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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RFA 28 of 2019
1. Smt. Bandhana Modak (Das),
W/o – Lt. Prabha Ranjan Das
2. Diptanu Das,
S/o- Lt. Prabha Ranjan Das,
Permanent address Town Bordawali,
Near Vivekananda Bayamagar,
P.S- West Agartala, Agartala,
District- West Tripura
Present Address- C/o- Lt. Subrata Modak,
Modak Villa, Beltali Chowrangi,
P.O & P.S – A.D Nagar, Agartala,
District – West Tripura
---Appellant(s)
Versus
Sri Parswanath Saha,
S/o- Lt. Chunilal Saha, Town Boardawali,
Sukanta Palli, Near Forest Office,
P.S- West Agartala, Agartala,
District – West Tripura
---Respondent(s)
For the Appellant(s)
:
For the Respondent(s)
:
Date of hearing
Delivery of Judgment & Order
:
Whether fit for reporting
:
Mr. P. Roy Barman, Sr. Advocate
Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, Advocate
Mr. K. Nath, Advocate
Mr. D. R. Chowdhury, Sr. Advocate
Mr. S. Pal, Advocate
24.06.2022
29.07.2022
:
Yes
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G. CHATTOPADHYAY
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(Arindam Lodh, J.)
The legality and propriety of the judgment and decree
dated 20.11.2018 and 23.11.2018 respectively passed by the learned
Civil Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, in connection with case No. TS 135 of
2016 are challenged by the defendants by preferring the instant appeal
before this court.
The suit of the plaintiff, Sri Parswanath Saha, the
respondent herein praying for specific performance of agreement for
sale dated 27.05.2016 was decreed by the learned court below.
2.
The facts of the case, as deduced by the learned trial
Judge, may be reproduced here-in-below for convenience:“Fact of the case, in brief, is that the predecessor-ininterest of the defendants namely Prabha Ranjan Das due to
urgent need of money approached to the plaintiff for selling
of the suit land along with the building thereon mentioned in
the Schedule of the plaint owned by him for consideration of
Rs. 17,50,000/- and on acceptance of the proposal by the
plaintiff a Registered Agreement for Sale was executed by the
predecessor-in-interest of the defendants in favour of the
plaintiff after taking earnest money of Rs. 4,00,000/- with the
condition that the defendant shall execute a Registered Deed
of Sale transferring the suit land to the plaintiff within a
period of three months from the date of agreement for sale
after receiving rest consideration amount. But unfortunately
on 05.07.2016 Prabha Ranjan Das died. The expiry period of
the agreement was on 27.08.2016. But due to death of Prabha
Ranjan Das and for his Sraddha Ceremony the plaintiff was
silent for sometimes. But on 18.07.2016, 20.07.2016 and on
21.07.2016 the plaintiff visited the house of late Prabha
Ranjan Das as well as to the house of father of the defendant
No. 1 where she used to reside for sometimes. In spite of
repeated requests of the plaintiff as well as sending of
Advocate’s Notice dated 23.07.2016 defendants denied to
execute the Sale Deed on the ground that defendant No. 1
being the mother of the minor son i.e. defendant No. 2 was
required to obtain survivorship certificate and guardianship
certificate from the proper authority. But on 18.11.2016 when
the plaintiff inquired whether the defendant No. 1 applied for
those certificates she openly denied to sell the suit land.
Hence this suit.
After receiving of summons the defendants appeared
and filed written statement denying most of the contentions of
the plaint. Defendant No.1 has been appointed as the
guardian of minor defendant No.2. It is mentioned in the
written statement that the value of the suit land and the
building was much more than the consideration amount
mentioned in the agreement and deceased Prabha Ranjan
Das was not physically and mentally fit when the alleged
agreement was executed. They also contended that the
defendants have no other landed property except the suit land
and if it has been sold out they would be shelterless. They
stated that the agreement was not enforceable in law and so
there cannot be any specific performance of contract. Thus,
they prayed to dismiss the suit.”
3.
