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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
B.A. No.32 of 2025
Smt. Chandana Das Bhowmik,
W/O Shibu Bhowmik
R/O Chaigharia Uttar Maharani
P.S.-R.K. Pur, Udaipur,
Dist.-Gomati, Tripura
---- Applicant
On behalf of
Sri Shibu Bhowmik,
S/O Shibu Bhowmik
R/O Chaigharia Uttar Maharani
P.S.-R.K. Pur, Udaipur,
Dist.-Gomati, Tripura
---- Accused-person
Versus
The State of Tripura
----Respondent(s)
For Applicant(s)
:
Mr. Pijush Kanti Biswas, Sr. Adv,
Mr. Pujan Biswas, Adv,
Mr. Rishiraj Nath, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Raju Datta, P.P.,
Mr. Rajib Saha, Addl. P.P.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Order
04/07/2025
This bail application under Section 483 of BNSS, 2023
was filed for granting bail to the accused person in connection with
R.K. Pur PS case No.46 of 2025 for the offence punishable under
Section 281/105 of BNS, 2023 read with Section 184/187 of M.V.
Act.
Heard Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Pijush Kanti Biswas
assisted by Learned Counsel Mr. Pujan Biswas and Learned
Counsel Mr. Rishiraj Nath appearing on behalf of the accused
person and also heard Learned P.P. Mr. Raju Datta along with
Learned Addl. P.P. Mr. Rajib Saha appearing on behalf of the
State-respondent on the last date.
Initially by order dated 08.05.2025, the accused person
was granted interim bail after lodging in custody on and from
23.03.2025. At the time of hearing, Learned Senior Counsel fairly
submitted that the case covers under the relevant provision of
Section 106(1) of BNS, 2023 but at the time of registration of the
case, the IO just to harass the accused registered the case under
Section 281/105 of BNS, 2023 and under Section 184/187 of M.V.
Act in place of registering the case under Section 106 of MV Act.
In support of his contention Learned Senior Counsel relied upon
one citation of Hon’ble the Apex Court reported in (2007) 14 SCC
269 [Prabhakaran v. State of Kerala dated 21.06.2007]
wherein in para Nos.2, 4, 5 and 8, Hon’ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
“2. The background facts in a nutshell are as
follows:
A boy aged 10 years residing in a hostel of the
Tribal Welfare Department, while he was a student
of 4th standard in a nearby school, was run over by
a bus driven by the appellant in the middle of the
road. The investigation by the police revealed that
there was evidence to the effect that even the
passengers in the bus were alarmed at the
enormous speed at which it was being driven and
had cautioned the driver to stop, even crying, as
they had seen the school children crossing the road
in a queue. The investigation also revealed that
even the children crossing the road had raised both
hands for stopping the vehicle. The passengers and
pedestrians were of the view that the bus was
being driven at a high speed and that they had cried
aloud to stop the bus. It was, in spite of all these,
that the bus ran over the said student on his head
and the bus could be stopped only 15 to 20 feet
ahead of the spot of occurrence. In the light of the
said evidence, the investigating officer felt that
there was real intention on the part of the appellant
driver of the bus to cause death of persons to whom
harm may be caused by reason of hitting the bus
and he was charged with offence punishable under
Section 302 IPC. The court below found that no
intention had been proved in the case. But, at the
same time, the accused acted with the knowledge
that it was likely to cause death. So, the act
committed by the appellant was culpable homicide
not amounting to murder punishable under Section
304 Part II IPC. Convicting him for the said offence,
he
was
sentenced
to
undergo
rigorous
imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs
15,000 with a default sentence of imprisonment for
three years. This was assailed in appeal.
4. The respective stand taken before the High Court
was reiterated in this appeal.
5. Section 304-A speaks of causing death by
negligence. This section applies to rash and
negligent acts and does not apply to cases where
death has been voluntarily caused. This section
obviously does not apply to cases where there is an
intention to cause death or knowledge that the act
will in all probability cause death. It only applies to
cases in which without any such intention or
knowledge death is caused by what is described as
a rash and negligent act.
8. As noted above, 'rashness' consists in hazarding
a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that
it is so, and that it may cause injury. The criminality
lies in such a case in running the risk of doing such
an act with recklessness or indifference as to the
consequences. Criminal negligence on the other
hand, is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to
exercise that reasonable and proper care and
precaution to guard against injury either to the
public generally or to an individual in particular,
which, having regard to all the circumstances out of
which the charge has arisen it was the imperative
duty of the accused person to have adopted.”
