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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
B.A. No.7 of 2025
Smt. Anamika Sarkar
W/O: Shri Uttam Sarkar,
aged about 37 years,
resident of Baishnab Tilla, Badharghat,
PO: ONGC, P.S.: Amtali
Dist: West Tripura, Pin: 799014.
---- Applicant(s)
Versus
1. The State of Tripura
2. Shri Samarjit Chowdhury,
son of Shri Dinesh Chowdhury,
resident of Khamarhati, P.S.-Madhupur,
P.O.-Madhupur, District-Sepahijala,
Pin-799102.
----Non-Applicant(s)
For Applicant(s)
:
Mr. Subham Majumder, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Raju Datta, P.P.,
Mr. Rajib Saha, Addl. P.P.,
Mr. Subrata Sarkar, Sr. Adv,
Mr. Kabrabam Dhirendra Singha, Adv.
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Order
30/04/2025
This bail application under Section 483 read with
Section 528 of BNSS is filed for cancelling/quashing/setting aside
the order of interim bail dated 09.01.2025 delivered by Learned
CJM, West Tripura, Agartala in connection with Amtali PS case
No.126 of 2024 for the offence punishable under 103(1) of BNS,
2023. The respondent-principal accused has filed objection by
filing counter affidavit and additional counter affidavit challenging
the prayer of the victim-cum-applicant.
Heard
Learned
Counsel
Mr.
Subham
Majumder
appearing on behalf of the victim-applicant and also heard
Learned P.P. Mr. Raju Datta representing the State of Tripura and
Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Subrata Sarkar assisted by Learned
Counsel Mr. Kabrabam Dhirendra Singha appearing on behalf of the
respondent-accused namely Shri Samarjit Chowdhury.
In course of hearing of argument Learned Counsel for
the victim-applicant first of all drawn the attention of the Court
referring the order dated 09.01.2025 delivered by Learned CJM,
West Tripura, Agartala and submitted that without considering the
heinous nature of crime Learned CJM West Tripura Agartala by the
said order granted interim bail to the respondent-accused whereas
on the same day, charge-sheet was submitted by the IO on
completion of investigation along with separate prayer for holding
custody trial of the accused. However, from the order of Learned
CJM, West
Tripura, Agartala, it
appears
that
nothing
was
mentioned in respect of filing of charge-sheet by the IO and the
prayer of holding custody trial submitted by the IO was also not
placed before Learned CJM, West Tripura, Agartala. Learned
Counsel further submitted that although from the said order prima
facie it appears that at the time of passing of order Learned CJM
mentioned that the accused person was in JC for 89 days but
factually on that day it was the 88th day, not 89th day and that
order does not contain any ground as to why the bail was granted
to the respondent-accused. Learned Counsel also referred the
provision of Section 437(1) and its proviso and also Section
437(4) of Cr.P.C. and submitted that on bare perusal of the order,
it appears that no reason was assigned by Learned CJM at the
time of granting interim bail. Learned Counsel also drawn the
attention of the Court referring the contents of the FIR and
submitted that it is clear that the alleged respondent-accused on
the alleged day of commission of offence committed murder of
two innocent persons mercilessly. So, considering the nature and
gravity of the offence, he should be put behind the bars and the
trial should be held keeping the accused in JC. Learned Counsel
further drawn the attention of the Court referring Annexures-R/2
and R/3 and submitted that those papers were not placed before
the Learned CJM at the time of passing of order. Learned Counsel
also referred the statements of some of the witnesses of the
prosecution recorded by the IO under 180 of BNSS in course of
investigation of this case. Learned Counsel again drawn the
attention of the Court referring Annexure-R/8 by which the
informant of this case on 17.02.2025 submitted a prayer to SP,
West Tripura District informing that the accused after release on
bail from the Court was threatening the witnesses of the
prosecution including the victim herself and further drawn the
attention of the Court referring Annexure-R/9 and submitted that
on 16.02.2025 the victim-applicant appeared before O/C, Amtali
PS and narrated the fact of threatening the prosecution witnesses
including the applicant herself by the respondent-accused and on
the basis of that a P/R under Section 126 of BNSS is submitted by
the IO and in support of his contention, he referred few citations
before the Court.
Learned
P.P.
appearing
on
behalf
of
the
State-
respondent submitted that the IO on completion of investigation
on the 88th day submitted charge-sheet against the accused
before the Court but for some unknown reason, the said charge-
sheet was not placed before Learned CJM, West Tripura, Agartala
and from the order of the Learned CJM, it is clear that simply on
the basis of the fact that the accused was in JC for last 89 days,
the order of interim bail was passed without assigning any reason
which needs to be interfered with. In support of his contention,
Learned P.P. also referred some citations which would be
discussed later on. After that, the case was committed to the
Court of Learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala and by
order dated 24.03.2025, Learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura,
Agartala extended the period of interim bail till 16.04.2025 which
was further extended later on till 30.04.2025. Learned P.P. also
drawn the attention of the Court considering the seriousness and
the gravity of the offence, the interim bail granted to the accused
needs to be set aside and the accused may be taken into custody
for the sake of justice and he may put behind the bars till
conclusion of the trial of this case.