After exchange of pleadings and hearing both the sides, the
learned trial court framed the following issues:(i) Is the suit maintainable in its present form and nature?
(ii) Has the plaintiff any cause of action to institute the
instant suit?
(iii) Has the plaintiff entered into a registered agreement for
sale dated 27.05.2016 with Prabha Ranjan Das (Predecessor
of the defendants) to purchase the suit land?
(iv) Are the averments available in the plaint in respect of
readiness and willingness to perform the part of the contract
in its true construction sufficient to enforce specific
performance as prayed for?
(v) Is the plaintiff entitled to get a registered sale deed in
terms of agreement for sale?
(vi) Is the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree as prayed for?
(vii) What other relief/reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to?
4.
To substantiate the claim, the plaintiff examined six
witnesses and exhibited relevant documents.
On the other hand, the defendants examined one witness,
but no document was produced by them.
Having heard the rival contentions of the learned counsels,
all the issues were decided in favour of the plaintiff/respondent and
decreed the suit in his favour.
5.
While considering the point of hardship as argued by
learned counsel appearing for the defendant/appellants, the learned trial
court had observed thus:
“It was also argued by Ld. Counsel of the defendant
side that where the performance of contract would involve
some hardship on the defendants decree for specific
performance may not be granted by the court. In the present
suit except the suit land the defendants have no other shelter
and so if decree is granted it will cause hardship to the
defendants.
On the other hand, the Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff
submitted that it is evident that the defendants were not
residing with deceased Prabha Ranjan Das during his life
time and so there will be no hardship to the defendants if the
suit land is sold out.
Explanation-2 of section 20(2) speaks that the question
whether the performance of a contract would involve
hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause-(b)
shall, except in case where the hardship has resulted from any
act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined
with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the
contract.
There is no doubt that no hardship resulted subsequent
to the contract from any act of the plaintiff in this suit.
Defendants also failed to show any circumstances existing at
the time of the contract that if the suit land is sold out it would
cause hardship to the defendants. Hence, for the present
circumstances of the defendants it cannot be said that the
agreement for sale is not enforceable.
6.
Ultimately, the learned trial court held that the agreement
for sale is enforceable and following order was passed:“In the result, the suit is decreed with cost in favour of
the plaintiff with following directions :
(a)
The defendant No. 1 Smt. Bandana Modak (Das) shall
execute a Registered Deed of Sale on behalf of herself and
also being the guardian on behalf of her minor son i.e.
defendant No. 2 Master Diptanu Das in favour of the plaintiff
Shri Parswanath Saha for the suit land measuring 1 ganda 1
kara of land alongwith building thereon measuring 529 sq.ft
appertaining to Khatian No. 347 having R.S. Plot No. 151
within a period of forty five days from the date of drawing up
of decree failing which the plaintiff will be entitled to get the
Sale Deed be executed through this Court as per law subject
to payment of rest consideration amount of Rs. 13,50,000/(thirteen lac fifty thousand) only by the plaintiff to the
defendants;
(b)
The defendants shall hand over the possession of the
suit land to the plaintiff immediately after execution of the
above mentioned Sale Deed along with all the documents of
title relating to the suit property which are in the defendants’
possession or power.
Prepare decree accordingly.”
7.
Keeping in view the above facts and the order as quoted
here-in-above passed by learned trial Judge, we have heard Mr. P. Roy
Barman, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of defendant-appellants and Mr. D. R.
Chowdhury, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. S. Pal, learned
counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent. For convenience, the
parties are referred to here-in-below as their original status as mentioned
in the plaint.
8.
At the time of hearing of this appeal, Mr. Roy Barman,
learned senior counsel, mainly argued on the suspicious circumstances
under which the deed of agreement for sale was entered into between the
plaintiff and Prabha Ranjan Das, the predecessor-in-interest of the
defendants and the hardship to be faced by the defendants, if the suit
instituted by the plaintiff praying for performance of the said agreement
for sale is decreed. Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel submitted
that the defendants would be landless and their very existence would be
at stake.
