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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
MFA 04 OF 2019
Shri Ratan Paul,
son of late Anil Baran Paul, Proprietor of M/s Nabarupa Food Products,
Golchakkar, near Border Check Gate, P.O. Agartala-799001, P.S. West
Agartala, District- West Tripura.
---- Appellant.
Versus
1. The Employees’ State Insurance Corporation,
Regional Office, North East Region, Panchadeep Bhawan, Bamuni maidan,
Guwahati-780021, Assam
2. The Regional Director,
Regional Office, North East Region, Panchadeep Bhawan, Bamuni maidan,
Guwahati-780021, Assam
3. The Assistant Director (INS),
Regional Office, North East Region, Panchadeep Bhawan, Bamuni maidan,
Guwahati-780021, Assam
4. The Social Security Officer,
Employees‟ State Insurance Corporation, Regional Office, North East
Region, Panchadeep Bhawan, Bamuni maidan, Guwahati-780021, Assam
5. The Assistant Director,
Regional Office, Employees‟ State Insurance Corporation, Shyamali Bazar,
P.O. Kunjaban-799006, P.S. East Agartala, District- West Tripura
6. The Employees’ State Insurance Corporation,
Branch Office, Shyamali Bazar, Agartala, P.O. Kunjaban-799006, P.S. East
Agartala, District- West Tripura, represented by its Branch Office
---Respondents.
For Appellant(s)
: Mr. BN Majumder, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. DJ Saha, Advocate
For Respondent(s)
: Mr. KK Pal, Advocate
Date of hearing & delivery
of Judgment and order : 13.01.2022
Whether fit for reporting : No
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
Judgment & Order (Oral)
By means of filing this appeal under Section 82 of Employees‟ State
Insurance Act, 1948, the appellant has challenged the judgment and order
dated 28.05.2019 passed by the learned District Judge, West Tripura,
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Agartala in connection with case Nos. Misc. (ESI) 05 of 2014, whereby and
whereunder the learned Judge dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner
under Section 75 (1)(g) and Section 2(a) of the Employees‟ State Insurance
Act, 1948 (for short, „ESI‟ Act) against the demand of ESI authority for
payment of Rs. 6,22,765/- by notices dated 29.01.2014, 03.02.2014 and
06.05.2014.
2.
To appreciate the controversy raised in the present appeal, few
relevant facts may be noted:
2.1. The petitioner is the owner of one business establishment namely,
Nabarupa Food Products situated at Gol Chakkar, Agartala, dealing in
backery, sweets and confectionary items having 13 employees employed
therein and his work is carried with the aid of electricity. Suddenly, he
received one summons from the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Kamrup (M), Guwahati in connection with case no. 1313/C/ 2014 asking
him to appear in that Ld. Court on 6.8.2014. After he appeared there, it
was found that the Social Security Officer of ESI authority had lodged the
said complaint and after receiving copies of relevant documents filed in
that case, it appeared that present O.P.no.2 issued a memorandum dated
6.5.2014 according sanction to prosecute against him under section 85(a)
of ESI Act as he failed to pay contribution of Rs.6,22,765/- as ESI
contribution for his said establishment. From the documents of said case,
the petitioner also came to know that the Assistant Director, ESI
Corporation, Guwahati had issued one show cause notice dated
29.1.2014 asking the petitioner to show cause as to why he should not be
prosecuted under section 85 of the Act, though practically he did not
receive any such notice. It also came to his knowledge from documents
of said criminal case that he was also served with another notice
3.2.2014 by said Assistant Director proposing to determine and recover
ESI contribution from him under section 45A of the Act claiming
outstanding dues to be Rs.6,22,765/- though actually no such notice was
served upon him on any occasion. It also further came to his knowledge
at that time that a preliminary survey was shown to be conducted on
12.2.2009 by Inspector/Branch Manager of ESI Corporation giving list of
names of employees therein without mentioning their father’s name,
designation etc. and even signatures of said persons were also not taken
in the said report. So, according to the petitioner, said document is a
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manipulated and imaginary one. According to him, practically no enquiry
atall was done by the ESI authority in his establishment and even no
abstract copies of relevant registers of the establishment was taken by
enquiring officer. Even no notice was also issued to the petitioner before
taking any action against him. The petitioner was never asked by ESI
authority to submit any return of his
establishment. Thus, ultimately whole process initiated by the ESI
authority was illegal. After receipt of summons from Ld. Chief Judicial
Magistrate of Kamrup in said criminal case, he preferred WP (C) 484 of
2014 in Hon’ble High Court of Tripura which was lateron withdrawn by
him with liberty to approach the proper Forum and thereafter, the
present case was filed him with prayer to declare that the establishment
of the petitioner does not come under the purview of ESI Act and that
the petitioner is not liable to pay any amount to ESI authority and as such
with further prayer to quash the notices dated 29.1.2014, 3.2.2014 and
6.5.2014 of ESI authority asking him to deposit said amount of
Rs.6,22,765/-.