Relying upon the same Learned Senior Counsel has
drawn the attention of the Court that often it is found that just to
harass the accused in a case of this nature the police authority is
registering the case under Section 105 of BNS, 2023 erstwhile
Section 304 Part-II of IPC in place of Section 106(1) of BNS, 2023
resulting which in maximum number of cases, the drivers of the
vehicle without any justified grounds are languishing in jail which
needs to be taken into consideration. In this case from the
contents of the FIR and other circumstantial evidence, it is very
much clear that this was simply a case under Section 106 of BNS,
2023 but the police ignoring the relevant provisions of law has
registered the case under Section 105 of BNS, 2023 in addition to
other Sections and in view of principle of law laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforenoted case the accused deserves
to be released on permanent bail.
On the other hand, Learned P.P. appearing on behalf of
the State-respondent produced the Case Diary and submitted that
from the statement of witnesses so far collected by IO up to this
stage of investigation, it is crystal clear that the accused person
has committed an offence punishable under Section 105 of BNS
and in support of his contention he relied upon one citation of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2012) 8 SCC 450
[State through PS Lodhi Colony, New Delhi v. Sanjeev
Nanda dated 03.08.2012] wherein in para Nos.28, 29, 30, 31,
40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 92, 111, 121, 122 Hon’ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
28. It is a settled principle of law that if something
is required to be done in a particular manner, then
that has to be done only in that way or not at all. In
Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor:AIR 1936 PC 253(2) it
has been held as follows: (IA pp. 381-82)
"... The rule which applies is a different and not
less well-recognised rule, namely, that where a
power is given to do a certain thing in a certain
way the thing must be done in that way or not
at all."
29. It has also come on record that seven persons
were standing close to the middle of the road. One
would not expect such a group, at least, at that
place of the road, that too in the wee hours of the
morning, on such a wintry night. There is every
possibility of the accused failing to see them on the
road. Looking to all this, it can be safely assumed
that he had no intention of causing bodily injuries
to them but he had certainly knowledge that
causing such injuries and fleeing away from the
scene of accident, may ultimately result in their
deaths.
30. It is also pertinent to mention that soon after
hitting one of them, the accused did not apply the
brakes so as to save at least some of the lives.
Since all the seven of them were standing in a
group, he had not realised that impact would be so
severe that they would be dragged for several feet.
Possibility also cannot be ruled out that soon after
hitting them, the respondent, a young boy of 21
years then, might have gone into trauma and could
not decide as to what to do until the vehicle came to
a halt. He must have then realised the blunder he
committed.
31. The respondent, instead of rendering a helping
hand to the injured, ran away from the scene, thus
adding further to the miseries of the victims. It is
not a good trend to run away after causing motor
road accidents. An attempt should be made to
render
all
possible
help,
including
medical
assistance, if required. Human touch to the same
has to be given.
40. Now, we have to consider if it is a fit case where
conviction should be altered to Section 304 Part II
IPC and sentence awarded should be enhanced.
41. We are of the considered view that looking to
the nature and manner in which the accident had
taken place, it can safely be held that the
respondent had no intention to cause death but
certainly had the knowledge that his act may result
in death.
42. Thus, looking to the matter from all angles, we
have no doubt in our mind that knowledge can still
be attributed to accused Sanjeev that his act might
cause such bodily injuries which may, in ordinary
course of nature, be sufficient to cause death but
certainly he did not have any intention to cause
death. He was not driving the vehicle with that
intention. There is nothing to prove that he knew
that a group of persons was standing on the road he
was going to pass through. If that be so, there
cannot be an intention to cause death or such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death. Thus, in our
opinion, he had committed an offence under Section
304 Part II IPC. We accordingly hold so.
43. Now the greater question that arises for
consideration is if sentence deserves to be suitably
enhanced or the same can be maintained as
awarded by the High Court, the period which the
respondent has already undergone.
47. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the
appeal is partly allowed. The judgment:(2009) 160
DLT 775 and order of conviction passed by the Delhi
High Court is partly set aside and the order of
conviction of the trial court is restored and upheld.
The accused is held guilty under Section 304 Part II
IPC. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the
same, we deem it appropriate to maintain the
sentence awarded by the High Court, which he has
already undergone. However, we make it clear that
this has been held so, looking to the very peculiar
facts and features of this particular case and it may
not be treated as a precedent of general proposition
of law on the point, for other cases.
Duty of the driver, passengers and bystanders
92. We have found on facts that the accused had
never extended any helping hand to the victims
lying on the road and had fled from the scene.