Learned senior counsel further argued that this is a fit case
to invoke the discretionary power of this Court as contemplated under
Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, dismissing the suit of the plaintiff.
9.
Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel appearing for the
defendants emphasised that when the predecessor of the defendants had
entered into agreement for sale in question, admittedly, the defendant
No.2 i.e. son of late Prabha Ranjan Das was minor and being the father,
late Prabha Ranjan Das did not take care of the interest of his wife and
the minor son and rendered them helpless, who were compelled to take
shelter in the father’s house of the defendant no. 1. Learned senior
counsel also tried to persuade this court that the execution of the said
deed of agreement of sale (Exbt.1) was surrounded by suspicious
circumstances as all the witnesses appearing on behalf of the plaintiff’s
side deposed and stated in their evidence that at the time of execution of
the said deed of agreement, the said Prabha Ranjan Das was suffering
from ailments and he was hospitalized on repeated occasions. It was
pointed out that the deed of agreement was executed and registered on
27.05.2016 and late Prabha Ranjan Das died on 05.07.2016.
10.
Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel strenuously
argued that at the time of execution of registration of the agreement of
sale in question, late Prabha Ranjan Das was not in sound state of mind.
11.
Mr. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel appearing for the
defendants further contended that the plaintiff failed to prove his
readiness and willingness to perform his part of liabilities as stipulated in
the said deed of agreement of sale (Exbt.1).
12.
Per contra, Mr. Chowdhury, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of plaintiff contended that the defendants being the
inheritors of late Prabha Ranjan Das were under obligation to perform
their parts of liabilities under the said deed of agreement of sale (Exbt.1).
It was argued that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform
his part of performance as stipulated under the said deed of agreement of
sale . Even a demand notice was served upon the defendants expressing
his willingness and readiness to perform his part of contract and
requested the defendants to come forward and execute the sale deed in
terms of the agreement dated 27.05.2016, which was entered into
between him and their predecessor, late Prabha Ranjan Das. Mr.
Chowdhury, learned senior counsel further argued that the defendant
never pleaded their hardships in their written statement. As such, learned
senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff contended that the
learned trial court had decreed the suit in accordance with law in favour
of the plaintiff asking the defendants to execute the registered sale deed
in favour of the plaintiff asking the defendant no. 1, Smt. Bandhana
Modak (Das) to execute the registered deed of sale in regard to the suit
land described in the schedule of the plaint in favour of plaintiff.
13.
We have given our thoughtful consideration in the matter
and perused the pleadings as well as the evidence brought on record.
There cannot be any debate in the Bar that a remedy for specific
performance exercises discretionary jurisdiction. Section 20 of the
Specific Relief Act specifically provides that the jurisdiction of the court
to grant decree of specific performance is discretionary but not arbitrary.
Discretion must be exercised in accordance with the sound and
reasonable judicial principles. Here, we may profitably refer the principle
laid down by the Kings Bench in Rooke’s case [(1598) 5 Co Rep 99 b,
100a: 77 ER 209], which observed that:
“Discretion is a science, not to act arbitrarily
according to men’s will and private affection: so the
discretion which is exercised here, is to be governed by rules
of law and equity, which are not to oppose, but each, in its
turn, to be subservient to the other. This discretion, in some
cases follows the law implicitly, in others or allays the rigour
of it, but in no case does it contradict or overturn the grounds
or principles thereof, as has been sometimes ignorantly
imputed to this court. That is a discretionary power, which
neither this nor any other court, not even the highest, acting
in a judicial capacity is by the constitution entrusted with.”
14.
Here it would be worthy to reproduce Section 20 of the
Specific Relief Act:“ Discretion as to decreeing specific performance.—(1) The
jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary,
and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it
is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary
but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and
capable of correction by a court of appeal.
(2) The following are cases in which the court may properly
exercise discretion not to decree specific performance:(a)
Where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the
parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other
circumstances under which the contract was entered into are
such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff
an unfair advantage over the defendant; or
(b)
Where the performance of the contract would involve
some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee,
whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship
on the plaintiff; or
(c)
Where the defendant entered into the contract under
circumstances which though not rendering the contract
voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance.