2.2. The Opposite parties in their written statement stated that the
notice dated 3.2.2014 was duly received by one Smti Soma Paul on
15.2.2014 and moreso, the observation slip attached with survey report
was signed by one of the employee of the petitioner namely Sri Alak
Nani. According to them, despite attempts made by Social Security
Officer to make survey of the unit of the petitioner 10.2.2009 and
11.2.2009, the employer failed to produce any record as such the visiting
ESI officer collected the names of employees based on head count
available at the factory premise on 12.2.2009. According to them, as the
employer failed to produce record of the establishment on 10.2.2009 and
11.2.2009, again on 23.7.2010, 6.8.2010 and finally on 13.8.2010,
Agartala based Manager of ESI authority visited the establishment with
prior intimation and the observation of inspection dated 23.7.2010 was
handed over to the In charge employer namely Sri Sajal Ch. Das on
23.7.2010, and again observation of inspection dated 6.8.2010 was
handed over to him on the same date and finally observation inspection
dated 13.8.2010 was refused by the representatives of the employer. The
employer also duly received the notice the notice dated 3.2.2014
notifying him the scope of personal hearing fixed on 26.2.2014.
According to the O.P.s, there were 26 nos. of workers found in the
establishment of the petitioner. Finally it has been stated by them that as
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the petitioner did not comply with the mandatory procedure under ESI
Act, action was taken against him in accordance with provisions of said
Act and as such the petition is liable to be rejected.
2.3.
The respondents on receipt of summon filed joint written
statement stating inter alia that as per record and preliminary enquiry
report dated 16.2.2009, 10 nos. of employees were found on the date of
survey/enquiry and the list of employees was handed over to the Social
Security Officer during his visit by the wife of the petitioner namely Smti
Anjana Dam. Thus, ESI Act was applicable in the business unit of the
petitioner w.e.f 01.01.2009. Accordingly notice dated 2.9.2014 was
issued to the petitioner. According to them, by notice dated 3.2.2014 the
petitioner was afforded with the scope of personal hearing on 3.3.2014
with all necessary documents but the petitioner did not turn up. It is
further plea of the respondent-OPs that they also vide their office letter
dated 5.6.2014 advised the petitioner to prefer appeal before the
appropriate authority within 60 days from the date of passing order
under section 45A of the Act on 9.4.2014 by depositing 25% of the
demanded amount and as such they did not feel any necessity to give
reply of the letter of the petitioner dated 18.6.2014. The respondent-OPs
finally prayed for rejection of the claim of the petitioner.
2.4.
On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Insurance Court had
framed the following issues:
(I) Whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit ?
(II) Whether the present suit is maintainable?
(III) Whether the orders dated 13-10-2011, and 01-04-2014 of
respondent no.3 and his letters dated 29-01-2014, 03-02-2014 and 02-092014 are liable to be cancelled and quashed ?
(IV) Whether the industry of the petitioner comes under the
purview of ESI Act, 1948 and consequently the petitioner is liable to make
any contribution in the account of ESI ?
(V) Any other relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to?
2.5. In course of recording evidences, the petitioner examined himself
as PW.1 During hearing the petitioner examined himself as PW.1 and
proved certain documents into evidence which were marked as Exbt.1 to
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Exbt.6. From the side of opposite party one Bjeet Kumar Pegu was
examined as OPW.1 and he proved certain documents which were
marked as Exbt.A to Exbt.M/2.
3.
After closure of recording evidences, the learned Court heard
arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties to the
lis and finally dismissed the petition of the petitioner by the judgments, as
aforestated. Being aggrieved by and dis-satisfied with the said judgment of
dismissal of the petition, the petitioner has preferred the instant appeal
before this court.
4.
At the time of admission of the appeal, this court had formulated the
following question of law by order dated 01.02.2020:
“(I) Whether ESI Act is applicable in the establishment of the applicant?
5.
