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CGHC010445822025
2026:CGHC:35823
AFR
Digitally
VISHAKHA signed by
BEOHAR
VISHAKHA
BEOHAR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 5472 of 2025
Order Reserved on 17.07.2026
Order Delivered on 13.08.2026
1 - Sitaram Matolia S/o Late Shri Durgadutt Matolia Aged About 80
Years R/o Sarju Bagicha, Bilaspur, Tehsil And District Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of
Urban Administration And Development, Mahanadi Bhawan,
Mantralaya, Capital Complex, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District
Raipur
Chhattisgarh
2 - Municipal Corporation Bilaspur Through Its Commissioner,
Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh
3 - Commissioner Municipal Corporation Bilaspur, District Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh
-
Collector
Bilaspur,
District
Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh
-
Tehsildar
Bilaspur,
District
Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh
6 - Bilaspur Smart City Company Limited Through Its Managing
Director, Vikas Bhawan, Nehru Chowk, Bilaspur, District - Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh
7 - Shri Amit Kumar (I A S) Commissioner, Municipal Corporation
Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from the Case Information System)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------For Petitioner
:-
Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate
along with Mr. Amit Soni, Advocate
For State
:-
Dr. Arham Siddiqui, P.L.
For Respondents No. 2 & 3:- Mr. Divy Jha, Advocate on behalf of
Mr. S.S. Marhas, Advocate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SB- Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV Order
1. By way of the present writ petition filed under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the
proposal letter dated 07.08.2025 issued by respondent No. 2
and the terms and conditions of the lease agreement dated
18.08.2025 executed between the petitioner and respondent
No. 2, particularly insofar as they relate to the period of lease,
fixation of rent and the conditions imposed for running the
hotel. The case of the petitioner is that the respondents ought
to have granted the lease of the newly allotted shop for the
unexpired period of the earlier lease in terms of the policy
decision dated 26.03.2024. It is further contended that the
rent fixed for the new shop is arbitrary, excessive and
unreasonable and is contrary to the terms and conditions of
the earlier lease deed. The petitioner also seeks a direction
permitting him to continue his hotel business from the said
premises.
2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following
reliefs:“1. That, to issue a suitable writ/direction to
quash the impugned proposal letter dated
07.08.2025 (Annexure P/1) issued by respondent
no. 2, insofar as it limits the lease period to 3
years and fixes the monthly rent at Rs.
24,443/+GST.
2. That, to issue a suitable writ/direction to quash
the conditions no. 2, 5, 8, 16 and 17 of
agreement dated 18.08.2025.
3. That, to issue a suitable writ/direction directing
the respondent authorities to execute a fresh
lease deed in favour of the petitioner for the
allotted shop no. 2 for the remaining period of the
original lease, i.e., up to 20.08.2036, and to fix
the rent in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the original lease deed dated
21.08.2006 or in alternative the authorities may
kindly be directed to re-consider the matter so far
as it relates to fixing the reasonable monthly rent
under rehabilitation.
4. That the respondent authorities may kindly be
directed to delete condition no. 2, 5, 8, 16 and 17
of agreement dated 18.08.2025 and they may
further be directed to execute the registered
leased deed in favour of the petitioner as per
direction issued by this Hon'ble Court.
5. That, any other further order(s) as deemed fit
and necessary by this Hon'ble Court in the
interest of justice.”
3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner has filed the
present writ petition challenging the legality and validity of the
proposal letter dated 07.08.2025 issued by respondent No. 2
and the subsequent lease agreement dated 18.08.2025,
particularly with regard to the period of lease, fixation of rent
and other conditions imposed for running the business from
the allotted shop. The petitioner was granted a registered
lease of Shop No. A-1 situated at Imlipara Road, Old Bus
Stand, Bilaspur (C.G.), admeasuring 718 sq. ft. (G+1), by the
Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, vide lease deed dated
21.08.2006 for a period of 30 years, which was valid up to
20.08.2036. The petitioner was carrying on his business in
the name and style of "Rajasthan Jalebi Wala" from the said
premises and was regularly paying rent to the Municipal
Corporation. During the subsistence of the lease period, the
Municipal Corporation decided to demolish the petitioner's
shop for the purpose of road widening, pursuant to which the
petitioner approached this Court
1517/2021.
