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Serial No. 02
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 205 of 2016
Date of Decision: 20.04.2021
Smti. Effilina Marak & 28 Ors.
Vs.
State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
For the Respondent(s)
:
:
Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, Adv.
Mr. K. Khan, Sr. GA. with
Mr. S. Sengupta, Addl. Sr. GA.
Mr. A.H. Kharwanlang, GA.
Mr. K.P. Bhattacharjee, GA.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
1.
Yes/No
Yes/No
What can be understood from this writ petition is that the Petitioners
are said to be the absolute land owners of land situated at Mendipathar
village, North Garo Hills (then East Garo Hills District). The details of the
land owned by each of the 29 Petitioners herein is given at paragraph 3 of
this writ petition.
2.
At paragraph 7 of the writ petition, reference was made to the
Notification No. RDA.21/08/134, dated Shillong the 24 th November, 2009
issued by the Under Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya, Revenue and
Disaster Management Department, which is a notification made u/s 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 indicating the requirement of the Government
for construction of new B.G Railway Line from Dudhnoi to Mendipathar. In
the same notification, the Government in exercise of power conferred by
Section 17(4) of the said Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have decided that in
view of the urgency of the project, provisions of Section 5 (A) of the Act
shall not apply to the land described above.
3.
‘Public Notice’ No. EGH/REV.235/2009/79, dated Williamnagar, the
30th November 2009 was also issued by the Deputy Commissioner, East Garo
Hills, Williamnagar whereby, the Government had authorized entry and
survey of the land and to do all other Acts required or permitted by subSection (2) of Section 4 of the Act.
4.
It may be mentioned that the Petitioners citing reference to the fixation
of land compensation by the Garo Hills Autonomous District Council, Tura
whereby rates were fixed for different category of land within its jurisdiction,
had petitioned the Deputy Commissioner, Williamnagar for fixation of a
higher rate of compensation by giving stating that since the rate determined
by the Garo Hills Autonomous District Council, Tura does not reflect the
correct and existing market rate. A similar letter was written to the Deputy
Commissioner, East Garo Hills, Williamnagar vide letter dated 16.01.2010
(Annexure-D).
5.
Thereafter, vide Notification No. RDA.21/2008/147, dated Shillong
the 8th February 2010, the Government of Meghalaya through the Under
Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya, Revenue and Disaster Management
Department, Shillong has issued the declaration u/s 6 of the said Act of 1894,
whereby the land of the writ Petitioners and others was acquired for public
purpose for the said construction of the new B.G Railway Line from Dudhnoi
to Mendipathar.
6.
The Petitioners then filed another representation dated 06.03.2010
addressed to the Executive Secretary, Garo Hills District Council, Tura under
the subject ‘Review of Land Compensation for railway affected areas of
Mendipathar’. Copy of this representation was also sent to the
Respondent/Deputy Commissioner, Williamnagar herein.
7.
It is the case of the Petitioners that the Collector in exercise of power
u/s 11 of the L.A Act. 1894 had made an award dated 09.11.2010 without
taking into consideration the objections raised by the Petitioners in their
representation mentioned above. The Petitioners were then called to collect
the award which they did between 22.12.2010 to 11.08.2011 after raising
serious oral protests against the manner in which the award was determined.
However, the Collector inspite of the said protests did not allow them to write
the word “Under Protest” on the revenue records at the time of receiving the
compensation being 80 per cent of the same received on 22.12.2012.
8.
Another letter dated 24.12.2011 was submitted before the Deputy
Commissioner, East Garo Hills, Williamnagar by some of the Petitioners
herein under the subject ‘Complaint against unjustified and discriminatory
land compensation’ whereby reference was made to the letter dated
15.01.2009 and 15.07.2009.
9.
The Collector vide letter dated 13.02.2012 asked all the writ
Petitioners and others to collect the remaining 20 per cent of the
compensation from the office on 24.02.2012 to which the Petitioners received
the same with oral protests, which was not recorded on the revenue records
prompting them to file another reference application dated 26.02.2012 and a
reminder to this being application dated 05.03.2012 and again another
reminder dated 03.04.2012 which was sent to the Collector with a request to
refer their matter for reference u/s 18 of the said L.A Act, 1894 to which the
Collector has declined to take any action on the same.