On the other hand, Learned Senior Counsel, Mr.
Subrata Sarkar appearing on behalf of the respondent-accused
first of all submitted that this present application is not at all
maintainable. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that from
the order dated 09.01.2025, it appears that at the time of
granting bail to the accused, considering the period of detention of
the accused in custody and applying the judicial mind, Learned
CJM, West Tripura, Agartala granted bail to the accused. Learned
Senior Counsel also submitted that there is nothing on record to
satisfy that after release on bail, the respondent-accused misused
the conditions of bail granted to him and at this stage there is no
scope to allow the prayer of the victim-applicant and again
submitted that the victim-applicant in the prayer portion although
submitted that she has sought for separate relief under Section
528 of BNSS and since there is specific provision for dealing with
the matter so, section 528 of BNSS is not applicable in this matter
at this stage and urged for rejection of the application filed by the
victim-applicant. In support of his contention, he also referred few
citations.
In the case at hand, the prosecution was set into
motion on the basis of an FIR laid by one Anamika Sarkar to O/C,
Amtali PS alleging inter alia that on 13.10.2024(Sunday), her
mother Soma Acharjee(51 years), her younger sister, Tanushree
Chowdhury(34 years) and her maternal sister, Sonia Acharjee
returned back to her mother’s residence at ONGC, Netaji nagar
after visting Durga Puja celebration from Agartala city and at that
time, the husband of her younger sister namely Samarjit
Chowdhury in a premeditated
manner was waiting at the
residence armed with sharp weapons and as soon as her mother,
younger sister and maternal sister arrived home, said Samarjit
Chowdhury launched a brutal attack on them with a sharp
weapon. In an attempt to save their life, her mother and younger
sister ran towards the gate but
said Samarjit
Chowdhury
mercilessly killed them by chopping their heads and different parts
of their bodies with sharp weapon. Seeing this, her maternal sister
Sonia Acharjee started screaming and managed to escape by
seeking refuse in neighbour’s house thereby saving her life. Said
Samarjit Chowdhury had been subjecting her younger sister to
continuous physical and mental torture for a prolonged period due
to family dispute. About one year back when she was physically
tortured to a dangerous extent, her younger sister took shelter to
her mother’s house and she has been residing therein since then.
Meanwhile, a divorce case was filed which is pending. On
12.10.2024, said Samarjit Chowdhury made telephonic threats to
her mother and younger sister stating that he would kill them and
would not find peace unless he did so. Acting on this threat, he
committed the gruesome murders in the dawn of 13.10.2024. She
further stated that some other persons may be involved in this
matter and accordingly laid the FIR.
On the basis of FIR, Amtali PS case No.126 of 2024
under Section 103(1) of BNS, 2023 was registered and in course
of investigation, the IO caused arrest of the accused and produced
him before the Court on 13.10.2024 and since then the accused
was in custody. Thereafter, on 09.01.2025, Learned CJM granted
interim bail to the accused till 22.01.2025 on the ground that the
accused was in JC for 89 days but the accused could not execute
bail bond so he was kept in J/C. Later on, he executed bail bond
on 04.02.2025 and was released from custody on that day. The
case was thereafter committed to the Court of Learned Sessions
Judge, West Tripura, Agartala and by order dated 28.02.2025,
Learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala allowed the
accused to remain on interim bail till 30.04.2025. In the
meantime, on 28.02.2025, the IO of this case filed one application
before the Court of Learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura,
Agartala for cancellation of the bail granted to the accused in
reference to Amtali PS GD entry No.38 dated 17.02.2025.
I have heard detailed argument of both the sides at
length and gone through the records of the Learned Court below.
Here in this case at this stage this Court is to see as to whether
the order dated 09.01.2025 passed by Learned CJM, West Tripura,
Agartala granting interim bail to the accused was legally justified
or
not.
As
already
stated
along
with
the
application
for
cancellation of bail, the victim-applicant annexed two documents
i.e. Annexure-R2 and R3. R2 is one acknowledgment slip from
which it appears that the charge-sheet of this case was received
by some person on 09.01.2025 and from R3, it appears that the
IO submitted charge-sheet and by the forwarding report prayed
before the Court for holding custody trial of the accused but from
the order of Learned CJM, it appears that nothing is mentioned in
the order of Learned CJM that the IO has submitted charge-sheet
on that day and the same forwarding report was produced before
the Court of Learned CJM. Alternatively, if it is found that the IO
on that date placed the same before Learned CJM but no
cognizance on it was taken by Learned CJM on that day but on
bare perusal of the order dated 09.01.2025 passed by Learned
CJM, it appears that the said order does not contain any reasons
as to why the bail was granted but save and except the
observation that the accused is in JC for 89 days although
according to the victim-applicant on 09.01.2025, it was the 88th
day not 89th day. A calculation sheet was submitted in this regard
before this Court and from which it appears that the accused was
produced before the Court of Learned Jurisdictional Magistrate on
13.10.2024 and the applicant has counted the date as 88 th day
excluding the date of production. This concept is not correct.
