Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:CGHC:14528
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRR No. 1367 of 2025
Order Reserved on : 09.03.2026
Order Delivered on : 27.03.2026
1. Smt. Birja Zena W/o Rameshwar Zena Aged About 46 Years R/o
B.K.D./02- Sector- 09, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
... Applicant
versus
1. Yashraj Mehra S/o Namalum Aged About 42 Years R/o Makan No.
31, Jipsi Ganpati Vihar, Birsi Durg Tahsil And District Durg
Chhattisgarh
... Respondent
For Applicant
:
Mr. Hariom Rai, Advocate
For Respondent
:
Mr. Ali Afzal Mirza, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas
(CAV Order)
1.
The applicant has filed the present criminal revision under Section
438 read with Section 442 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 challenging the order dated 17.04.2025 passed by the learned
8th Additional Sessions Judge, Durg (C.G.) in Criminal Appeal No.
74/2024 by which the learned Additional Sessions Judge has set
aside the judgment of conviction and sentence under Section 138 of
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short “Act of 1881”) dated
21.02.2024 (Annexure P/2) passed by the learned Judicial
Digitally
signed by
MANISH
MANISH YADAV
YADAV Date:
2026.03.27
14:16:19
+0530
Magistrate First Class Durg (C.G.) in Criminal Complaint Case No.
1511/2017.
2.
Brief facts of the case are that:
(a) It is the case of the complainant that the complainant and the
accused had a prior acquaintance having domestic relationship.
The accused was engaged in the business of construction
activity, sale of land for which he required funds, as such, he
oftenly asked the complainant to provide funds. Further case of
the complainant that in February 2014, the accused asked the
complainant to arrange Rs. 30,00,000/- for a project, accordingly
the complainant has given the amount to the accused as a loan.
As per the understanding arrived at between them, the accused
promised to repay the amount within 3-4 months without interest.
(b) When the agreed time was lapsed the complainant requested to
repay the amount, but instead of paying the amount he started
avoiding complainant. On persuasion made by the complainant,
on 19.07.2016, the accused gave her a cheque No. 847714 for
Rs. 30,00,000/- drawn on United Bank of India, Branch B. Market
Street No. 25, Plot No. 5, Sector 6, Bhilai, and asked her not to
present it for encashment immediately, saying that he would
receive money from the sale of some land/house purchaser and
would repay the amount in cash and take back the cheque.
(c) It is also the case of the complainant that after some time, the
accused instructed the complainant to present the cheque for
encashment. The complainant deposited the said cheque in her
bank account maintained in Bank of Baroda, Branch - Civic
Centre
Bhilai
on
24.08.2016
for
clearance,
but
it
was
dishonoured due to “insufficient funds” in the accused's bank
account. When the complainant orally informed the accused
about the dishonour of the cheque, he said that he would arrange
and pay the entire amount, but he did not pay any amount.
Thereafter, the complainant sent a registered notice through her
advocate to the accused on 20.09.2016, informing him about the
dishonour of the cheque and requesting payment of the amount.
The said notice was returned to the complainant on 26.09.2016,
with the remark that the accused's house was locked on five
consecutive days. Despite oral intimation to the accused
personally and through mobile, he did not pay the amount to the
complainant which has necessitated the complainant to file a
complaint against the appellant/accused before the learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act.
3.
The complainant to prove her case has examined herself by way of
an affidavit as provided under Section 145 of Act of 1881 wherein
she has reiterated the stand taken by her in the complaint. The
complainant has exhibited documents i.e. Statement of Bank of
Baroda (Exhibit P/1), Cheque dated 19.07.2016 (Exhibit P/2),
Cheque dishonour memo issued by the Bank (Exhibit P/3),
Registered Legal Notice dated 20.09.2016 (Exhibit P/4), Postal
Receipt (Exhibit P/5) and Acknowledgment (Exhibit P/6) in support of
his complaint.
4.
The witness was extensively cross-examined wherein in paragraph
10 she has affirmed that she has withdrawn Rs. 25,50,000/- from her
account and handed it over to the accused in cash; furthermore, at
the behest of the accused, she transferred an amount of Rs.
