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CGHC010413862024
2026:CGHC:33005
NAFR
KUNAL
DEWANGAN
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally
signed by
KUNAL
DEWANGAN
CRR No. 1339 of 2024
Shri Rajesh Dewangan S/o Bhuwanlal Dewangan Aged About 46 Years
R/o Posted As Assistant Teacher (Lb) At Village Selud, Tehsil Patan,
District Durg (Chhattisgarh) Officer Residence- Government Primary
School, Baijalpur, Tehsil Bemetara, District Bemetara (Chhattisgarh)
... Applicant(s)
versus
1 - Smt. Jyoti Dewangan W/o Shri Rajesh Dewangan Aged About 32
Years R/o Village Pachri, Tehsil Tilda, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh)
2 - Minor Love Dewangan Through His Natural Guardian Mother Namely
Smt. Jyoti Dewangan, S/o Shri Rajesh Dewangan, Aged About 8 Years,
R/o Village Pachri, Tehsil Tilda, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh)
... Non-applicant(s)
For Applicant
: Mr. Shubhank Tiwari, Advocate.
For Non-applicants : Mr. Vivek Kumar Agrawal, Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Order on Board
30.07.2026
1.
Heard Mr. Shubhank Tiwari, learned counsel for the applicant as
well as Mr. Vivek Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the
non-applicant.
2.
Heard on I.A. No.02/2024, which is an application for condonation
of delay of 79 days in preferring the instant criminal revision.
3.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the present
criminal revision has been preferred assailing the order dated
30.05.2024 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,
Raipur (C.G.) in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 15/2023 (Smt. Jyoti
Dewangan & Another Vs. Shri Rajesh Dewangan), whereby the
application filed by the non-applicants under Section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure has been partly allowed and the applicant has been
directed to pay maintenance of Rs.6,000/- per month to non-applicant
No.1 (wife) and Rs.4,000/- per month to non-applicant No.2 (minor),
along with litigation expenses of Rs.2,000/-, totaling Rs. 10,000/- per
month. It is contended that though the marriage between the applicant
and non-applicant No.1 was solemnized on 07.03.2022 in accordance
with Hindu rites and customs but the non-applicant No.2 is not the
biological child of the applicant, he was born out of the previous
marriage of non-applicant No.1 with one Manoj Dewangan, which
aspect has not been properly appreciated by the learned Family Court
while passing the impugned order. It is further submitted that the
findings recorded by the learned Family Court are contrary to the
material available on record and are based on conjectures and
surmises, thereby rendering the impugned order legally unsustainable.
4.
Learned counsel further submits that the revision could not be
preferred within the prescribed period as the applicant, being a
Government Teacher, was under a bona fide impression that the order
passed by the Family Court had attained finality and was not amenable
to challenge before a higher forum. It is also contended that the
applicant was continuously subjected to threats of false criminal
implication of himself and his family members and being the sole
earning member of the family, he remained silent apprehending that any
criminal proceedings might adversely affect his government service and
the livelihood of his entire family. It is further submitted that immediately
upon acquiring knowledge regarding the legal remedy available against
the impugned order, the applicant contacted a local counsel, who
advised him to prefer the present revision before this Court. Thereafter,
on the advice of the counsel engaged before this Court, the applicant
obtained certified copies of the entire Family Court record through his
local counsel and, after collecting all the necessary documents, filed the
present revision without any further delay. It is, therefore, submitted that
the delay in filing the revision is neither deliberate nor intentional but
has occurred due to bona fide and unavoidable circumstances
constituting sufficient cause. It is thus prayed that the delay in filing the
present revision be condoned and the impugned order be set aside by
allowing the present revision.
5.
