dibakar and Nabanita waiting for Sarifull Hosan
house galli road of a/p Joydeep Das and then at
about 2100 hrs Sarifull came at Indranagar
Kabarkhala with a motor cycle (TR01AH8866) and
then they received Sarifull Hosan and took him in
the house of a/p Joydeep Das.
On 09.06.2025 early morning the FIR named
A/P Dibakar Saha shifted the trolley bag containing
the body of the deceased Sarifull Hosan from the
house of Joydeep Das to the rented house of Smt.
Moushami Das sister of the FIR named A/P
Nabanita Das at East Dhaleswar, Chandrapur. A/P
Nabanita was shared the contact number of her
sister with a/p Dibakar. Thereafter on the same day
morning at about 0930hrs FIR named A/P Nabanita
came and left the said gray colour pitto bag to her
sister's rented house of Smt Moushami Das. Then
the FIR named A/P Nabanita Das & Dibakar Saha
communicated (messages/called) with the parents
of the FIR named A/P Dibakar Saha, namely a/p
Dipak Ch Saha and a/p Debika Saha and aware
them about the incident (murder of Sarifull Hosan),
shared her sister's contact number(Mousami Das)
with parents of Dibakar Saha and directed them for
collected the dead body containing trolley bag of
deceased Sarifull Hosan from the rented house of
Smt Mousami Das sister of the FIR Named A/P
Nabanita
Das
located
at
East
Dhaleswar,
Chandrapur and also told them to disposed the dead
body of Sarifull Hosan at anywhere in Gandacherra.
On 08.06.25 a/p Dibakar Saha told a/p
Joydeep Das to arranged some jeam boy in his
friend circle to punished Sarifull Hosan as many of
time he warned Sarifull to break up love relation
with his sister Souramita but every time he deny.
Then he called a/p Animesh and as per their plan on
08.06.2025 evening they all (a/p Dibakar, Nabanita,
Animesh & Dibakar) gathered in the house of a/p
Joydeep Das and a/p Dibakar called Sarifull Hosan
for come in the house of a/p Joydeep. Consequently
on 08.06.2025 a/p Dibakar and Nabanita waiting
for Sarifull Hosan house galli road of a/p Joydeep
Das and then at about 2100hrs Sarifull came at
Indranagar Kabarkhala with
a motor cycle
(TRO1AH8866) and then they received Sarifull
Hosan and took him in the house of a/p Joydeep
Das. After entered into the room of Joydeep Das
a/p Nabanita locked the door and a/p Dibakar
caught hold him neck with his arm from the
backside of Sarifull and in few moment Sarifull put
out his tung then Dibakar dropped him on the floor
and strangulated him by his foot then a/p Animesh
Yadav & Joydeep Das was sitting on top his chest
and caught hold his hand/legs. After that a/p
Nabanita taken out one brown colour cellotape rool
and strapped Sarifull's face/hands and a/p Joydeep
& Animesh strapped Sarifull's legs by the said
cellotape. Then a/p Dibakar tied his (Sarifull)
hand/legs with a green colour plastic rope and put
him into a black colour large trolley bag and sealed
the chain by cellotape. Then they collect the mobile
phone of Sarifull Hosan, one pair Sandals white
colour, eye-glass, cellotape roll which approx half of
used, one transparent glass container containing
with some white powder substances and put this
articles into a gray colour pitto bag of a/p Dibakar
Saha. Then a/p Dibakar handed over bike key of
Sarifull Hosan and the said pitto bag and told her to
destroy it. Thereafter they all left the dead body
filled trolley bag in the house of Joydeep Das and
then a/p Dibakar Saha booked a auto rickshaw
through Uber app from his mobile number and they
all (A/P Dibakar, Nabanita, Joydeep & Animesh) left
out from there for Chandrapur by the said auto
rickshaw. From Chandrapur they all separated A/P
Nabanita Went to her house at Jamtala with the
said pitto bag where mobile phone of Sarifull Hosan
was kept into this Pitto bag, a/p Joydeep &
Animesh went to rented house of a/p Animesh
Yadav at Khayerpur and a/p Dibakar Saha went to
his residing house located at Bankumari.
