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2024:MLHC:974
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List 1
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 362 of 2023 with
WP(C) No. 18 of 2024
Date of Decision: 05.11.2024
SM Energenco Limited
…. Petitioner(s)
- Versus –
1.
State of Meghalaya,
Through the Chief Secretary
Govt. of Meghalaya, Shillong.
2.
State of Meghalaya
Through the Commissioner & Secretary,
Power Department, Government of Meghalaya, Shillong.
3.
Meghalaya Power Generation Corporation Limited,
A Public Sector Undertaking of the Government of Meghalaya
Through the Director (Generation) and Chief Engineer (C),
Having office at Lumjingshai, Short Round Road,
Shillong-793001.
… Respondent(s)
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner(s)
:
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. D. Das, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. R. Hazarika, Adv.
Mr. I. Das, Adv.
Mr. K. Talukdar, Adv.
Mr. A. Kumar, AG with
Ms. Z.E. Nongkynrih, GA
Ms. R. Colney, GA
2024:MLHC:974
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
Yes/No
These two writ petitions being connected and involving the
same subject matter in issue, are being disposed of by this common
judgment and order. In WP(C) No. 362 of 2023, the writ petitioner has
assailed the cancellation of the works awarded to it in respect of the
Upper Khri Stage I and Upper Khri Stage II Hydro Electric Project of
15 MW and 10 MW respectively, on the ground given by the
respondents, that the project though technically viable, was
commercially un-viable. The petitioner has based its claim on the fact
that after the bidding process for the said project, a Letter of Intent had
been issued in their favour on 11.01.2013, and that a Letter of
Allotment was also issued on 26.03.2013, which culminated in the
execution of two Preliminary Agreements both dated 09.05.2014 in
respect of the projects. The petitioner’s stand is that the said closure of
the project was contrary to the terms of the Preliminary Agreements
and that instead of the issue being resolved, the respondents on
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12.09.2023 announced the revival of the said projects with new
partnership and under a new format. As such, directions had been
prayed for, to restrain the respondents from issuing any tenders,
bidding documents, work orders etc., in respect of the said Hydro
Electric Project.
2.
In the second writ petition i.e. WP(C) 18 of 2024, the
petitioner has put a challenge to the impugned termination order dated
22.12.2023, which was issued during the pendency of WP (C) No. 362
of 2023, by which both the Preliminary Agreements dated 09.05.2014
stood terminated. The petitioner has thus, sought for withdrawal and
quashment of the impugned termination order dated 22.12.2023.
3.
Mr. D. Das, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. K.
Talukdar, learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner has taken this
Court through the sequence of events and submitted that for the said
Hydro Electric Project, after the bidding process and execution of two
separate Preliminary Agreements, which required the survey and
investigation of the project sites and preparation of a Detailed Project
2024:MLHC:974
Report (DPR), by the petitioner within a certain timeframe, the
petitioner had completed the same as required and had submitted the
DPR. However, he submits the project did not take off as the
respondents raised various queries and sought clarifications, which
delayed the execution of the project, even though the petitioner had cooperated throughout the deliberations which took place and had also
complied with the additional requirements of the respondents. He then
submits that without any notice to the petitioner, the respondents
unilaterally decided to cancel the project during a meeting held of
20.04.2022, on the ground that the projects were technically viable but
financially un-viable due to high cost. The petitioner he submits, had
incurred substantial cost which was invested in the preparation of the
DPR, and thus suffered irreparable loss, with the arbitrary termination
or cancellation which should have taken place only after due notice.
4.
The termination order dated 22.12.2023, it is contended
cannot be termed as a mere communication as sought to be made out
by the respondents, as the said order has referred to various clauses of
the Preliminary Agreements, with allegations that the petitioner was in
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breach of the same thereby resulting in the termination. Learned Senior
counsel submits that termination has civil consequences and therefore
prior notice is an essential requirement. The last paragraph of the
termination order dated 22.12.2023, he argues shows that the said
Preliminary Agreements were subsisting as it is stated therein, that the
termination order was issued in accordance with the Preliminary
Agreements. As such, he submits what is clearly apparent from the
facts of the case is the contradictory nature or stance, that has been
adopted by the respondents, inasmuch as, in the impugned termination
order though it is stated the Preliminary Agreements is not in
existence, the termination ostensibly was in accordance with and made
in exercise of clause 29 of the Preliminary Agreements. He therefore
submits that the termination order being bad in law is liable to be set
aside and quashed.