However, learned counsels have urged to formulate the following
additional substantial questions of law for adjudication of the above noted
appeal. Accordingly, the following substantial questions of law have been
formulated for the purpose of hearing of the appeal:(i) Whether the petition filed by the petitioner before the Insurance
Court was maintainable for not depositing fifty percent of the
claimed amount, as raised by the respondents-ESI Corporation ?
(II) Whether the provisions as envisaged in Section 45 AA and
Section 75(2B) are mandatory in nature?
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6.
Learned counsel of both the parties to the lis have proceeded to argue
the case on the basis of above substantial questions of law.
7.
I have perused the judgment passed by the learned District Judge,
here-in-after referred to as Insurance Court, for convenience. From the
judgment of the learned Insurance Court, it is revealed that the learned
Judge had examined and verified the records submitted by the parties to the
lis. He had observed that the petitioner had not produce any attendance
registers of the establishment of the petitioner which were required to be
submitted, he became satisfied that the opposite party had proved one
preliminary survey report dated 12.02.2009 which was marked as Exbt. A
alongwith one physical verification report, which was marked as Exbt. B,
and the survey report i.e. Exbt.A clearly shows that the establishment of the
petitioner was being run by 24 numbers of employees plus 2 numbers of
guards. Learned Judge has further observed that ‘As per said preliminary
survey report, Mr. Hek found total 24 nos. of employees plus 2 nos. of
guard in the said establishment and he has given the list (Ext.B) containing
names of such employees but in said list details of father’ names and
respective addresses of such employees are not mentioned. In said
preliminary survey report (Ext.A), it is mentioned that he had interviewed
one person namely Sri Sajal Das (Manager) to collect such information but
signature of Sajal Das was not taken therein. Moreover, in the list of
employees prepared by Mr. Hek (Ext.B) name of said Sajal Das is missing.
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Even the signatures of the employees mentioned in the said list were also
not taken therein.”
8.
Referring to Section 2(12) of the ESI Act, the learned Insurance
Court observed that “when it is the case of the petitioner that his
manufacturing unit is run by electricity, automatically, it will come within
the purview of ESI Act if number of employees therein are 10 or more”.
Thereafter, the learned Insurance Court held that “the petitioner has
categorically stated that as per return submitted by the petitioner before
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, number of his employees is 13
which means he had more than 10 number of employees. Thus, as per
admission of the petitioner himself, ESI Act is applicable in his
establishment. In such a situation, he is not entitled to get the notices issued
by ESI authority quashed”.
9.
Answering to the issues regarding maintainability of the petition
filed by the petitioner, the learned Insurance Court held that since the
petitioner never deposited fifty percent of the sum due, as claimed by the
ESI Corporation nor filed any petition for waiving of such deposit or for
reduction of amount of such deposit, the petitions filed by the petitioner
under Section 75 of the ESIC Act, 1948 were not maintainable. The
petition filed by the appellant before the learned Insurance Court was
dismissed on the ground of maintainability since fifty percent of the
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amount due from the petitioner by the Corporation was not deposited in
compliance of Section 75(2-B) of the ESI Act.
10.
At the threshold of hearing of the present appeal, learned senior
counsel Mr. BN Majumder, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has
invited my attention that during pendency of the present appeal, the
appellant had submitted petition for allowing them to deposit fifty percent
of the claimed amount. Learned senior counsel has further submitted that
the petitioner-appellant may be allowed to deposit fifty percent of the
claimed amount in this appellate court.
11.
Mr. Majumder, learned senior counsel has emphatically submitted
that the procedure for preferring appeal as contemplated under sub-section
(2B) of Section 75 of the ESI Act, 1948, is a mere technicality and for this
the appellant should not be prevented in pursuing the petition as well as the
present appeal. Learned senior counsel has further argued that the preconditions for depositing fifty percent of the claimed amount at the time of
filing petition under Sections 75(2)(g) and (2B) of the ESI Act went unnoticed out of inadvertence, and according to learned senior counsel, nondepositing of fifty percent of the sum due as demanded by the Employees
State Insurance Corporation, cannot be the ground to hold the petition filed
by the petitioner as not maintainable. Learned senior counsel has further
argued that the pre-condition of depositing fifty percent of the amount
claimed by the respondent-Corporation is not mandatory, rather, optional as
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contemplated under sub-section (2B) of Section 75 of the ESI Act. Mr.
Majumder, learned senior counsel has further argued that the establishment
of the petitioner-appellant does not come within the purview of the
definition as contemplated under Section 2(12) of the ESI Act since the
respondent-Corporation has failed to establish that the establishment of the
petitioner had ever exceeded ten numbers of employees.