4,50,000/- via RTGS to another individual, but she does not recall his
name. In paragraph 16, she has admitted that in the complaint case
she has neither arrayed Shree Siddhivinayak Buildcon as accused
nor demand notice was given to the Shree Siddhivinayak Buildcon.
In paragraph 18, she has admitted that in Ex. P/3 neither the seal of
the Bank nor signature of any officer is reflected. She has stated that
the notice was sent on the address was returned along with
acknowledgment card. She has admitted that in Ex. P/1 which the
bank statement wherein regarding withdrawal of Rs. 25,50,000/-, the
name of accused has been written. She has stated that the said
name has been written on instruction of her husband.
5.
The accused has examined himself as defence witness No. 1 who
has stated that Birja Jena had provided a sum of Rs. 4,50,000/- to
the Siddivinyak firm in the year 2014, out of this amount, he repaid
Rs. 1,00,000/- in cash and in return received Cheque No. 847710
dated 20.05.2014 from Birja Jena. Amount of Rs. 30,00,000/erroneously entered into the cheque. The said witness was
extensively cross-examined by the complainant wherein he has
admitted in paragraph 6 that he is the partner of Shree
Siddhivinayak Buildcon and also admitted that on 12.02.2014 an
amount of Rs. 4,50,000/- was transferred from the account of the
firm through RTGS. He has also admitted that in Ex. D/7 which is
document related to the registry of the property his name has been
recorded as seller. He has stated that he is not aware that the
cheque was dishonored due to “insufficient funds”. He has also
admitted that he has not lodged any complaint against the
complainant.
6.
The accused examined Bank Officer (DW/2) who has stated that in
account cheque No. 847714 was submitted which was dishonored
due to “insufficient funds” on 24.08.2016 itself and also admitted Ex.
P/3 which is the memo regarding intimation of dishonor of cheque
issued by the Bank.
7.
The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class on the basis of evidence
and material on record has recorded its finding in paragraph 12 that
the accused is unable to dislodge the fact that the cheque was not
given towards any debt or liability which is sine qua non for attracting
the offence enumerated in Section 138 of Act of 1881. The learned
trial Court has also recorded its finding that in the cross-examination
the accused has admitted that he is partner of Shree Siddhivinayak
Buildcon and on 12.02.2014 Rs. 4,50,000/- has been transferred
from RTGS. It has also recorded its finding that the accused has
admitted his signature in Ex. P/2 i.e. dishonored cheque, as such,
there is sufficient material to record presumption. It has also
assigned the reason that though the accused has raised doubt about
his handwriting but no expert opinion or any evidence has been
brought on record to establish that he has signed in a blank cheque.
Accordingly, it has convicted the accused with six months simple
imprisonment and compensation of Rs. 30,00,000/- payable to the
complainant, in default situation three months simple imprisonment.
8.
Being aggrieved with the order of acquittal the accused has preferred
appeal before the learned 8th Additional Sessions Judge Durg (C.G.)
who by impugned judgment dated 17.04.2025 has set aside the
order of conviction and acquitted the accused. Being aggrieved with
the acquittal of the accused, the applicant has preferred this criminal
revision.
9.
Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the learned
Appellate court has failed to appreciate that the complainant has
proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts and the appellate
Courts has ignored the evidence, material on record, on perverse
finding the learned appellate Court has passed the impugned
judgment of acquittal which is liable to be set aside by this Court. He
would further submit that in the recent judgment the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in case of Dhansingh Prabhu vs. Chandrashekhar
and Another in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 5706 of
2024 vide judgment dated 14.07.2025 has held that the complaint
under Section 138 of Act of 1881 for dishonor of cheque is
maintainable against partner without arraigning partnership firm as
partnership firm under the Partnership Act, 1932 (in short “Act of
1932”) as company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 or
Companies Act, 2013 are two distinct legal entity.” Thus, he would
pray for allowing the revision.
10.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the
complainant has not placed any record to demonstrate that the said
cheque was given by the accused towards any debt or liability. He
would further submit that the applicant is unable to establish the fact
that the respondent was solely responsible for the day to day
functioning of the firm. He would submit that there was no legally
enforceable debt on the part of the respondent, as the applicant
could not establish the correctness of the amount which was alleged
to have been loaned to the respondent nor the applicant had
adequately explained as to why and for what purpose the loan was
given.