From the disclosure statement of a/p Dipak
Ch Saha it has revealed out that on 09.06.2025
morning he has received an information from
Indranagar through his mobile phone that his only
son a/p Dibakar Saha was involved with missing of
a person of that area. Accordingly he along with his
wife & father in law left for Agartala with one
vehicle bearing registration number TR04D0536
(EECO) and when they reached at Udaipur then a/p
Dipak Ch Saha & his wife received an message from
his son's lover namely a/p Nabanita Das. Nabanita
shared a contact number and directed them to
collect a trolley bag with contact that number and
she also directed them to delete the message.
Accordingly 09.06.2025 they arrived at Chandrapur
Agartala and collected one large size trolley bag
and one pitto bag from the house of Smt Mousami
Das. Then he has a doubt of this trolley bag as it
was heavy weight after that keeping in the said
vehicle pushed it from outside of this bag and then
they confirmed that one dead body was inside this
bag. As his father in law was inside the car so they
did not discussed about the matter and after left
him at Bhattapukur Agartala they shifted the dead
body containing trolley bag & the said pitto bag at
Narayanpur, Gandacherra in his shop and concealed
the trolley bag in a deep refrigerator/freezer.
Disclosure statement of a/p Debika Saha is also
same with a/p Dipak Ch. Saha as she told.”
Referring the observations of the I/O in the chargesheet, Learned Counsel for the accused persons-in-custody drawn
the attention of the Court that there is no direct evidence against
the accused persons-in-custody showing their involvement in
murder of the deceased rather on the following day of the incident
they came when according to prosecution both the accused
persons carried the bag containing the dead body of the deceased.
6.
It was further submitted that, even for arguments
sake, if it is established that the allegation of the prosecution
against accused persons is true. In that case also there are no
materials on record that the accused persons committed murder
of the deceased rather from the allegation of the prosecution it is
crystal clear that the accused persons-in-custody had committed
offence which is bailable in nature and as such they are liable to
be released on bail in any condition. In this regard, Learned
Counsel drawn the attention of the Court the provision of Section
238(a) of BNS which provides as under:“238. Causing disappearance of evidence of offence,
or giving false information to screen offender.Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that
an offence has been committed, causes any
evidence of the commission of that offence to
disappear, with the intention of screening the
offender from legal punishment, or with that
intention gives any information respecting the
offence which he knows or believes to be false
shall,(a) if the offence which he knows or
believes to have been committed is
punishable with death, be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, and
shall also be liable to fine.”
Referring the aforesaid provision, Learned Counsel for
the accused persons-in-custody submitted that since the alleged
prosecution allegation discloses commission of bailable offence
against the accused persons-in-custody and they are lodging in
custody more than 10 (ten) months, so considering the long
incarceration of the accused persons-in-custody they may be
released on bail in any condition.
7.
It was further submitted by Learned Counsel for the
accused persons-in-custody that prosecution may oppose the bail
application referring Section 3(5) of BNS but on perusal of the
relevant prosecution papers there would be no material showing
implication of the accused persons-in-custody with the said
offence. In support of his contention, Learned Counsel referred
few citations.
8.
It was further submitted by Learned Counsel appearing
for the accused persons-in-custody that even if it is found that the
disclosure statement was admissible and believable still there was
no scope to detain the accused persons furthermore in judicial
custody. In this regard, reference was placed upon one judgment
of this Court of India in Mintur Rahaman Vs. State of Tripura
reported in (2024) 2 TLR 359 wherein in Para Nos.33, 34 and
37, this High Court observed as under:“33. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that
the witness of the prosecution in course of their
examination deposed before the Court that the
deceased
expired
due
to
electrocution.
The
prosecution did not take any step for declaring those
witnesses as hostile. In this regard, Learned Senior
Counsel has also relied on a citation of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in Javed Masood and Another versus
State of Rajasthan reported in 2010 AIR SCW 1656
which reads as under:
“13. In the present case the prosecution
never declared PWs 6, 18, 29 and 30
"hostile". Their evidence did not support the
prosecution.
Instead,
it
supported
the
defence. There is nothing in law that
precludes the defence to rely on their
evidence. This court in Mukhtiar Ahmed
Ansari vs. State (NCT of Delhi) : (2005) 5 SCC
258 observed:
"30. A similar question came up for
consideration before this Court in Raja Ram v.