12.
Reacting sharply to the said submissions of Mr. Majumder, learned
senior counsel, Mr. KK Pal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent-Corporation has contended that the statements made before this
court that the provision of sub-section (2B) of Section 75 went un-noticed
to the petitioner-appellant is totally misconceived and misleading to this
court. Learned counsel has argued that the said provision was well within
the knowledge of learned senior counsel as well to the petitioner for the
reason that the question of maintainability was raised before the learned
Insurance Court when Mr. Majumder, learned senior counsel had defended
the action of the petitioner for non-depositing fifty percent of the claimed
amount since he filed application under Section 75(1)(g) and 2A of the ESI
Act, 1948, and further, the establishment of the petitioner does not come
within the purview of definition of „Factory‟ as contemplated under Section
2(12) of the ESI Act. Learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation has
further urged that sub-section (2B) of Section 75 of the Act, should not be
taken lightly since it carries statutory mandate. It is further argued that
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learned Insurance Court after examination and verification of records
meticulously came to a finding in the case Misc. (ESI) 05 of 2014 is
assailed before this court, as held that the establishment of the petitionerappellant being a single Unit were working with more than ten numbers of
staffs. Mr. Pal, learned counsel has further submitted that the petition of the
petitioner-appellant bearing no. Misc. (ESI) 5 of 2014 was dismissed on the
ground of maintainability due to non-compliance of the provision of subsection (2B) of Section 75 of the ESI Act. Mr. Pal, learned counsel had
tried to persuade this court that even the applications filed by the petitioner
before the Insurance Court were not maintainable and were liable to be
dismissed at the very threshold on the sole ground that the petitioner does
not exhaust the remedy by way of intra-departmental appeal as
contemplated under section 45AA of the ESI Act, which, according to
learned counsel, is mandatory.
13.
I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions as
advanced by learned counsel appearing for the parties.
14.
Having given a glimpse to the preamble, I find that the Employees‟
State Insurance Act became law on 19th April, 1948 with a definite purpose
and object to provide for certain benefit to the employees in case of
sickness, maternity, employment injury and to make provision for certain
other matters in relation thereto. From a plain reading of the scheme, it
appears that the act is a „Social Security Legislation‟. As such, needless to
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say, any provision of which two interpretations may be possible would
deserve such construction as would be beneficial to the working class, but,
at the same time, the court cannot give a go-by to the plain language of a
provision. In other words, where the language „employee‟ in the provision
is plain and unambiguous, the same should not be ignored. [Whirlpool of
India Ltd. vs. Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, reported in (2000)
3 SCC 185.
15.
Now, keeping in view the challenge made by the petitioner-
appellant, where his establishment falls within the scope of definition of
„Factory‟, it would be apposite to quote Section 2(12) of the ESI Act,
which reads as under:“2(12) “Factory”” means any premises including the precincts thereof
whereon ten or more persons are employed or were employed on any
day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a
manufacturing process is being carried on or is ordinarily so carried on,
but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952) or a railway running shed;”
16.
The relevant provisions which are necessary to adjudicate the
disputes raised in this appeal also should be reproduced, for convenience:“75. Matters to be decided by Employees' Insurance Court.- (1) If any
question or dispute arises as to-—
(a) whether any person is an employee within the meaning of this
Act or whether he is liable to pay the employee's contribution, or
(b) the rate of wages or average daily wages of an employee for the
purposes of this Act, or
(c) the rate of contribution payable by a principal employer in
respect of any employee, or
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(d) the person who is or was the principal employer in respect of any
employee, or
(e) the right of any person to any benefit and as to the amount and
duration thereof, or
[(ee) any direction issued by the Corporation under section 55A on a
review of any payment of dependants' benefit, or]
(ff) [omitted], or
(g) any other matter which is in dispute between a principal
employer and the Corporation, or between a principal employer and
an immediate employer or between a person and the Corporation or
between an employee and a principal or immediate employer, in
respect of any contribution or benefit or other dues payable or
recoverable under this Act, [or any other matter required to be or
which may be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court under this
Act],
such question or dispute [subject to the provisions of sub-section (2A)]
shall be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court in accordance with
the provisions of this Act.
