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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RSA No.47 of 2022
Sri Uttam Roy,
S/O. Sukhendu Bikash Roy
Of village Mirzapur (now Sarashima),
P.S. Belonia, South Tripura.
……. Appellant
Versus
1.
Smt. Jita Roy (Datta),
W/O. Sri Dilip Roy
Of Village Mirzapur (now Sarashima),
P.S. Belonia, South Tripura.
2.
Smt. Suniti Majumder (Chowdhury),
W/O. Sri Arun Baran Chowdhury of Aswini Datta Road,
Damdam, Kolkata, P.S. Damdam,
District: Kolkata-28.
………Respondents
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. Sankar Deb, Sr. Adv,
Mr. S. Datta, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. S. M. Chakraborty, Sr. Adv,
Ms. P. Chakraborty, Adv.
Date of Hearing
:
29.07.2024
Date of delivery of
Judgment and Order :
Whether fit for
Reporting
:
06.08.2024
YES
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
This appeal under Section 100 of CPC is preferred
challenging the judgment dated 16.08.2022 and decree
dated 17.08.2022 delivered by Learned District Judge, South
Tripura, Belonia in connection with case No. Title Appeal
No.16 of 2019. By the said judgment, Learned First Appellate
Court was pleased to affirm the judgment dated 03.07.2019
and decree dated 15.07.2019 delivered by Learned Civil
Judge, Junior Division, Belonia, South Tripura in connection
with case No.T.S.24 of 2012.
02.
Heard Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Sankar Deb
assisted by Learned Counsel Mr. S. Datta for the appellant
and
also
heard
Chakraborty
Learned
assisted
by
Senior
Counsel,
Learned
Mr.
Counsel,
S.
M.
Ms.
P.
Chakraborty for the respondent No.1. None appeared on
behalf of the respondent No.2 because as per order dated
15.03.2023, the appeal processed ex-parte against the said
respondent. Before proceeding with the merit of this appeal,
preferred under Section 100 of CPC, let us discuss about the
subject matter of the suit filed by the respondent No.1 as
plaintiff before the Learned Trial Court.
03.
The case of the respondent-plaintiff before the
Learned Trial Court in short was that the mother-in-law of
the respondent-plaintiff namely Arati Bala Roy (Muhuri) got 1
kani 5 gandas i.e. 50 decimals of land as gift from one
Nirmala Sundari Majumder under Mouja and T.K. Sarashima,
Khatian No.615, 312 appertaining to C.S. Plot No.1291 and
1292 and the said mother-in-law of the respondent-plaintiff
was in peaceful possession of the suit land. The said deed of
gift was executed on 08.10.1975, thereafter, after the death
of said Arati Bala Roy, the property left by her was amicably
partitioned amongst the legal heirs of said Arani Bala Roy
(Muhuri). One of the legal heirs of said Arati Bala Roy,
namely Smt. Chandana Bala Roy as per family settlement,
got said 50 decimals of land in her share and on attaining
majority said Chandana Bala Roy sold those .50 decimals of
land in favour of the respondent-plaintiff and handed over
possession of the same to her. But the defendant No.1 i.e.
the present appellant herein, being the brother-in-law of the
respondent-plaintiff disturbed her possession over the suit
land measuring 0.6 decimal on the plea that he has
purchased the said land from one Smt. Suniti Bala Majumder
(Chowdhury), daughter of Nirmala Sundari Majumder (since
dead). It was the further case of the respondent-plaintiff that
after execution of gift deed for 6 decimals of land to the Arati
Bala Roy, said Nirmala Sundari Majumder was never been in
possession of the said land. However, said Nirmala Sundari
Majumder somehow managed to incorporate her name in the
revenue records and executed a Will in favour of her
daughter Suniti Majumder, who later on sold the suit land
i.e. 6 decimals of land by sale deed No.1-50 of 2009 to the
defendant No.1 i.e. the appellant herein. On 25.07.2008 the
appellant herein tried to occupy said 6 decimals land, but
failed. Again on 12.06.2009, he tried to take possession of
the said land but failed and after that the plaintiff filed a suit
which was numbered as T.S.34 of 2009 for declaration and
for injunction and after that the said suit was withdrawn on
29.02.2012. It was the further case of the respondentplaintiff
that
on
21.11.2009,
the
appellant
forcefully
dispossessed the respondent-plaintiff from the suit land. The
present appellant as respondent No.1 appeared before the
Learned
Trial
Court
and
submitted
written
statement,
wherein it was mentioned that the suit was not maintainable
for non-joinder of necessary party and the respondentplaintiff has/had got no right, title and interest over the suit
land and there was no cause of action.
It was further asserted that Nirmala Sundari
Majumder did not execute any deed of gift in favour of Arati
Bala Roy, nor gave any possession to said Arati Bala Roy. He
also denied the partition of the land. It was further submitted
that he purchased the suit land from one Suniti Bala
Majumder by a registered sale deed. Hence, by the WS, the
defendant No.1 i.e. the appellant herein prayed for dismissal
of the suit with costs.