State of Rajasthan, (2005) 5 SCC 272. In that
case, the evidence of the Doctor who was
examined as a prosecution witness showed
that the deceased was being told by one K
that she should implicate the accused or else
she might have to face prosecution. The
Doctor was not declared "hostile". The High
Court, however, convicted the accused. This
Court held that it was open to the defence to
rely on the evidence of the Doctor and it was
binding on the prosecution.
14. The proposition of law stated in the said
judgment is equally applicable to the facts in
hand.”
Referring the aforesaid citation, Learned Senior
Counsel further submitted that since the material
witnesses of the prosecution were not declared
hostile by the prosecution who very specifically
stated
that
the
deceased
expired
due
to
electrocution. So, there is no scope to place any
reliance on the prosecution story that the present
appellant caused the murder of his wife by electric
heater on the alleged date and time just relying on
the alleged disclosure statement of the appellant.
34. Learned Senior Counsel also in course of hearing
referred the provision of Sections 25 and 26 of the
Evidence Act and submitted that if for argument sake
the alleged statement of the accused appellant is
treated as confessional statement under Section 25
and 26 of the Evidence Act, in that case the same also
cannot be taken into consideration as per law. In this
regard, Learned Senior Counsel has relied upon
another citation of Hon‟ble Gauhati High Court in
Kartik Chakraborty and Others versus State of Assam
reported in (2018) 2 GLR 1 which reads as under :
“33. This has also been the view of the
Madras High Court and it finds its expression
in several decisions. In Palanisamy alias
Kunjupaiyan Vs. State, Criminal Appeal
No.541/2005, decided on 22.03.2013, Madras
High Court has held that the Evidence Act was
enacted before the commencement of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In view
of Section 3(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the term "Magistrate"
referred to in Section 26 of the Evidence Act
does not refer to Executive Magistrate.
Consequently, the expression "Magistrate" as
appearing in Section 26 of the Evidence Act
would mean only a Judicial Magistrate.
Therefore,
confession
recorded
or
videographed by police in the presence of
Executive Magistrate would be hit by Sections
25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. Again, in the
case of Kalam @ Abdul Kalam Vs. Inspector of
Police, reported in MANU/TN/07588/2011,
the Madras High Court examined the
provisions of Section 26 of the Evidence Act
vis-à-vis Section 3(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 and after observing that
the Evidence Act was enacted before the
commencement of
the
Code of
Criminal
Procedure,
1973,
held
that
the
term
"Magistrate" as referred to in Section 26 of
the Evidence Act will mean only a Judicial
Magistrate.”
Referring the above, Learned Senior Counsel
submitted that the statement was recorded in
presence of Executive Magistrate, not before any
Judicial Magistrate as interpreted by the Hon‟ble
Gauhati High Court. So, there was also no scope to
place any reliance upon the evidence of PW-1, Shri
Santanu Dutta DCM in whose presence the disclosure
statement was recorded by IO on the alleged date
and time.
37. Here in the case at hand, the evidence on record
of the prosecution is discussed in detail and we have
already come to the conclusion that there is no
evidence on record to sustain the charge against the
appellant under Section 498A of IPC as because the
prosecution by adducing evidence on record has
failed to satisfy the Learned Court below that the
deceased prior to her death was subjected to cruelty
for unlawful demand of money by the present
appellant. So, Learned Court below has rightly
acquitted the present appellant from the charge
under Section 498A of IPC. Now regarding the charge
as leveled under Section 302 of IPC, it appears that
all the witnesses very categorically stated that on the
alleged
day,
the
accident
occurred
due
to
electrocution resulting which the accident took place
and the victim succumbed to death. The medical
evidence also reveals that the victim died due to
electrocution. Now, the witnesses who deposed that
the deceased died due to electrocution were not
tendered for cross examination by the prosecution.
There is also no evidence on record that the victim
has/had strain relation with her deceased husband.
No motive has been proved by the prosecution as to
why the appellant committed the murder of his wife
on the alleged day. Further, from the disclosure
statement it also appears that the same also has not
been proved in accordance with Section 27 of the
Evidence Act as observed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court
in
the
judgment
Ramanand
alias
Nandlal
Bharti(supra). Prosecution also failed to prove that
the alleged statement of the appellant as a
confession as the same was not made before a
Judicial Magistrate as required under law and the
citations as relied upon by the appellant in Zwinglee
Ariel (supra) also supports the case of the appellant
in the case at hand.”