Actually the period should be counted including the date of
production before the Court. So, if it is so, it appears that Learned
CJM rightly counted the days as 89 days in place of 88 days.
In support of his contention Learned Counsel for the
victim-applicant referred few citations as already stated. In
Gurcharan Singh and others v. State (Delhi Administration)
reported in (1978) 1 SCC 118 wherein in para No.18 Hon’ble the
Apex Court observed as under:
“18. Chapter XXXIII of the new Code contains
provisions in respect of bail bonds. Section
436, Cr. P. C., with which this Chapter opens
makes an invariable rule for bail in case of
bailable offences subject to the specified
exception under sub-section (2) of that
section. Section 437, Cr.P.C. provides as to
when bail may be taken in case of non-bailable
offences. Sub-section (1) of Secion 437, Cr.
P.C. makes a dichotomy in dealing with nonbailable offences. The first category relates to
offences
punishable
with
death
or
imprisonment for life and the rest are all other
non-bailable offences. With regard to the first
category, Section 437(1), Cr. P. C. imposes a
bar to grant of bail by the Court or the officer
incharge of a police station to a person accused
of or suspected of the commission of an
offence punishable with death or imprisonment
for life, if there appear reasonable grounds for
believing that he has been so guilty. Naturally,
therefore, at the stage of investigation unless
there are some materials to justify an officer or
the Court to believe that there are no
reasonable grounds for believing that the
person accused of or suspected of the
commission of such an offence has been guilty
of the same, there is a ban imposed under
Section 437(1), Cr. P.C. against granting of
bail. On the other hand, if to either the officer
incharge of the police station or to the Court
there appear to be reasonable grounds to
believe that the accused has been guilty of
such an offence there will be no question of the
Court or the officer granting bail to him. In all
other non-bailable cases judicial discretion will
always be exercised by the Court in favour of
granting bail subject to sub-section (3) of
Section 437, Cr. P. C. with regard to imposition
of conditions, if necessary. Under sub-section
(4) of Section 437, Cr. P.C. an officer or a Court
releasing any person on bail under sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2) of that section is
required to record in writing his or its reasons
for so doing. That is to say, law requires that in
non-bailable offences punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, reasons have to be
recorded for releasing a person on bail, clearly
disclosing how discretion has been exercised in
that behalf.”
Further
Hon’ble
the Supreme Court
in
State of
Maharashtra v. Sitaram Popat Vetal and another reported in
AIR 2004 SC 4258 wherein in para Nos.7, 8 and 9 observed as
under:
“7. There is a need to indicate in the order,
reasons for prima facie concluding why bail
was being granted particularly where an
accused was charged of having committed a
serious offence. It is necessary for the Courts
dealing with application for bail to consider
among other circumstances, the following
factors also before granting bail, they are:
1. The nature of accusation and the severity
of punishment in case of conviction and the
nature of supporting evidence;
2. Reasonable apprehension of tampering of
the witness or apprehension of threat to the
complainant;
3. Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in
support of the charge.
8. Any order dehors of such reasons suffers
from non-application of mind as was noted by
this Court. In Ram Govind Upadhyay v.
Sudarshan Singh and others:(2002) 3 SCC
598); Puran etc. v. Rambilas and another etc.
:(2001) 6 SCC 338) and in Kalyan Chandra
Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav and
another (JT 2004 (3) SC 442).
9. Though a conclusive finding in regard to the
points urged by the parties is not expected of
the Court considering the bail application, yet
giving reasons is different from discussing
merits or demerits. As noted above, at the
stage of granting bail a detailed examination of
evidence and elaborate documentation of the
merits of the case has not to be undertaken.
But that does not mean that while granting bail
some reasons for prima facie concluding why
bail was being granted is not required to be
indicated.”
Further Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India in State of
Rajasthan v. Indraj Singh reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC
518 wherein in para Nos.8.2 and 8.3 observed as under:
8.2 In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar², this Court
held as follows:-
"11. Essentially, this Court is required to
analyse whether there was a valid exercise
of the power conferred by Section 439 CrPC
to grant bail. The power to grant bail under
Section 439 is of a wide amplitude. But it is
well settled that though the grant of bail
involves the exercise of the discretionary
power of the court, it has to be exercised in
a judicious manner and not as a matter of
course. In Ram Govind Upadhyay v.
Sudarshan Singh [Ram Govind Upadhyay v.
Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 2002
SCC (Crl) 688], Umesh Banerjee, J.
speaking for a two-Judge Bench of this
Court, laid down the factors that must guide
the exercise of the power to grant bail in
the following terms: (SCC p. 602, paras 3-4)
3. Grant of bail though being a
discretionary order - but, however, calls
for exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of
course. Order for bail bereft of any
cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the
grant of bail is dependent upon the
contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts,
however, do always vary from case to
case. The nature of the offence is one of
the basic considerations for the grant of
bail more heinous is the crime, the
greater is the chance of rejection of the
bail, though, however, dependent on the
factual matrix of the matter...
12. The determination of whether a case is
fit for the grant of bail involves the
balancing of numerous factors, among
which the nature of the offence, the
severity of the punishment and a prima
facie view of the involvement of the
accused are important. No straitjacket
formula exists for courts to assess an
application for the grant or rejection of bail.