Explanation 1.- Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere
fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident
in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair
advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within
the meaning of clause (b).
Explanation 2.- The question whether the performance of a
contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the
meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship
has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the
contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances
existing at the time of the contract.
(3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific
performance in any case where the plaintiff has done
substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract
capable of specific performance.
(4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of
a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not
enforceable at the instance of the party.”
On plain reading of the above provision, it is aptly clear
that a party is not entitled to get a decree for Specific Performance
merely because it is lawful to do so. Nevertheless, once an agreement of
sale is legally and validly proved and further requirements for getting
such a decree which is established, then, the court has to exercise its
discretion in granting relief for Specific Performance.
15.
In the instant case, the plaintiff has been able to establish
that when the deed of agreement of sale (Exbt.-1) was executed and
registered by late Prabha Ranjan Das, he was suffering from serious
illness. The plaintiff in his evidence stated that late Prabha Ranjan Das
was staying with one lady namely, Smt. Pratima Debnath who deposed
as PW4. She stated in her cross-examination that she was working as
maid servant in the house of Prabha Ranjan Das for about 17 years and
she also purchased a portion of the land from late Prabha Ranjan Das
but PW4 was not a witness to the said deed of agreement of sale (Exbt.1).
16.
According to us, this PW-4 was a natural witness. The said
deed of agreement was executed and registered on 27.05.2016 and late
Prabha Ranjan Das died on 05.07.2016, and from the evidence of all the
witnesses it is revealed that said Prabha Ranjan Das was suffering from
serious illness, immediately before his death.
17.
Apart from the aforesaid facts, we find that the submission
of learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff that the
defendants have not pleaded the fact of hardship in their written
statement is not correct. The defendants have specifically stated in their
written statement that except the suit land they have no other piece of
land and they require the suit land for their own residential purpose and
they cannot expect to dispose of their only piece of land and building
standing thereon which would render them homeless, shelterless and
roofless. This pleading is also supported by their evidence. Even from
the evidence of the witnesses of the plaintiff, it is established that the
defendant no. 1 used to reside in the house of her father at Beltali. The
plaintiff deposing as PW-1 specifically stated that he along with his
staff met with the defendant No.1 personally in the house of her father
at Beltali, Agartala on 21.08.2016 and told her as to whether she could
obtain the said Survivor Certificate and the Guardianship Certificate.
18.
From such evidence of the plaintiff, there cannot be any
doubt that the defendants had no shelter other than the father of the
defendant no.1 and according to us, this admitted fact is enough to
prove the hardship of the defendants that the defendant no.1, who along
with her minor son would be rendered homeless and shelterless, if the
suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale (Exbt.1) is
decreed in favour of the plaintiff.
19.
Applying the well settled principle that it is not always
necessary to grant specific performance simply for the reason that it is
legal to do so, we are of the opinion, that the case in hand is a fit case to
exercise our discretion rejecting the plaintiff’s claim to ask the
defendants to execute the deed of sale in terms of Exbt.1 as decreed by
learned court below.
20.
As a sequel, we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to get
a decree for specific performance of the agreement of sale (Exbt.-1) and
the defendants are not under any obligation to execute the sale deed in
favour of the plaintiff in the light of the agreement of sale (Exbt.-1).
However, the plaintiff is definitely entitled to get refund of the earnest
money, which he paid to late Prabha Ranjan Das, the predecessor of the
defendants along with interest at the rate of 8% per annum. The
defendants shall refund the said earnest money of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees
four lakhs) along with simple interest at the rate of 8% per annum to the
plaintiff from the date of the institution of the suit within a period of
3(three) months from today.
21.
In the light of the above, the judgment and decree passed
by learned trial court stands set aside and quashed.
Accordingly, the instant appeal stands allowed and thus
disposed of.
Send down the LCRs
JUDGE
Rohit
JUDGE
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