9.
Further reference was placed upon another citation of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Chandrapal v. State of
Chhattisgarh (Earlier Madhya Pradesh) reported in (2023)
16 SCC 655, wherein in para Nos.18, 19, 20, 21 and 28, Hon’ble
the Apex Court observed as under:
“18. At this juncture, it may be noted that as per Section
30 of the Evidence Act, when more persons than one are
being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession
made by one of such persons affecting himself and some
other of such persons is proved, the court may take into
consideration such confession as against such other
person as well as against the person who makes such
confession. However, this Court has consistently held that
an extra-judicial confession is a weak kind of evidence and
unless it inspires confidence or is fully corroborated by
some other evidence of clinching nature, ordinarily
conviction for the offence of murder should not be made
only on the evidence of extra-judicial confession. As held
in State of M.P. v. Paltan Mallah [State of M.P. v. Paltan
Mallah, (2005) 3 SCC 169 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 674] , the
extra-judicial confession made by the co-accused could be
admitted in evidence only as a corroborative piece of
evidence. In absence of any substantive evidence against
the accused, the extra-judicial confession allegedly made
by the co-accused loses its significance and there cannot
be any conviction based on such extra-judicial confession
of the co-accused.
19. In Sahadevan v. State of T.N. [Sahadevan v. State of
T.N., (2012) 6 SCC 403 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 146] , it was
observed in para 14 as under : (SCC p. 410)
“14. It is a settled principle of criminal
jurisprudence that extra-judicial confession is a
weak piece of evidence. Wherever the court, upon
due appreciation of the entire prosecution
evidence, intends to base a conviction on an extrajudicial confession, it must ensure that the same
inspires confidence and is corroborated by other
prosecution evidence. If, however, the extrajudicial
confession
suffers
from
material
discrepancies or inherent improbabilities and does
not appear to be cogent as per the prosecution
version, it may be difficult for the court to base a
conviction on such a confession. In such
circumstances, the court would be fully justified in
ruling such evidence out of consideration.”
20. The said ratio was also reiterated and followed by this
Court in Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab [Jagroop Singh
v. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 SCC 768 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri)
1136] , Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B. [Sk. Yusuf v. State of
W.B., (2011) 11 SCC 754 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 620] and
Pancho v. State of Haryana [Pancho v. State of Haryana,
(2011) 10 SCC 165 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 223] , wherein it
has been specifically laid down that the extra-judicial
confession is a weak evidence by itself and it has to be
examined by the court with greater care and caution. It
should be truthful and should inspire confidence. An extrajudicial confession
attains greater
credibility
and
evidentiary value if it is supported by chain of cogent
circumstances and is further corroborated by other
prosecution evidence.
21. In the instant case it is true that the co-accused
Videshi had allegedly made self-inculpatory extra-judicial
confession before PW 4 Bhola Singh, and had made extrajudicial confession before the other witnesses i.e. PW 5
Chandrashekhar, PW 6 Baran Singh Thakur and PW 7
Dukaluram stating, inter alia, that the other three accused
i.e. Bhagirathi, Chandrapal and Mangal Singh had
committed the murder and he (i.e. Videshi) was asked to
assist them in disposing of the dead bodies and concealing
the evidence. However, the High Court, considering the
inconsistency between the said two extra-judicial
confessions made by the co-accused Videshi, did not find it
safe to convict the other accused i.e. Bhagirathi, Mangal
Singh and Videshi himself, and the High Court surprisingly
considered the said extra-judicial confession made by
Videshi as an incriminating circumstance against the
appellant Chandrapal for convicting him for the offences
charged against him. In our opinion if such weak piece of
evidence of the co-accused Videshi was not duly proved or
found trustworthy for holding the other co-accused guilty
of committing murder of the deceased Brinda and
Kanhaiya, the High Court could not have used the said
evidence against the present appellant for the purpose of
holding him guilty for the alleged offence.