(2) [Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2-A), the following claims]
shall be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court, namely:-—
(a) claim for the recovery of contributions from the principal
employer;
(b) claim by a principal employer to recover contributions from any
immediate employer;
(c) [omitted]
(d) claim against a principal employer under section 68;
(e) claim under section 70 for the recovery of the value or amount of
the benefits received by a person when he is not lawfully entitled
thereto; and
(f) any claim for the recovery of any benefit admissible under this
Act.
[(2A) If in any proceedings before the Employees' Insurance Court a
disablement question arises and the decision of a medical board or a
medical appeal tribunal has not been obtained on the same and the
decision of such question is necessary for the determination of the
claim or question before the Employees' Insurance Court, that Court
shall direct the Corporation to have the question decided by this Act
and shall thereafter proceed with the determination of the claim or
question before it in accordance with the decision of the medical board
or the medical appeal tribunal, as the case may be, except where an
appeal has been filed before the Employees' Insurance Court under subsection (2) of section 54-A in which case the Employees' Insurance Court
may itself determine all the issues arising before it.]
[(2B) No matter which is in dispute between a principal employer and
the Corporation in respect of any contribution or any other dues shall
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be raised by the principal employer in the Employees' Insurance Court
unless he has deposited with the Court fifty per cent. of the amount
due from him as claimed by the Corporation:
Provided that the Court may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under this subsection.]
82. Appeal.- (1) Save as expressly provided in this section, no appeal
shall lie from an order of an Employees’ Insurance Court.
(2) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of an Employees’
Insurance Court if it involves a substantial question of law.
(3) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be
sixty days.
(4) The provisions of sections 5 and 12 of the [Limitation Act, 1963 (36
of 1963)], shall apply to appeals under this section.”
17.
Dealing with the submission of Mr. Majumder, learned senior
counsel for the appellant that the provisions of sub-section (2B) of Section
75 of the ESI Act went un-noticed, qua the submission of Mr. KK Pal,
learned counsel for the respondent that question of maintainability was
raised before the ESI Court and necessary arguments were placed before
the Insurance court by learned senior counsel, I find that the issue was dealt
by the Insurance Court on the basis of submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties. For convenience, respective submissions of learned
counsel appearing for the parties may be reproduced hereunder, in
extenso:“6) During argument Ld. Counsel Mr. A Gon Choudhury for the petitioner
submitted that the petition was filed under section 75(1)(g) of the ESI Act and
as such it was maintainable. According to him, there were only 06 employees
in the establishment of the petitioner, so ESI Act was not applicable in the
establishment of the petitoiner. While challenging the validity of verification
report submitted from the side of the O.P.s., he argued that name of the
employees is not mentioned therein, moreso, the author of said report was
also examined and as per OPW.1, he had no personal knowledge about said
verification report as he didnot visit the establishment of the petitioner.
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According to him, names, father’s names, length of service etc. should
specifically be mentioned in the verification report. He also argued that no
report was collected by the O.P.s from Labour Department about actual nos.
of employees working in the establishment of the petitioner and signatures of
the employees were also not taken in the verification report. Thus, such
verification report is not reliable. Regarding deposit of 50% of the amount
claimed by the ESI authority before filing of the case in this Court, he
submitted that in this regard, he filed one petition bearing no. Misc.(ESI) 04 of
2014 which was ultimately not pressed by the petitioner. Still it will have no
bearing in the case, as, when the ESI Act itself is not applicable in the
establishment of the petitioner, there is no legal requirement to deposit 50%
of the amount so claimed by the O.P.s.
7) Ld. Counsel, Mr. K.K. Paul argued that the present petition was not
maintainable as despite having scope to file appeal, the petitioner did not file
any appeal. He also argued that the petition was bad for non-joinder of
necessary parties as all the employees were not made party in the proceeding
as required under section 75 of the Act. Referring to section 44 of the Act, he
argued that it was the duty of the petitioner to submit return in prescribed
form to the ESI authority giving particulars of employees employed and
necessary registers or records of the establishment under the regulations of
ESI Act, but nothing was maintained or submitted before the ESI authority by
the petitioner, so adverse inference may be taken against the petitioner. Ld.
Counsel Mr. Paul also referred one decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court
rendered in ESI Corpn. v. Bhakra Beas Management Board, (2009) 10 SCC 671,
wherein the followings were held :
“8. In our opinion, wherever any petition is filed by an employer under
Section 75 of the Act, the employer has not only to implead ESIC but has
also to implead at least some of the workers concerned (in a
representative capacity if there are a large number of workers) or the
trade union representing the said workers. If that is not done, and a
decision is given in favour of the employer, the same will be in violation of
the rules of natural justice. After all, the real parties concerned in labour
matters are the employer and the workers. ESI Corporation will not be in
any way affected if the demand notice sent by it under Sections 45-A/45-B
is quashed.”