04.
Upon the pleadings of the parties, following issues
were framed:
ISSUES
i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its
present form and nature ?
ii) Whether the plaintiff to a decree
declaring her right, title and interest over
the suit land ?
iii) Whether the Will executed after
disposition of the land by way of sale is
valid ?
iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to have
the benefit of Section 48 of Transfer of
Property Act ?
v) Whether the plaintiff is entitled
recovery of possession of the suit land ?
to
vi) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any
other consequential relief/reliefs and if so
up to what extent?
05.
The plaintiff in order to establish her claim
adduced three witnesses and relied upon certain documents
which were marked as exhibits in this case. On the other
hand, the contesting defendant adduced three witnesses and
relied upon certain documents which were marked as
exhibits in support of his defence:
APPENDIX
A) PLAINTIFF WITNESSES :PW 1- Smt. Jita Datta (Roy),
PW 2- Sri Babul Das,
PW 3- Sri Rakhal Ch. Datta,
B) DEFENDANT WITNESSES :DW1- Sri Uttam Kr. Roy,
DW2- Sri Bishu Nandi,
DW 3-Dulal Ch. Shome,
C) PLAINTIFF EXHIBITS :i) Exbt.1 : Certified copy of order dated,
29.02.12 passed in TS- 34 of 09;
ii) Exbt.2 : Original of gift deed bearing no.
I-5527 for the year 1978,
iii) Exbt.3 : Deed of family settlement
bearing no. I-1894 ;
iv) Exbt.4 : Original sale deed bearing no. I1705 for the year 1995;
v) Exbt.4/1 : Signature of Pw-3 on the sale
deed no. I-1705;
vi) Exbt.5 : Certified copy of sale deed
bearing no. I-50 for the year 2009;
vii) Exbt.6 : Certified
published Khatian no.
Sarashima,
copy
viii) Exbt.7 : Map of the suit land,
of
of
finally
Mouja
ix) Exbt.8 : Revenue receipt,
D) DEFENDANT EXHIBITS :i) Exbt.A : Khatian no. 494;
ii) Exbt.B (series) : The Will (five sheets);
iii) Exbt.C (series) : The
Nadabi deed (two sheets);
unregistered
iv) Exbt.D (series) :- Sale deed bearing no.
I-50;
v) Exbt.D/1 : Signature of DW-3 on the sale
deed bearing no.I-50,
06.
Finally on conclusion of trial the Learned Trial
Court below by judgment dated 03.07.2019 decreed the suit
in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. The operative portion of
the order of the Learned Trial Court runs as follows:
ORDER
“[10] In the result the case of the plaintiff
it is decreed that the plaintiff is entitled to
right, title and interest over the suit land
and the Will executed is not valid as per
law and that the plaintiff is entitled to
benefit of Section 48 of T.P Act.
[11] It is also decreed that the plaintiff is
entitled to right, title and interest over the
6 decimals of land mentioned in the A
schedule of the land.
[12] It is also decreed that the plaintiff is
entitled to recovery of possession of the
suit land described in schedule B measuring
6 decimals equivalent to 3 gandas from the
defendants and defendants are directed to
hand over the vacant possession of the said
suit land to the plaintiff. In case the
defendants are not handing over the vacant
possession to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff
can pray for taking legal measures of
getting the vacant possession of the land.
[13] The case is disposed of on contest.”
07.
Challenging that judgment, the defendant No.1 as
appellant preferred appeal before the Court of Learned
District Judge, South Tripura, Belonia and the Learned
District Judge by judgment dated 16.08.2022 was pleased to
dismiss the appeal upholding the judgment delivered by
Learned Trial Court below. For the sake of convenience, I
would like to refer herein below the operative portion of the
judgment
of
the
Learned
First
Appellate
Court
dated
16.08.2022 in connection with Title Appeal No.16 of 2019:
“[11] In the result, I find no merit in the
appeal to interfere with the judgment and
decree passed by learned trial Court in Case
No. T.S. 24 of 2012. Therefore, the appeal
merits rejection which I hereby do.
[12] Prepare appellate decree accordingly.
[13] Send back the L.C. record with a copy
of this judgment and decree.
[14] The case is thus disposed of on
contest.”
08.
At the time of admission of appeal, this High
Court by order dated 27.03.2023 formulated the following
substantial questions of law:
“i) Whether the suit instituted by the
plaintiff is barred by law of limitation?
ii) Whether the interpretation made by the
learned Courts below as regards the
document of title in favour of the plaintiff is
perverse?”
09.
Senior
At the time of hearing of argument, Learned
Counsel,
Mr.
