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2026:CGHC:5427
Digitally
signed by
JYOTI
NAFR
SHARMA
JYOTI
SHARMA Date:
2026.02.02
10:50:59
+0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SA No. 548 of 2025
1. Smt. Ful Bai W/o Shri Kanti Kumar Aged About 52 Years R/o
Village - Sukulpara (Kharoud), Tah. Pamgarh, District - JanjgirChampa (C.G.)
2. Kanti Kumar S/o Shri Bhurwa Aged About 64 Years R/o Village Sukulpara (Kharoud), Tah. Pamgarh, District - Janjgir-Champa
(C.G.)
3. Shivshankar S/o Late Shri Nandlal Aged About 27 Years R/o
Village - Sukulpara (Kharoud), Tah. Pamgarh, District - JanjgirChampa (C.G.)
4. Pushpalata Wd/o Late Shri Nandlal Aged About 47 Years R/o
Village - Sukulpara (Kharoud), Tah. Pamgarh, District - JanjgirChampa (C.G.)
5. Laxmi Kumari D/o Late Shri Nandlal Aged About 25 Years R/o
Village - Sukulpara (Kharoud), Tah. Pamgarh, District - JanjgirChampa (C.G.)
... Appellant(s)
versus
1. Shanti Lal Yadav S/o Bhurwa Aged About 62 Years R/o Vill Sukulpara (Kharoud), Tah. Pamgarh, Dist- Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
2. State Of Chhattisgarh Through - Collector Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s)
: Mr. P.K. Patel, Advocate
For Respondent NO. 1 : Mr. Chandrikaditya Pandey, Advocate
For Respondent/ State : Mr. Lekhram Dhruv, P.L.
Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge
Judgment on Board
31.01.2026
1. The defendant/ appellant has preferred this second appeal under
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity CPC)
against the judgment & decree dated 09.09.2025 passed by the
Learned Fourth District Judge, Janjgir, dist Janjgir-Champa in Civil
Appeal No. 27-A/2025 (Shanti Lal Yadav and Anr. Vs. Smt. Ful Bai
and Ors.) whereby the appeal of the plaintiff has been allowed in
part which was preferred against the judgment and decree dated
21.03.2025 passed by the Learned Additional Judge, Pamgarh,
District Janjgir-Champa to the Court of First Civil Judge Senior
Division Janjgir whereby the learned trial Judge has dismissed the
suit of the plaintiff/ respondent herein.
For the sake of
convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status
before the learned trial Court.
2. The plaintiff preferred the suit for declaration of title and injunction
pleading inter alia that the disputed land was recorded in the
revenue records in the name of late Bhurwa and others up to the
year 2004–05, and Khasra No. 2450/1 stood recorded exclusively
in the name of Bhurwa. Late Bhurwa was the father of the plaintiff
and defendant No. 2, the grandfather of defendants No. 3 and 5,
and the father-in-law of defendants No. 1 and 5. The disputed
lands comprising Khasra Nos. 1533, 1535 and 1537 were jointly
recorded in the name of Bhurwa and others, whereas Khasra Nos.
1534 and 2450/1 were recorded in the name of Bhurwa alone. It is
pleaded that defendant No. 1 has illegally got the disputed land
mutated in her name without any lawful authority. The plaintiff
further submits that with respect to Khasra No. 2450/1
admeasuring 0.30 acres, the defendants have produced a forged
and fabricated Will before the Court. Suspecting the genuineness
of the said Will, the plaintiff obtained a certified copy from the office
of the Sub-Registrar, Pamgarh, and upon comparison with the Will
produced by the defendants, it was found that the Will relied upon
by the defendants shows material alterations and tampering,
thereby rendering it suspicious and invalid. It is further pleaded that
on the basis of the partition deed and title documents produced by
the plaintiff, along with the certified copy of the Will dated
24.04.2002, the disputed land is the property of the plaintiff and is
liable to be partitioned. The plaintiff states that Khasra Nos. 1534
and 2450/1 were purchased by late Bhurwa from his own earnings
derived from his employment at Kati, and that there was no other
source of income available to the family at the relevant time. Late
Bhurwa had been working at Korba during the years 1980–90, and
the said lands were acquired from his personal income. The
plaintiff further submits that during his lifetime, late Bhurwa
partitioned his movable and immovable properties among his three
sons, namely Kanti Kumar, Shantilal, and the heirs of deceased
Nandlal Yadav, in which partition Khasra No. 2450/1 (Kesruwa
field) fell to the share of the plaintiff, while the remaining disputed
land was retained by late Bhurwa for his livelihood. The plaintiff
has been in continuous possession of the land allotted to him since
the said partition. It is further averred that presently the disputed
land is wrongly recorded in the revenue records in the name of
defendant No. 1, Phoolbai. Upon inquiry, defendant No. 2 admitted
that he had reduced the plaintiff’s share at the time of account
division but subsequently denied the partition based on
possession, thereby creating a cloud over the plaintiff’s title.