Section 134 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 casts a
duty on a driver to take reasonable steps to secure
medical attention for the injured person. Section
134 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 reads as
follows:
"134. Duty of driver in case of accident and
injury to a person.- When any person is injured
or any property of a third party is damaged, as
a result of an accident in which a motor vehicle
is involved, the driver of the vehicle or other
person in charge of the vehicle shall(a) unless it is not practicable to do so on
account of mob fury or any other reason
beyond his control, take all reasonable steps
to secure medical attention for the injured
person, by conveying him to the nearest
medical practitioner or hospital, and it shall
be the duty of every registered medical
practitioner or the doctor on the duty in the
hospital immediately to attend to the injured
person and render medical aid or treatment
without
waiting
for
any
procedural
formalities, unless the injured person or his
guardian, in case he is a minor, desired
otherwise;
(b) give on demand by a police officer any
information required by him, or, if no police
officer is present, report the circumstances of
the occurrence, including the circumstances,
if any, or not taking reasonable steps to
secure medical attention as required under
clause (a), at the nearest police station as
soon as possible, and in any case within
twenty-four hours of the occurrence;
(c) give the following information in writing
to the insurer, who has issued the certificates
of insurance, about the occurrence of the
accident, namely(i) insurance policy number and period of
its validity;
(ii) date, time and place of accident;
(iii) particulars of the persons injured or
killed in the accident;
(iv) name of the driver and the particulars
of his driving licence.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this
section, the expression 'driver' includes the
owner of the vehicle."
111. In Jagriti Devi v. State of H.P.:(2009) 14 SCC
771 a Bench of this Court held that it is trite law
that Section 304 Part II comes into play when the
death is caused by doing an act with knowledge
that it is likely to cause death but there is no
intention on the part of the accused either to cause
death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death.
121. The High Court, in our view, has committed an
error in converting the conviction to Section 304-A
IPC from that of Section 304 Part II IPC and the
conviction awarded calls for a relook on the basis of
the facts already discussed, otherwise this Court
will be setting a bad precedent and sending a wrong
message to the public. After having found that the
offence would fall under Section 304 Part II IPC,
not under Section 304-A, the following sentence
awarded would meet the ends of justice, in addition
to the sentence already awarded by the High Court.
Community service for avoiding jail sentence
122. Convicts in various countries, now, voluntarily
come forward to serve the community, especially in
crimes relating to motor vehicles. Graver the crime,
greater the sentence. But, serving the society
actually is not a punishment in the real sense where
the convicts pay back to the community what they
owe. Conduct of the convicts will not only be
appreciated by the community, it will also give a lot
of solace to them, especially in a case where
because of one's action and inaction, human lives
have been lost.”
Relying upon the same, Learned P.P. submitted that
Hon’ble Apex Court in the above judgment clearly stated that in
such a situation there was evidence against the accused for
commission of offence punishable under Section 304 Part-II of IPC
erstwhile now Section 105 of BNS and the same principle of law
also can be applied in this case.
Further, Learned P.P. also referred another citation of
Hon’ble Calcutta High Court reported in 2022 SCC Online Cal
3989 [Arnav Choudhury v. State of West Bengal and
Another dated 14.12.2022] wherein in para Nos.16, 22 and 24,
Hon’ble the Calcutta High Court observed as under:
“16. Plain reading of Section 304 makes it clear that
it is in two parts the first part of the Section is
generally refers to as "Section 304 Part-I," where
as the second part as "Section 304 Part-II". The
first part applies where the accused causes death to
the victim with intention to cause such bodily injury
as is likely to cause death. Part II on the other hand
comes into play when death is caused by doing an
act under knowledge that it is likely to cause death,
but without any intention to cause death or such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
22. There is thus distinction between Section 304
and Section 304A. Section 304A carves out case
where death is caused by doing a rash or negligent
act which does not amount to culpable homicide not
amounting to murder within the meaning of Section
299 or culpable homicide amounting to murder
under Section 300 of the IPC. In other words
Section 304A excludes all the ingredients of Section
299 as also of Section 300. Where intention or
knowledge is "motivating force" of the act
complained of, Section 304A will have to make
room for the graver or most serious charge of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder or
amounting to murder as the facts disclose. The
Section has application to those case where there is
neither intention to cause death or knowledge that
the act in all probability will cause death. The
learned counsel for the petitioner argues with great
force that by no stretch of imagination, it can be
said that the petitioner while driving the car had the
knowledge that it would cause death by accident of
one of his friends.
24. I have already discussed that there cannot be
any direct evidence of knowledge of the offender. It
can be only ascertained through circumstantial
evidence. The test adopted by the court under such
circumstances is the test of prudent person under
the same facts and circumstances. A prudent person
will not drive a vehicle at a very high speed and in a
dangerous manner which he cannot control because
a man of prudence has the knowledge that there is
obvious chance of fatal accident if a car is driven at
very high speed and in dangerous manner. It is
found from the initial police report vide G.D No. 915
dated 14th November, 2022 that the offending car
was being driven at such high speed from east to
west that it had first dashed against the footpath
and then collided with a milk van coming from the
opposite direction and then overturned. The
petitioner was driving the vehicle at utmost high
speed inspite of having knowledge that such
reckless driving may cause death of any by-stander
or himself and his fellow passengers.”