At the stage of assessing whether a case is
fit for the grant of bail, the court is not
required to enter into a detailed analysis of
the evidence on record to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the
crime by the accused. That is a matter for
trial. However, the Court is required to
examine whether there is a prima facie or
reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had committed the offence and on
a balance of the considerations involved,
the continued custody of the accused
subserves the purpose of the criminal
justice system. Where bail has been granted
by a lower court, an appellate court must be
slow to interfere and ought to be guided by
the principles set out for the exercise of the
power to set aside bail."
8.3 The discussion made in Ajwar v. Waseem³
by a coordinate Bench of this Court (which
included one of us, i.e., Amanullah J.) is on
point. The relevant paragraphs are as under: "Relevant parameters for granting bail
26. While considering as to whether bail
ought to be granted in a matter involving a
serious criminal offence, the Court must
consider relevant factors like the nature of
the accusations made against the accused,
the manner in which the crime is alleged to
have been committed, the gravity of the
offence, the role attributed to the accused,
the criminal antecedents of the accused, the
probability of tampering of the witnesses
and repeating the offence, if the accused
are released on bail, the likelihood of the
accused being unavailable in the event bail
is granted, the possibility of obstructing the
proceedings and evading the courts of
justice and the overall desirability of
releasing the accused on bail. [Refer:
Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v.
State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1977); Masroor v. State of U.P.
[Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC
286 (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta
Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta
Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010)
14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765); Neeru
Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State
of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508: (2015) 3 SCC
(Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT
of Delhi) [Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 (2018) 3 SCC
(Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar
[Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC
118: (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558].]
27. It is equally well settled that bail once
granted, ought not to be cancelled in a
mechanical
manner.
However,
an
unreasoned or perverse order of bail is
always open to interference by the superior
court. If there are serious allegations
against the accused, even if he has not
misused the bail granted to him, such an
order can be cancelled by the same Court
that has granted the bail. Bail can also be
revoked by a superior court if it transpires
that the courts below have ignored the
relevant material available on record or not
looked into the gravity of the offence or the
impact on the society resulting in such an
order. In P v. State of M.P. [P v. State of
M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a
three-Judge Bench of this Court [authored
by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out
the considerations that must weigh with the
Court for interfering in an order granting
bail to an accused under Section 439(1)
CrPC in the following words: (SCC p. 224,
para 24)
"24. As can be discerned from the above
decisions, for cancelling bail once
granted,
the
court
must
consider
whether any supervening circumstances
have arisen or the conduct of the
accused post grant of bail demonstrates
that it is no longer conducive to a fair
trial to permit him to retain his freedom
by enjoying the concession of bail during
trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana,
(1995) 1 SCC 349 1995 SCC (Cri) 237].
To put it differently, in ordinary
circumstances, this Court would be
loathe to interfere with an order passed
by the court below granting bail but if
such an order is found to be illegal or
perverse or premised on material that is
irrelevant, then such an order is
susceptible to scrutiny and interference
by the appellate court."
Considerations for setting aside bail orders
28. The considerations that weigh with the
appellate court for setting aside the bail
order on an application being moved by the
aggrieved party include any supervening
circumstances that may have occurred after
granting relief to the accused, the conduct
of the accused while on bail, any attempt on
the part of the accused to procrastinate,
resulting in delaying the trial, any instance
of threats being extended to the witnesses
while on bail, any attempt on the part of the
accused to tamper with the evidence in any
manner. We may add that this list is only
illustrative and not exhaustive. However,
the court must be cautious that at the stage
of granting bail, only a prima facie case
needs to be examined and detailed reasons
relating to the merits of the case that may
cause prejudice to the accused, ought to be
avoided. Suffice it is to state that the bail
order should reveal the factors that have
been considered by the Court for granting
relief to the accused."
Learned P.P. in course of hearing referred one citation
of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2024) 10 SCC
768 [Ajwar v. Waseem and another] wherein in para Nos.26
and 27 observed as under:
Relevant parameters for granting bail
26. While considering as to whether bail ought
to be granted in a matter involving a serious
criminal offence, the Court must consider
relevant factors like the nature of the
accusations made against the accused, the
manner in which the crime is alleged to have
been committed, the gravity of the offence, the
role attributed to the accused, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, the probability of
tampering of the witnesses and repeating the
offence, if the accused are released on bail, the
likelihood of the accused being unavailable in
the event bail is granted, the possibility of
obstructing the proceedings and evading the
courts of justice and the overall desirability of
releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman
Lal v. State of U.P.:(2004) 7 SCC 525; Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan:(2004) 7 SCC
528; Masroor v. State of U.P.:(2009) 14 SCC
286,
Prasanta
Kumar
Sarkar
v.
Ashis
Chatterjee:(2010) 14 SCC 496; Neeru Yadav v.
State of U.P.:(2014) 16 SCC 508; Anil Kumar
Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi):(2018) 12 SCC
129; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar :(2020) 2 SCC
118.]