10.
The Petitioners then approached this Court with a writ petition No. 255
of 2012 seeking appropriate relief on being denied of the same by the inaction
of the Collector. This Court sitting in Division Bench has then disposed of
the said writ petition vide order dated 25.10.2013 whereby the Petitioners
were allowed to filed an application before the Deputy Commissioner,
Williamnagar within a period of one month and the Deputy Commissioner
may make a reference under Section 18 of the Act to the Reference Court.
The Petitioners were also allowed to file an application for condonation of
delay which may be considered by the Deputy Commissioner.
11.
The Petitioners in compliance with the said direction of this Court, had
accordingly filed the said application on 19.11.2013 and on the same not
being taken up, a contempt application was preferred before this Court which
compelled the Collector to dispose of the said application vide order dated
29.09.2014 rejecting the application.
12.
Thus being highly aggrieved by the said order dated 29.09.2014, the
Petitioners have come before this Court with a prayer to set aside and quash
the said order and to treat the representation dated 15.07.2009, 16.01.2010
and 06.03.2010 as sufficient protest against the final award dated 09.11.2010.
There is also a prayer for condonation of the delay in filing the application
dated 24.12.2011 and another one dated 26.02.2012 as well as the reminder
dated 05.03.2012 and last reminder dated 03.04.2012.
13.
Mr. H.L. Shangreiso, learned counsel for the Petitioners after leading
this Court to the case of the Petitioners as enumerated above, has submitted
that the Deputy Commissioner, East Garo Hills in
his affidavit dated
11.04.2017, at paragraph 15 has stated that no award was made under Section
11 of the L.A. Act and 80 per cent of the compensation was made under
Section 17(4) of the said Act, however in the additional affidavit dated
22.07.2019 at sub-para (c) of para 4 has admitted that the award statement
under Section 11 was prepared and finalized on 14.11.2011 and has alleged
that none of the Petitioners has lodged protest at the time of receiving the
award or the remaining amount of compensation within six weeks of passing
of the award as required under Section 18 of the L.A Act, 1894 and as such,
the Petitioners are disqualified from filing the said protest. This, according to
the learned counsel is a contradiction made which cannot be contemplated
since the date of the award is not known, then how can one calculate the date
on which a protest application can be made.
14.
In the said proceedings under the L.A. Act, the Deputy Commissioner
while passing the purported award under Section 11 has based the rate of
compensation on the rates as was given by the Garo Hills Autonomous
District Council, to which the Petitioners had made a prayer before the said
Deputy Commissioner to not take into account the rate given therein and as
such, the Petitioners are entitled to file their protest, which was not allowed,
submits the learned Counsel.
15.
However, the main thrust of the argument advanced by the learned
counsel for the Petitioners is that the representation of the Petitioners dated
24.12.2011 should have been treated as the letter of protest by the Collector
and reference should have been made accordingly, which was not done so.
16.
Reference to the order dated 25.10.2013 in W.P.(C) 255 of 2012 was
made by submitting that the Hon’ble High Court had allowed the Petitioners
to file an application for reference in accordance with law which was
accordingly filed on 13.11.2013 before the Collector.
17.
Mr. Shangrieso has reiterated that the sum and substance of his
contention is that even the date of the award is taken to be 14.11.2011, the
provisions of Section 18 of the Act provides that any person interested who
has not received the same may by written application to the Collector require
that the matter be referred for determination by the Court within six weeks
from the date of the said award, which was duly complied with by the
Petitioners vide their representation dated 24.12.2011.
18.
As to the manner of protest in the event of the award being received
inspite of the same, Mr. Shangrieso has submitted that proviso to sub-Section
2 of Section 31 of the said L.A. Act was fulfilled by the Petitioners, inasmuch
as, though the award was received by them, yet a protest in terms of Section
18 of the Act was also made and as such, the Collector was bound to refer
the same to the competent court.