Hence, the plaintiff has been constrained to file the present suit
seeking declaration of title, along with a permanent injunction
restraining the defendants from interfering with his peaceful
possession and from alienating the suit land.
3. The defendants No. 1 and 2 have filed their written statement
denying the allegations made by the plaintiff. It is pleaded that the
disputed lands are situated at Village Sukulpara and comprise
Khasra Nos. 1533, 1534, 1535, 1537 and 2450, admeasuring 0.20,
0.030, 0.011, 0.06 and 0.30 acres respectively, totaling 0.97 acres.
According to the defendants, the said lands were recorded in the
revenue records in the name of late Bhurwa and others up to the
year 2004, while Khasra No. 2450 stood recorded exclusively in
the name of late Bhurwa. It is further contended that Khasra Nos.
1534 and 2450/1, admeasuring 0.30 hectares, were lawfully
transferred in favour of defendant No. 1 through a registered Will
executed by late Bhurwa. On the basis of the said registered Will,
the disputed lands have been duly mutated and recorded in the
revenue records in the name of defendant No. 1. The defendants
have specifically denied the contention that the suit lands were
purchased from the income or earnings of the plaintiff, and have
asserted that the lands were the self-acquired properties of late
Bhurwa. The defendants have further pleaded that during his
lifetime, late Bhurwa had already divided the lands among his
three sons, and thereafter executed a registered Will bequeathing
the entire land, comprising Khasra Nos. 1533, 1534, 1535, 1537
and 2450/1, admeasuring 0.20, 0.30, 0.11, 0.06 and 0.30 acres
respectively, in favour of defendant No. 1. Pursuant to the said
Will, the entire suit land stands recorded in the name of defendant
No. 1, and defendants No. 1 and 2 are in peaceful possession
thereof. It is further pleaded that the plaintiff has no right, title or
interest in the suit land and that the present suit has been filed on
false and concocted grounds. On these premises, defendants No.
1 and 2 have prayed for dismissal of the suit.
4. Defendants No. 4 and 5 have also filed their written statement,
wherein they have adopted and reiterated all the averments made
by defendants No. 1 and 2. They have further stated that a
registered Will in respect of the entire land comprising Khasra Nos.
1533, 1534, 1537 and 2450/1, admeasuring 0.20, 0.30, 0.11, 0.06
and 0.30 acres respectively, was executed by late Bhurwa in
favour of defendant No. 1, and that on the basis thereof the entire
land stands recorded in her name. It is lastly contended by
defendants No. 4 and 5 that the disputed land is in the actual
possession of defendants No. 1 and 2, and that the plaintiff has no
subsisting cause of action to maintain the present suit.
Accordingly, defendants No. 4 and 5 have also prayed for
dismissal of the suit.
5.
On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Judge framed as
many as 9 issues and given opportunity to the parties to adduce
evidence, both oral and documentary and after a full fledged trial
dismissed the suit of the plaintiff mainly on the grounds that the
plaintiff has failed to establish his title or possession over the
disputed land. Although a partition among the sons of late
Bhuruvadas is admitted, no reliable evidence has been produced
to show that the suit land was allotted to the plaintiff’s share. The
revenue records consistently reflect possession in favour of
defendant No. 1, which the plaintiff has failed to rebut. As regards
the Will (Ex. D-1), though the scribe has been examined, the Will
has not been proved in accordance with law due to nonexamination of any attesting witness, however, even ignoring the
Will, the plaintiff has independently failed to prove his own title or
possession.
6. Against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court the
plaintiff/ respondent has preferred first appeal before the First
Appellate Court which has been allowed in part vide judgment and
decree impugned herein and granting 1/3rd share in the suit
property holding that the learned trial court committed error not
declaring the plaintiff’s 1/3rd share in the suit property. The learned
First Appellate court has categorically observed that the execution
of WILL has not been proved in accordance with the well settled
principles of law. Therefore, since the suit property is joint property
and the fact of its prior partition has not been proven, the plaintiff’s
share in the suit property is established. Against this impugned
judgment and decree, the present Second Appeal has been filed
by the defendants.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material
available on record.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendants submits that the suit
property is partitioned in the favour of the appellant through
registered WILL. He further submits that as per Section 68 of the
Evidence Act if the WILL is registered the attested witness are not
required to be examined and thus the appellate court has erred in
allowing the appeal of the plaintiff.