Sankar
Deb
assisted
by
Learned
Counsel, Mr. S. Datta for the appellant first of all drawn the
attention of the Court referring page 18 of the memo of
appeal i.e. the Annexure-A and submitted that in para No.13,
Sub-clause (iv), the plaintiff in the original suit relied upon
certified copy of sale deed bearing No.1-50 for the year
2009. He further submitted that the said plaint of the
plaintiff, now the respondent No.1 herein was verified on
19.06.2009. Thereafter, Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Sankar
Deb drawn the attention of the Court referring the order
dated 29.02.2012 passed by the then Learned Civil Judge
(Junior Division), Belonia, South Tripura in connection with
T.S.34 of 2009 i.e. the order regarding withdrawal of the
suit. In support of his contention, Learned Senior Counsel
further, submitted that the suit T.S.24 of 2012 was filed on
23.05.2012. Thereafter, again Learned Senior Counsel drawn
the attention of the Court referring page No.9 i.e. para No.18
of the plaint of the plaintiff, now the respondent No.1 herein,
in the original suit and further submitted that in page No.10
of the plaint, in the relief portion of prayer of the original
plaintiff, no relief was sought for declaring the suit deed/sale
deed bearing No.1-50 for the year 2009 void which was
barred by the provisions of Section 34 and Section 31 of SR
Act. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant referring the
said provision of Specific Relief Act submitted that both the
Sections should be conjointly read together, but surprisingly,
no relief was sought for by the original plaintiff in the suit for
cancellation of the instrument for which the suit was not
maintainable before the Learned Trial Court. It was further
submitted by Learned Senior Counsel that the suit was
barred by the law of limitation as per Article 58 and 59 of the
Limitation Act. But the Learned Courts below did not consider
those provisions of law and decreed the suit in favour of the
original plaintiff, now the respondent No.1 herein in this
appeal.
Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that Arati
Bala Roy as revealed from the record was the mother-in-law
of the plaintiff and the mother of the original defendant i.e.
the appellant herein. She alleged to have got 50 decimals of
land including the alleged suit land measuring 6 decimals i.e.
3 gandas appertaining to Dag No.1292 which was not
partitioned, because the said plot comprised total land
measuring
decimals
which
was
purchased
by
the
appellant herein by sale deed dated 14.01.2009 which was
executed by one Smt. Suniti Bala Majumder (Chowdhury),
wife of Sri Arun Baran Chowdhury and accordingly, the same
was mutated in her favour vide MR case No.250/04 in
Khatian No.494 under Mouja and T.K.-Sarashima, Toudi
No.223 surveyed in C.S. Plot No.2286.
Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant also
submitted that said Suniti Bala Majumder (Chowdhury) got
the said land along with other lands from one Nirmala
Majumder on the basis of Will dated 09.08.1995. It was also
submitted that said Suniti Majumder was all along in
possession of the suit land and after that, she transferred the
said land to the present appellant, who also got possession
over the same and the mutation record also confirms his
ROR over the suit land but the Learned Trial Court below did
not consider the same and passed the judgment ignoring the
factual aspects for which the judgment of the Learned Trial
Court and the Learned First Appellate Court suffers from
perversities for which the interference of the Court is
required. It was further submitted that the substantial
question of law leans in favour of the present appellant
herein, for which the judgment of the Learned First Appellate
Court needs to be set aside and Learned Senior Counsel
referred few citations which would be discussed in due
course of time.
10.
On the contrary, Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. S.
M. Chakraborty for the respondent No.1 i.e. the original
plaintiff strongly countered the submission made by Learned
Senior Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sankar Deb and first of
all drawn the attention of the Court, referring the plaint filed
by the respondent No.1 before the Learned Trial Court in Suit
No.T.S.24 of 2012 wherein it was specifically stated that the
sale deed was executed without any authority by Smt. Suniti
Bala Majumder, bearing No.1-50 for the year 2009 being a
fraudulent transaction is to be declared cancelled. So,
according to Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. S. M. Chakraborty
the suit suffers from non-declaration of instrument to be
cancelled is not correct. He also submitted that initially a suit
was filed which was numbered as T.S.34 of 2009 wherein in
Clause (b) of para No.14 i.e. the relief portion, specific relief
was sought for cancellation and for declaring the sale deed
bearing No.1-50 for the year 2009 to be void. And later on,
due to some technical reasons, i.e. in the plaint, Purchase
Deed was written in place of Gift Deed and the said suit was
withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit and accordingly, the
then Learned Trial Court by order dated 29.02.2012 in the
said suit permitted the plaintiff, now the respondent No.1
herein, to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit
and according to Learned Senior Counsel, if both the plaints
are conjointly read together, it would be clear that the
submission of Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is not
correct and not tenable in the eye of law and cannot be
considered, because in both the suits the same relief was
sought for. So, the question of ‘barred by limitation’ as
raised by Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant cannot be
accepted and Learned Trial Court, after considering the
evidence on record, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff,
now the respondent No.1 herein, which was affirmed by the
Learned First Appellate Court.
Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. S. M. Chakraborty
further submitted that there was not a single whisper in the
WS filed by the present appellant herein, before the Learned
Trial Court regarding raising of any question on the point of
law of limitation and the point of limitation is a mixed
questions of law and fact, so, at this stage, the appellant has
got no authority to raise this plea before the High Court in
the Second Appeal. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. S. M.
Chakraborty regarding point of limitation further submitted
that the original suit T.S.34 of 2009 was filed on 19.06.2009
and the said suit was withdrawn on 29.02.2012 with the
leave of the Court. So, Section 14(3) of the Limitation Act
protects the right of the respondent No.1 herein i.e. the
plaintiff of the original suit to file the suit. Learned Senior
Counsel further submitted that in the suit before the Learned
Trial Court, there was another prayer for recovery of
possession
of
the
suit
property
and
for
recovery
of
possession the period of limitation was 12 years. So, in both
the way, according to Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. S. M.
Chakraborty, the suit was not barred by the law of limitation
as alleged by Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and
finally, Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. S. M. Chakraborty
submitted that there was also no counter-claim from the side
of the appellant as per provision of Order VIII, Rule 8 of CPC
and finally, Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. S. M. Chakraborty
submitted that there was no infirmity or irregularity in the
judgment passed by Learned Trial Court which was affirmed
by the Learned First Appellate Court and here in this appeal,
no substantial question of law could be made for which this
present appeal is liable to be dismissed with costs. He also
referred few citations.
11.
I have heard detailed arguments of both the sides
at length and gone through the records of the Learned Court
below. Here in this case, prima facie it appears that
regarding the title over the suit land, there were two sets of
evidence. According to plaintiff, i.e. the respondent No.1
herein, originally the suit land along with other lands were
belonged to one Nirmala Sundari Majumder who by deed of
gift donated land measuring 50 decimals to her elder
daughter, namely Arati Bala Roy (Muhuri), wife of Sukhendu
Bikash Roy (Muhuri) by a registered deed of gift bearing
No.1-5527 dated 08.10.1975 (Exbt.-2). From the said deed,
it appears that from Old C.S. Plot No.1291, 44 decimals of
land was given to her by way of deed of gift and from C.S.
Plot No.1292, 6 decimals land was given to her by the said
gift of deed. After that, the property of Arati Bala Roy was
partitioned amongst her legal heirs by a deed of partition
bearing No.1-1894 (Exbt.-3,3/1 series) and as per deed of
partition, one of the legal heirs, Smt. Chandana Roy got said
land measuring 50 decimals and since she was minor on that
relevant point of time, so, on her behalf her father, Sri
Sukhendu Bikash Roy became the guardian. Thereafter, said
Smt. Chandana Bala Roy when became major, she, by a
deed of sale vide No.1-1705 of 95 dated 23.09.1992 sold the
said land of Arati Bala Roy to the respondent No.1, herein,
i.e. the original plaintiff measuring 50 decimals which
includes the suit land, i.e. 44 decimals of land from C.S. Plot
No.1291 corresponding to present C.S. Plot No.2270 and 6
Decimals from Old C.S. Plot No.1292 which comprised of 26
decimals of land. This is the story of the respondent No.1 in
support of her title over the suit land.
12.
On the other hand, the present appellant as
defendant took the plea that one Smt. Suniti Majumder
(Chowdhury), wife of Arun Barun Chowdhury by a deed of
sale bearing No.1-50 dated 14.01.2009 sold the suit land
measuring 6 decimals (3 gandas) appertaining to C.S. Plot
No.2286 by deed No.1-50 dated 14.01.2009 to the present
appellant.
Further according to the appellant, said Suniti
Majumder got the said quantum of land from Nirmala
Majumder, wife of Jyotindra Kumar Majumder on the basis of
registered a deed of Will (Exbt. B series) executed by
Nirmala Majumder in favour of her younger daughter Suniti
Majumder land measuring 26 decimals from C.S. Plot
No.2286 of Khatian No.494, land measuring 47 decimals of
Plot No.2105 and land measuring 88 decimals of present
C.S. Plot No.1906 of Khatian No.446 in two different moujas.
According to the appellant, said 26 decimals of land
bequeathed to Suniti Majumder by her mother Nirmala
Majumder which attracts the suit land and the same was
under her possession and after that transfer, the same is
presently under occupation and possession of the present
appellant herein.
It was the further case of the present appellant
that said land was recorded in the name of Nirmala
Majumder and later on, the same was recorded in the name
of Suniti Majumder in Khatian No.494 under Mouja and T.K.
Sarashima vide M.R. Case No.250/04, from which it appears
that the present C.S. Plot No.2286 land measuring 0.26
acres was recorded in the name of Suniti Majumder. In the
alleged Will, Old C.S. Plot No.1292 was not mentioned even
in the deed of the present appellant (Exbt.5), Old C.S. Plot
No.1292 was not reflected. In this regard, there was no
explanation from the side of the appellant.