19.
As to the form and format or manner of protest, the learned counsel for
the Petitioners has cited the case of M/S Steel Authority of India v.
S.U.T.N.I. Sangam & Ors: AIR 2010 SC 112 at paragraphs 95 and 96
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that under the L.A. Act, no
form of protest has been prescribed, no form of application in writing has
also been prescribed. The form, mode and manner of protest are procedural
in nature. The statute does not provide for a thing to be done in a particular
manner.
20.
Maintaining that the Petitioners had duly registered their protest as is
evident from the representations referred to herein, therefore there is no issue
of condonation of delay and as such, the impugned order dated 29.09.2014
passed by the Collector is liable to be dismissed and the Collector may be
directed to refer the case of the Petitioners to the Reference Court.
21.
Also heard Mr K. Khan, learned Sr. GA who at the outset has taken
this Court to the Order dated 25.10.2013 passed by the Division Bench of
this Court in W.P.(C) No 255 of 2012, wherein this Court has issued certain
directions, the first being that the Petitioners were allowed to make reference
in accordance with law within a period of one month and secondly, that the
Deputy Commissioner may consider the application for condonation of delay
if any, moved by the writ Petitioners in accordance with law.
22.
Mr. Khan has further submitted that the learned counsel for the
Petitioners has stressed on the letter or representation dated 24.12.2011 and
the application for reference to the Reference Court, however this particular
letter was the subject matter of the said W.P. (C) No 255 of 2012 and the
Division Bench of this High Court has not come to any finding as regard the
said letter dated 24.12.2011 as to whether it was set aside, or that it was time
barred or even that it was filed within the six weeks period. What happened
before the Order dated 25.10.2013 was passed got eclipsed by an operation
of law, by a new direction, a new mandamus, in other words, a fresh
consideration of the Petitioners’ case has emerged by the Court’s allowance
to the Petitioners to ‘make an application for reference in accordance with
law’.
23.
The second part of this Court’s order is that apart from the one months’
period granted to the Petitioners to prefer the said application for reference,
the High Court has further granted liberty to the Petitioners to file an
application for condonation of delay, perhaps considering the special
circumstances surrounding the case of the Petitioners even though there is
no express provision of law which empowers the Deputy Commissioner to
condone the delay if any, which ran contra to the authority issued by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court on this issue.
24.
Learned Sr. GA has also referred to the application of the Petitioners
before the Deputy Commissioner dated 19.11.2013, the subject of the same
being very crucial as it states that it is a ‘Prayer of reference u/s 18 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as per the direction of the Hon’ble High Court
of Meghalaya vide Judgment & Order dated 25.10.2013 passed in W.P.(C)
No 255/2012’ and nothing was mentioned about the previous applications if
any, it was submitted.
25.
The second part of the High Court’s Order is that the Petitioners were
given the liberty to file an application for condonation of delay, the delay
here is not for preferring the said application dated 19.11.2013, which was
well within the one month’s period, but it would relate to the date of the
award which was passed on 14.11.2011, it was submitted. Here, the
Petitioners have not filed any such application for condonation of delay and
has thus waived their opportunity for being considered as far as delay is
concerned. In the given situation, when the award was made on 14.11.2011,
the application for reference was made on 19.11.2013, even if the six weeks
period is calculated, there has occurred a delay of almost one and a half year.
26.
Finally, Mr. Khan has directed the attention of this Court to the order
dated 29.09.2014 passed by the Deputy Commissioner on the application
dated 19.11.2013 filed by the Petitioners and has submitted that the Deputy
Commissioner has observed that the Petitioners have not filed any protest
when the award was received by them at the relevant time, however in
compliance with the Hon’ble High Court’s Order dated 25.10.2013, the
Petitioners were allowed to file an application for reference along with an
application for condonation of delay, but there was no compliance to the High
Court’s Order as they have failed to file an application for condonation of
delay as a separate application and as such, the observation of the Deputy
Commissioner in this regard is proper and no infirmity can be attributed to
the same. This petition is therefore liable to be dismissed with cost.