27. It is equally well settled that bail once
granted, ought not to be cancelled in a
mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned
or perverse order of bail is always open to
interference by the superior court. If there are
serious allegations against the accused, even if
he has not misused the bail granted to him,
such an order can be cancelled by the same
Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be
revoked by a superior court if it transpires that
the courts below have ignored the relevant
material available on record or not looked into
the gravity of the offence or the impact on the
society resulting in such an order. In P v. State
of M.P.:(2022) 15 SCC 211 decided by a threeJudge Bench of this Court [authored by one of
us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the
considerations that must weigh with the Court
for interfering in an order granting bail to an
accused under Section 439(1) CrPC in the
following words: (SCC p. 224, para 24)
"24. As can be discerned from the above
decisions, for cancelling bail once granted,
the court must consider whether any
supervening circumstances have arisen or
the conduct of the accused post grant of
bail demonstrates that it is no longer
conducive to a fair trial to permit him to
retain his freedom by enjoying the
concession of bail during trial. To put it
differently, in ordinary circumstances, this
Court would be loathe to interfere with an
order passed by the court below granting
bail but if such an order is found to be
illegal or perverse or premised on material
that is irrelevant, then such an order is
susceptible to scrutiny and interference by
the appellate court."
Referring the aforesaid citations, Learned Counsel for
the victim-applicant and Learned P.P. has drawn the attention of
the Court that an unreasoned and perverse order of bail is always
open for interference by the superior Court. Here in the given
case, since the order of Learned CJM is silent as to why the bail
was granted so the principles of aforesaid citations can be applied
and the bail granted to the accused may be cancelled accordingly.
On the other hand, Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. S.
Sarkar in course of hearing referred few citations. In Satendra
Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of investigation and another
reported in (2022) 10 SCC 51 wherein in para Nos.70 to 74
Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“70. The power of a court is quite enormous
while exercising the power under Section 437.
Apart from the general principle which we have
discussed, the court is also empowered to
grant bail on special reasons. The said power
has to be exercised keeping in view the
mandate of Sections 41 and 41-A of the Code
as well. If there is a proper exercise of power
either by the investigating agencies or by the
court, the majority of the problem of the
undertrials would be taken care of.
71. The proviso to Section 437 warrants an
opportunity to be afforded to the learned Public
Prosecutor while considering an offence
punishable with death, imprisonment for life,
or imprisonment for seven years or more.
Though, this proviso appears to be contrary to
the main provision contained in Section 437(1)
which, by way of a positive direction, prohibits
the Magistrate from releasing a person guilty of
an offence punishable with either death or
imprisonment for life. It is trite that a proviso
has to be understood in the teeth of the main
provision. Section 437(1)(i) operates in a
different field. The object is to exclude the
offence exclusively triable by the Court of
Sessions. Thus, one has to understand the
proviso by a combined reading of Sections 437
and 439 of the Code, as the latter provision
reiterates the aforesaid provision to the
exclusion of the learned Magistrate over an
offence triable exclusively by a Court of
Sessions. To make the position clear, if the
Magistrate has got the jurisdiction to try an
offence for which the maximum punishment is
either life or death, when such jurisdiction is
conferred on the learned Magistrate, it goes
without saying that the power to release the
accused on bail for the offence alleged also can
be exercised.
72. This Court in Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State
(NCT of Delhi):(2001) 4 SCC 280 has held: (SCC
p. 284, para 7)
"7. Powers of the Magistrate, while dealing
with the applications for grant of bail, are
regulated by the punishment prescribed for
the offence in which the bail is sought.
Generally
speaking
if
punishment
prescribed is for imprisonment for life and
death penalty and the offence is exclusively
triable by the Court of Session, the
Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant bail
unless the matter is covered by the provisos
attached to Section 437 of the Code. The
limitations circumscribing the jurisdiction of
the Magistrate are evident and apparent.
Assumption of jurisdiction to entertain the
application is distinguishable from the
exercise of the jurisdiction."
73. We wish to place reliance on the judgment
of the Bombay High Court in Balasaheb Satbhai
Merchant Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra:2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1261: (SCC
OnLine Bom paras 13-14)
“13. At this stage, it may be useful to quote
the observations of this Court in Ambarish
Rangshahi
Patnigere
v.
State
of
Maharashtra:2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1968
referred supra, which reads thus: (SCC
OnLine Bom para 18)
„18. It may be noted here that the
learned
counsel
for
intervener
contended that the Magistrate did not
have jurisdiction to grant bail because
the offences under Sections 467 and 409
IPC, carry punishment which may be life
imprisonment. According to the learned
counsel, if the offence is punishable with
sentence of death or life imprisonment,
the Magistrate cannot grant bail under
Section 437(1) CrPC, unless there are
special grounds mentioned therein. He
relied upon certain authorities in this
respect including Prahlad Singh Bhati v.
State (NCT of Delhi):(2001) 4 SCC 280.
In that case, offence was under Section
302 which is punishable with death
sentence or life imprisonment and is
exclusively triable by Court of Sessions.
The offence under Section 409 is
punishable with imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for 10 years and fine.
Similarly, the office under Section 467 is
also punishable with imprisonment for
life or imprisonment for 10 years and
fine.