Similarly, in the deed of respondent No.1, the
present C.S. Plot No.2286 was not mentioned which she
purchased from Chandana Bala Roy.
13.
It is the settled position of law that Khatian does
not confer the title. If a particular land is not recorded in the
name of original ‘Rayat’, it cannot be said that the ‘Rayat’ is
not the owner of the land as Khatian does not confer any
title. Learned Trial Court below, on the basis of materials on
record, decreed the suit in favour of the respondent No.1
which was confirmed by Learned First Appellate Court. Now
after hearing arguments of both the sides, we are to
examine the following two points for determination of this
appeal:
i) Whether the suit of the plaintiff was barred by the law of limitation?
and
ii) whether the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 34 and
Section 31 of SR Act for not making any specific relief for cancellation
of instrument?
14.
As already stated, at the time of admission two
substantial questions of law were formulated by order dated
27.03.2023 because in course of hearing of argument,
Learned
Senior
Counsel
for
the
appellant
rests
his
submission covering the aforesaid points. Now, after going
through the records of the Learned Court below, it appears
that the original suit T.S.34 of 2009 was filed by the
respondent No.1 as plaintiff on 19.06.2009 before the
Learned Trial Court, wherein in the relief portion, the present
respondent No.1 specifically sought relief for declaring the
deed of the year 2009, executed by Suniti Majumder in
favour of the appellant herein to be void in addition to other
reliefs. Meaning thereby, the plaintiff i.e. the respondent
No.1 herein had clear knowledge about the execution of deed
by Suniti Majumder in favour of the present appellant herein,
at the time of filing of the said suit before the Learned Trial
Court. Thereafter, the said suit was withdrawn from the said
Trial Court vide order dated 29.02.2012 and after that the
plaintiff on the basis of leave granted by the Court filed the
second suit bearing No.T.S.24 of 2012 on 23.05.2012
mentioning the same grounds. The deed of the appellant was
executed by Suniti Majumder in favour of Uttam Kumar Roy
i.e. the appellant (Exbt.5) on 14.01.2009 and the suit of the
respondent No.1 was filed on 19.06.2009 that was within the
period of limitation as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act
(Part-IV). So, it is clear that the said suit was filed within the
period of limitation. Thereafter, the subsequent suit was filed
on 23.05.2012 which was numbered as T.S. 24 of 2012. In
this regard, I would like to refer herein below the relevant
provision of Section 14(3) of the Limitation Act which
provides as under:
Section 14(3) in The Limitation Act, 1963:14.(3) Notwithstanding anything contained
in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions
of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to
a fresh suit instituted on permission
granted by the court under Rule 1 of that
Order, where such permission is granted on
the ground that the first suit must fail by
reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the
court or other cause of a like nature.
Explanation.—For
section,—
the
purposes
of
this
(a) in excluding the time during which a
former civil proceeding was pending, the
day on which that proceeding was
instituted and the day on which it ended
shall both be counted;
(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an
appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a
proceeding;
(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of
action shall be deemed to be a cause of a
like nature with defect of jurisdiction.
15.
any
The appellant of the present appeal did not file
counter-claim,
nor
did
he
make
any
prayer
for
cancellation of the instrument of the respondent No.1 herein,
by way of filing counter-claim. So, the submission of Learned
Counsel was that the suit was barred by the law of limitation
cannot be accepted as because in both the plaints, same
relief was sought for, in the earlier plaint, the respondent
No.1 sought for cancellation of the instrument and in the
subsequent plaint of T.S.24 of 2012, similar relief was sought
for although in the prayer portion may be due to some
typing error, it was not specifically stated but the in the
Cause Title, it was specifically asserted by the respondent
No.1, even the respondent No.1 as plaintiff in the original
suit, in her cross-examination specifically stated that as her
brother-in-law fraudulently purchased the portion of land
purchased by her, so, she filed a case for cancellation of the
sale deed. So, for want of clerical error/mistake, it cannot be
said that the suit was barred by the law of limitation and also
no relief under Section 31 of the SR Act was sought for in
filing the suit under Section 34 of the SR Act. In this regard,
I would like to refer herein below the relevant provisions of
Sections 31 and 34 of the SR Act:
Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act:
31. When cancellation may be ordered.- (1)
Any person against whom a written
instrument is void or voidable, and who has
reasonable
apprehension
that
such
instrument, if left outstanding may cause
him serious injury, may sue to have it
adjudged void or voidable; and the court
may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and
order it to be delivered up and cancelled.
(2) If the instrument has been registered
under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16
of 1908), the court will shall also send a
copy of its decree to the officer in whose
office
the
instrument
has
been
so
registered; and such officer shall note on
the copy of the instrument contained in his
books the fact of its cancellation.
Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act:
Discretion of court as to declaration of
status or right.- Any person entitled to any
legal character, or to any right as to any
property, may institute a suit against any
person denying or interested to deny, his
title to such character or right, and the
court may in its discretion make therein a
declaration that he is so entitled, and the
plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any
further relief:
Provided that no court shall make any such
declaration where the plaintiff, being able
to seek further relief than a mere
declaration of title, omits to do so.
Explanation.- A trustee of property is a
“person interested to deny” a title adverse
to the title of someone who is not in
existence, and for whom, if in existence, he
would be a trustee.”
16.
From the aforesaid provisions also it is very much
clear that in the original plaint (T.S. 34 of 2009) and in the
subsequent plaint i.e. T.S. 24 of 2012, the respondent No.1
as plaintiff sought for the same relief. There is no ambiguity
on that and since the first suit was withdrawn with liberty to
file a fresh suit and the leave was granted by the Court by
order dated 29.02.2012, so, the suit of the respondent No.1
herein was protected in view of the provision under Section
14(3) of the Limitation Act. More so, in determining the
matters in controversy, I have also taken assistance of
ChatGpt raising the following query:
“When a suit is withdrawn with leave of the
Court to file a fresh suit, then what would
be the period of limitation for filing the
subsequent suit?
--When a suit is withdrawn with the leave
of the Court to file a fresh suit, the period
of limitation for filing the subsequent suit is
governed by Section 14 of the Indian
Limitation Act, 1963.
Under Section 14, the time during which
the first suit was pending will be excluded
from the period of limitation for the
subsequent suit. This is provided that the
first suit was filed in good faith and
prosecuted with due diligence.
To put it simply:
If you withdraw a suit with the
Court’s permission to file a new one,
the time spent in prosecuting the
original suit is not counted against
the
limitation
period
for
the
subsequent suit.
The
limitation
period
for
the
subsequent suit will be the original
limitation period minus the time that
the first suit was pending in court.
Here is the relevant excerpt from Section
14 of the Limitation Act, 1963:
Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in
court without jurisdiction.
(1) In computing the period of limitation
for any suit the time during which the
plaintiff has been prosecuting with due
diligence another civil proceeding, whether
in a court of first instance or of appeal or
revision, against the defendant, shall be
excluded, where the proceeding relates to
the same matter in issue and is prosecuted
in good faith in a court which, from defect
of jurisdiction or other cause of a like
nature, is unable to entertain it.
Therefore, as long as the initial suit was
prosecuted in good faith and with due
diligence, and it relates to the same matter,
the time spent on it can be excluded,
effectively extending the limitation period
for filing the subsequent suit.”
It appears that both the suits filed by the
respondent No.1 as plaintiff were of the same nature. The
first suit was withdrawn on the ground that in the plaint, in
place of gift deed, deed of purchase was written on the basis
of which the predecessor of the respondent No.1, Arati Bala
Roy got the suit land along with other lands from Nirmala
Majumder and that mistake was bonafied one, so, after
hearing both the sides, it appears to this Court that the suit
of the respondent No.1 filed before the Learned Trial Court
below was not barred by the law of limitation and the same
was also not barred in view of the provision provided under
Section 34 read with Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act,
rather his right was also protected under Section 48 of T.P.
Act.
17.
Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant in course
of hearing of argument relied upon few citations:
In State Bank of India & Ors. v. S. N. Goyal
dated 02.05.2008 reported in (2008) 8 SCC 92, wherein in
para No.13 Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:
“What is a substantial question of law?
13. Second appeals would lie in cases
which involve substantial questions of law.
The
word
“substantial”
prefixed
to
“question of law” does not refer to the
stakes involved in the case, nor intended to
refer only to questions of law of general
importance, but refers to impact or effect of
the question of law on the decision in the
lis between the parties. “Substantial
question of law” means not only substantial
questions of law of general importance, but
also substantial question of law arising in a
case as between the parties. In the context
of Section 100 CPC, any question of law
which affects the final decision in a case is
a substantial question of law as between
the parties. A question of law which arises
incidentally or collaterally, having no
bearing on the final outcome, will not be a
substantial question of law. Where there is
a clear and settled enunciation on a
question of law, by this Court or by the
High Court concerned, it cannot be said
that the case involves a substantial
question of law. It is said that a substantial
question of law arises when a question of
law, which is not finally settled by this
Court (or by the High Court concerned so
far as the State is concerned), arises for
consideration in the case. But this
statement has to be understood in the
correct perspective. Where there is a clear
enunciation of law and the lower court has
followed or rightly applied such clear
enunciation of law, obviously the case will
not be considered as giving rise to a
substantial question of law, even if the
question of law may be one of general
importance. On the other hand, if there is a
clear enunciation of law by this Court (or by
the High Court concerned), but the lower
court had ignored or misinterpreted or
misapplied
the
same,
and
correct
application of the law as declared or
enunciated by this Court (or the High Court
concerned) would have led to a different
decision, the appeal would involve a
substantial question of law as between the
parties. Even where there is an enunciation
of law by this Court (or the High Court
concerned) and the same has been
followed by the lower court, if the appellant
is able to persuade the High Court that the
enunciated
legal
position
needs
reconsideration, alteration, modification or
clarification or that there is a need to
resolve an apparent conflict between two
viewpoints, it can be said that a substantial
question of law arises for consideration.