27.
Having heard the parties, this Court has given due consideration to
the submissions made, the factual aspect of the matter need not be repeated
as the same has been enumerated above. Be that as it may, what can be
understood here is that the Petitioners have approached this Court impugning
the order dated 29.09.2014 passed by the Deputy Commissioner which in
essence has rejected the application of the Petitioners dated 19.11.2013 for
reference under section 18 of the L.A. Act.
28.
Again, the genesis of the dispute which culminated in the passing of
the said impugned order dated 29.09.2014 is the writ petition filed by the
Petitioners before this Court being W.P. ( C) 255 of 2012 wherein the alleged
non-reference of the Deputy Commissioner to the Reference Court as
provided under the L.A. Act and in particular, the non-consideration of the
representation of the Petitioners dated 24.12 2011 as a letter of protest and
prayer for reference was the subject matter of the said writ petition No. 255
of 2012. This Court sitting in the Division Bench had passed the order dated
25.10.2013 inter alia by observing that the Court is not inclined to interfere
with the acquisition proceeding under the circumstances, however the
Petitioners were allowed to make an application for reference under Section
18 of the Act in accordance with law.
29.
If any application for reference is to be made in accordance with law,
which means that Section 18 of the L.A. Act is to be resorted to, then as
pointed out by Mr. Khan, the provisions of the same has to be complied with.
Section 18 reads as follows:
“18. Reference to Court. - (1) Any person interested
who has not accepted the award may, by written application to
the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the
Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his
objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the
compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the
apportionment of the compensation among the persons
interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which
objection to the award is taken:
Provided that every such application shall be made,(a) if the person making it was present or represented
before the Collector at the time when he made his
award, within six weeks from the date of the
Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of
the notice from the Collector under section 12,
sub-section (2), or within six months from the date
of the Collector's award, whichever period shall
first expire.”
30.
In sub-Section 2 of Section 18 what is seen is that an application so
made must be made within six weeks from the date of accepting the award
from the Collector or on receipt of notice under Section 12, sub-Section (2),
within six weeks or six months from the date of the Collector’s award.
31.
Again, in the said order dated 25.10.2013, this Court being mindful of
the provision of the L.A. Act and the time limit prescribed therein for making
any reference, has given the Petitioners liberty to file an application for
condonation of delay, if so desired and that the Deputy Commissioner may
consider the same in accordance with law.
32.
As agreed to by the parties, there is no specific provision for
condonation of delay in making an application under Section 18 of the Act
and as such, the learned counsel for the Petitioners have candidly submitted
that knowing fully well that the Deputy Commissioner has no power to
condone any delay, such an application has not been filed.
33.
On this premise, what can be deduced is that this Court in the said writ
petition No. 255 of 2012 have decided on the prayer of the Petitioners inter
alia on the said representation dated 24.12.2011, the Petitioners are therefore
precluded from raising the same issue again in this instant petition. The issue
under agitation is therefore the impugned order dated 29.09.2014 vis-a- vis
the letter dated 19.11.2013.
34.
The said letter dated 19.11.2013 is therefore to be taken as the letter
seeking reference and this, placed in juxtaposition with the award dated
14.11.2011, as rightly submitted by Mr. Khan, the period for filing the same
is indeed time barred and though a narrow window of opportunity was given
to the Petitioners to file an application for condonation of delay, the same not
being availed, the impugned order is therefore proper and suffers from no
legal infirmity.
35.
The case laws cited by the learned counsel for the Petitioners are
relevant only to the extent that there is no form or format for filing the protest
while seeking reference, however this is not the case here as the Petitioners
have stressed on the applicability of the said representation dated 24.12.2011
as the letter of protest and application for reference.
36.
Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
Petitioners have not been able to make out a case for interference by this
Court and this petition is hereby rejected as devoid of merits.
37.
Petition disposed of. No cost.
Judge
Meghalaya
20.04.2021
“D. Nary, PS”
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