Even
though
the
maximum
sentence which may be awarded is life
imprisonment, as per Part I of Schedule
annexed to CrPC, both these offences
are triable by a Magistrate of First Class.
It appears that there are several
offences including under Section 326 in
the Penal Code, 1860 wherein sentence,
which may be awarded, is imprisonment
for life or imprisonment for lesser terms
and such offences are triable by
Magistrate of the First Class. If the
Magistrate is empowered to try the case
and pass judgment and order of
conviction or acquittal, it is difficult to
understand why he cannot pass order
granting bail, which is interlocutory in
nature, in such cases. In fact, the
restriction under Section 437(1) CrPC is
in respect of those offences which are
punishable with alternative sentence of
death or life imprisonment. If the
offence
is
punishable
with
life
imprisonment or any other lesser
sentence and is triable by Magistrate, it
cannot be said that Magistrate does not
have jurisdiction to consider the bail
application. In taking this view, I am
supported by the old Judgment of
Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Court in
Tularam v. King Emperor:1926 SCC
OnLine MP 176 and also by the
Judgment of the Kerala High Court in
Satyan v. State of Kerala:1981 SCC
OnLine Ker 147. In Satyan(supra), the
Kerala High Court considered several
earlier judgments and observed thus in
paras 8 to 10:(Satyan case:1981 SCC
OnLine Ker 147, SCC OnLine Ker).
"8.
According
to
the
learned
Magistrate Section 437(1) does not
empower him to release a person on
bail if there are reasonable grounds
for believing that he has committed
an offence punishable with death or
an
offence
punishable
with
imprisonment for life. In other words
the
learned
Magistrate
has
interpreted the expression „offence
punishable
with
death
or
imprisonment for life‟ in Section
437(1) to include all offences where
the
punishment
extends
to
imprisonment for life. This reasoning,
no doubt, is seen adopted in an old
Rangoon Case H.M. Boudville v. King
Emperor:1924 SCC OnLine Rang 21
while interpreting the phrase "an
offence punishable with death or
transportation for life" in Section 497
CrPC 1898. But that case was
dissented from in Mohd. Eusoof v.
King Emperors:1925 SCC OnLine
Rang 73. The Rangoon High Court
held that the prohibition against
granting bail is confined to cases
where the sentence is either death or
alternative transportation for life. In
other words, what the Court held was
that
the
phrase
"death
or
transportation for life" in Section 497
of the old Code did not extend to
offences
punishable
with
transportation for life only, it will be
interesting to note the following
passage from the above judgment:
(Mohd. Eusoof cases(supra), SCC
OnLine Rang para 9)
„9. It is difficult to see what
principle,
other
than
pure
empiricism,
should
distinguish
offences
punishable
with
transportation
for
life
from
offences punishable with long
terms of imprisonment; why, for
instance, the detenu accused of
lurking house trespass with a view
to commit theft, for which the
punishment is fourteen years'
imprisonment, should be specially
favoured as against the individual
who has dishonestly received
stolen property, knowing that it
was obtained by dacoity, for which
the punishment happens to be
transportation for life? It cannot
seriously be argued that the
comparatively slight difference in
degree of possible punishment,
will render it morally less likely
that the person arrested will put
in an appearance in the one case
rather than the other. On the
other
hand,
the
degree
of
difference is so great as between
transportation for life and death
as to be immeasurable. A prudent
legislature
will,
therefore,
withdraw from the discretion of
the Magistracy cases in which, if
guilt is probable, even a man of
the greatest fortitude may be
willing to pay a material price,
however, exorbitant, for life.'
9. The above decision has been
followed by the Nagpur High Court in
Tularam v. King Emperor(supra).
"10. The reasoning applies with
equal force in interpreting the
phrase "offence punishable with
death or imprisonment for life”.
So long as an offence under
Section 326 is triable by a
Magistrate of the First Class, there
is no reason why it should be
viewed differently in the matter of
granting bail from an offence
under Section 420 IPC for which
the
punishment
extends
imprisonment for 7 years or any
other non-bailable offence for
which the punishment is a term of
imprisonment."
It would be illogical and incomprehensible
to say that the Magistrate who can hold the
trial and pass judgment of acquittal or
conviction for the offences punishable with
sentence of life imprisonment or lesser term
of imprisonment, for example in offences
under Sections 326, 409, 467, etc. cannot
consider the application for bail in such
offences. In fact, it appears that the
restriction under Section 437(1)(a) is
applicable only to those cases which are
punishable with death sentence or life
imprisonment as alternative sentence. It
may be noted that in Prahlad Singh
Bhati(supra), in para 6, the Supreme Court
held that even though there is no legal bar
for a Magistrate to consider an application
for grant of bail to a person who is arrested
for an offence exclusively triable by a Court
of session, yet it would be proper and
appropriate that in such a case the
Magistrate directs the accused person to
approach the Court of Session for the
purposes of getting the relief of bail. This
may be applicable to many cases, wherein
the sentence, which may be awarded, is not
even life imprisonment, but the offence is
exclusively triable by court of Sessions for
example
offences
punishable
under
Sections 306, 308, 314, 315, 316, 399, 400
and 450. Taking into consideration the legal
position, I do not find any substance in the
contention of Mr Bhatt, learned counsel for
the intervener that merely because the
offence is under Sections 409 and 467 IPC,
Magistrate did not have jurisdiction to hear
and grant the bail."