There cannot, therefore, be a straitjacket
definition as to when a substantial question
of law arises in a case. Be that as it may.”
In Ram Saran and Anr. v. Smt. Ganga Devi
dated 17.04.1972 reported in (1973) 2 SCC 60, wherein in
para No.4 Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:
“4. We are in agreement with the High Court
that the suit is hit by Section 42 of the
Specific Relief Act. As found by the factfinding courts, Ganga Devi is in possession of
some of the suit properties. The plaintiffs
have not sought possession of those
properties. They merely claimed a declaration
that they are the owners of the suit
properties.
Hence
the
suit
is
not
maintainable. In these circumstances, it is
not necessary to go into the other contention
that the suit is barred by limitation.”
In Jaswant Singh & Ors. v. Union Territory of
Chandigarh dated 08.09.1992 reported in 1993 Supp. (2)
SCC 122, wherein in para Nos.13 and 14 Hon’ble Apex Court
observed as under:
“13. Section 122 relates to adjudication
of confiscations and penalties. Section
124 requires issue of show-cause
notice before confiscation of goods or
imposition of penalty, which was
waived by the appellants in the present
case
when
they
accepted
the
laboratory test reports and agreed to
the
adjudication
proceedings
contemplated
under
Section
122.
Section 125 provides for option to pay
fine in lieu of confiscation which was
resorted to in the present case
accepting the appellants’ prayer to
release the goods to them on their
agreeing to adjudication proceedings.
These provisions were clearly attracted
in the case of these imported goods
and that is what the appellants agreed
to expressly when they agreed to
adjudication and prayed for delivery of
the imported goods to them in lieu of
confiscation. In addition to the liability
for penalty under Section 112 of the
Act, the appellants were liable also to
pay fine in lieu of the confiscation of
the imported goods at the request of
the appellants. There is no dispute
raised about the quantum of the fine
which does not, therefore, require any
consideration.
14. The above discussion makes it clear
that the misdeclaration of the goods
imported by the appellants rendered it
liable to confiscation under Section
111(m) and attracted Section 112 for
imposition of penalty for improper
importation of goods on the appellants
on adjudication made under Section
122 giving the appellants option to pay
fine in lieu of confiscation, to which
they readily agreed accepting the
laboratory test reports which proved
the misdeclaration of the imported
goods and attracted these provisions
for adjudication of confiscation and
penalty. There is no infirmity in the
Tribunal’s order.”
In Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and Anr.
dated 17.07.2012 reported in (2012) 8 SCC 148, wherein
in para Nos.55, 56, 57 and 58 Hon’ble Apex Court observed
as under:
“Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act,
55. The section provides that courts
have discretion as to declaration of
status or right, however, it carves out
an exception that a court shall not
make any such declaration of status or
right where the complainant, being
able to seek further relief than a mere
declaration of title, omits to do so.
56. In Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi:(1973)
2 SCC 60, this Court had categorically
held
that
the
suit
seeking
for
declaration of title of ownership but
where possession is not sought, is hit
by the proviso of Section 34 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter
called “the Specific Relief Act”) and,
thus, not maintainable. In Vinay
Krishna
v.
Keshav
Chandra:1993
Supp.(3) SCC 129 this Court dealt with
a similar issue where the plaintiff was
not in exclusive possession of property
and had filed a suit seeking declaration
of title of ownership. Similar view has
been reiterated observing that the suit
was not maintainable, if barred by the
proviso to Section 34 of the Specific
Relief Act. (See also Gian Kaur v.
Raghubir Singh:(2011) 4 SCC 567.)
57. In view of the above, the law
becomes crystal clear that it is not
permissible to claim the relief of
declaration
without
seeking
consequential relief.
58. In the instant case, the suit for
declaration of title of ownership had
been filed, though Respondent 1plaintiff
was
admittedly
not
in
possession of the suit property. Thus,
the suit was barred by the provisions of
Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act
and, therefore, ought to have been
dismissed solely on this ground. The
High Court though framed a substantial
question on this point but for unknown
reasons did not consider it proper to
decide the same.”
18.
