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WP(C) NO. 18782 OF 2024
2025:KER:31531
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BECHU KURIAN THOMAS
THURSDAY, THE 10TH DAY OF APRIL 2025 / 20TH CHAITHRA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 18782 OF 2024
PETITIONER :
SISTER SUPERIOR, ST. VINCENT DE PAUL CONVENT,
AGED 51 YEARS,
OLLUR, THRISSUR, REP. BY SR. SOPHIA,
D/O.INASHU (LATE), SISTER SUPERIOR,
ST. VINCENT DE PAUL CONVENT,
OLLUR, PIN – 680 306
BY ADVS.
J.JULIAN XAVIER
FIROZ K.ROBIN
JOSE. V.V. (THENGATHARA)
ROY JOSEPH
ANIES MATHEW
NIRMAL KURIEN EAPEN
JOSEPH JOSE
CHRISTEENA AUGUSTINE
RAJU JOSEPH (SR.)
RESPONDENTS :
THRISSUR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
KURUPPAM, THEKKINKADU MAIDAN,
THRISSUR, PIN – 680 001
THE SECRETARY,
THRISSUR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
KURUPPAM, THEKKINKADU MAIDAN, THRISSUR,
PIN – 680 001
WP(C) NO. 18782 OF 2024
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STATE OF KERALA,
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY,
LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT,
SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
PIN – 695 001
BY SRI.SANTHOSH P.PODUVAL, SC
BY SMT.DEEPA K.R., SPL.GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS
WRIT
PETITION
(CIVIL)
HAVING
BEEN
FINALLY
HEARD
04.03.2025, THE COURT ON 10.04.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING :
ON
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“C.R.”
BECHU KURIAN THOMAS, J.
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=W.P.(C).No.18782 of 2024
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Dated this the 10th day of April, 2025
JUDGMENT
Petitioner seeks for a declaration that the levy and collection of
property tax without fixing the rate of tax as per the mandate of Section 233
of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 (for short ‘the Act’) and its Rules is without
any authority of law. Petitioner also seeks to quash Ext.P12 demand notice and
a direction not to collect property tax for its building under the category of
‘Special Residential’ apart from a further direction to refund the amounts paid
towards such tax.
2.
Petitioner represents a convent for nuns of the Christian faith
under the Congregation of Mother of Carmel. The building used as the
residence for aged nuns and other sisters of charity is the subject matter of
this writ petition. According to the petitioner, the convent had been paying
property tax to the respondent Corporation, without any default. However,
when the demand was enhanced exorbitantly and the basis for such a demand
was not revealed, except for an oral statement that petitioner's building falls
within the category of 'Special Residential', this writ petition was filed.
3.
Sri. Raju Joseph, the learned Senior Counsel, as instructed by
Sri. Firoz K. Robin, the learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that
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neither the Act, nor the Kerala Municipality (Property Tax, Service Cess and
Surcharge) Rules, 2011, (for short 'the Rules'), prescribe a category called the
‘Special Residential Building’ and hence imposition of property tax under such a
category is without authority. Apart from the above, it was also contended that
the minimum and maximum limits of rates of basic property tax has to be fixed
by the Government every five years, as per section 233(4) of the Act and if it
is not so fixed, at the end of the fifth year, there cannot be any levy of such
tax from the expiry of that period till the limits are revised. It was also
submitted that the limits of property tax as per section 233(2) of the Act was
fixed in 2011 and until it was revised in 2023, there could not have been any
levy or collection of tax from 01.04.2016. Subsequent revision of the limits,
according to the Senior Counsel, was effected by Ext.P1 Notification dated
01.04.2023, and hence collection of property tax during that period is hit by
Article 265 of the Constitution of India, as being one without authority.
4. Smt.Deepa K.R., the learned Special Government Pleader relying
upon the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the second respondent submitted
that the Government had notified the minimum and maximum rates of basic
property tax as per a Gazette Notification dated 14.01.2011 and the Rules
were also notified on the said date itself with effect from 01.04.2013. However,
according to the third respondent, since the various Municipalities and
Corporations had not completed the procedural formalities, demands could not
be made immediately and hence a Government Order was issued, permitting
the local authorities to levy the revised property tax with effect from
01.04.2016
instead
of
01.04.2013,
considering
the
time
consuming
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background work. Controverting the contentions of the petitioner, it was
submitted that Section 233(4) of the Act is only an enabling provision by which
the Legislature can revise the rates of basic property tax to enhance the
previous rates and it cannot be treated as a restriction to collect tax if such
revision is not carried out. It was further submitted that property tax being the
main source of income for the Local Self Government Institutions, various
beneficial projects depend upon such tax collection and the entire financial
planning of the Municipalities will be affected if the interpretation suggested by
the petitioner is accepted.