In
the
said
by filing
proceedings,
the
WPC No.
Municipal
Corporation, in its reply, specifically undertook that the
petitioner, being an existing leaseholder, would be allotted a
new shop in the newly constructed complex as a measure of
rehabilitation. Thereafter, the lease granted in favour of the
petitioner was cancelled vide order dated 14.02.2025, which
was challenged by the petitioner in WPC No. 1027/2025.
During the pendency of the said writ petition, the respondent
authorities took a policy decision dated 26.03.2025 to allot
newly constructed shops to existing valid leaseholders for the
remaining period of their respective lease. Accordingly, a
committee was constituted for fixation of rent and other terms
for fresh allotment. The petitioner contends that such fixation
was applicable only to fresh allotments and could not be
applied to rehabilitation of existing leaseholders having
subsisting lease rights. Subsequently, the petitioner was
allotted Shop No. 2 in the newly constructed commercial
complex at Imlipara, Bilaspur through lottery proceedings held
on 04.08.2025. However, respondent No. 2 issued the
proposal letter dated 07.08.2025 proposing execution of a
fresh lease only for a period of three years and imposed
excessive financial conditions, including enhanced monthly
rent of Rs.20,035/- plus GST, operation and maintenance
charges
of
Rs.2,68,871/-
and
security
deposit
of
Rs.2,68,871/-. Thereafter, pursuant to the order dated
11.08.2025 passed in WPC No.1027/2025, the petitioner
deposited the demanded amount under protest and took
possession of the newly allotted shop, whereafter an
agreement dated 18.08.2025 was executed between the
petitioner and respondent No.2. The grievance of the
petitioner is that the respondents, contrary to their own policy
decision and the original lease deed, have reduced the lease
period from the remaining period up to 2036 to only three
years and have arbitrarily fixed an exorbitant rent and
imposed unreasonable conditions in the agreement dated
18.08.2025, thereby adversely affecting the petitioner's
existing lease rights and his right to carry on business.
Hence, the petitioner has approached this Court challenging
the aforesaid actions of the respondent authorities.
4. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Advocate along with Mr.
Amit Soni, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner,
submits that the petitioner is a lawful lessee of the premises
in question and has been in peaceful possession and
enjoyment thereof for several years. It is submitted that the
petitioner was granted lease of Shop No. A-1 situated at
Imlipara Road, Old Bus Stand, Bilaspur by a registered lease
deed dated 21.08.2006 for a period of 30 years, which was
valid up to 20.08.2036. Therefore, the petitioner continues to
have subsisting lease rights over the said premises.
5. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the petitioner was
carrying on his business in the name and style of "Rajasthan
Jalebi Wala" for the last several decades and the said
business is the source of his livelihood. It is contended that
the right to livelihood forms an integral part of the right to life
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and
the right to property is protected under Article 300-A of the
Constitution
of
India.
The
respondents,
being
State
instrumentalities, are required to act fairly, reasonably and in
a non-arbitrary manner and cannot deprive the petitioner of
his lawful rights. It is submitted that by way of the present writ
petition, the petitioner is not challenging all the terms and
conditions
incorporated
in
the
proposal
letter
dated
07.08.2025
and
the
subsequent
agreement
dated
18.08.2025. The petitioner has restricted his challenge only to
the extent that the lease in respect of the newly allotted shop
be granted/executed for the remaining and unexpired period
of the original lease, i.e. up to 20.08.2036, instead of
restricting the same to a period of three years. It is further
submitted that the petitioner is also seeking a direction to the
respondent authorities to provide essential basic amenities,
namely electricity and water supply, to the newly allotted
shop, as despite handing over possession, the said facilities
have not been provided till date.
6. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the original shop of the
petitioner was demolished by the Municipal Corporation,
Bilaspur for the purpose of road widening. Being aggrieved by
the proposed demolition, the petitioner had approached this
Hon'ble Court by filing WPC No. 1517 of 2021, wherein an
interim order dated 17.03.2021 was passed. During the
pendency of the said proceedings, the Municipal Corporation
itself placed an affidavit before this Hon'ble Court stating that
the petitioner, being a leaseholder for a period of 30 years,
would be rehabilitated and allotted a shop in the newly
constructed complex and that no such shop would be
auctioned. It is further submitted that during the pendency of
the aforesaid proceedings, the lease of the petitioner was
cancelled vide order dated 14.02.2025 on the ground that the
petitioner had kept dustbin and gas outside the shop, which
according to the Corporation amounted to encroachment and
caused traffic obstruction. The said action was challenged by
the petitioner by filing WPC No. 1027 of 2025 before this
Hon'ble Court. During the pendency of the said writ petition,
the Municipal Corporation itself undertook before this Hon'ble
Court that the petitioner would be allotted a newly constructed
shop. Thereafter, by order dated 21.02.2025, this Hon'ble
Court
directed
the
petitioner
to
cooperate
with
the
administration and police authorities till allotment of a new
shop in the newly constructed complex.
7. Learned Senior Counsel submits that during the pendency of
WPC No. 1027 of 2025, the Municipal Corporation, through
its Mayor-in-Council/General Body meeting dated 26.03.2025,
took a conscious policy decision whereby five valid and
subsisting leaseholders, including the present petitioner, were
decided to be allotted shops in the newly constructed Imlipara
Commercial Complex for the remaining/unexpired lease
period. It is submitted that the petitioner was placed at Serial
No. 1 in Category "A" of valid leaseholders. Thus, the
respondent Corporation itself recognized the status of the
petitioner as a valid leaseholder and resolved to rehabilitate
him for the remaining lease period. It is submitted that
thereafter, pursuant to the said policy decision, the petitioner
was called upon to participate in the lottery proceedings for
allotment of shop on 04.08.2025 and Shop No. 2 in the newly
constructed complex was allotted to him. The petitioner
accepted the said allotment believing that the same was
being made in furtherance of the policy decision dated
26.03.2025, whereby allotment was contemplated for the
remaining lease period.
8. However, learned Senior Counsel submits that to the utter
surprise of the petitioner, thereafter proposal letter dated
07.08.2025 was issued by respondent No. 2 stipulating that
only a fresh lease for a period of three years would be
executed and imposing substantial financial liabilities towards
operation and maintenance charges, security deposit and
monthly rent. It is contended that such restriction to a period
of three years is contrary to the Corporation's own resolution
dated 26.03.2025 and contrary to the legitimate expectation
created in favour of the petitioner. It is submitted that WPC
No. 1027 of 2025 was thereafter disposed of by this Hon'ble
Court vide order dated 11.08.2025, directing the petitioner to
deposit the amount as per the proposal letter dated
07.08.2025 for securing possession, while granting liberty to
the petitioner to approach this Hon'ble Court in case of any
fresh cause of action. In compliance thereof, the petitioner
deposited the requisite amount under protest and thereafter
has also continued to pay rent; however, despite handing
over possession, essential facilities such as electricity and
water supply have not been provided, due to which the
petitioner has been unable to commence his business from
the newly allotted shop.
9. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the restriction of lease
period to three years was not confined only to the petitioner
but was imposed upon all five valid leaseholders included in
Category "A", which itself demonstrates that the respondent
Corporation has acted contrary to its own policy decision. It is
submitted that two other leaseholders, namely Sushil
Samnani and Rani Samnani, also challenged the said action
by filing WPC No. 4503 of 2025 before this Hon'ble Court. It is
submitted that in the said writ petition, the Municipal
Corporation had taken a stand that since the property was
situated over Nazul land, the Corporation had no authority to
execute a long-term lease and therefore a three-year
management agreement was the appropriate mechanism.