5.
On the aspects of civil consequences, availability of
alternative remedy, disputed question of facts, which are the points that
have been raised by the respondents in the invocation of writ
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jurisdiction by the petitioner, learned Senior counsel has relied upon
the following decisions:-
i)
Raghunath Thakur vs. State of Bihar (1989) 1 SCC 229
ii)
Mahabir Auto Stores vs. Indian Oil Corporation (1990) 3
SCC 752
iii)
Haji Abdul Shakoor & Co. vs. Union of India (2002) 9 SCC
iv)
Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd, (2003) 2
SCC 107
v)
ABL International Ltd., vs. Export Credit Guarantee
Corporation of India Ltd. (2004) 3 SCC 553
vi)
UMC Technologies (P) Ltd., vs. Food Corporation of India
(2021) 2 SCC 551
vii)
M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd., vs. Sky Power Southeast
Solar India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703
viii) SBI vs. Rajesh Agarwal (2023) 6 SCC 1
6.
ix)
Ramakrishna Mission vs. Kago Kunya (2019) 16 SCC 303
x)
St. Mary’s Education Society vs. Rajendra Prasad
Bhargava (2023) 4 SCC 498
In reply, the learned Advocate General assisted by Mr. A.S.
Pandey, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the
2024:MLHC:974
issuance of the order dated 22.12.2023, is not a termination of the
Preliminary Agreements but is a mere reiteration of the consequences
of the contractual provisions which provides for termination, due to
efflux of time. The learned Advocate General has referred to the
Preliminary Agreements and has highlighted the relevant clauses of
provisions as contained in clauses 4, 9, 12, 13 and 30. It is submitted
that an entire reading of the said clauses shows that within two years of
signing of the Agreement, the contractor was to furnish five reports,
the failure of which the respondents were at liberty to cancel the
Preliminary Agreements. The other following clauses he submits
clearly shows that the validity of the Agreement was up to a period of
one month after the due date of submission of DPR which in this case
expired on 12.10.2016, and that further as required under clause 13,
the parties did not enter into any Implementation Agreement within
one year of submission of DPR. As such therefore, no contractual
relationship existed between the parties at the time of issuance of the
impugned notice and that the same was a mere reiteration of the
correct position as it stood between the parties, as per the contractual
terms.
2024:MLHC:974
7.
The learned Advocate General then submits that the
petitioner had been given ample opportunity, but they failed to attend
review meetings and that clause 30 itself provides that any dispute
between the parties shall be resolved through mutual negotiations.
From the reading of the entire Preliminary Agreements, the learned AG
submits that the same stood expired due to efflux of time for noncompliance of clause 12 by the petitioner, and as such at the time of
issuance of notice dated 22.12.2023, the same was as per the
Agreement itself, which provided for such consequences. The
petitioner he then submits by way of the writ petitions is seeking
specific performance of a contract which is financially un-viable and in
complete contravention of clause 13 thereof, and as such the writ is
liable to be dismissed as no specific performance or injunction can be
granted in a determinable contract, even under the Specific Relief Act,
1963.
8.
The learned AG has then contended that the writ petition
itself is not maintainable as it is hit by delay and laches, and the matter
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concerns disputed question of facts and is in the realm contractual
jurisdiction. It is further contended that the same is a terminable
contract for which specific performance cannot be sought; and in
support of these contentions has placed reliance on the following
decisions:-
i)
Municipal Council Gondia vs. Divi Works & Suppliers
2022 SCC OnLine SC 247
ii)
State of Gujarat vs. Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust
(1994) 3 SCC 552
iii)
Tata Motors Ltd. vs. Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply &
Transport Undertaking (BEST), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 671
iv)
Bareilly Development Authority vs. Ajai Pal Singh (1989) 2
SCC 116
v)
Jagdish Mandal vs. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517 :
2006 SCC OnLine SC 1373
9.
Heard learned counsels for the parties.
10.