11.
He would further submit that admittedly the complainant has given
loan to Shree Siddhivinayak Buildcon for purchasing of property, but
he has not arrayed the firm as party to the case. He would further
submit that finding recorded by the First Appellate Court that the
cheque was not given towards liability is legal, justified and does not
warrant interference by this Court. He would further submit that the
learned appellate Court has not committed any material illegality and
irregularity in passing the order of acquittal which warrants
interference by this Court in the revisional jurisdiction exercised by
this Court. He would further submit that there is no material
irregularity and illegality which warrants interference by this Court in
the revisional jurisdiction and would pray for dismissal of the
revision.
12.
To substantiate his submission, learned counsel for the respondent
has referred to the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case
of Shakti Travel & Tours vs. State of Bihar and Another reported
in 2002 (9) SCC 415, Bijoy Kumar Soni vs. Paresh Manna vs.
Another reported in 2024 INSC 1024, Ajeet Seeds Ltd. vs. K.
Gopal Krishnaian reported in 2014 (12) SCC 685, Anil Chanana
vs. M/s Gyani Ram Ruliya Ram (P&H) reported in 2019 (1) RCR
(Criminal) 388, Sudhir Kumar Bhalla vs. Jagdish Chand reported
in AIR 2008 SC 2407, Aneeta Handa vs. Godfather Travels &
Tours (P) Ltd. reported in 2012 ( 5) SCC 661.
13.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record
with utmost circumspection.
14.
Considering the rival submissions of the parties, the point emerged
for determination by this Court is:
“Whether the impugned order of acquittal passed by the
appellate Court dated 17.04.2025 on account of non-arraying
firm as accused in the complaint case or non-issuance of
notice under Section 138 of Act of 1881 to the firm vide order
is legal, justified and warrants interference by this Court?”
15.
To appreciate this point emerged for determination by this Court, it is
expedient for this Court to go through the relevant provisions of
Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Section 4, 13 and 25 of Act of 1932 as
well as Section 141 of N.I. Act, 1881 which are extracted as under:
“Section 2(a) - an“act of a firm” means any act or omission by
all the partners, or by any partner or agent of the firm which
gives rise to a right enforceable by or against the firm;
Section 4. Definition of “partnership”, “partner”, “firm”
and “firm name” - “Partnership” is the relation between
persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business
carried on by all or any of them acting for all.
Persons who have entered into partnership with one another
are called individually “partners” and collectively “a firm”, and
the name under which their business is carried on is called the
“firm name”.
Section 13. Mutual rights, and liabilities.- Subject to
contract between the partners—
(a) a partner is not entitled to receive remuneration for taking
part in the conduct of the business;
(b) the partners are entitled to share equally in the profits
earned, and shall contribute equally to the losses sustained by
the firm;
(c) where a partner is entitled to interest on the capital
subscribed by him such interest shall be payable only out of
profits;
(d) a partner making, for the purposes of the business, any
payment or advance beyond the amount of capital he has
agreed to subscribe, is entitled to interest thereon at the rate
of six per cent, per annum;
(e) the firm shall indemnify a partner in respect of payments
made and liabilities incurred by him—
(i) in the ordinary and proper conduct of the business, and
(ii) in doing such act, in an emergency, for the purpose of
protecting the firm from loss, as would be done by a person of
ordinary prudence, in his own case, under similar
circumstances; and
(f) a partner shall indemnify the firm for any loss caused to it
by his wilful neglect in the conduct of the business of the firm.
25. Liability of a partner for acts of the firm.- Every partner
is liable, jointly with all the other partners and also severally,
for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner.”
141. Offences by companies.- (1) If the person committing
an offence under section 138 is a company, every person
who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of,
and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the
business of the company, as well as the company, shall be
deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be
proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall
render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the
offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had
exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such
offence:
[Provided further that where a person is nominated as a
Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or
employment in the Central Government or State Government
or a financia corporation owned or controlled by the Central
Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he
shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.]