5.
referring
Sri. Santhosh P.Poduval, the learned Standing Counsel, after
to the statement
and the affidavit filed by the respondent
Corporation, contended that, pursuant to the amendment and notification of
the Government fixing the minimum and maximum rates of property tax, by a
resolution dated 21.10.2011, the Thrissur Corporation had complied with all
the procedural formalities. It was also argued that the occupancy certificate
issued to the petitioner on 26.04.2019 categorized its building as a 'Special
Residential' building and hence the assessment was made at Rs.50/- per sq.m.
treating it as an assembly building and the property tax was fixed accordingly.
It was further submitted that petitioner had filed an appeal to the Standing
Committee for Finance, which rejected its appeal as per order dated
12.07.2023 and further that, after voluntarily paying the tax imposed,
petitioner is precluded from challenging the assessment. According to the
learned counsel, the Municipality provides various services to its inhabitants
and for those services to continue, collection of property tax is essential and
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that the provisions under section 233(4) of the Act is enabling an increase in
the tax and the same cannot be interpreted as preventing the levy. According
to the learned counsel, the said provision is not a protection to the owners but
a right given to the local authorities and to the Government to revise and
impose a higher tax at the end of five years.
6. On an appreciation of the rival contentions, it is evident that the
main issue to be decided is whether section 233(4) of the Act contemplates
revision of property tax every five years and whether its failure would result in
the local authority being deprived of the right to collect any tax. Yet another
issue that requires a decision is whether the building of the petitioner can be
levied with property tax classifying it as a ‘Special Residential’.
Issue No.(i) Whether section 233(4) of the Act contemplates revision of
property tax every five years and its failure would result in the local authority
being deprived of the right to collect any tax?
7.
Part IXA of the Constitution of India deals with Municipalities.
Article 243X confers power upon the State Legislature to authorise a
Municipality to collect taxes, duties, tolls and fees in accordance with such
procedure as may be specified by law. In accordance with the aforesaid power,
the State has enacted section 233 of the Act, enabling the Council of a
Municipality to levy property tax on every building situated within its area and
not exempted under the Act. Till 2009, property tax was levied on the basis of
the annual value of a building, the said value being calculated on the basis of
the annual rent that can reasonably be expected for the property. However, by
Act 30 of 2009, the provision was substituted, providing for imposition of
property tax on the basis of plinth area of the building.
WP(C) NO. 18782 OF 2024
8.
Section
233(2)(a)
of
the
Act,
as
was
2025:KER:31531
enacted in 2009,
contemplated the Government to fix, by notification, the minimum and
maximum limits of tax that can be made applicable to one square metre of
plinth area of the different categories of buildings and the date that it shall
come into force. Seven categories had been specified in the provision of which
the seventh enables the Government to notify any other category of building.
Sub-clause (b) of section 233(2) of the Act gave power to the Government to
fix sub categories of the above referred seven categories of buildings.
9. After the Government prescribes the limits of basic property tax as
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Council of the respective
Municipality has to fix, as per section 233(3) of the Act, the rates of basic
property tax as applicable to each category of building within its area and such
rates shall be the same for all buildings of the same category or its subcategory. Sub-section (4) of section 233 of the Act provides for the revision of
the limits of property tax fixed by the Government as well as the period for
which the rate of tax shall be in force. Since section 233(4) is relevant, the
said provision is extracted below:
“S.233(4). The limits of rates of basic property tax fixed by the
Government under sub-section (2) and the rates of basic property tax
once determined by the Council subject thereto under sub-section (3)
shall be in force for five years from the date on which they come into
force and thereafter on completion of every five years, the Government
and the Council, respectively, shall, revise the rates of basic tax in such
a manner as to have an enhancement of twenty five per cent on the
existing limits and rates by the completion of the period of every five
years, so as to be in force for the next five years. While assessing the
tax in accordance with the revised rate of tax as stated above,-
WP(C) NO. 18782 OF 2024
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(a) in the case of buildings which are new, reconstructed and
altered in usage, the secretary shall fix the tax as prescribed and take
further action;
(b) in the case of building which does not belong to the
categories stated in Clause (a) and the annual property tax of which was
fixed once based on the plinth area, the Council shall, for the purpose of
revising the annual property tax for the succeeding five year period, revise
tax by enhancing the existing annual property tax along with twenty five
per cent of the same and accordingly the Secretary shall give demand
notice for next five years to the owner of the building:
Provided that while revising such annual property tax, no deduction or
enhancement under sub-section (7) shall be applicable.”