However, this very stand was considered by this Hon'ble
Court in WPC No. 4503 of 2025, wherein vide order dated
28.10.2025, this Hon'ble Court held that the petitioners
therein were valid leaseholders and that the allotment could
not be restricted merely to three years on account of
administrative convenience. The Court directed that the
period of allotment be determined keeping in view the original
lease tenure and the subsisting rights of the leaseholders.
10.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that the aforesaid
order dated 28.10.2025 has subsequently been affirmed by
the Hon'ble Division Bench in WA No. 397 of 2026 vide order
dated 08.05.2026, wherein it has been held that the directions
issued by the learned Single Judge only protect the legitimate
expectation and preferential entitlement arising from the
subsisting lease and the assurances/resolution of the
Corporation. It is contended that the present petitioner stands
on an identical footing, being one of the valid leaseholders
covered under the resolution dated 26.03.2025. Therefore,
the petitioner is also entitled for allotment of the shop for the
remaining/unexpired period of the original lease.
11.
Learned Senior Counsel further submits that once the
Municipal Corporation itself had passed a resolution for
allotment of shops to valid leaseholders for the remaining
lease period and had acted upon the said resolution by
allotting a shop to the petitioner, it cannot subsequently take a
contrary stand and restrict the lease period to only three
years.
Such
action
is
contrary
to
the
principles
of
administrative fairness, legitimate expectation and nonarbitrariness.
12.
Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand and Others v.
Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. Ranchi and Another, (2023) 10
SCC 634, wherein it has been held that the State and its
instrumentalities are bound to honour their policy decisions
and representations made in the public domain and cannot
act arbitrarily to the prejudice of citizens who have acted upon
such representations. Learned Senior Counsel submits that
no separate issue survives regarding cancellation of the
earlier lease, as the subsequent resolution passed by the
Municipal
Corporation
itself
demonstrates
that
the
Corporation had, in substance and effect, accepted the
entitlement of the petitioner for rehabilitation as a valid
leaseholder. The respondents cannot be permitted to take
mutually inconsistent stands by first recognizing the petitioner
as a valid leaseholder entitled for rehabilitation and thereafter
restricting the benefit contrary to their own resolution. It is
further submitted that despite handing over possession of the
newly allotted shop, the respondents have failed to provide
electricity and water supply from the very date of delivery of
possession. The petitioner has already approached this
Hon'ble Court by filing an interim application, wherein the
Corporation submitted that installation of transformer was to
be undertaken by the Electricity Department and that
necessary steps would be taken. However, till date, no
effective steps have been taken and the petitioner is unable
to commence his business in absence of basic amenities.
13.
In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned Senior
Counsel prays that the respondent Corporation be directed to
execute/grant lease of the newly allotted shop in favour of the
petitioner for the remaining period of the original lease up to
20.08.2036, in terms of the policy decision dated 26.03.2025,
and further be directed to forthwith provide electricity and
water supply to the allotted shop so that the petitioner may
resume his business.
14.
Mr. Divy Jha, Advocate on behalf of Mr. S.S. Marhas,
learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3
submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable, as
the grievance raised by the petitioner pertains to the terms
and conditions of a lease agreement executed between the
parties, which is contractual in nature. It is submitted that the
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India is a public law remedy and cannot be invoked for
enforcement or modification of contractual obligations. The
petitioner, if so advised, may avail the appropriate remedy
before the competent civil forum. It is submitted that the
petitioner has already been granted Shop No. 2 situated at
New Commercial Complex, Imlipara Road, Bilaspur, and a
lease agreement was executed by the Commissioner,
Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, in favour of the petitioner for
a period of three years. The petitioner, after accepting the
terms and conditions of the lease agreement, has taken
possession of the said shop. It is contended that the petitioner
voluntarily entered into the agreement and, after accepting
the benefits arising therefrom, cannot now challenge the
terms and conditions of the same. Learned counsel submits
that the earlier lease granted in favour of the petitioner was
already cancelled vide order dated 14.02.2025 on account of
violation of the terms and conditions of the lease deed. The
said cancellation order was challenged by the petitioner in
WPC No.1027/2025; however, the said writ petition was
disposed of on 11.08.2025 and the order of cancellation was
neither quashed nor interfered with. Therefore, the earlier
lease stood terminated and the petitioner cannot claim
continuation of the earlier lease period up to 2036.