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),
where any offence under this Act has been committed by a
company and it is proved that the offence has been committed
with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any
neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or
other officer of the company, such director, manager,
secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of
that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and
punished accordingly.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm
or other association of individuals; and
(b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.”
16.
From perusal of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of 1932, it is
quite vivid that Section 4 of the Partnership Act contains three
elements; (i) there must be an agreement entered into by all the
persons concerned; (ii) the agreement must be to share the profits of
a business; and (iii) the business must be carried on by all or any of
the persons concerned, acting for all. All these elements which must
be present before a group of associates can be held to be partners.
The third element shows that the persons of the group who conduct
the business do so as agents for all the persons in the group and are
therefore liable to account for all. It is equally well settled position of
law that position of a partner in the firm is thus not of a master and a
servant or employer and employee which concept involves an
element of subordination, but that of equality. Section 4 of the
Partnership Act clearly provides that persons who have entered into
partnership with one another are individually called partners and
collectively a firm and the name under which their business is
carried out is called a firm name.
17.
Thus, while partnership is the relation between persons who have
agreed to share profits of the business carried on by all or any of
them acting for all, the persons are collectively called a firm and the
name of the firm is the firm name which is a compendious or
collective term of partnership of the partners. The said Section also
clearly implies that a firm or partnership is not a legal entity, separate
and distinct from its partners. Thus, partnership is merely a
convenient name to carry out business by partners. Thus, a firm is
not an entity of persons in law but is merely an association of
individuals and firm name is only a collective name of those
individuals who constitute the firm. In other words, the firm name is
merely an expression, only a compendious mode of designating the
persons who have agreed to carry on business in partnership. Thus,
a firm may not be a legal entity in the sense of a corporation or a
company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 or 2013, but it
is still an existing concern where business is done by a number of
persons in partnership.
18.
Thus, partnership firm, does not possess a separate legal
personality and the firm’s name is only a compendious reference for
describing its partners and there is fundamental distinction between
a firm and a company as company is separate from shareholders.
19.
The issue whether the complaint under Section 138 of Act of 1881
filed against the partner of the firm without impleading the firm or
statutory notice to the firm has recently come up for consideration
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Dhanasingh Prabhu
vs. Chandrasekar & Another reported in 2025 INSC 831, wherein
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in paragraphs 9.8 to 9.11 and
10 as under:
“9.8 However, jurisprudentially speaking, the partners of a
partnership firm constitute the firm and a firm is a
compendious term for the partners of a firm. This is opposed
to the position of a director in a company which is a body
corporate stricto sensu and such a company is a separate
juristic entity vis-à-vis the directors. On the other hand, a
partnership firm has no legal recognition in the absence of its
partners. If a partnership firm is liable for the offence under
Section 138 of the Act, it would imply that the liability would
automatically extend to the partners of the partnership firm
jointly and severally. This underlying distinction between a
partnership firm and a company which is a body corporate
has to be borne in mind while dealing with an offence
committed by a company or a partnership firm, as the case
may be, within the meaning of Section 138 read with Section
141 of the Act. To reiterate, in the case of a partnership firm,
there is no concept of vicarious liability of the partners as
such. The liability is joint and several because a partnership
firm is the business of partners and one cannot proceed
against only the firm without the partners being made liable.
9.9 Therefore, even in the absence of partnership firm being
named as an accused, if the partners of the partnership firm
are proceeded against, they being jointly and severally liable
along with the partnership firm as well as inter-se the partners
of the firm, the complaint is still maintainable. The accused in
such a case would in substance be the partners of the
partnership firm along with the firm itself. Since the liability is
joint and several, even in the absence of a partnership firm
being proceeded against by the complainant by issuance of
legal notice as mandated under Section 138 of the Act or
being made an accused specifically in a complaint filed under
Section 200 of CrPC, (equivalent to Section 223 of the
BNSS), such a complaint is maintainable.