On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the non-
applicants opposes the prayer for condonation of delay and submits that
the applicant has failed to demonstrate any sufficient cause for not
preferring the revision within the prescribed statutory period. It is
contended that a delay of about 79 days is inordinate and cannot be
brushed aside lightly, as condonation of such prolonged delay defeats
the very object of the law of limitation, which is to ensure certainty and
finality in litigation.It is further argued that the reasons assigned by the
applicant for the delay are bona fide, as he remained under a bona fide
impression regarding the finality of the impugned order and filed the
present revision immediately after obtaining legal advice and the
certified copies of the record, do not constitute sufficient cause in the
eye of law. Learned counsel stresses that the applicant has not acted
with due diligence and has failed to show that he was prevented by
circumstances beyond his control. It is also urged that the explanation
furnished is vague and does not satisfactorily account for the long
period of delay. The non-applicants therefore prays that the application
for condonation of delay be rejected and consequently the revision
petition itself be dismissed as barred by limitation.
6.
I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties as also
perused the application for condonation of delay in preferring the instant
criminal revision.
7.
The primary question that arises for consideration before this
Court is whether the delay of about 79 days in preferring the present
revision petition deserves to be condoned or not.
8.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932 , while
considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-
“5. The legal position is that where a case
has been presented in the Court beyond
limitation, the petitioner has to explain the
Court as to what was the "sufficient cause"
which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the
Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v.
Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it
was held by this Court that even though
limitation may harshly affect the rights of a
party, it has to be applied with all its rigour
when prescribed by statute. A reference was
also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay
Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92
wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a case
has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the
court as to what was the “sufficient cause”
which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach
the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona
fide
on
his
part
in
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground
to condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay
by
imposing
any
condition
whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court did not commit
any mistake in dismissing the delay
condonation application of the present
appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously
based
on
facts
and
circumstances of each case and that, the
expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be
liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction
or lack of bona fides is attributed to the
party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024
INSC
262,
wherein,
one
of
us
(J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after
referring to various decisions on the issue,
it was in unequivocal terms observed by
this Court that delay should not be excused
as a matter of generosity and rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice
to the opposite party. The relevant passage
of the same is profitably extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we
made it very clear that we are not going to
look into the merits of the matter as long as
we are not convinced that sufficient cause
has been made out for condonation of such
a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India
when it comes to condoning the gross
delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant
chooses to approach the court long after
the lapse of the time prescribed under the
relevant provisions of the law, then he
cannot turn around and say that no
prejudice would be caused to either side by
the delay being condoned. This litigation
between the parties started sometime in
1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years
have elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap the
fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery
of justice if we condone the delay of 12
years and 158 days and once again ask
the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of
the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether
the delay should be condoned or not. From
the tenor of the approach of the appellants,
it appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a
party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own
inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed
to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be
heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering
the plea for condonation of delay, the court
must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It
is only if the sufficient cause assigned by
the litigant and the opposition of the other
side is equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for
the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation
is
not
merely
a
technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should
not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging
over the head of the respondent for
indefinite period of time to be determined at
the whims and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the High
Court committed no error much less any
error of law in passing the impugned order.
Even otherwise, the High Court was
exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court,
it has been said that delay should not be
excused
as
a
matter
of
generosity.
Rendering substantial justice is not to
cause prejudice to the opposite party. The
appellants have failed to prove that they
were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the
matter and this vital test for condoning the
delay is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this
appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There
shall be no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the
facts of the present case, we are of the
opinion that the High Court correctly refused
to condone the delay and dismissed the
appeal by observing that such inordinate
delay was not explained satisfactorily, no
sufficient cause was shown for the same, and
no plausible reason was put forth by the
State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this
petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush
aside the delay occurred in preferring the
second
appeal,
due
to
callous
and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the
officials functioning in the State machinery.
Though the Government adopts systematic
approach in handling the legal issues and
preferring the petitions/applications/appeals
well within the time, due to the fault on the
part of the officials in merely communicating
the information on time, huge revenue loss
will be caused to the Government exchequer.