10. A plain reading of the above extracted provision will reveal that
the limits of property tax fixed by the Government followed by the rate
determined by the Council shall be in force only for five years from the date it
comes into force. Thereafter, a revision of the limits of tax and a determination
by the Council must be carried out every five years. Being a taxing provision,
normally, the above method of literal interpretation ought to be adopted.
However, such an interpretation can lead to a situation where the result would
be a manifest injustice and totally unintended by the Legislature. An
interpretation, as canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel, would lead to a
situation where, after five years, no tax can be levied if there is any failure to
revise the tax.
11. A power to revise tax cannot result in effacement of the tax
already fixed. Further, if the tax already fixed becomes redundant or effaced,
there cannot be any existing limits of rates of tax, for the purpose of
stipulating an enhancement from the existing limits. An anomalous situation
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not contemplated by the Legislature would befall, if the interpretation as
canvassed by the petitioner is adopted and the owners of property will not be
liable to pay any property tax despite enjoying all the benefits from the
Municipality. Of course, the provision can be intended to be a compulsion on
the Government and the Council to revise property tax every five years. Such
a compulsion would again result in an anomalous situation as the property
owners would be liable to pay enhanced property tax every five years,
irrespective of the ground realities.
12. The method of interpretation to be adopted in respect of a taxing
statute has been laid down in various decisions including Commissioner of
Sales Tax U.P v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd.
[AIR 1961 SC 1047]. In a recent
decision in Chief Commissioner of Goods and Service Tax v. M/s. Safari
Retreats Private Limited [2024 SCC Online SC 2691], the Supreme Court
had succinctly reiterated the principles that govern the interpretation of a
taxing statute. The principle that can be culled out from the above decisions is
that generally, even if the result of an interpretation of a taxing provision leads
to absurdities, the Court has to adopt the plain interpretation, irrespective of
the consequences. However, a different note has been struck in Deputy
Commissioner Income Tax and another v. Pepsi foods Ltd. (2021) 7 SCC
413, wherein, while considering the constitutional validity of the third proviso
to section 254(2A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, it was observed that, though
tax and equity are often strangers, attempts should be made that they do not
always remain so and if a construction results in equity rather than injustice,
then such construction should be preferred to the literal construction. The
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following observations in paragraph 24 of the said judgment are relevant:
“Also,
it
is
important
to
remember
that
the
golden
rule
of
interpretation is not given a go - by when it comes to interpretation of
tax statutes. This Court in CIT v. J.H. Gotla (1985) 4 SCC 343, put it
well when it said:
46. Where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory
provision produces a manifestly unjust result which could never
have been intended by the Legislature, the Court might modify
the language used by the Legislature so as to achieve the
intention
of
the
Legislature
and
produce
a
rational
construction. The task of interpretation of a statutory provision
is an attempt to discover the intention of the Legislature from
the language used. It is necessary to remember that language
is at best an imperfect instrument for the expression of human
intention. It is well to remember the warning administered by
Judge Learned Hand that one should not make a fortress out of
dictionary but remember that statutes always have some
purpose
or
object
to
accomplish
and
sympathetic
and
imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.
47. We have noted the object of S.16(3) of the Act which has
to be read in conjunction with S.24(2) in this case for the
present purpose. If the purpose of a particular provision is
easily discernible from the whole scheme of the Act which in
this case is, to counteract the effect of the transfer of assets so
far as computation of income of the assessee is concerned then
bearing that purpose in mind, we should find out the intention
from the language used by the Legislature and if strict literal
construction leads to an absurd result i.e. result not intended to
be subserved by the object of the legislation found in the
manner indicated before, and if another construction is possible
apart from strict literal construction then that construction
should be preferred to the strict literal construction. Though
equity and taxation are often strangers, attempts should be
made that these do not remain always so and if a construction
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results in equity rather than in injustice, then such construction
should be preferred to the literal construction. Furthermore, in
the instant case we are dealing with an artificial liability created
for counteracting the effect only of attempts by the assessee to
reduce tax liability by transfer. It has also been noted how for
various purposes the business from which profit is included or
loss is set off is treated in various situations as assessee's
income. The scheme of the Act as worked out has been noted
before.”