Referring the same, Learned P.P. has drawn the
attention of the Court that the present case sufficiently covers the
ingredients of Section 105 of BNS and as such the interim bail
granted to the accused person may be cancelled and the accused
may be taken into custody. Considered.
In this case, the prosecution was set into motion on the
basis of an FIR laid by one Prasenjit Roy being the son of the
deceased alleging inter alia that on 22.03.2025 when his father
namely Bikash Kumar Roy was proceeding towards Udaipur to pick
up his niece from Abacus Centre situated opposite to Udaipur Girls
school by riding his scooty bearing No.TR-03-F-7013, that time,
one unknown bus which was proceeding towards Udaipur from
Agartala dashed against him at Agriculture Chowmuhani at around
3pm and due to that accident his father died on the spot. It was
further asserted that the accident caused due to rash and
negligent driving of the driver of unknown bus who had knowledge
that the reckless driving likely to cause death. On the basis of the
FIR, O/C R.K. Pur PS registered R.K. Pur PS case No.46 of 2025
(RKP0046 dated 22.03.2025) under Section 281/105 of BNS, 2023
and also under Section 184/187 of MV Act.
Now for the sake of convenience let us see the relevant
provisions under which the case has been registered by O/C of the
concerned PS:
Section 281 of BNS:
“281. Rash driving or riding on a public way.Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public
way in a manner so rash or negligent as to
endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or
injury to any other person, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extends to six months, or with fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”
Section 105 of BNS:
“105. Punishment for culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.- Whoever commits culpable
homicide not amounting to murder, shall be
punished
with
imprisonment
for
life,
or
imprisonment of either description for a term which
shall not be less than five years but which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine,
if the act by which the death is caused is done with
the intention of causing death, or of causing such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years and with fine, if the act is
done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause
death, but without any intention to cause death, or
to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death.”
Section 184 of MV Act:
“184. Driving dangerously.- Whoever drives a motor
vehicle at a speed or in a manner which is
dangerous to the public [or which causes a sense of
alarm or distress to the occupants of the vehicle,
other road users, and persons near roads,] having
regard to all the circumstances of the case including
the nature, condition and use of the place where the
vehicle is driven and the amount of traffic which
actually is at the time or which might reasonably be
expected to be in the place, shall be punishable for
the first offence with imprisonment for a term
[which may extend to one year but shall not be less
than six months or with fine which shall not be less
than one thousand rupees but may extend to five
thousand rupees, or with both], and for any second
or subsequent offence if committed within three
years of the commission of a previous similar
offence with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine [of ten thousand
rupees], or with both.”
Section 187 of MV Act:
“187. Punishment for offences relating to accident.Whoever fails to comply with the provisions of
clause [(a)] of sub-section (1) of Section 132 or of
Section 133 or Section 134 shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to [six
months], or with fine [of five thousand rupees], or
with both or, if having been previously convicted of
an offence under this section, he is again convicted
of an offence under this section, with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to [one year], or with
fine [of ten thousand rupees], or with both.”
Aforesaid Section 105 of BNS corresponds to Section 304 of
IPC.
Further for the sake of convenience, I would like to
refer herein below the Section 106 of BNS which provides as
under:
“106. Causing death by negligence.-(1) Whoever
causes death of any person by doing any rash or
negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to five
years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if such act
is done by a registered medical practitioner while
performing medical procedure, he shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to two years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
(2) Whoever causes death of any person by rash
and negligent driving of vehicle not amounting to
culpable homicide, and escapes without reporting it
to a police officer or a Magistrate soon after the
incident, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description of a term which may extend to
ten years and shall also be liable to fine.”
The aforesaid provision also corresponds to Section
304A of IPC with some modifications.
Since the citations referred by Learned Senior Counsel
refers to Section 304 and 304A of IPC so for the sake of
convenience let us also refer herein below the relevant provisions
of Section 304 and 304A of IPC which also provides as under:
Section 304 of IPC:
“304. Punishment for culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.- Whoever commits culpable
homicide not amounting to murder, shall be
punished
with
[imprisonment
for
life],
or
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done
with the intention of causing death, or of causing
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death;
or with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or
with both, if the act is done with the knowledge
that it is likely to cause death, but without any
intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death.”
Section 304A of IPC:
“304A. Causing death by negligence.- Whoever
causes the death of any person by doing any rash or
negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide
shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine, or with both.”