To the mind of this Court, the entire matter hinges upon
the maintainability of the writ petition considering the fact that the
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dispute that has arisen is purely from a contractual arrangement or
situation in the realm of private law. The only factor that will
determine this question is whether the action of termination by the
impugned notice, can be considered arbitrary to the extent to warrant
interference by this Court, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
11.
In the first writ petition i.e. WP(C) 362 of 2023, the
petitioner had only sought withdrawal of the minutes of a meeting held
on 20.04.2022, wherein in a review meeting the decision to cancel the
project was taken based on an appraisal report showing that the project
was technically viable but not financially viable due to high cost, and a
letter dated 09.09.2022, wherein the petitioner was informed about the
said decision. It is to be noted that the petitioner did not attend the said
meeting, though notice had been issued to them. In the second writ
petition that followed, the same challenges the letter dated 22.12.2023
terminating the two Preliminary Agreements dated 09.05.2014. The
termination order however, invoked clause 29 of the Preliminary
Agreements and it is given therein, that the order was being issued in
accordance with the Preliminary Agreement dated 09.05.2014. This
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order in fact has changed the complexion of the ‘lis’ between the
parties, inasmuch as, from a simple cancellation which was under
review along with other power projects, which stood cancelled due to
unviability or other conditions, the invocation of the clauses of the
Preliminary Agreements to effect the same, would mean that a
contractual relationship or the Preliminary Agreements was still
subsisting.
12.
At this juncture, the Preliminary Agreements may be
referred to wherein clause 5 reads as follows: “5 The Second Party shall carry out the technoeconomic studies of the Project and submit a Detailed
Project Report (hereinafter called the “DPR”) to the
First Party within a period of 48 months from the date
of signing of this Preliminary Agreement failing which,
the First Party will be at liberty to cancel the
Preliminary Agreement after affording due opportunity
to the Second Party. No compensation whatsoever shall
be payable by the First Party in this regard. The Upfront
Premium deposited by the Second Party shall also be
liable for forfeiture.”
13.
Further, in the Preliminary Agreements certain other
conditions that is Clause 4, 9, 12, 13 & 30 as has been cited by the
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learned Advocate General which govern the relationship between the
parties being relevant, are extracted hereinbelow:“4. Within Two years time as the case may be of signing
of Preliminary Agreement the Second Party shall
furnish to the Government the following:i. A Compendium giving details of hydrological and
metrological data/observation.
ii. Topographical sheets prepared after conducting
surveys.
iii.A
Compendium
giving
details
of
Geological/Geophysical observations.
iv. A report on the Power Evacuation Arrangement
envisaged by the Second Party.
v. Feasibility of the Project.
In case the Second Party is not able to furnish the above
documents within the stipulated period, the First Party
will be at liberty to cancel the Preliminary Agreement
after affording due opportunity to the Second Party. No
compensation whatsoever shall be payable by the First
Party in this regard. The Upfront Premium deposited by
the Second Party shall also be liable for forfeiture.
9. Following milestones shall be achieved by the Second
Party failing which consequential action as mentioned
will be taken by the First Party. The Second Party shall
be required to submit monthly progress report to the
Power Department. At the end of each quarter, the
Second Party shall be required to submit a quarterly
report to the First Party. The First Party will be at
liberty to cancel the Preliminary Agreement, after
affording due opportunity to the Second Party in case
the First Party is not satisfied about the progress made
by the Company.
Sl.
Milestones
For Projects where
Consequential
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No
.
(i)
1.
2.
(ii)
Upfront Premium
Conveyance
of
Feasibility/Nonfeasibility of the
Project:
i. A Compendium
giving details of
Feasibility is to be
ascertained by IPPs
falling under remote
areas
(iii)
First
Installment
comprising 50% (less
5%
amount
deposited as Bid
Security) amount of
total fixed upfront
premium payable for
the project, shall be
required
to
be
deposited within 30
days from the date of
issuance of Letter of
Intent. Immediately
after deposit of first
instalment, Letter of
Allotment shall be
issued
Second Instalment
comprising balance
50% of total fixed
upfront
premium
shall be required to
be deposited within a
period 3 months
from the date of
issuance of Letter of
Allotment
24 Months
Action
(iv)
Cancellation
Allotment
Cancellation
Allotment
Cancellation of
the Preliminary
Agreement and
forfeiture
of
Upfront
Premium
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3.