13. Sub-section (4) of section 233 of the Act uses the words “shall”
twice. The expression in the provision is that the limits of rates of basic
property tax fixed ‘shall’ be in force for five years and the Government and the
Council ‘shall’ revise the rates of basic property tax. Normally, when the
statute uses the expression ‘shall’ it is to be interpreted as being mandatory.
However, if the consequences that ensue if such an imperative meaning is
adopted are absurd, it is always open for the court to interpret the word ‘shall’
as ‘may’ to make the provision only directory. In such instances, the courts
can strike a balance between the convenience of interpreting the word ‘shall’
as ‘may’ and the inconvenience of a contrary interpretation. When a public
duty is required to be performed within a time limit, unless a prejudicial
consequence ensues for non-performance within that time, the prescription of
time limit can only be regarded as a directory provision. Of course, when a
consequence for non-compliance with the time is stipulated, then the word
‘shall’ can be interpreted as mandatory. Reference to the decisions in State of
U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (AIR 1957 SC 912), Kailash v. Nanhku
and Others (2005) 4 SCC 480), Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017)
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8 SCC 746) and SCG Contracts (India) (P) Ltd. v. K. S. Chamankar
Infrastructure (P) Ltd. and Others (2019) 12 SCC 210) are relevant in this
context.
14. After providing for a law that imposes property tax, Legislature
would never have intended a situation that leads to absence of any property
tax at all. The revenue for a local authority is primarily from the property tax
collected. Generally, once a rate of tax is fixed, it should continue until revision
takes place or a change is brought about. After fixing a rate of tax, it could be
too incongruous to create a situation where there is a vacuum and no tax is
leviable.
15. Applying the principles laid down in the decisions referred to
earlier to the instant case, it is evident that the statute does not provide for
any express consequence for not revising the minimum and maximum limits of
property tax within five years. Further, if the word ‘shall’ in section 233(4) of
the Act is interpreted rigidly as a mandatory prescription, the consequences
would be so absurd that the Legislature would never have intended it. Despite
fixing the minimum and maximum limits of property tax that can be imposed,
a vacuum could be created after five years if the word ‘shall’ in section 233(4)
of the Act is interpreted as a mandatory requirement. Moreover, it could also
be a compulsion upon the Government and consequently the Council, to
mandatorily revise property tax every five years, burdening the public further.
If a mandatory meaning is given, the discretion to revise or not to revise the
tax after every five year period will not be available either with the
Government or the Municipal Council and both of them would be under a
WP(C) NO. 18782 OF 2024
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compulsion to revise. On the other hand, if there is no such revision, there
would be a total vacuum and the local authority will not be entitled to collect
any tax at all despite having to provide all the facilities for the people. Such a
situation, unmindful of the consequences, could not have been intended by the
Legislature while enacting sub-section (4) of section 233 of the Act. Hence,
having regard to the absurd consequences that will ensue, the word ‘shall’
occurring in section 233(4) of the Act has to be interpreted as ‘may’, being
only directory.
16. Thus, this Court is of the emphatic view that the requirement of
revision of property tax every five years as per section 233(4) of the Act is
only a directory provision, enabling the Government and the Municipal Council
to revise tax every five years.
Issue No.(ii) Whether the building of the petitioner can be levied with
property tax classifying it as ‘Special Residential”?
17. Section 233(2)(a) of the Act enables the Government to fix the
minimum and maximum limits of rates of basic property tax for categories of
buildings named therein. Sub-clause (b) of section 233(2) provides for fixing
sub-categories for each of the categories named therein. The provision in
section 233(2)(a) and section 233(2)(b) of the Act as it stood till 2023, is
extracted below:
“S.233(2)(a) For the purpose of levying property tax, the Government
shall, by notification, fix the minimum and maximum limits of rates of
basic property tax applicable to one square meter plinth area of the
following categories of building in accordance with the use and the date
on which they shall come into force, namely:(i) used for residential purpose;
WP(C) NO. 18782 OF 2024
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(ii) used for industrial purpose;
(iii) used for Schools and Hospitals;
(iv) used for amusement parks, mobile telephone tower etc,
(v) used for commercial purpose;
(vi) used for other purposes;
(vii) Any other category of building notified by the Government.