9. From the material available on record, it is evident that, upon due
appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the
parties, the Appellate Court has recorded a categorical finding that
as per the mandatory provisions of law, a Will is required to be
proved by examining at least one attesting witness. In the present
case, defendant No. 1 failed to examine any attesting witness to
prove the Will (Ex. D-01), and merely examined the scriber, whose
testimony is insufficient in the absence of proof that the attesting
witnesses were unavailable or deceased. Consequently, the Will
and the mutation based thereon cannot be held to be valid, and
defendant No. 1 cannot be said to have acquired title to the suit
land through the said Will. In the absence of proof of a valid Will
and of any prior partition, the suit land is held to be joint family
property. As the plaintiff and his two brothers constitute the
coparcenary, the plaintiff’s entitlement to a 1/3rd share in the suit
property stands established. Though the plaintiff failed to prove
exclusive ownership over the entire suit land, his right to a 1/3rd
share is proved, and to that extent the suit deserves to be and is
allowed.
10. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gopal Krishan and Ors. Vs.
Daulat Ram and Ors. 2025 (2) SCC 804 laid down the principles
which are required for proving of a WILL. Para 15 of the said
decision reads as under:15. The requisites for proving of a will are well
established. They were recently reiterated in a
judgment of this Court in Meena Pradhan v. Kamla
Pradhan. See also Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa,
The principles as summarised by the former are
reproduced as below: (Meena Pradhan cases, SCC pp.
737-38, para 10)
"10.... 10.1. The court has to consider two aspects:
firstly, that the will is executed by the testator, and
secondly, that it was the last will executed by him:
10.2. It is not required to be proved with mathematical
accuracy, but the test of satisfaction of the prudent mind
has to be applied.
10.3. A will is required to fulfil all the formalities required
under Section 63 of the Succession Act, that is to say:
(a) The testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will
or it shall be signed by some other person in his
presence and by his direction and the said signature
or affixation shall show that it was intended to give
effect to the writing as a will;
(b) It is mandatory to get it attested by two or more
witnesses, though no particular form of attestation is
necessary;
(c) Each of the attesting witnesses must have seen
the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has
seen some other person sign the will, in the
presence and by the direction of the testator, or has
received
from
the
testator
a
personal
acknowledgment of such signatures;
(d) Each of the attesting witnesses shall sign the will
in the presence of the testator, however, the
presence of all witnesses at the same time is not
required.
10.4. For the purpose of proving the execution of the
will, at least one of the attesting witnesses, who is alive,
subject to the process of court, and capable of giving
evidence, shall be examined;
10.5. The attesting witness should speak not only about
the testator's signatures but also that each of the
witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the
testator.
10.6 If one attesting witness can prove the execution of
the will, the examination of other attesting witnesses
can be dispensed with;
10.7. Where one attesting witness examined to prove
the will fails to prove its due execution, then the other
available attesting witness has to be called to
supplement his evidence;
10.8. Whenever there exists any suspicion as to the
execution of the will, it is the responsibility of the
propounder to remove all legitimate suspicions before it
can be accepted as the testator's last will. In such
cases, the initial onus on the propounder becomes
heavier;
10.9. The test of judicial conscience has been evolved
for dealing with those cases where the execution of the
will is surrounded by suspicious d circumstances. It
requires to consider factors such as awareness of the
testator as to the content as well as the consequences,
nature and effect of the dispositions in the will, sound,
certain and disposing state of mind and memory of the
testator at the time of execution; testator executed the
will while acting on his own free will;
10.10. One who alleges fraud, fabrication, undue
influence et cetera e has to prove the same. However,
even in the absence of such allegations, if there are
circumstances giving rise to doubt, then it becomes the
duty of the propounder to dispel such suspicious
circumstances by giving a cogent and convincing
explanation:
10.11. Suspicious circumstances must be "real,
germane and valid" and not merely "the fantasy of the
doubting mind [Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa".
Whether
a
"suspicious"
particular
would
feature
depend
would
on
the
qualify
as
facts
and
circumstances of each case. Any circumstance raising
suspicion legitimate in nature would qualify as a
suspicious circumstance, for example, a shaky
signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust
disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a
leading part in the making of the will under which he
receives a substantial benefit, etc."
11. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely
limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a
substantial question of law. Findings of fact recorded by the Court
cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be
perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of
law.
12. In the present case, the First Appellate Court has recorded finding,
on the basis of evidence available on record. The appellants have
failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of
law in the concurrent findings so recorded.
13. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal
essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to
findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial
question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
14. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for
the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be
regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’
within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my
view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise
any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100
of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any
substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of
the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The
judgments impugned passed by the learned First appellate Court is
just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all.
15.Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby
dismissed at the motion stage itself.
SD/(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
Jyoti
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