15.
It is further submitted that the allotment of the new shop
was a fresh arrangement made in favour of the petitioner as a
rehabilitation measure and not a continuation of the earlier
lease. The petitioner, along with other similarly situated
persons, was called for allotment proceedings through lottery
on 04.08.2025. Before the allotment process, the terms and
conditions of the proposed lease were duly explained to the
participants, and the petitioner's representative participated in
the proceedings and accepted the conditions. Learned
counsel further submits that the petitioner did not raise any
objection at the time of execution of the lease agreement and
voluntarily accepted the terms thereof. The petitioner is,
therefore, estopped from challenging the same after taking
possession of the premises. The allegations that the terms
and conditions are arbitrary, oppressive or contrary to
legitimate expectation are misconceived.
16.
Learned counsel submits that the fixation of rent for
Shop No. 2 in the newly constructed commercial complex has
been done after considering various factors, including the
expenditure incurred in construction of the complex, overhead
expenses and maintenance charges. The rent so fixed cannot
be termed as arbitrary or unreasonable. It is further submitted
that the earlier rent payable under the old lease cannot be
compared with the rent fixed for a newly constructed
commercial complex. Learned counsel also submits that the
petitioner has wrongly relied upon the policy decision dated
26.03.2025 and the proceedings of the earlier writ petition.
The said policy decision was applicable to rehabilitation of
eligible leaseholders; however, the allotment of the new shop
was subject to execution of a fresh lease agreement and the
terms and conditions mentioned therein. It is further submitted
that
the
order
dated
11.08.2025
passed
in
WPC
No.1027/2025 only granted liberty to the petitioner to
approach this Court in case any fresh cause of action arose
and cannot be interpreted as conferring any right upon the
petitioner to challenge the terms of the lease agreement
which were already within his knowledge and accepted by
him. It is submitted that the petitioner continues to carry on
his business and the respondents have provided an
alternative shop as a rehabilitation measure. Therefore, the
claim that the petitioner's livelihood has been affected is
wholly misconceived.
17.
Dr. Arham Siddiqui, learned State counsel submits that,
though the dispute in the present matter is essentially
between the petitioner and the Municipal Corporation, which
is arrayed as respondent No. 2, the State Government
through the Secretary, Department of Urban Administration
and
Development,
has
supervisory
control
over
the
functioning of the Municipal Corporation. It is submitted that,
having regard to the nature of the dispute and upon
consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the
case, particularly the lease agreement executed between the
petitioner and the Municipal Corporation, it is apparent that
the petitioner had accepted the terms and conditions
incorporated therein and thereafter taken possession of the
allotted premises. Once the petitioner has voluntarily
accepted the terms and conditions of the agreement, he
cannot be permitted to turn around and challenge the same
after deriving benefits under such agreement. Learned State
counsel further submits that the petitioner, having entered into
a contractual arrangement with open eyes and without any
objection, is bound by the terms and conditions of the
agreement and cannot seek modification or alteration thereof
through a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. Therefore, the present writ petition, being devoid of
merit, deserves to be dismissed.
18.
I have heard learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner as well as learned counsel appearing for the
respondents and have carefully perused the pleadings,
documents placed on record and the submissions advanced
by the respective parties.
19.
I have heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2
and 3 as well as learned State counsel, and have perused the
pleadings, documents brought on record and the authorities
relied upon by the respective parties.
20.
The principal grievance of the petitioner is that though
he was a valid leaseholder under the registered lease deed
dated 21.08.2006 valid till 20.08.2036 and was allotted an
alternative shop pursuant to demolition of the earlier premises
for public purpose, the respondent-Municipal Corporation has
arbitrarily restricted the fresh allotment to a period of three
years and has imposed onerous financial conditions, contrary
to the policy decision dated 26.03.2025. On the other hand,
the stand of the respondent-Corporation is that the earlier
lease already stood cancelled; thereafter, a fresh contractual
arrangement came into existence which was voluntarily
accepted by the petitioner without protest and, therefore, the
petitioner cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court to
alter the contractual terms.