Hydrological/
Meteorological
data/observations
ii.Topographical
sheets
prepared
after conducting
surveys.
iii.A Compendium
giving details of
Geological/
Geophysical
observations.
iv.A report on the
Power Evacuation
Arrangement
envisaged by the
Second Party.
Submission
of
Detailed
Project
Report
deposited.
36 months from the
date of signing of
Preliminary
Agreement
Extension
of
prescribed
period in the
Preliminary
Agreement upto
maximum of six
months subject
to deposit of
prescribed
Extension of Rs.
10,000/- per MW
per month.
Sanction of TEC and other required clearance within 1 (one) year
from submission of DPR date.
Signing of IA within 1 (one) year of submitting DPR or receipt of the
above clearance, whichever is earlier.
12. The Validity of this Preliminary Agreement shall be
up to a period of 1 (one) month after due date of
submission of DPR or signing of IA whichever is earlier.
In the event, the Project is not found viable by the
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Second Party after the submission of PFR and the First
Party is satisfied that the Second Party has sufficient
ground to establish that the Project is not technoeconomically viable, the Company will be permitted to
withdraw from the Project within a maximum period of
24 months or 30 months as the case may be, without any
compensation or liability of First Party for the
expenditure incurred by the Second Party before the
expiry of this period. The 50% amount of the first
installment fixed upfront premium deposited at the time
of allotment of the project shall be refunded without any
interest and the balance 50% of the upfront premium
shall be forfeited to the First Party. This will ensure the
commitment of the Second Party towards the execution
of the Project and loss of time for the revenues which
could have otherwise accrued.
13. Subject to the First Party and the Second Party
having satisfied themselves about the techno-economic
feasibility of the Project, an Implementation Agreement
shall be signed between the First Party and the Second
Party within 1(one) year from the date of submitting of
DPR for Projects (where feasibility of the Project is to be
ascertained by IPPs) or receipt of clearance whichever
is earlier. The Company will have to deposit a Security
Deposit of sum of Indian Rupees equivalent to Rupees
(Rs. 1,00,000) per MW of installed capacity as
cash/Bank Draft within one month of signing of the
Implementation Agreement with the First Party.
30. Any difference and/or disputes arising at any time
between the parties out of this PA/IA or interpretation
thereof shall be endeavour to be resolved by the parties
hereto by mutual negotiation. All disputes shall be
settled within the jurisdiction of Courts of Shillong.”
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Clause 12 in this regard is of some importance, as it is
provided therein that the validity of the agreement shall be up to a
period of 1 month after due submission of the DPR, which in the
instant case would have expired on 12.01.2016, as the DPR had been
submitted on 13.12.2015. Clause 13, it can be seen has made a
provision for the parties to enter into an Implementation Agreement
within 1 year from the date of the submission of the DPR, on the
satisfaction about the techno-economic feasibility of the project which
however, was not done. As such, in this situation and on the nonsatisfaction of the conditions, by efflux of time the Agreement would
have stood extinguished.
14.
However, the impugned termination notice dated
22.12.2023, categorically under the two subject heads has stated and
described the nature and purport of the said notice as one of
termination of Preliminary Agreements dated 09.05.2014. A further
perusal of the termination order would reflect that reliance has been
placed for the said termination in the clauses contained in the
Preliminary Agreement and in the said notice itself reference has been
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made to a proposal placed in the review meeting dated 19.02.2022. In
the concluding part it has been stated that the termination has been
made in exercise of powers under clause 29 of the Preliminary
Agreement, and that the impugned order was being issued in
accordance to the said Agreement. Though it has been argued and also
reflected that the termination order is a reiteration that the Preliminary
Agreement is no longer in existence, the very fact however, the
respondents in spite of having by letter dated 09.09.2022 conveyed the
decision of cancellation, which would have effectively cut short the
matter, the termination order being on the basis of the Preliminary
Agreement, it stands to reason that before issuance of the same, as per
clause 5, the petitioner should have been show caused and heard. This
opportunity having admittedly not been extended to the petitioner, this
Court is therefore, to finally examine as to whether the termination
order is arbitrary and unreasonable.
15.