9.10 Thus, when it is a case of an offence committed by a
company which is a body corporate stricto sensu, the
vicarious liability on the categories of persons mentioned in
sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 141 of the Act
accordingly would be proceeded against and liable for the
offence under Section 138 of the Act. In the case of a
partnership firm on the other hand, when the offence has
been proved against a partnership firm, the firm per se would
not be liable, but liability would inevitably extend to the
partners of the firm inasmuch as they would be personally,
jointly and severally liable with the firm even when the offence
is committed in the name of the partnership firm.
9.11 To reiterate, when the partnership firm is only a
compendious name for the partners of the firm, any offence
committed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act
would make the partners of the firm jointly and severally liable
with the firm. If, on the other hand, the Parliament intended
that the partners of the firm be construed as separate entities
for the purpose of penalty, then it would have provided so by
expressly stating that the firm, as well as the partners, would
be liable separately for the offence under Section 138 of the
Act. Such an intention does not emanate from Section 141 of
the Act as the offence proved against the firm would amount
to the partners of the firm also being liable jointly and
severally with the firm. Therefore, there is no separate liability
on each of the partners unless sub-section (2) of Section 141
applies, when negligence or lack of bona fides on the part of
any individual partner of the firm has been proved.
10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the High
Court was not right in rejecting or dismissing the complaint for
the reason that the partnership firm was not arraigned as an
accused in the complaint or that notice had not been issued to
it under Section 138 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, the notice issued to the partners of the firm in the
instant case shall be construed to be a notice issued to the
partnership firm also viz., ‘Mouriya Coirs’. Permission is
granted to arraign the partnership firm as an accused in the
complaint.”
20.
Evidence recorded during trial would clearly demonstrate that the
accused has admitted that he is the partner of the firm and in view of
the provisions of Act of 1932 vis-a-vis provisions of the Act of 2013
as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of
Dhanasingh Prabhu (Supra), the partnership firm does not possess
a separate legal personality and the firm’s name is only a
compendious reference for deciding its partner, as such, there is
fundamental distinction between a firm and a company on the
premises that company is separate from shareholders. Therefore,
the learned first appellate Court has committed material irregularity
and illegality in dismissing the complaint on the count that the
complainant has neither made party to the case nor issued notice to
the firm. The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the
respondent is not applicable to the present facts of the case as they
relates to provisions of Companies Act, whereas, the case in hand
relates to firm which has separate statutory provisions governing the
provisions relating to partnership firm i.e. Indian Partnership Act,
1932.
21.
The learned appellate Court has not touched the findings of the trial
Court regarding commission of offence under Section 138 of Act of
1881 whereas the learned trial Court has elaborately discussed the
evidence and material on record in paragraphs 12 to 14 of its
judgment and held that the accused has committed the offence under
Section 138 of Act of 1881 which cannot be held to suffer from
perversity or illegality. The well reasoned finding recorded by the
learned trial Court regarding commission of offence by the
respondent has not been disturbed by the appellate Court, as such,
it has attained finality. It is pertinent to mention here that the
respondent has not challenged that finding before this Court, as
such, the finding recorded by the trial Court regarding commission of
offence by the respondent attained finality, therefore, the conviction
of the respondent for commission of offence deserves to be restored
and accordingly it is restored.
22.
Consequentially the criminal revision is allowed. The judgment
passed by the learned appellate Court dated 17.04.2025 is set aside
and order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class is
restored with modification granting compensation along with the
cheque amount and in default situation R.I. for six months,
Accordingly the accused is directed to pay within four months the
amount of dishonored cheque amounting to Rs. 30,00,000/- with
10% of cheque amount as victim’s compensation from date of filing
of the complaint i.e. 13.10.2016 before the Judicial Magistrate First
Class Durg (C.G.) failing which the accused shall undergone six
month R.I..
Sd/(Narendra Kumar Vyas)
Judge
Manish
Head Note:
“Without impleading firm or issuing notice to the firm, the complaint
under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is
maintainable against the partner of the firm.”
eq[; fcanq%
^^QeZ dks i{kdkj cuk, fcuk ;k QeZ dks uksfVl tkjh fd, fcuk Hkh]
ijØkE; fy[kr vf/kfu;e] 1881 ds /kkjk 138 ds varxZr QeZ ds lk>snkj
ds fo:) ifjokn izpyu ;ksX; gSA^^
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review