28. Ergo, having regard to the totality of evidence on
record, the Court is of the opinion that the High Court had
committed gross error in convicting the appellant-accused
for the alleged charge of Section 302 read with Section
34IPC, relying upon a very weak kind of evidence of extrajudicial confession allegedly made by the co-accused
Videshi, and relying upon the theory of “last seen
together” propounded by PW 1 Dhansingh. It is also
significant to note that no evidence worth the name as to
how and by whom the deceased Brinda was allegedly
murdered was produced by the prosecution. Under the
circumstances, it is required to be held that the
prosecution had miserably failed to bring home the
charges levelled against the appellant-accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The suspicion howsoever strong cannot
take place of proof.”
Referring the same, Learned Counsel appearing for the
accused-persons submitted that in view of the observation of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, there is no scope to the accused persons
in judicial custody furthermore. Further extra judicial confession is
a very week piece of evidence, on the basis of that there is no
scope to convict any person.
10.
Learned Counsel, Mr. R. Datta thereafter referred
another citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
Surinder Kumar Khanna v. Intelligence Officer, Directorate
of Revenue Intelligence reported in (2018) 8 SCC 271,
wherein in para No.10, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as
under:10. In Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P. [Kashmira Singh v.
State of M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952 SCR 526 : AIR 1952
SC 159 : 1952 Cri LJ 839] , this Court relied upon the
decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. R.
[Bhuboni Sahu v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 12 : (1948-49)
76 IA 147 at p. 155.] and laid down as under: (AIR p. 160,
paras 8-10)
“8. Gurubachan's confession has played an important
part in implicating the appellant, and the question at
once arises, how far and in what way the confession
of an accused person can be used against a coaccused? It is evident that it is not evidence in the
ordinary sense of the term because, as the Privy
Council say in Bhuboni Sahu v. R. [Bhuboni Sahu v.
R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 12 : (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at
p. 155.] : (SCC OnLine PC)
„…It does not indeed come within the definition of
“evidence” contained in Section 3 of the Evidence
Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the
presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by
cross-examination.‟
Their Lordships also point out that it is
„obviously evidence of a very weak type. … It is a
much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of
an approver, which is not subject to any of those
infirmities‟.
They stated in addition that such a confession cannot
be made the foundation of a conviction and can only
be used in “support of other evidence”. In view of
these remarks, it would be pointless to cover the
same ground, but we feel it is necessary to expound
this further as misapprehension still exists. The
question is, in what way can it be used in support of
other evidence? Can it be used to fill in missing gaps?
Can it be used to corroborate an accomplice or, as in
the present case, a witness who, though not an
accomplice, is placed in the same category regarding
credibility because the Judge refuses to believe him
except insofar as he is corroborated?
9. In our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by Sir
Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan
Chuckerbutty [Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty,
ILR (1911) 38 Cal 559 at p. 588.] where he said that
such a confession can only be used to “lend
assurance to other evidence against a co-accused “or,
to put it in another way, as Reilly, J. did in
Periaswami Moopan, In re [Periaswami Moopan, In
re, 1930 SCC OnLine Mad 86 : ILR (1931) 54 Mad 75
at p. 77.] : (SCC OnLine Mad)
„…the provision goes no further than this—where
there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if
believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of
confession described in Section 30 may be thrown
into the scale as an additional reason for believing
that evidence.‟
10. Translating these observations into concrete
terms they come to this. The proper way to approach
a case of this kind is, first, to marshal the evidence
against the accused excluding the confession
altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is
believed, a conviction could safely be based on it. If it
is capable of belief independently of the confession,
then of course it is not necessary to call the
confession in aid. But cases may arise where the
Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as
it stands even though, if believed, it would be
sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event
the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to
lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify
himself in believing what without the aid of the
confession he would not be prepared to accept.”
11.
Learned Counsel, Mr. R. Datta for the accused persons-
in-custody referred another citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias
Pappu Yadav & Anr. reported in (2005) 2 SCC 42, wherein in
para Nos.18 and 19, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:“18. It is trite law that personal liberty cannot be taken
away except in accordance with the procedure established
by law. Personal liberty is a constitutional guarantee.
