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[2025:RJ-JP:52010]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11468/2014
Shri Madan Lal, S/o Shri Mukataya, since deceased
1/1
Smt. Rameshwari Wife Of Late Shri Madan Lal, Aged
About 53 Years.
1/2
Sanju Daughter Of Late Shri Madan Lal, Aged About 29
Years.
1/3
Anju Daughter Of Late Shri Madan Lal, Aged About 27
Years
All R/o Behind Patni Bhawan, Madangunj, Kishangarh,
District Ajmer.
----Petitioners
Versus
1.
Municipal Corporation of Kishangarh, Ajmer through
Commissioner.
2.
Commissioner,
Municipal
Corporation
Inspector,
Municipal
Of
Kishangarh,
Ajmer.
2.
Chief
Health
Corporation
Of
Kishangarh, Ajmer.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Veyankatesh Garg with
Mr. Pranjal &
Ms. Disha Jain
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. B.K. Sharma
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA
Order
Arguments concluded on
:::
November 19, 2025
Reserved on
:::
November 19, 2025
Pronounced on
:::
January 19, 2026
1.
The petitioner- Shri Madan Lal by filing instant writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has
made a challenge to the order dated 09.10.2013 (Annex.2)
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[CW-11468/2014]
issued under the signatures of the Commissioner, Nagar
Parisad
Kishangarh, by which
the
petitioner
has been
dismissed (removed) from service.
2.
Since the original petitioner- Shri Madan Lal has
passed away, the benefits accruing from this order, shall be
payable to the legal heirs of the deceased petitioner.
3.
The facts of the case in nutshell are that the
petitioner- Shri Madan Lal was initially appointed as a Class
IV
in the respondent department on 07.12.1973. The
petitioner was said to have witnessed a prolonged and bitter
family dispute in his later part of entire life, which had
completely shattered him emotionally and psychologically.
The petitioner proceeded on an unsanctioned leave from
01.01.2011 to March 2011, which resulted into issuing a
show-cause-notice dated 25.03.2011 to the petitioner. The
petitioner submitted reply to the aforesaid show-cause-notice
on 31.03.2011. The respondent department being dissatisfied
with the reply to the show-cause-notice dated 31.03.2011,
issued a notice dated 27.04.2011 under Rule 86(3) of the
Rajasthan Service Rules. On 03.05.2004 the petitioner in
response to the aforesaid notice submitted an application/
reply to the notice before the respondent authority with the
request that he shall not commit such mistake in future.
On
01.06.2011
the
petitioner
submitted
an
application before the respondent No. 2 by which he sought
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voluntarily retirement w.e.f. 01.09.2011 mainly on
the
ground of prolonged ill-health and continuous family dispute.
The service career of the petitioner for 29 years remained
unblemished.
The respondent-department dissatisfied with the
reply to the notice dated 27.04.2011, issued a memorandum
of charges along-with charge-sheet on 07.07.2011 under
Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules, 1958
(for short 'Rule of 1958').
application
the
submitted
by
petitioner
on
The
01.06.2011
seeking voluntarily retirement was dismissed on the ground
that the inquiry against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the
Rules of 1958 is under cotemplation.
The petitioner on 17.08.2011 submitted reply to
the charges levelled against him. On 30.04.2012 the Inquiry
Committee submitted its report and found the charges proved
against
the
petitioner.
(Annexure-12),
(removed)
the
the
Vide
dated
09.10.2013
respondent-Authority
dismissed
petitioner
from
order
service.
The
petitioner
aggrieved with the order of dismissal (removal) dated
09.10.2013 has preferred this writ petition.
4.
Learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
petitioner
abandoning to challenge the punishment order on its merit
and has limited his challenge to the extent that the penalty
imposed upon the petitioner i.e. removal from service for the
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allegation of willful absence from the duty is disproportionate
and is very harsh and to alter the same. Counsel also
submitted that the petitioner in reply to the notice tendered
an apology and sought permission to join. Further the
application for voluntary retirement dated 01.06.2011 was
turned down for reason of a pending departmental inquiry by
letter dated 10.08.2011. It is evident that on the day when
the petitioner applied for voluntary retirement, no inquiry was
pending against him. Counsel submitted that the respondent
rejected the application of the petitioner for voluntary
retirement so that a departmental enquiry could be initiated
to deprive him of his benefits.