Referring
the
said
citations,
Learned
Senior
Counsel for the appellant submitted that every interpretation
of instrument is also a substantial question of law. So, the
plea of the respondent No.1 that no substantial question of
law could be formulated in this appeal is not tenable in the
eye of law and further submitted that the respondent No.1 as
plaintiff did not submit any prayer for cancellation of Will and
furthermore, according to Learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant, Court also cannot travel beyond the relief sought
for. So, Learned Senior Counsel, finally, urged for allowing
this appeal by setting aside the judgment of the Learned
First Appellate Court. He further referred the provision of
Section 27 of the Limitation Act and submitted that since the
suit was barred by law of limitation, so, the right of the
respondent
No.1
over
the
suit
land
has
been
thus
extinguished and both the Learned Courts below committed
error
in
appreciating
the
legal
position
and
gave
an
erroneous finding for which the judgment and decree of the
Learned First Appellate Court has become perverse. On the
other hand, Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.1,
in support of his contention referred one judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in in Kshitish Chandra Purkait v.
Santosh Kumar Purkait and Ors. dated 07.05.1997
reported in (1997) 5 SCC 438, wherein in para No.9
Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:
“9. Delivering the judgment of a two-member
Bench in Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh
Chandra Goswami:(1997) 4 SCC 713 one of
us (Dr Anand, J.) in his judgment dated 1202-1997 has lucidly explained the scope of
Section 100 CPC as amended, thus: (SCC
pp.719-20, paras 7 and 8)
“7. A bare look at Section 100 CPC
shows that the jurisdiction of the High
Court to entertain a second appeal
after the 1976 Amendment is confined
only to such appeals as involve a
substantial question of law, specifically
set out in the memorandum of appeal
and formulated by the High Court. Of
course, the proviso to the section
shows that nothing shall be deemed to
take away or abridge the power of the
court to hear, for reasons to be
recorded, the appeal on any other
substantial
question
of
law,
not
formulated by it, if the court is satisfied
that the case involves such a question.
The proviso presupposes that the court
shall
indicate
in
its
order
the
substantial question of law which it
proposes to decide even if such
substantial question of law was not
earlier formulated by it. The existence
of a ‘substantial question of law’ is
thus, the sine qua non for the exercise
of the jurisdiction under the amended
provisions of Section 100 CPC.
8. Generally speaking, an appellant is
not to be allowed to set up a new case
in second appeal or raise a new issue
(otherwise than a jurisdictional one),
not supported by the pleadings or
evidence on the record and unless the
appeal involves a substantial question
of law, a second appeal shall not lie to
the High Court under the amended
provisions. In the present case, no
such question of law was formulated in
the memorandum of appeal in the High
Court and Grounds (6) and (7) in the
memorandum of the second appeal
only which reliance is placed did not
formulate any substantial question of
law. The learned single Judge of the
High Court also, as it transpires from a
perusal of the judgment under appeal,
did not formulate any substantial
question of law in the appeal and dealt
with the second appeal, not on any
substantial question of
law,
but
treating it as if it was a first appeal, as
of right, against the judgment and
decree of the subordinate Court. The
intendment of the legislature in
amending Section 100 CPC was, thus,
respected in its breach. Both the trial
court and the lower appellate court had
decided the cases only on questions of
fact, on the basis of the pleading and
the evidence led by the parties before
the Trial Court. No pure question of law
nor even a mixed question of law and
fact was urged before the trial court or
the first appellate court by the
respondent. The High Court was,
therefore, not justified in entertaining
the second appeal on an altogether
new
point,
neither
pleaded
nor
canvassed in the subordinate courts
and that too by overlooking the
changes
brought
about
in Section
100 CPC by the Amendment Act of
1976 without even indicating that
substantial
question
of law was
required to be resolved in the second
appeal. To say the least, the approach
of the High Court was not proper. It is
the obligation of the courts of law to
further
the
clear
intendments
legislature and not to frustrate it by
ignoring
the
same."
(emphasis
supplied)
The above statement of law has our
respectful concurrence.
Referring
the
same,
Learned
Senior
Counsel
drawn the attention of the Court, since the appeal does not
involve any substantial question of law, so, there is no scope
to entertain this present appeal and prayed for dismissal of
this appeal with costs.
19.
After hearing both the sides and also after going
through the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the afore noted cases and also after going
through the record of the Learned Court below, it appears
that the present appellant has failed to make out any
substantial question of law to be formulated in this appeal.
So, this appeal deserves no consideration and accordingly,
the same is liable to be dismissed with costs.
20.
In the result, the appeal filed by the appellants
stands dismissed being devoid of merit with costs. The
judgment of the Learned District Judge, South Tripura,
Belonia in connection with case No.Title Appeal No.16 of
2019 dated 16.08.2022 and decree dated 17.08.2022 is
hereby confirmed and accordingly, it is upheld.
Send down the LCRs along with a copy of the
judgment.
Prepare decree accordingly.
Pending
application(s),
if
any,
also
stands
disposed of.
JUDGE
MOUMITA DATTA DATTA
Date: 2024.08.07 15:34:55 +05'30'
Purnita
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