However, Article 21 which guarantees the above right also
contemplates deprivation of personal liberty by procedure
established by law. Under the criminal laws of this
country, a person accused of offences which are nonbailable is liable to be detained in custody during the
pendency of trial unless he is enlarged on bail in
accordance with law. Such detention cannot be questioned
as being violative of Article 21 since the same is
authorised by law. But even persons accused of nonbailable offences are entitled to bail if the court concerned
comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to
establish a prima facie case against him and/or if the
court is satisfied for reasons to be recorded that in spite of
the existence of prima facie case there is a need to release
such persons on bail where fact situations require it to do
so. In that process a person whose application for
enlargement on bail is once rejected is not precluded from
filing a subsequent application for grant of bail if there is a
change in the fact situation. In such cases if the
circumstances then prevailing require that such persons
be released on bail, in spite of his earlier applications
being rejected, the courts can do so.
19. The principles of res judicata and such analogous
principles although are not applicable in a criminal
proceeding, still the courts are bound by the doctrine of
judicial discipline having regard to the hierarchical system
prevailing in our country. The findings of a higher court or
a coordinate Bench must receive serious consideration at
the hands of the court entertaining a bail application at a
later stage when the same had been rejected earlier. In
such an event, the courts must give due weight to the
grounds which weighed with the former or higher court in
rejecting the bail application. Ordinarily, the issues which
had been canvassed earlier would not be permitted to be
reagitated on the same grounds, as the same would lead
to a speculation and uncertainty in the administration of
justice and may lead to forum hunting.”
Referring the same, Learned Counsel submitted that in
view of the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
there is no scope to refuse the bail application filed on behalf of
the accused persons-in-custody at this stage.
12.
Lastly, Learned Counsel, Mr. R. Datta for the accused
persons-in-custody relied upon another citation in Ram Sharan
Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2022) 16
SCC 166, wherein in para Nos.27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Hon’ble
the Apex Court observed as under:“27. The principal ingredient of the offence of
criminal conspiracy under Section 120-BIPC is an
agreement to commit an offence. Such an agreement
must be proved through direct or circumstantial
evidence. The court has to necessarily ascertain
whether there was an agreement between the
appellant and A-1 and A-2.
28. In the decision of State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan
[State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan, (2000) 8 SCC 203 :
2000 SCC (Cri) 1474] , this Court noted that an
agreement forms the core of the offence of
conspiracy, and it must surface in evidence through
some physical manifestation : (SCC pp. 211-12, paras
12-13)
“12. … As in all other criminal offences, the
prosecution has to discharge its onus of
proving the case against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. … A few bits here and a few
bits there on which the prosecution relies
cannot be held to be adequate for connecting
the accused with the commission of the crime
of criminal conspiracy.…
13. … The most important ingredient of the
offence being the agreement between two or
more persons to do an illegal act. In a case
where criminal conspiracy is alleged, the court
must inquire whether the two persons are
independently pursuing the same end or they
have come together to pursue the unlawful
object. The former does not render them
conspirators but the latter does. For the
offence of conspiracy some kind of physical
manifestation of agreement is required to be
established. The express agreement need not
be proved. The evidence as to the transmission
of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is not
sufficient.”
(emphasis supplied)
29. The charge of conspiracy alleged by the
prosecution against the appellant must evidence
explicit acts or conduct on his part, manifesting
conscious and apparent concurrence of a common
design with A-1 and A-2. In State (NCT of Delhi) v.
Navjot Sandhu [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot
Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1715] ,
this Court held : (SCC p. 691, para 101)
“101. One more principle which deserves
notice is that the cumulative effect of the
proved circumstances should be taken into
account in determining the guilt of the accused
rather than adopting an isolated approach to
each of the circumstances. Of course, each one
of the circumstances should be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Lastly, in regard to the
appreciation of evidence relating to the
conspiracy, the Court must take care to see
that the acts or conduct of the parties must be
conscious and clear enough to infer their
concurrence as to the common design and its
execution.”