(b) The Government may by notification fix the sub-categories of each
category of building from (i) to (vii) above and the minimum and the
maximum limits of rates of basic property tax applicable to them.”
18. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that the seven
categories specified therein are based on the purpose of use of the building. It
also enables the Government to specify any other category which shall be
notified by the Government. Rule 4 of the Rules stipulates the manner in which
rates of basic property tax is to be fixed for the different categories wherein
also, the seven categories are reiterated. In rule 5 of the Rules, the
assessment of basic property tax is provided for. Since the said provision is
relevant, it is extracted as below:
“5. Assessment of basic property tax.—(1) All buildings in the area of
Municipality shall be classified in accordance with the use stated in subrule (1) of rule 4 in order to assess property tax.
Note 1:—Buildings for residential purposes includes
apartments, residential flats, hostels (except lodges) etc.
houses,
Note 2:—Buildings for industrial purpose means buildings for
production or processing any kind of products, objects or things or for
collecting or operating machineries.(sic)
Note 3:—Buildings for commercial purposes means buildings for
selling, purchasing and gather ing (sic) goods for sale and i t (sic)
includes restaurants and buildings constructed for commercial purpose
appurtenant to the places of worship.
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Note 4:—Buildings for other purposes includes offices, auditorium,
kalyanamandapam, conference hall, workshop, service station, lodges
etc; buildings related to any profession and which cannot be included in
any other categories may be considered as buildings for other purposes.
(2) Plinth area of any building multiplied with the rate of basic property tax fixed
by the Council as per sub-rule (1) of rule 4 to each and every category of any
building in accordance with the use, rounded to its next higher whole number
shall be the basic property tax of that building and shall be the basis for
assessment of annual property tax of that building as per rule 9.”
19.
Note 1 of rule 5 of the Rules includes buildings for residential
purposes including houses, apartments, residential flats, hostels, except
lodges. In view of the above provision, the assessment of property tax is to be
done based on the residential purpose for which a building is put to, in
contradistinction to the commercial purpose of renting it out as a lodge. Even if
an apartment or a house is rented out to another person, the purpose for the
use of the building remains residential as against commercial or other
purposes. On the other hand, if a building is rented out on a daily or monthly
basis to different persons on a commercial basis, the situation is different.
20. Petitioner asserts that its buildings are used for the residential
purposes of aged nuns and other sisters of charity who reside there
permanently.
However,
the
Municipality
claims
that
under
the
Kerala
Municipality Building Rules, 2019, buildings are classified on the basis of
occupancies as residential, lodging houses etc. and convents are included
under Group A2, dealing with lodging houses and special residential buildings
and therefore petitioner falls within that category. The aforesaid contention of
the Municipality is not legally tenable for two reasons. Under Chapter IV of the
WP(C) NO. 18782 OF 2024
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Kerala Municipality Building Rules, 2019, Group A1 is stated as residential
while Group A2 to Group J is treated as non-residential. Since, the building of
the petitioner is stated to be residential in character, it cannot fall under Group
A2 as a non-residential occupancy. Apart from the above, there is nothing to
indicate that the Kerala Municipality Building Rules, 2019 have been
incorporated into the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 for the purpose of
categorising the buildings for imposing property tax. In the absence of any
legislative incorporation or even a reference in section 233 of the Act to the
Kerala Municipality Building Rules, 2019, importing the said provision into
section 233 of the Act, is without any legal basis.
21.
The learned counsel for the respondent Municipality however
relied upon Ext.R1(a) to canvas for the proposition that the said category has
been created as assembly building and therefore the petitioner's building ought
to be classified as such. However, on a perusal of Ext.R1(a), it is evident that
the first category deals with residential purpose and thereafter different
categories are created, none of which deals with residential purposes. There is
no case for the Municipality that the building of the petitioner is used as an
assembly. Even if there is a prayer room in a residential building, the same
cannot convert the building into an assembly, when the primary purpose is
residential. Having regard to the above circumstances, this Court is of the view
that categorising petitioner's building as ‘Special Residential’ is not legally
proper and the same is liable to be interfered with and it should be categorised
as ‘residential’.