In the case of Mahabir Auto Stores vs. Indian Oil
Corporation (supra) it has been held that fairness in action should be
present and that even there is no duty to hear or give reasons, it is
2024:MLHC:974
essential to inform the affected party and take it into confidence. In the
case of SBI vs. Rajesh Agarwal (supra) which has dealt with and
discussed the principles of natural justice, it has been held that an
administrative action can be tested for constitutional infirmities under
Article 14 on four grounds i.e. (i) unreasonableness or irrationality (ii)
illegality (iii) procedural impropriety and (iv) proportionality but the
scope of such judicial review is limited to ascertaining the deficiency
in the decision making process and not the correctness of the choice. It
further held that the principles of natural justice have universal
application and constitute an important facet of procedural propriety
envisaged under Article 14. With regard to the point that writ
jurisdiction is a public law remedy, and that the instant matter is
entirely in a private realm of affairs, in the case of M.P. Power
Management Co. Ltd., vs. Sky Power Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd.,
(supra) on this point itself at Para 82.12, it has been held as follows:“In a case the State is a party to the contract and a
breach of a contract is alleged against the State, a civil
action in the appropriate forum is, undoubtedly,
maintainable. But this is not the end of the matter.
Having regard to the position of the State and its duty to
act fairly and to eschew arbitrariness in all its actions,
resort to the constitutional remedy on the cause of
action, that the action is arbitrary, is permissible (see in
2024:MLHC:974
this regard Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P.30).
However, it must be made clear that every case involving
breach of contract by the State, cannot be dressed up and
disguised as a case of arbitrary State action. While the
concept of an arbitrary action or inaction cannot be
cribbed or confined to any immutable mantra, and must
be laid bare, with reference to the facts of each case, it
cannot be a mere allegation of breach of contract that
would suffice. What must be involved in the case must be
action/inaction, which must be palpably unreasonable or
absolutely irrational and bereft of any principle. An
action, which is completely mala fide, can hardly be
described as a fair action and may, depending on the
facts, amount to arbitrary action. The question must be
posed and answered by the Court and all we intend to lay
down is that there is a discretion available to the Court to
grant relief in appropriate cases.”
A perusal of the above noted pronouncements therefore,
would necessarily demand that the respondents maintain fairness in
action and the observance of the principles of natural justice,
notwithstanding the fact that the main subject matter from which the
dispute has arisen is in the realm of private law.
16.
Further, though it has been submitted by the respondents
that alternate remedy exists in the form of an arbitration clause in the
Preliminary Agreement itself, this however, cannot serve as a bar to the
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exercise of writ jurisdiction in certain cases where the action of the
authorities is in violation of the principles of natural justice. As held in
the case of Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd (supra)
at Para-7 thereof, “In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of
the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ
jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition
seeks enforcement of any fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure
of the principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders of
proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is
challenged”.
With regard to the question of disputed facts though this
aspect has been agitated, this Court on examination of materials does
not find this point relevant for consideration. On the issue of whether
the petitioner is seeking specific performance of contract, this Court is
of the considered view that with the issuance of the termination order
which has been challenged in the second writ petition and now
concerns only the question as to whether the said order is unreasonable
and arbitrary, this aspect also has no further relevance in this discourse.
2024:MLHC:974
17.
The recent decision in the case of Tata Tata Motors Ltd.
vs. Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking
(BEST), (supra) however, has cautioned court to exercise restraint
while exercising their powers of judicial review in contractual or
commercial matter. At Para-48 of the judgment, it has been held as
follows:-
“48. This Court being the guardian of fundamental
rights is duty-bound to interfere when there is
arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides and bias. However,
this Court has cautioned time and again that courts
should exercise a lot of restraint while exercising their
powers of judicial review in contractual or commercial
matters. This Court is normally loathe to interfere in
contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of
arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or irrationality is
made out. One must remember that today many public
sector undertakings compete with the private industry.
The contracts entered into between private parties are
not subject to scrutiny under writ jurisdiction. No doubt,
the bodies which are State within the meaning of Article
12 of the Constitution are bound to act fairly and are
amenable to the writ jurisdiction of superior courts but
this discretionary power must be exercised with a great
deal of restraint and caution. The courts must realise
their limitations and the havoc which needless
interference in commercial matters can cause. In
contracts involving technical issues the courts should be
even more reluctant because most of us in Judges' robes
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do not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon
technical issues beyond our domain. The courts should
not use a magnifying glass while scanning the tenders
and make every small mistake appear like a big blunder.