The investigation of the case is in progress and by this
time the IO has recorded the statements of some of the relevant
witnesses
and
also
conducted
other
relevant
parts
of
his
investigation. From the statement of the witnesses so far collected
by IO up to this stage of investigation specifically the statements
of 2/3 witnesses, it appears that on the alleged day a person was
proceeding towards Udaipur by riding a scooty bearing No.TR-03F-7013 touching Agriculture Chowmuhani, that time, at about
3:10 pm one bus vehicle came and dashed against the rider of the
scooty from its backside resulting which the victim fell down on
the road along with the scooty and thereafter the driver by the
rear right wheel of the bus ran over the body of the victim but the
driver in place of stopping the vehicle fled away from the alleged
PO. One of the witnesses stated that when the bus fled away he
has detected the number of the vehicle as TR-03-1455 and the
vehicle was of white colour naming “Joy baba Garia”. Thereafter
fire service came and brought the victim to Tepania Hospital and
later on they could know that the victim has succumbed to injury.
The other witnesses also deposed about the fact of accident on the
alleged day.
The numbers of road traffic accident are increasing day
by day due to different reasons.
I have gone through the citations referred by Learned
Counsel for the parties. The citation referred by Learned P.P. in
State through PS Lodhi Colony, New Delhi (supra), both the
Learned Judges comprising of the Bench have pronounced two
separate judgments but both of them have signed both the
judgments though on some issues they have expressed divergent
views and at the end of judgment, a common order was appended
in which their Lordships have indicated the provisions of law under
which the respondent stands convicted and imposed punishment
upon the convict.
Similarly, Hon’ble the Supreme Court in another case
reported in 2012 2 SCC 648 [Alister Anthony Pareira v. State
of Maharashtra dated 12.01.2012] wherein in para Nos.28, 29,
30, 41, 42, 47, 78, 79 and 91 observed as under:
“28. For punishment under Section 304 Part I, the
prosecution must prove the death of the person in
question; that such death was caused by the act of
the accused and that the accused intended by such
act to cause death or cause such bodily injury as
was likely to cause death. As regards punishment
for Section 304 Part II, the prosecution has to
prove the death of the person in question; that such
death was caused by the act of the accused and that
he knew that such act of his was likely to cause
death. In order to find out that an offence is
"culpable homicide not amounting to murder"-since
Section 304 does not define this expressionSections 299 and 300 IPC have to be seen.
29. Section 299 IPC reads as under:
"299. Culpable homicide. Whoever causes death
by doing an act with the intention of causing
death, or with the intention of causing such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with
the knowledge that he is likely by such act to
cause death, commits the offence of culpable
homicide."
To constitute the offence of culpable homicide as
defined in Section 299 the death must be caused by
doing an act: (a) with the intention of causing
death, or (b) with the intention of causing such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or (c) with
the knowledge that the doer is likely by such act to
cause death.
30. Section 300 IPC deals with murder and also
provides for Exceptions. The culpable homicide is
murder if the act by which the death is caused is
done: (1) with the intention of causing death, (2)
with the intention of causing such bodily injury as
the offender knows to be likely to cause the death
of the person to whom the harm is caused, or (3)
with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, or (4) with the knowledge that it is so
imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death and commits such act without
any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or
such injury as aforesaid. The Exceptions provide
that the culpable homicide will not be murder if that
act is done with the intention or knowledge in the
circumstances and subject to the conditions
specified therein. In other words, culpable homicide
is not murder if the act by which death is caused is
done in extenuating circumstances and such act is
covered by one of the five Exceptions set out in the
later part of Section 300.
41. Rash or negligent driving on a public road with
the knowledge of the dangerous character and the
likely effect of the act and resulting in death may
fall in the category of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder. A person, doing an act of
rash or negligent driving, if aware of a risk that a
particular consequence is likely to result and that
result occurs, may be held guilty not only of the act
but also of the result. As a matter of law-in view of
the provisions of IPC-the cases which fall within the
last clause of Section 299 but not within clause
"Fourthly" of Section 300 may cover the cases of
rash or negligent act done with the knowledge of
the likelihood of its dangerous consequences and
may entail punishment under Section 304 Part II
IPC. Section 304-A IPC takes out of its ambit the
cases of death of any person by doing any rash or
negligent act amounting to culpable homicide of
either description.
42. A person, responsible for a reckless or rash or
negligent act that causes death which he had
knowledge as a reasonable man that such act was
dangerous enough to lead to some untoward thing
and the death was likely to be caused, may be
attributed with the knowledge of the consequence
and may be fastened with culpability of homicide
not amounting to murder and punishable under
Section 304 Part II IPC. There is no incongruity, if
simultaneously with the offence under Section 304
Part II, a person who has done an act so rashly or
negligently endangering human life or the personal
safety of the others and causes grievous hurt to any
person is tried for the offence under Section 338
IPC.