21.
Upon consideration of the rival submissions, this Court
finds that it is not in dispute that after issuance of the proposal
letter dated 07.08.2025, the petitioner deposited the amount
demanded therein, accepted possession of the newly allotted
shop and thereafter executed the lease agreement dated
18.08.2025. The petitioner has admittedly entered into the
contractual arrangement and has continued to remain in
possession
of
the
allotted
premises
under
the
said
agreement. The challenge raised in the present petition
substantially relates to the tenure of the lease, fixation of rent
and certain terms and conditions incorporated in the
agreement.
22.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of St. Mary’s
Education Society and Another vs. Rejendra Prasad
Bhargava and Others (2023) 4 SCC 498 has held as under:“75. We may sum up our final conclusions as
under:
75.1. An application under Article 226 of the
Constitution is maintainable against a person or
a body discharging public duties or public
functions. The public duty cast may be either
statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise,
the body or the person must be shown to owe
that duty or obligation to the public involving the
public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the
discharge
of
public
function,
it
must
be
established that the body or the person was
seeking to achieve the same for the collective
benefit of the public or a section of it and the
authority to do so must be accepted by the
public.
75.2. Even if it be assumed that an educational
institution is imparting public duty, the act
complained of must have a direct nexus with the
discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a
public law action which confers a right upon the
aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative
writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual
contracts without having any public element as
its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ
petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have
intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226, either the service conditions were
regulated by the statutory provisions or the
employer had the status of “State” within the
expansive definition under Article 12 or it was
found that the action complained of has public
law element.
75.3. It must be consequently held that while a
body may be discharging a public function or
performing a public duty and thus its actions
becoming amenable to judicial review by a
constitutional court, its employees would not
have the right to invoke the powers of the High
Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of
matter relating to service where they are not
governed
or
provisions.
An
controlled
by
educational
the
statutory
institution
may
perform myriad functions touching various facets
of public life and in the societal sphere. While
such of those functions as would fall within the
domain of a “public function” or “public duty” be
undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny
under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions
or decisions taken solely within the confines of
an ordinary contract of service, having no
statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised
as being amenable to challenge under Article
226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the
service conditions being controlled or governed
by statutory provisions, the matter would remain
in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.”
23.
It is well settled that the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is essentially a
public law remedy. Ordinarily, disputes arising purely out of
contractual obligations, particularly where the parties have
consciously entered into a contract and the controversy
relates to interpretation, enforcement or modification of its
terms, are not amenable to writ jurisdiction unless the action
complained of is shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory or
violative of any statutory or constitutional provision. Whether
the petitioner is entitled to continuation of the original lease till
20.08.2036, whether the fresh allotment should be treated as
a continuation of the earlier lease, or whether the conditions
incorporated in the agreement deserve to be modified are
essentially questions flowing from contractual rights and
obligations,
which
require
adjudication
on
facts
and
interpretation of the contractual documents. Such issues are
more appropriately examined before the competent civil
forum and not in proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
24.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Government
of Tamil Nadu and others vs. P.R. Jaganathan and others,
2025 SCC Online SC 2496, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
observed as under:“21. Once such an agreement is arrived at, it becomes
a concluded contract under Section 3 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872. The rights and liabilities of the
parties would only be governed by the terms of the
contract. Hence, a contract voluntarily entered into
between the parties, shall not be disturbed by taking
recourse to the statutory provisions, which are sought
to be excluded by such contract. A party to a contract
cannot be permitted to have recourse to two different
modes,
especially
after
having
accepted
the
compensation under the contract without any demur or
protest. It is not open to either of the parties to resile
from the terms of the agreement arrived at. We may
note that the issues of rent and compensation were
raised even earlier. These issues were put to an end
through
the
agreement.