14. It may also be useful to refer the
observations of this Court in Ishan Vasant
Deshmukh v. State of Maharashtra:2010
SCC OnLine Bom 1593 referred supra, which
read thus: (SCC OnLine Bom para 23)
„23. ... The observations of the Supreme
Court that generally speaking if the
punishment
prescribed
is
that
of
imprisonment for life or death penalty,
and the offence is exclusively triable by
the Court of Sessions, the Magistrate has
no jurisdiction to grant bail, unless the
matter is covered by the provisos
attached to Section 437 of the Code.
Thus, merely because an offence is
punishable with imprisonment for life, it
does not follow a Magistrate would have
no jurisdiction to grant bail, unless
offence is also exclusively triable by the
Court of Sessions. This, implies that the
Magistrate would be entitled to grant
bail in cases triable by him even though
punishment prescribed may extend to
imprisonment for life. This judgment in
Prahlad Singh Bhati case(supra) had not
been cited before the Judge, who
decided
State
of
Maharashtra
v.
Rajkumar
Kunda
Swami:2001
SCC
OnLine Bom 1171. Had this judgment
been noticed by the Hon'ble Judge
deciding that case, the observation that
the Magistrate may not decide an
application for bail if the offence is
punishable with imprisonment for life
would possibly would not have been
made. In view of the observations of the
Supreme Court in Prahlad Singh Bhati
case(supra), it is clear that the view
taken by J.H. Bhatia, J. in Ambarish
Rangshahi
Patnigere
v.
State
of
Maharashtra(supra) is in tune with the
Judgment of the Supreme Court and
therefore, the Magistrate would have
jurisdiction to grant bail.‟ "
74. Thus, we would like to reiterate the
aforesaid position so that the jurisdictional
Magistrate who otherwise has the jurisdiction
to try a criminal case which provides for a
maximum punishment of either life or death
sentence, has got ample jurisdiction to
consider the release on bail.”
Again,
Learned
Senior
Counsel
referred
another
ciataion of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in State of Gujarat v.
Salimbhai AbdulGaffar Shaikh and others reported in (2003)
8 SCC 50 wherein in para No.16 Hon’ble the Apex Court observed
as under:
“16. The High Court has also invoked powers
under Section 482 CrPC while granting bail to
the respondents. Section 482 CrPC saves the
inherent power of the High Court. The High
Court possesses the inherent powers to be
exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and
substantial justice for the administration of
which alone courts exist. The power has to be
exercised to prevent abuse of the process of
the court or to otherwise secure the ends of
justice. But this power cannot be resorted to if
there is a specific provision in the Code for the
redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved
party. (See Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtras.) There being a specific provision
for grant of bail, the High Court clearly erred in
taking recourse to Section 482 CrPC while
enlarging the respondents on bail.”
Learned
Senior
Counsel
further
referred
another
citation of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2020) 2
SCC 743 [Myakala Dharmarajam and others v. State of
Telangana and another] wherein in para Nos.5, 7 and 8 Hon’ble
the Apex Court observed as under:
“5. We are informed at the Bar that the case
has been committed for trial. The High Court
allowed the applications filed for cancellation
of bail on the ground that the Principal
Sessions Judge did not consider the material
available on record before granting bail to the
appellants. The High Court further held that the
criminal antecedents of the appellants were
not taken into account by the trial court. That
apart, the High Court accepted the submissions
on behalf of Respondent 2 that the appellants
indulged in threatening the witnesses after
being released on bail.
7. The factors to be considered while granting
bail have been held by this Court to be the
gravity of the crime, the character of the
evidence, position and status of the accused
with reference to the victim and witnesses, the
likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice
and repeating the offence, the possibility of his
tampering with the evidence and witnesses,
and obstructing the course of justice, etc. Each
criminal case presents its own peculiar factual
scenario and, therefore, certain grounds
peculiar to a particular case may have to be
taken account by the court. The court has to
only opine as to whether there is prima facie
case against the accused. For the purpose of
bail, the court must not undertake meticulous
examination of the evidence collected by the
police and comment on the same.
8. In Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar:(1986) 4
SCC 481 this Court held that bail can be
cancelled where (i) the accused misuses his
liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity,
(ii) interferes with the course of investigation,
(iii) attempts to tamper with evidence or
witnesses, (iv) threatens witnesses or indulges
in similar activities which would hamper
smooth investigation, (v) there is likelihood of
his fleeing to another country, (vi) attempts to
make himself scarce by going underground or
becoming unavailable to the investigating
agency, (vii) attempts to place himself beyond
the reach of his surety, etc. The above grounds
are illustrative and not exhaustive. It must also
be remembered that rejection of bail stands on
one footing but cancellation of bail is a harsh
order because it interferes with the liberty of
the individual and hence it must not be lightly
resorted to.”