He also argued that there are 3 seperate establishment running under
Nabarupa Food Products and thus, all the employees of said three separate
unit/establishment will be taken into consideration. In this regard, he
referred section 45(A) of the Act. Referring to the cross examination of the
petitioner that he would maintain attendance register of his establishment
but did not submit said register before the Court, Ld. Counsel Mr. K.K.Paul
argued that intentionally same was withheld by the petitioner to suppress
the actual nos. of employee of his establishment. Finally he argued that what
was done by the ESI officer, was done in discharge of their official duties and
thus, there is nothing to disbelieve them, so the petition may be rejected.”
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18.
In view of the aforesaid observations and discussions made by
learned Insurance Court, I find that the issue of depositing fifty percent of
the sum due, as claimed by the Corporation were taken into account
extensively both by Mr. Majumder, learned senior counsel for the
petitioner-appellant, which were properly dealt with by the learned
Insurance Court. In view of this, I find no force in the submission of
learned senior counsel that the provision as contemplated under sub-section
(2-B) of Section 75 of the ESI Act, went un-noticed to the petitioner and
the same appears to be contrary to the records, and accordingly, is repelled.
19.
From a plain reading of Section 82 of the ESI Act, it appears that to
file an appeal before the High Court against the judgment passed by the
Insurance Court, there must involve substantial question of law, as
envisaged in sub-section (2) of Section 82 of the said Act.
20.
Here, I deem it imperative to mention that in exercise of powers
conferred under Section 96 of the ESI Act, the Labour Department,
Government of Tripura, had framed Rules, which is called as „The Tripura
Employees‟ Insurance Court, Rules, 2008‟ (for short “Rules”). Rule 38 of
the said Rules provides that the order of a court shall be final and binding
upon the parties. Rule 38 reads thus:“38. Finality of order:- Save as provided in section -82, the order of a
court shall be final and binding upon the parties.
NOTES.
Section-82 of the Act provides for Appeal.”
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21.
A bare perusal of Rule 38 of the said Rules, it is aptly clear that to
file an appeal there must be compliance of Section 82 of the ESI Act. Subsection (1) of Section 82 contemplates that no appeal shall lie from an
order of an Employees’ Insurance Court, save and expressly provided in
this section making it implicit that the filing of appeal against the judgment
passed by the Insurance court is not automatic rather conditional. The
condition is encrypted in sub-section (2) of Section 82, which mandates
that there must be substantial question of law to file an appeal to the High
Court from an order of the Insurance Court. So, existence of substantial
question of law is a condition precedent to prefer appeal before the High
Court against the judgment and decree passed by the Insurance court.
22.
Chapter IV of the said Rules dealing with „Miscellaneous provisions‟
has engrafted Rule 47, which prescribes that when there is no specific
provision in the Rules, the provision of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall
be applicable. Rule 47 reads thus:“47. Provisions in the code of civil procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) to
apply:- In respect of matters relating to procedure or admission, or
evidence for which no specific provision is made in these rules, the
provisions of the code of civil procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) including the
rules made thereunder and the Indian evidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872),
shall, so far as may be apply to proceedings under the Act.”
23.
Now, from a conjoint reading of Section 82(2) and Rule 47 of the
Rules, it can easily be said that to file an appeal, the appellant has to
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comply the essentialities of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (for short, “CPC”), which provides that:"100. Second appeal.-(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the
body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an
appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by
any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied
that the case involves a substantial question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree
passed ex parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall
precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law
is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the
respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that
the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take
away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be
recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not
formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question."
24.
So, for hearing an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by
the Insurance Court existence of substantial question of law is a sine qua
non for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 82(2) and the procedure is
mandatory as provided under Section 100 CPC. It is settled proposition of
law that second appeal does not lie on the erroneous findings of facts based
on appreciation of relevant evidences. Further, the scope of exercise of
jurisdiction by the High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC is
limited to the substantial question of law. To be a substantial question of
law, it must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a
binding precedent and answer to the same will have a material bearing as to
the rights of parties before the court.
Page - 18
25.