47. Each case obviously has to be decided on its
own facts. In a case where negligence or rashness
is the cause of death and nothing more, Section
304-A may be attracted but where the rash or
negligent act is preceded with the knowledge that
such act is likely to cause death, Section 304 Part II
IPC may be attracted and if such a rash and
negligent act is preceded by real intention on the
part of the wrongdoer to cause death, offence may
be punishable under Section 302 IPC.
78. We have also carefully considered the evidence
let in by the prosecution- the substance of which
has been referred to above- and we find no
justifiable ground to take a view different from that
of the High Court. We agree with the conclusions of
the High Court and have no hesitation in holding
that the evidence and materials on record prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant can be
attributed with knowledge that his act of driving the
vehicle at a high speed in a rash or negligent
manner was dangerous enough and he knew that
one result would very likely be that people who
were asleep on the pavement may be hit, should the
vehicle go out of control.
79. There is a presumption that a man knows the
natural and likely consequences of his acts.
Moreover, an act does not become involuntary act
simply because its consequences were unforeseen.
The cases of negligence or of rashness or
dangerous driving do not eliminate the act being
voluntary. In the present case, the essential
ingredients of Section 304 Part II IPC have been
successfully established by the prosecution against
the appellant. The infirmities pointed out by Mr U.U.
Lalit, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant,
which have been noticed above are not substantial
and in no way affect the legality of the trial and the
conviction of the appellant under Section 304 Part
II IPC. We uphold the view of the High Court being
consistent with the evidence on record and law.
91. In State of M.P. v. Saleem:(2005) 5 SCC 554,
while considering the case under Section 307 IPC
this Court stated in paras 6-10 of the Report as
follows: (SCC pp. 558-59)
"6. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate
sentence would do more harm to the justice
system to undermine the public confidence in
the efficacy of law and society could not long
endure under such serious threats. It is,
therefore, the duty of every court to award
proper sentence having regard to the nature of
the offence and the manner in which it was
executed or committed, etc. …
7. After giving due consideration to the facts
and circumstances of each case, for deciding
just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for
an offence, the aggravating and mitigating
factors and circumstances in which a crime has
been committed are to be delicately balanced
on the basis of really relevant circumstances in
a dispassionate manner by the court. Such act
of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has
been very aptly indicated in McGautha v.
California:28L Ed 2d 711 that no formula of a
foolproof nature is possible that would provide
a reasonable criterion in determining a just and
appropriate punishment in the infinite variety of
circumstances that may affect the gravity of the
crime. In the absence of any foolproof formula
which may provide any basis for reasonable
criteria
to
correctly
assess
various
circumstances germane to the consideration of
gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in
the facts of each case, is the only way in which
such judgment may be equitably distinguished.
8. The object should be to protect society and to
deter the criminal in achieving the avowed
object of law by imposing appropriate sentence.
It is expected that the courts would operate the
sentencing system so as to impose such
sentence which reflects the conscience of the
society and the sentencing process has to be
stern where it should be.
9. Imposition of sentence without considering
its effect on the social order in many cases may
be in reality a futile exercise. The social impact
of the crime e.g. where it relates to offences
against
women,
dacoity,
kidnapping,
misappropriation of public money, treason and
other offences involving moral turpitude or
moral delinquency which have great impact on
social order and public interest, cannot be lost
sight of and per se require exemplary
treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing
meagre sentences or taking too sympathetic
view merely on account of lapse of time in
respect of such offences will be result wise
counterproductive in the long run and against
societal interest which needs to be cared for
and strengthened by a string of deterrence
inbuilt in the sentencing system.
10. The court will be failing in its duty if
appropriate punishment is not awarded for a
crime which has been committed not only
against the individual victim but also against
the society to which the criminal and victim
belong. The punishment to be awarded for a
crime must not be irrelevant but it should
conform to and be consistent with the atrocity
and brutality with which the crime has been
perpetrated, the enormity of the crime
warranting public abhorrence and it should
'respond to the society's cry for justice against
the criminal'."
Similarly, Hon’ble Kerala High Court reported in 2024
SCC OnLine ker 6468 in Crl. A. No.267 of 2016 dated
06.11.2024 wherein in para Nos.11.3, 12, 13 and last part of
para No.21 observed as under:
11.3. "Reckless" as defined in Law Lexicon,
Black Law Dictionary, 7th Edn. 1999, reads"characterised by the creation of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk of harm to others and by a
conscious (and sometimes deliberate) disregard
for or indifference to that risk; heedless; rash.
Reckless conduct is much more than mere
negligence: it is a gross deviation from what a
reasonable person would do". Intention cannot
exist without foresight, but foresight can exist
without intention. For a man may foresee the
possible or even probable consequences of his
conduct and yet not desire them to occur; none
the less if he persists on his course, he
knowingly runs the risk of bringing about the
unwished result. To describe this state of mind
the word "reckless" is the most appropriate.