Referring the said citations, Learned Senior Counsel
drawn the attention of the Court that once the bail is granted
there is very least scope to cancel it and here in the case at hand,
the victim-applicant or the prosecution could not place any
supervening circumstances to reject the interim bail granted to
the accused and urged for dismissal of the application filed by the
victim-applicant for cancellation of bail.
I have heard both the sides at length and also perused
the citations as referred by the parties. It is on record that by
order dated 09.01.2025, the respondent-accused was granted
interim bail by Learned CJM on 89th day but surprisingly from the
order, it appears that at the time of granting bail, Learned CJM did
not mention any specific grounds as to why the concession of bail
was granted to the accused in such a grievous/heinous offence
like murder. Here in the case at hand two murders were
committed by the alleged accused according to the prosecution. It
is the settled position of law that in granting bail in a heinous
offence, specific reasons should be given by the concerned Court
as to why the Court has exercised its jurisdiction to consider the
bail application. In this case, on 89th day bail was granted by
Learned CJM but from the order it appears that no cogent and
justified grounds were reflected by Learned CJM as to why the bail
was granted as required under Section 437(4) of Cr.P.C. Section
437(1) of Cr.P.C. describes as to when bail should be granted in a
case of non-bailable offence. For the sake of convenience, I would
like to refer herein below the provision of Section 437(1) of
Cr.P.C.:
437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable
offence.(1) When any person accused of, or suspected of,
the commission of any non-bailable offence is
arrested or detained without warrant by an officerin-charge of a police station or appears or is
brought before a Court other than the High Court or
Court of Session, he may be released on bail, but(i) such person shall not be so released if there
appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has
been guilty of an offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life;
(ii) such person shall not be so released if such
offence is a cognizable offence and he had been
previously convicted of an offence punishable with
death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for
seven years or more, or he had been previously
convicted on two or more occasions of [a cognizable
offence punishable with imprisonment for three
years or more but not less than seven years]:
Provided that the Court may direct that a person
referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) be released on
bail if such person is under the age of sixteen years
or is a woman or is sick or infirm:
Provided further that the Court may also direct that
a person referred to in clause (ii) be released on
bail if it is satisfied that it is just and proper so to
do for any other special reason:
Provided also that the mere fact that an accused
person may be required for being identified by
witnesses during investigation shall not be
sufficient ground for refusing to grant bail if he is
otherwise entitled to be released on bail and gives
an undertaking that he shall comply with such
directions as may be given by the Court:]
[Provided also that no person shall, if the offence
alleged to have been committed by him is
punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or
imprisonment for seven years or more, be released
on bail by the Court under this sub-section without
giving an opportunity of hearing to the Public
Prosecutor.]
Similarly, Section 437(4) of Cr.P.C. also provides as under:
4) An officer or a Court releasing any person on bail
under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), shall
record in writing his or its [reason or special
reasons] for so doing.
From the aforesaid provisions of law, it is found that when
Court can grant bail in a non-bailable offence.
From the citations relied upon the victim-applicant as
well as prosecution, it appears that although it is the settled
position of law that bail once granted, ought not to be cancelled in
a mechanical manner but if the order itself is unreasoned or
perverse, in that case, there is scope on the part of the superior
Court to interfere with the order.
Here in the case at hand after going through the entire
case records and the submission of Learned Counsel for both the
sides and also after perusing the citations as relied upon by the
victim-applicant as well as the respondent-accused, it appears
that
Learned
CJM
by
the
said
order
dated
09.01.2025
mechanically granted bail to the accused without application of
proper mind and without giving any justified reasons only on the
ground of having custody of the accused for 89 days. As such, in
the considered opinion of this Court, the order of bail cannot be
sustained and accordingly the same stands cancelled and also the
bail bond executed by the respondent-accused stands cancelled.
From the record, it appears that the case has already
been committed to the Court of Learned Sessions Judge, West
Tripura, Agartala and the Learned Sessions Judge by the earlier
order extended the period of interim bail till 30.04.2025. So, the
accused shall surrender before the Court of Learned Sessions
Judge, West Tripura, Agartala on or before 05.05.2025 and
Learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala shall take the
accused into custody and accordingly shall pass necessary remand
orders time to time and shall also make all endeavour to dispose
of the case giving top priority. In default of appearance of the
accused, Learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala shall be
at liberty to ensure production of the accused in accordance with
law.
It is further ordered that in future Learned CJM, West
Tripura, Agartala, shall ensure the production of charge-sheet to
the respective Courts on the same day if the accused person or
persons is/are remains in custody to avoid any legal confusion
regarding the detention of the accused in custody.
A copy of this order along with photocopy of AnnexureR/2 and R/3 be transmitted to Learned CJM, West Tripura,
Agartala by Registrar(Judicial) to verify the matter and to submit a
report in the administrative side within 15(fifteen) days as alleged
and raised by Learned Counsel for the victim-applicant.
Also, a copy of this order be supplied to Learned P.P.
for information.
With this observation, this application for cancellation
of bail stands allowed.
Send down the LCRs along with a copy of this order.
JUDGE
signed by
MOUMIT Digitally
MOUMITA DATTA
2025.04.30
A DATTA Date:
16:33:52 -07'00'
Deepshikha
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