However, factual findings based on no evidence can be agitated in
the second appeal, that is to say, in an appeal under Section 82(2) of the
ESI Act. In the instant appeal, it is observed that the learned Insurance
Court has elaborately discussed the evidence and after comparing the
registers of the establishment, he came to a finding that the establishment,
namely Nabarupa Food Products was manned by 13 (thirteen) employees.
No register was produced by the petitioner. In view of this, the above
findings of the learned Insurance Court regarding the establishment of the
petitioner having thirteen employees, and constitute one unit came within
the purview of the definition of “factory” as provided under Section 2(12)
of the ESI Act and the said findings on fact do not call for any interference
by this Court since such findings do not suffer from perversity. Rather, the
findings are based on the materials, which were proved in accordance with
law in course of trial.
26.
In the instant case, learned Insurance Court held that the petition
filed by the petitioner raising the dispute whether his establishment was
manned by ten or more employees was not maintainable for noncompliance of Section 75 of the ESI Act. I have gone through the said
findings of the learned Insurance Court, and am of the opinion that the said
findings on fact cannot be said to be perverse.
Thus, the substantial question of law as formulated in the appeal has
been answered accordingly.
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27.
Now, the additional substantial questions of law remain to be
answered are whether the petition/application filed by the petitioner before
the Insurance Court were maintainable or not in the light of the provisions
under Section 45 AA and Section 75 of the ESI Act, and whether the said
provisions are mandatory or directory in nature.
28.
On meticulous reading of Section 45-AA of the ESI Act, it is apt to
say that if an employer is not satisfied with the order referred to in Section
45-A, he may prefer an appeal to an appellate authority as may be
provided by regulation, within sixty days of the date of such order after
depositing twenty-five per cent of the claimed amount. The language of the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The legislature while inserting this
provision by way of amendment of the Act, 18 of 2010 (w.e.f. 01.06.2010)
had employed the word, “may” in Section 45-AA of the Act. Before the
amendment was carried out, this provision was not in the original ESI Act.
The object of making provision for appeal in the Act by way of
amendment, only in the year 2010, in my opinion, was to enable the
employer to redress his grievances against the order passed by the assessing
officer, which was simply aimed at to reducing the litigation in the Court.
I have noticed that the Amendment Act, 18 of 2010, which followed
the report of the Standing Committee on Labour, inserted many provisions
and also made amendments with the existing provisions. Many provisions
used the expression “shall”, which shows that it was mandatory and
Page - 20
provisions which used the expression “may” shows that it was
discretionary. The use of the word “may”, in my considered view, makes
Section 45-AA, optional, i.e. it is the choice of the employer whether he
would prefer appeal or approach the Insurance Court directly without
exhausting his remedy as provided under Section 45-AA of the ESI Act.
What crystallizes is that even after introduction of Section 45-AA of the
Act, the right of the employer to challenge an assessment before the ESI
Court, at the first instance under Section 75 of the Act, remains intact. To
summarize, Section 45-AA speaks about the appellate authority, which is a
choice, granted to the employer being it an option only, can be exercised at
the choice of the employer. The ESI Court cannot compel an employer to
exhaust the appeal remedy as contemplated under Section 45-AA to
entertain an application filed before it by the employer challenging the
assessment of the ESI authority concerned. If such interpretation is adapted
by the ESI Court, then, in my considered view, it will be contrary to the
intention of the legislature. In my opinion, had it be the intention of the
legislatures to make the provision for appeal under Section 45-AA as
mandatory, then, they would have carried out necessary amendment in
Section 75 of the Act also.
29.
In the case of Union of India vs. A.K. Pandey, reported in
(2009) 10 SCC 552, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in para 10 of judgment
referring People v. Sutcliffe, 7 NYS(2) 431 held as under:
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“………The construction of mandatory words as directory and directory
words as mandatory should not be lightly adopted. The opposite meaning
should be unequivocally evidenced before it is accepted as the true
meaning; otherwise, there is considerable danger that the legislative
intent will be wholly or partially defeated.”
In para 15 of A.K. Pandey(supra), it was held thus:
“15. The principle seems to be fairly well settled that prohibitive or
negative words are ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the
provision; although not conclusive. The Court has to examine carefully
the purpose of such provision and the consequences that may follow
from non-observance thereof……………”
30.