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjeev Nanda:(2012) 8
SCC 450.
12. Going by the allegations in the final
report/charge-sheet, the case on hand falls
within the third limb of Section 299 IPC. Alister
Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, also a
case of drunken driving, the Supreme Court
after referring to several decisions dealing with
the scope of Section 304 Part II and Section
304-A IPC held that the question whether the
knowledge of the accused who is causing death
of others while driving a motor vehicle would
fall within the scope of Section 304 Part II or
Section 304-A IPC is to be decided on the facts
of each case. Where rash or negligent act is
preceded with the knowledge that it is likely to
cause death, the offence punishable under
Section 304 Part II IPC would be attracted. In a
case where negligence or rashness is the cause
of death and nothing more, Section 304-A IPC
would be attracted. However, where the rash or
negligent act is preceded with the knowledge
that such act is likely to cause death, Section
304 Part II IPC may be attracted and if such a
rash and negligent act is preceded by real
intention on the part of the wrongdoer to cause
death, offence may be punishable under Section
302 IPC. (State case:(2012) 8 SCC 450 also).
13. Having thus reminded myself of the law on
the point, I now proceed to consider the
question whether the act of the accused
preceded with the knowledge that his act was
likely to cause death attracting the punishment
contemplated under Section 304 Part II IPC. As
pointed by the learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant-accused and as held in Satish
case:(1998) 8 SCC 493, there can be no doubt
that vehicles are intended to be driven in speed.
Merely because the vehicle is being driven at a
high speed does not show that the driver was
rash or negligent by itself. "High speed" or
"over speed" as it is often referred to, is a
relative term. It is for the prosecution to bring
on record materials to establish as to what is
meant by "high speed" in the facts and
circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial,
the burden of proving everything essential to
the establishment of the charge against an
accused always rests on the prosecution and
there is a presumption of innocence in favour of
the accused until the contrary is proved.
Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of
course to some statutory exceptions. In the
absence
of
any
material-on-record,
no
presumption of "rashness" or "negligence"
could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa
loquitur".
21.
***
***
***
The principle mentioned in Alister Anthony
Pareira case:(2012) 2 SCC 648 indicates that
the person must be presumed to have had the
knowledge that, his act of driving the vehicle on
the wrong side after consuming liquor beyond
the permissible limit, is likely or sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death of the
pedestrians on the road or of persons travelling
in vehicles. That being the position, it can only
be held that the accused was driving the vehicle
in a rash manner sufficient to attribute on him
knowledge of the consequences which would
bring the act within the scope of Section 304
Part II IPC. Therefore, I find no infirmity in the
findings of the trial court calling for an
interference by this Court.”
From the aforesaid citations, it appears that to attract
punishment under Section 304 part II of IPC now under Section
105 of BNS, it is to be proved that where the rash and negligent
act is proceeded with the knowledge that such act is likely to
cause death, in that case, Section 105 of BNS may be attracted
and where it appears that the negligence and rashness is the
cause of death and nothing more, in that case, Section 304A of
IPC may be attracted.
Learned Senior Counsel although relying upon the
judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2007) 14 SCC 269
as referred herein above tried to draw the attention of the Court
that prosecution up to this stage could not prove before the Court
that there was knowledge on the part of the accused person which
caused the death of the victim and mere knowledge to cause
death would not serve the purpose.
Further in the aforesaid judgment of Alister Anthony
Pareira(supra) wherein in para No.41, Hon’ble the Apex Court
also observed that rash and negligent driving on a public road with
the knowledge of dangerous character and the likely effect of the
act resulting in death may fall in the category of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder. A person, doing an act of rash and
negligent driving, if he aware of a risk that a particular
consequence is likely to result and that result occurs, may be held
guilty not only of the act but also of the result. As a matter of law
in view of the provisions of IPC the cases which fall within the last
clause of Section 299 but not within clause “Fourthly” of Section
300 may cover the cases of rash and negligent act done with the
knowledge that the likelihood of its dangerous consequences and
may entail punishment under Section 304 Part II of IPC.
Further, in State through PS Lodhi Colony (supra)
in para No.111 as referred earlier it also appears that Section 304
Part II of IPC comes into play when the death is caused by doing
an act with knowledge that it is likely to cause death but there is
no intention on the part of the accused either to cause death or to
cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
In a case of this nature, it is very difficult to get any
direct evidence regarding knowledge of the offender and it is also
not possible to prove the mental condition of the offender just at
the time or prior to the accident. It is desirable that a prudent
person driving a heavy vehicle like a bus will definitely take
necessary precautions at the time of plying the vehicle in a
crowded area because if he drives the vehicle in a high speed and
in a dangerous manner which he would not be able to control then
there will be every chance of accident if the same is driven at a
very high speed and in dangerous manner.