In fact, the courts must give “fair play in the joints” to
the government and public sector undertakings in
matters of contract. Courts must also not interfere where
such interference will cause unnecessary loss to the
public exchequer. (See: Silppi Constructions Contractors
v. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 489)”
18.
Similarly, in the case of Jagdish Mandal vs. State of
Orissa (supra) at Para 22, it has been held as follows:“22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended
to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness,
bias and malafides. Its purpose is to check whether
choice or decision is made 'lawfully' and not to check
whether choice or decision is 'sound'. When the power of
judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders
or award of contracts, certain special features should be
borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction.
Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are
essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity
and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision
relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public
interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial
review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error
in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The
power of judicial review will not be permitted to be
invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public
interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer
or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages
in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with
imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business
2024:MLHC:974
rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some
technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self,
and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of
judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences,
either interim or final, may hold up public works for
years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and
millions and may increase the project cost manifold.
Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or
contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial
review, should pose to itself the following questions :
i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the
authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone;
OR
Whether the process adopted or decision made is so
arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: 'the
decision is such that no responsible authority acting
reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could
have reached;'
ii) Whether public interest is affected.
If the answers are in the negative, there should be no
interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a
tenderer/contractor or distribution of state largesse
(allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships
and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may
require a higher degree of fairness in action.”
19.
In the backdrop of the above noted cases which have
been cited by the parties and in consideration of the facts and
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circumstances of the case, apart from the points of law and principles
as enunciated, the most important aspect is the situation of the facts of
the case which are peculiar to itself. As discussed above, the
Preliminary Agreement at clause 5 has clearly provided that due
opportunity be given to the petitioner in the advent that cancellation is
being contemplated on the breach of the conditions of the Preliminary
Agreement. No doubt this clause has provided for an inbuilt
mechanism that binds the respondents to afford an opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner before cancelling the agreement, thus
necessitating the adherence to the principles of natural justice.
However, on the other hand from the materials on record, it is seen that
in the review meeting held on 20.04.2022 when the feasibility of the
project was under consideration, and the decision taken to cancel the
Agreement taken, there was no representation from the side of the
petitioner. Further, by communications dated 24.07.2022, and
23.09.2023, the petitioner itself, on the decision of the respondents to
cancel the Agreement had raised the issues of recovery of costs and
expenses which have been incurred in carrying out feasibility reports
and sought for an amicable settlement. These facts assume
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significance, inasmuch as, the respondents by the impugned order of
cancellation dated 22.12.2023, though citing the Preliminary
Agreement have maintained that the order was only a reiteration of the
decision already arrived at by the respondents in the review meeting
held on 20.04.2022 and communicated by letter dated 09.09.2022,
wherein the decision to discontinue the project and also the fact that
the petitioner did not attend the same in spite of notice was mentioned.
20.
In the light of the facts as discussed above, in the
considered view of this Court therefore, it cannot be said that there was
no substantial compliance of the principles of natural justice in
cancelling the Agreement, inasmuch as, the petitioner was offered
adequate opportunity as can be seen from Para-11 of the impugned
order itself. The termination therefore cannot be held to be irrational or
arbitrary or that the same is malafide or unreasonable to the extent to
be interfered with in exercise of discretionary powers of a writ court
under Article 226. As noted earlier, the only concern of the petitioner is
with relief to be granted on account of the expenses incurred in
preparing for the project, which lies squarely in the realm of private
2024:MLHC:974
law, for which efficacious alternate remedy to sue for damages is
available.
21.
As such therefore, these writ petitions are found to be not
maintainable and are accordingly not entertained, leaving the petitioner
to seek private law remedy in accordance with law.
22.
The writ petitions are accordingly closed and disposed of.
JUDGE
Meghalaya
05.11.2024
“V. Lyndem PS”
VALENTINO LYNDEM
Date: 2024.11.05 16:30:53 IST
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