(emphasis supplied)
30. In accepting the story of the prosecution, the trial
court, as well as the High Court, proceeded on the
basis of mere suspicion against the appellant, which
is precisely what this Court in Tanviben Pankajkumar
Divetia v. State of Gujarat [Tanviben Pankajkumar
Divetia v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 156 : 1997
SCC (Cri) 1004] , had cautioned against : (SCC p. 185,
para 45)
“45. The principle for basing a conviction on
the basis of circumstantial evidence has been
indicated in a number of decisions of this Court
and the law is well settled that each and every
incriminating circumstance must be clearly
established by reliable and clinching evidence
and the circumstances so proved must form a
chain of events from which the only irresistible
conclusion about the guilt of the accused can
be safely drawn and no other hypothesis
against the guilt is possible. This Court has
clearly sounded a note of caution that in a case
depending
largely
upon
circumstantial
evidence, there is always a danger that
conjecture or suspicion may take the place of
legal proof. The Court must satisfy itself that
various circumstances in the chain of events
have been established clearly and such
completed chain of events must be such as to
rule out a reasonable likelihood of the
innocence of the accused. It has also been
indicated that when the important link goes,
the chain of circumstances gets snapped and
the other circumstances cannot, in any manner,
establish the guilt of the accused beyond all
reasonable doubts. It has been held that the
Court has to be watchful and avoid the danger
of allowing the suspicion to take the place of
legal proof for sometimes, unconsciously it
may happen to be a short step between moral
certainty and legal proof. It has been indicated
by this Court that there is a long mental
distance between “may be true” and “must be
true” and the same divides conjectures from
sure conclusions. (Jaharlal Das v. State of
Orissa [Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa, (1991)
3 SCC 27 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 527] )”
(emphasis in original and supplied)
31. It is not necessary that there must be a clear,
categorical and express agreement between the
accused. However, an implied agreement must
manifest upon relying on principles established in the
cases of circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, in the
majority opinion of Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI [Ram
Narayan Popli v. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641 : 2003 SCC
(Cri) 869] , this Court had held : (SCC p. 783, para
354)
“354. … For the offence of conspiracy some
kind of physical manifestation of agreement is
required to be established. The express
agreement need not be proved. The evidence
as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the
unlawful act is not sufficient.”
32. In view of the clear enunciation of law on the
criminal conspiracy by this Court, we find that the
prosecution has failed to produce any evidence
whatsoever to satisfy the Court that there was a prior
meeting of minds between the appellant and A-1 and
A-2. There is no physical manifestation of such a
concurrence
extractable
from
surrounding
circumstances, declarations, or the conduct of the
appellant. The evidence is shorn of even a passive
acknowledgment of conspiracy of the appellant with
the accused, let alone heralding a clear and
conscientious participation of the appellant in the
conspiracy. As noted above, this Court has cautioned
against replacing mere suspicion with the legal
requirement of proof of agreement.”
13.
Finally, Learned Counsel, Mr. R. Datta for the accused
persons-in-custody also drawn the attention of the Court the
accused or applicant No.1 is a government servant serving as
Assistant Head Master of School, there is no chance of his
absconsion and tampering evidence as the I/O has laid Chargesheet and they are the permanent inhabitants of Gandacherra. So,
there is no scope on their behalf to influence the investigation and
the applicant No.2 being a house lady that is the wife of applicant
No.1 and considering the materials on record it is clear that, they
did not participate in the commission of murder of the deceased
rather on the following day of the alleged occurrence they came to
Agartala, so there is no scope to detain them in custody and to
refuse their bail application.
It
was
further
submitted
that
the
statement
of
witnesses referred by the accused persons cannot be believed and
those statements of witnesses namely, Souramita and her mother
cannot have any bearing and their statements have got no
reference of the alleged accused persons-in-custody with the
murder of the deceased. So, the story of the prosecution cannot
be believed rather it should be dismissed/rejected henceforth.
14.
The submission of Learned Counsel was countenanced
by Learned Special P.P., Mr. S. Lodh. Learned Special P.P. first of
all drawn the attention of the Court the earlier order passed by
this Court on 03.11.2025 in B.A. No.75 of 2025. The operative
portion of B.A. No.75 of 2025 observed as under:“Situated thus, at this stage, it appears to this Court
that if they are released on bail in that case they may
tamper or influence the witnesses of the prosecution
and there will be every chance of vitiating the trial of
the case. Hence, I did not find any scope to consider
the bail application filed by the accused persons-incustody. Accordingly, the bail application filed stands
rejected. The accused persons are to remain in J/C as
before. Since in this case investigation is completed
and chargesheet is submitted by I.O. and the other
accused persons are also in custody, so, Learned CJM
shall make all endeavour for commitment of this case
to the Court of Sessions at an earliest.