The present case is one such case, wherein,
enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in
preferring the second appeal due to the
lapses on the part of the officials functioning
under the State, though valuable Government
lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the
State to streamline the machinery touching
the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing
of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix
the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned,
and penalize the officer(s), who is/are
responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc.,
if any, to the value of the loss caused to the
Government. Such direction will have to be
followed by all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter
which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a
period of time, we have noticed that
whenever there is a plea for condonation of
delay be it at the instance of a private litigant
or State the delay is sought to be explained
right from the time, the limitation starts and if
there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4
years till the end of the same. For example if
the period of limitation is 90 days then the
party seeking condonation has to explain why
it was unable to institute the proceedings
within that period of limitation. What events
occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no
consequence. The court is required to
consider what came in the way of the party
that it was unable to file it between the 1st
day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is
entitled to wait until the last day of limitation
for filing an appeal. But when it allows the
limitation to expire and pleads sufficient
cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the
sufficient cause must establish that because
of some event or circumstance arising before
the limitation expired it was not possible to file
the
appeal
within
time.
No
event
or
circumstance arising after the expiry of
limitation can constitute such sufficient cause.
There may be events or circumstances
subsequent to the expiry of limitation which
may further delay the filing of the appeal. But
that the limitation has been allowed to expire
without the appeal being filed must be traced
to a cause arising within the period of
limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and
Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC
733).”
9.
Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the
discretion to condone delay has to be exercised with great caution and
only upon a clear and satisfactory demonstration of “sufficient cause.”
The law is well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law, by themselves,
do not constitute such sufficient cause, and that negligence, inaction or
lack of bona fides cannot be overlooked under the guise of advancing
substantial justice.
10.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful
consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the delay of
79 days in filing the present revision is grossly inordinate. The
explanation offered by the applicant that the delay are bona fide, as he
remained under a bona fide impression regarding the finality of the
impugned order and filed the present revision immediately after obtaining
legal advice, though invoking sympathy, cannot be treated as “sufficient
cause” in the eye of law. It is now well-settled that poverty or ignorance
of law by themselves do not constitute adequate justification for
condoning delay, nor can the valuable right that accrues to the opposite
party by virtue of the law of limitation be lightly taken away.
11.
The doctrine of limitation is founded upon public policy that seeks
to ensure certainty and finality in litigation. Once the statutory period
has expired, a litigant seeking indulgence of the Court must show
diligence and bona fides, and must explain satisfactorily the
circumstances which prevented timely action. In the present case, the
applicant has not been able to point out any circumstance arising within
the period of limitation which disabled him from approaching this Court.
On the contrary, the record reveals that he remained inactive for a long
period and sought to revive his claim only after consulting legal aid
services. Such explanation cannot be construed as sufficient cause for
condonation of delay, particularly when the delay is prolonged and
unexplained for a substantial period.
12.
Even otherwise, from perusal of the impugned order, it transpires
that the marriage between the applicant and non-applicant No.1 is not in
dispute. The learned Family Court has recorded a finding that after the
marriage, non-applicant No.1 was subjected to cruelty and harassment at
the hands of the applicant and his daughter, due to which she was
compelled to reside separately at her parental home. The contention of
the applicant that non-applicant No.2 is not his biological son has also
been considered and rejected by the learned Family Court on the ground
that after the marriage, the applicant had accepted non-applicant No.2 as
his son and, therefore, was under a legal and moral obligation to maintain
him along with non-applicant No.1.
13.
The learned Family Court has further taken into consideration the
evidence regarding the income and financial status of the applicant and
has recorded a finding that the applicant is serving as an Assistant
Teacher (L.B.) in a Government Primary School and is also possessed of
agricultural land, thereby having sufficient means to maintain the nonapplicants.
14.
Considering the evidence available on record, the learned Family
Court concerned granted a total amount of Rs. 10,000/- per month (Rs.
6,000/- per month to the non-applicant No.1 and Rs. 4000/- per month to
the non-applicant No.2) as maintenance in favour of the non-applicants. In
view of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajnesh
v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324 and Anju Garg and Another v. Deepak
Kumar Garg, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1314, I do not find any ground to
interfere with the impugned order.
15.
Therefore, this Court is constrained to hold that no case for
condonation of delay is made out. The application for condonation of
delay is accordingly rejected. As a consequence, the instant criminal
revision petition also stands dismissed.
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
Kunal
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