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In the result, the writ petition is allowed in part. The assessment of
petitioner's building as ‘Special Residential’ is hereby set aside and the first
respondent is directed to re-assess the petitioner's building as coming under
the residential category and a fresh demand notice be issued in accordance
with law. Tax, if any, paid in excess by the petitioner shall be adjusted against
the payments for the subsequent years.
Writ petition is allowed in part.
Sd/BECHU KURIAN THOMAS, JUDGE
RKM
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APPENDIX OF WP(C) 18782/2024
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS :
Exhibit P1
TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION GO (MS) NO.
77/2023/LSGD DATED 22.03.2023
Exhibit P2
TRUE COPY OF THE PUBLIC NOTICE ISSUED BY THE
1ST RESPONDENT DATED 24.05.2013
Exhibit P2(a)
TYPED COPY OF EXT.P2
Exhibit P3
TRUE
COPY
OF
THE
DEMAND
NOTICE
DATED
03.05.2019 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT TO
THE PETITIONER
Exhibit P4
TRUE COPY OF THE RECEIPT OF PAYMENT DATED
03.05.2019, OF PROPERTY TAX FOR THE YEARS
2018-19 TO 2019-20
Exhibit P5
TRUE COPY OF THE RECEIPT SHOWING THE PAYMENT
OF PROPERTY TAX FOR THE YEAR 2020-2021
Exhibit P6
TRUE COPY OF THE RECEIPT OF
PROPERTY TAX DATED 09.09.2021
Exhibit P7
TRUE
COPY
02.02.2021
Exhibit P7(a)
TYPED COPY OF EXT.P7
Exhibit P8
TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE
GOVERNMENT OF KERALA AS S.R.O NO 480/2023
DATED 05.04.2023
Exhibit P9
TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION SUBMITTED BY
THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE SECRETARY THRISSUR
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION DATED 22.05.2023
Exhibit P9(a)
COPY OF THE RECEIPT ISSUED BY THE 1ST
RESPONDENT DATED 22.05.2023 TO THE PETITIONER
Exhibit P10
TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE ISSUED BY THE
SUPERINTEND THRISSUR CORPORATION, OLLUR ZONAL
OFFICE TO THE PETITIONER DATED 26.08.2023
OF
THE
PUBLIC
PAYMENT
NOTICE
OF
DATED
WP(C) NO. 18782 OF 2024
Exhibit P11
Exhibit P12
2025:KER:31531
TRUE COPY OF THE REQUEST MADE BY THE
PETITIONER UNDER RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT TO
THE INFORMATION OFFICER THRISSUR CORPORATION
DATED 17.02.2024
TRUE COPY OF THE DEMAND NOTICE ISSUED BY THE
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION DATED 14.03.2024
RESPONDENTS' ANNEXURES :
ANNEXURE -R1(A)
TRUE
COPY
OF
NOTIFICATION
NO.(G.O.
(P)NO.17/2011/LSGD) DATED 14/1/2011 ISSUED BY
THE GOVERNMENT ALONG WITH TRANSLATION
ANNEXURE -R1(B)
TRUE COPY OF NOTIFICATION NO.(R.1/8109/11)
DATED 24/5/13 PUBLISHED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT
ALONG WITH TRANSLATION
ANNEXURE -R1(C)
TRUE COPY OF PUBLIC NOTICE NO.(R1/8109/14)
ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY, OF 1ST RESPONDENT
CORPORATION UNDER FORM 1 DATED 3/3/14 ALONG
WITH TRANSLATION
ANNEXURE -R1(D)
TRUE COPY OF ORDER OF THE GOVERNMENT NO. G.O.
540/2019/LSGD
DATED
6/3/19
ALONG
WITH
TRANSLATION
ANNEXURE -R1(E)
TRUE COPY OF DECISION NO.1-OF MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL DATED 16/11/19 ALONG WITH TRANSLATION
ANNEXURE -R1(F)
TRUE COPY OF NOTIFICATION NO. (R.1/8901/11)
DATED 28/12/20.ISSUED BY THE CORPORATION
ALONG WITH TRANSLATION
EXHIBIT R3(A)
A
TRUE
COPY
OF
THE
NOTIFICATION
(SRO
NO.34/2011), G.O(P) NO.17/2011/LSGD ISSUED BY
THE GOVERNMENT DATED 14.01.2011
EXHIBIT R3(B)
TRUE COPY OF THE GO (RT) NO 540/2019/LSGD
DATED 06-03-2019
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