Therefore,
the
private
respondents are totally estopped from seeking any
relief beyond the terms of the contract.
23. It is not as if the agreement has been entered into
by force or deceit. There is no suppression of fact or
any element of fraud. Therefore, it can be seen that the
private respondents were initially inclined to accept the
amount determined by way of a final agreement. It is
only thereafter, wisdom dawned upon them to seek
interest. Thus, it is a clear case of approbation and
reprobation. The said doctrine of approbate and
reprobate has been enunciated by this Court in the
case of Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC
25:
“Approbate and reprobate:
26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots
law. They would only mean that no party can be
allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and
thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle
behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the
concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again,
it is a principle of equity coming under the
contours of common law. Therefore, he who
knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will
not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to
do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take
advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A
person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of
an instrument while questioning the same. Such
a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the
transaction. This principle has to be applied with
more vigour as a common law principle, if such a
party actually enjoys the one part fully and on
near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter
questions the other part. An element of fair play
is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of
estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. We
have already dealt with the provisions of the
Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party,
and
his
presumption
of
knowledge
while
confirming an offer through his acceptance
unconditionally.”
25.
(emphasis supplied)
The reliance placed by the petitioner upon the policy
decision dated 26.03.2025 and the earlier orders passed by
this Court has also been considered. However, once the
petitioner consciously entered into the subsequent agreement
and accepted possession of the premises thereunder, the
rights and liabilities of the parties thereafter became governed
by the terms of the said agreement. This Court, while
exercising writ jurisdiction, would not rewrite the contractual
terms or substitute a different bargain between the parties.
The petitioner, if so advised, is always at liberty to question
the validity or enforceability of the contractual stipulations
before the competent forum in accordance with law. This
Court, therefore, refrains from expressing any opinion on the
merits of the petitioner's claim regarding continuation of the
lease till 20.08.2036 or the validity of the impugned
contractual clauses, lest it may prejudice either party in any
future proceedings.
26.
However, one aspect of the matter stands on an entirely
different footing. It is an admitted position that after allotment
of the shop and execution of the agreement, the respondentMunicipal Corporation has not provided the petitioner with
essential amenities such as electricity and water supply,
which are indispensable for making the premises functional.
Simultaneously, the respondents are insisting upon payment
of rent and other charges in terms of the agreement. Such a
course of action cannot be countenanced. An allottee cannot
reasonably be expected to pay rent for a commercial
premises which has not been rendered fit for commercial use
on account of failure of the allotting authority itself. The
obligation to provide minimum civic amenities is incidental to
the allotment itself and cannot be divorced from the demand
of rent. The respondent-Corporation, being a statutory local
authority, is expected to act fairly and reasonably and cannot
compel the petitioner to perform his contractual obligations
while itself failing to discharge the corresponding obligations
necessary to make the premises usable.
27.
In the considered opinion of this Court, therefore, while
no interference is warranted with respect to the contractual
terms governing the lease period, rent and other conditions
contained in the agreement dated 18.08.2025 in exercise of
writ jurisdiction, the respondent-Municipal Corporation is dutybound to ensure that the allotted premises are made
functional by providing electricity connection, water supply
and all other basic amenities necessary for carrying on the
business for which the shop has been allotted.
28.
Consequently, respondent No.2-Municipal Corporation
is directed to provide electricity connection, water supply and
all other essential civic amenities to the shop allotted to the
petitioner within a period of four weeks from the date of
receipt of a certified copy of this order, if the same have not
already been provided.
29.
It is made clear that this Court has not adjudicated upon
the petitioner's claim regarding continuation of the lease for
the remaining period of the original lease, the legality of the
lease period fixed under the agreement dated 18.08.2025, the
fixation of rent or any other contractual stipulation, and the
petitioner shall be at liberty to avail such remedy as may be
available to him in accordance with law before the appropriate
forum.
30.
With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ
petition stands disposed of.
31.
No order as to costs.
sd/(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Vishakha
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