With this observation, the bail application filed
stands rejected and thus disposed of. Send down the
record to the Learned Trial Court alongwith a copy of
this order, Return back the Case Diary to I.O. through
Learned P.P. along with a copy of this order.”
Referring the same, Learned Special P.P. drawn the
attention of the Court that at the time of hearing of earlier bail
application all the issues were discussed in detail and after
considering all these things this Court rejected the bail application
and at this stage, the accused persons could not place any fresh
materials on record to consider their bail application. So, this
present bail application is not maintainable. Regarding ground of
arrest Learned Special P.P. submitted that the issue has been
dealt with earlier and at the time of arrest and forwarding of the
accused persons–in-custody to the Court the “Grounds of arrest”
were duly communicated to the accused persons and as such on
the issue of “Ground of arrest” there is no scope to release the
accused persons on bail.
15.
In support of his contention, Learned Special P.P.
appearing for the State-respondent referred one citation of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Lt. Col. Prasad Shrikant
Purohit Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2018) 11 SCC
458, wherein in Para No.30, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as
under:“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an
accused has a right to make successive applications for
grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail
applications has a duty to consider the reasons and
grounds on which the earlier bail applications were
rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record
the fresh grounds which persuade it to take a view
different from the one taken in the earlier applications.”
Referring the same, Learned Special P.P. drawn the
attention of the Court the accused persons-in-custody could not
place any materials before this Court at this stage to consider the
bail application as no new materials could be projected on behalf
of the accused persons-in-custody.
16.
Finally, Learned Special P.P. appearing for the State-
respondent submitted that since by the earlier order all the point
of arguments raised by Learned Counsel for the accused personsin-custody have been discussed and decided and at this stage on
behalf of the accused persons-in-custody, there is no new
materials on record. So, Learned Special P.P. urged for dismissal
of this bail application.
17.
Learned Special P.P. for the respondent in addition to
his submission also drawn the attention of the Court referring the
statements of witnesses namely, Souramita and her mother and
submitted that the accused persons-in-custody had a pre plan and
made conspiracy since long back and even it is found that they
were not participated in the murder of deceased directly but their
involvement with the alleged conspiracy cannot be disbelieved.
So, finally Learned Special P.P. urged for dismissal of this bail
application.
18.
I have heard both the sides at length and perused the
relevant prosecution papers. Admittedly, in this case the I/O after
completion of investigation has laid charge-sheet against 6 (six)
numbers of accused persons namely, Sri Dibakar Saha, Miss
Nabanita Das, Sri Joydeep Das, Sri Animesh Yadav, Sri Dipak
Chandra Saha, Smt. Debika Saha and accordingly Learned CJM,
West Tripura, Agartala by order dated 06.09.2025 took cognizance
of offence punishable under Sections 61(2)(a)/238(a)/238(b)
/127/58/103/3(5) of BNS, 2023 against the aforesaid accused
persons.
19.
It is true that in earlier occasions the present accused
persons-in-custody also moved another bail application which was
rejected by this Court after elaborate hearing of both the sides on
03.11.2025. At the time of disposal of the earlier bail application
all the points which have been argued by Learned Counsels have
been taken care of and were discussed. The accused persons-incustody at this stage before the Court could not place any fresh
ground to consider the bail application of the accused persons-incustody. The allegation of the prosecution is no doubt grave and
from the record of the Learned Trial Court it appears that the trial
is not yet been commenced and the other accused persons-incustody are also in custody. At this stage, their release may affect
the trial of this case. So, considering the materials on record and
the nature of allegation at this stage I do not find any scope to
grant bail to the accused persons-in-custody. Accordingly, their
bail application stands rejected.
The accused persons have to remain in J/C as before.
Learned Special Judge shall make all endeavour for early disposal
of the case since all the accused persons are incarceration in jail.
The citations referred by Learned Counsel for the
accused persons at this stage would not help this Court to
consider bail application of the accused persons-in-custody. Since,
those were dealt with during early hearing of the bail application
as stated Supra.
Send down the record to the Learned Trial Court along
with a copy of this order also supply a copy to the I.O. through
Learned Special P.P. for information.
With this observation, this present bail application
stands disposed of.
JUDGE
Amrita
AMRITA
DEB
AMRITA DEB
Date: 2026.04.13
17:28:07 +05'30'
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