It is now well settled that cardinal principles of interpretation of
statute is that the word, „statute’ must be understood in their natural,
ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical
meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there
is something in the context or in object of the statute to suggest to the
contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a ‘statute’ must prima facie
be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that
when the words of a „statute’ are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the
courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the
consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention
of the law giver. It is also well settled that the courts must interpret the
provisions of the statute upon ascertaining the object of the legislation
through the medium or authoritative forms in which it is expressed. It is
settled that the Court should, while interpreting the provisions of the
statute, assigns it ordinary literal meaning. As a corollary, no provision
either in the Act or in the Rules framed by the State Government makes it
Page - 22
mandatory for an employer to exhaust the appeal provision under Section
45-AA prior to filing of an application under Section 75/76 of the ESI Act,
1948. To reiterate, had it been the legislative intent it would have
specifically been provided in the Act or Rules. In absence thereof, the
arguments if any made that only after exhausting the option under Section
45-AA, can any application be filed in the Insurance Court shall be hard to
digest.
31.
Next, I have given my conscious consideration to the substantial
question of law formulated as to whether Section 75(2-B) is mandatory or
not. The Sub-Section 2-B starts with prohibitive or negative words, when it
provides, “no matter which is in dispute between a principal employer and
the Corporation in respect of any contribution………………….”
Following the principles laid down in A.K. Pandey as cited supra, it
appears that the provision is mandatory in nature. The discretion or
relaxation given to an employer is in-built in the provision itself. Firstly,
Sub-Section (2-B) stipulates that no dispute shall be raised by the principal
employer in the Employees‟ Insurance Court unless he deposits with the
Court fifty per cent of the amount due from him as claimed by the
Corporation. Thereafter, the legislature has incorporated a proviso which
gives a discretion to the Insurance Court, or in other words, a kind of
relaxation given to an employer to file an application to the Court on the
basis of which the Insurance Court has been given the power to waive or
Page - 23
reduce the amount to be deposited under this Sub-Section. So, in my
opinion, the provision of Sub-Section (2-B), inclusive of including its
proviso as a whole in the sense, is mandatory. The inclusion of proviso in
Sub-Section (2-B) makes the first part of the provision as directory because
the proviso empowers the employer to file an application to waive or
reduce the claimed amount to be deposited with the Insurance Court, but, it
is aptly clear that to file an application under Section 75 of the ESI Act
before the Insurance Court, the employer is mandatorily to deposit fifty
percent of the claimed amount; however, a relaxation has been given to
such applicant-employer of establishment to file an application under the
proviso as contemplated under sub-section (2-B) asking the court to waive
or reduce the claimed amount to be deposited in the court.
32.
Furthermore, it is to be borne in mind that the ESI Act is a social
security legislation, as I have stated here-in-above. There is clear statutory
mandate for depositing fifty percent of the claimed amount for filing an
application by the employer who opts to take recourse of Section 75 of the
Act. Only escape remains with the aggrieved employer to urge before the
Insurance Court to waive or reduce the said amount. Again the language of
the proviso of sub-section (2-B) crystalises that discretion or relaxation as
given to the employer under the said proviso is not to be exercised in a
routine manner or as a matter of course. Only when a strong prima facie
case is made out, then the Insurance Court after recording reasons in
Page - 24
writing may waive or reduce the claimed amount considering the
legislative intent and the purpose for which this Sub-section has been
incorporated in the ESI Act, 1948 by the Act 29, 1989(w.e.f. 20.10.1989).
Accordingly, the substantial question of law as formulated here-in-above
has been answered by this Court.
33.
In view of the above discussions, I do not accept the
submission of learned counsel appearing for the respondents-Corporation
that the application filed by the petitioner before the Insurance Court
without exhausting the remedy as provided under Section 45-AA of the ESI
Act is bad in law.
34.
Further, in the instant appeal, it comes to fore that the
petitioner neither had deposited fifty percent of the claimed amount nor
filed any application for waiving or reducing the claimed amount before the
Insurance Court. In this situation, Sub-Section (2-B) of Section 75 as a
whole being held to be mandatory, non-compliance of such mandatory
provision made their petitions raising a dispute before the Insurance Court
not maintainable.
35.
In the light of the above discussions, I find no merit in the appeal,
and accordingly, the appeal stand dismissed. Consequently, the judgment
and order dated 28.05.2019 passed by the learned District Judge
(Employees‟ Insurance Court), West Tripura, Agartala in connection with
case Nos. Misc. (ESI) 05 of 2014 stand upheld and affirmed.
Page - 25
Accordingly, the interlocutory applications filed by the petitioner i.e.
appellants herein, are also dismissed and disposed of.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed.
However, there shall be no order as to costs. Send down the LCRs.
JUDGE
Saikat
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