Here in the case at hand from the relevant prosecution
papers, it appears that on 22.03.2025 in the afternoon at about
1500 hours when the victim was proceeding towards Udaipur by
riding his scooty bearing No.TR-03-F-7013 to pick up the niece of
the informant from Abacus Centre situated opposite to Udaipur
Girls School and on the way when the deceased arrived at Udaipur
Agriculture Chowmuhani, that time, the offending bus bearing
No.TR-03-1455 being driven by the accused person which was
coming rash and negligently from Agartala towards Udaipur
suddenly dashed the rider of the scooty from his backside knowing
the fact that the Agriculture Chowmuhani where the accident took
place was a busy area of Udaipur and there was serious traffic
congestion on that relevant point of time and he drove the vehicle
with tremendous speed without taking proper care and caution
and furthermore after the accident he did not bother to stop his
vehicle rather he fled away from the spot. This act shows that the
accused person failed to take proper care and caution and he had
knowledge that such reckless driving may cause death of any
person. Furthermore, he had clear idea and knowledge about the
location and traffic condition of that particular area.
Thus, in summing up following points were emerged
from the statements of witnesses so far collected by IO up to this
stage of investigation:
i) The accused person was driving a bus (heavy
vehicle) with excessive speed.
ii) The accused person was driving the vehicle in a
congested area (Agriculture Chowmuhani, Udaipur) during broad
day light at about 3pm when there was clear visibility.
iii) The accused person through his vehicle dashed
against a two-wheeler scooty from his backside resulting which
the victim died on the spot.
iv) The accused person soon after the accident fled
away from the alleged PO along with the offending vehicle.
v) There was no evidence of any mechanical disorder of
the vehicle.
vi) Blood stain was found on the rear wheel and the
mud guard of the bus.
vii) The accused is a trained professional driver
presumed to understand the consequences of the act.
From the facts and circumstance of the case it appears
that the driver had knowledge of driving a heavy vehicle at a high
speed through a crowded area which could likely to resulting
death but prima facie there is no evidence on record that the
driver had an intention to kill the alleged victim.
In this case, investigation is still going on and the
charge-sheet is not yet been filed and what would be the
consequence of the case after conclusion of trial in the event of
filing of charge-sheet is not known to this Court at this stage.
However, from the facts and circumstances of the case and also
from the statements of witnesses so far collected by IO up to this
stage of investigation as discussed above, it appears to this Court
that the present accused person at the time of accident failed to
take proper care and caution to avoid accident and he had
knowledge that such act i.e. rash and negligent driving may cause
the death of any person and furthermore, he also had knowledge
about the location and traffic condition of that particular area.
Inspite of that, he had driven the vehicle in high speed knowing
the huge traffic on the road and not only that he could take proper
care and caution to avoid the accident and furthermore after the
accident he absconded from the alleged PO without giving any
assistance to the alleged victim. Although it may so happen that in
such a situation, his life also could be in danger. So, it cannot be
said that the prosecution case against him under Section 105 of
BNS, 2023 was bad in law considering the facts and circumstances
of the present case.
However, this Court granted interim bail to the accused
till today and in the meantime there is no adverse report from the
side of the IO that he violated the conditions of bail granted to
him or he has threatened the witnesses of the prosecution and as
such for the purpose of investigation, this Court does not find any
justified grounds to reject his bail application at this stage and
accordingly he is allowed to go on regular bail of his execution of
bond of Rs.50,000/- with one surety of like amount to the
satisfaction
of
Learned
CJM
with
the
following
terms
and
conditions:
i) The accused shall cooperate with the investigation as
and when called for.
ii) The accused shall not leave the jurisdiction of the
Court without prior permission of the Learned Court below.
iii) The accused shall not make any attempt to tamper
evidence on record of the prosecution failing which the IO shall be
at liberty to move appropriate application to the Learned Court
below.
Bail bond be executed on or before 08.07.2025 and till
execution of bail bond he shall remain on interim bail on previous
bail bond.
Registrar(Judl.) be asked to circulate the order of this
Court passed in connection with this case to all the Courts across
the State under the jurisdiction of this High Court.
With this observation, this bail application stands
disposed of.
Send down the record of Learned Trial Court along with
a copy of this order.
Return back the Case Diary to IO through Learned P.P.
along with a copy of this order.
A copy of this order be supplied to Learned Senior
Counsel Mr. P. K. Biswas for the accused person.
JUDGE
MOUMITA
DATTA
Deepshikha
MOUMITA DATTA
Date: 2025.07.04
19:16:45 -07'00'
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