Counsel also submitted that the penalty imposed
upon the petitioner is arbitrary, grossly excessive and out of
proportion warranted by the facts and circumstances of the
case. The order of the respondent was illegal and irrational in
the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic and
normal standards. The unsanctioned leave for which the
petitioner was terminated was for a period of around four
months, which would by no stretch of imagination attract a
punishment for termination and forfeiture of past service.
Counsel
also
submitted
that
the
act
of
the
respondents is illegal and will deprive the petitioner from his
legal and fundamental rights. The respondents have given a
harsh and unbalanced punishment by forfeiting the pension
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and other retiral benefits of the petitioner on account of a
conduct, which can be very well termed as minor fault.
Counsel to support his submissions has placed
reliance upon following judgments:(i)
Shashi Bala Meena V/s Punjab National Bank
and Ors. reported in 2023 SCC Online Raj. 5311
delivered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court;
(ii)
Union of India and Anr. V/s R.K. Sharma
reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 2010 passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court decided on 30.06.2022;
(iii) Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India
Limited & Anr. V/s Mukul Kumar Choudhuri & Ors.
reported in (2009) 15 SCC 620 delivered by the
Hon’ble Apex Court;
5.
Mr.
respondents
B.K.
Sharma
submitted
that
counsel
the
appearing
impugned
for
the
order
of
punishment has been passed by the respondent-authority
after taking into consideration the entire material made
available to the Enquiry Committee. In the reply to the writ
petition, counsel appearing for the respondent department
has raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition filed
by the petitioner is not maintainable against the impugned
order dated 09.10.2013 on the ground that the impugned
order passed by the respondent-authority, is an appealable
order, therefore, the petitioner has an alternative remedy of
filing an appeal before the Appellate Authority. Therefore, the
writ petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable.
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6.
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Considered the submissions advanced by both the
counsels appearing for the respective parties and gone
through the entire material made available to the Court
including the judgments cited.
7.
Counsel appearing for the respondents has raised
an issue that since the order under challenge in the present
writ petition is an appealable order, the present writ petition
is not maintainable.
8.
The impugned order imposing penalty of dismissal
from service has been passed on 09.10.2013 and the chargesheet is pending since 2011.
9.
The petitioner has limited his challenge to the
extent of proportionality of the punishment imposed and not
on the merits of factual aspects. In view of the limited
challenge i.e. proportionality of punishment for a charge of
willful absence from the duty for a period of about three
months only, the Court feels appropriate to exercise the writ
jurisdiction in the present case in view of limited prayer.
10.
The only charge against the petitioner is of willful
absence from duty for a period of about three months. After
holding the petitioner guilty for the misconduct of remaining
willful absence from duty for a period of about three months,
a penalty of removal from service has been imposed upon the
petitioner.
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11.
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It is not disputed that the petitioner has already
completed 29 years of service but the respondents have not
brought on record anything adverse other than the present
charge.
12.
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the
present case where the charge against the petitioner is of
willful absence from duty for a period of about three months,
the
punishment/
penalty
of
removal
from
service
is
disproportionate?
13.
The Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
Shashi Bala Meena (supra) has observed in paras 9.2, 9.3,
10, 10.5, 10.6, 10.8, 11 and 14 as under:"9.2 Now the questions remain for adjudication of
this court is that “Whether for absence of six months,
the punishment of “compulsory retirement” is proper
or disproportionate?”.
9.3 For adjudicating this fact, the whole service
career of the petitioner is required to be seen.
10. This court is conscious enough about the scope
of interference with the decision of Disciplinary'
Authority. The scope of interference is very narrow
and limited in such like matters, but the High Court
has powers of moulding the relief in case where the
punishment/penalty imposed shocks the judicial
conscience.
10.5.
The doctrine of proportionality is thus well
recognised concept of judicial review and if it is found
that the punishment is disproportionate, then it
remains open for the court to interfere under its
limited
scope
of
judicial
review.
10.6.
The principles of proportionality of
punishment
vis-avis
misconduct
have
been
recognised by the Courts of various European
countries as well as British Courts. It has time and
[2025:RJ-JP:52010]
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[CW-11468/2014]
again been held that if the punishment imposed on
an employee is out of proportion, the Court has
power to interfere with the same. In Council of Civil
Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services,
[1984] 3 All ER 935, it has been held:"Judicial review
has I think developed to a stage today when, without
reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the
development has come about, one can conveniently
classify under three heads the grounds on which
administrative action is subject to control by judicial
review. The first ground I would call illegality the
second irrationality and the third procedural
impropriety. This is not to say that further
development on a case by case basis may not in
course of time add further grounds. I have in mind
particularly the possible adoption in the future of the
principle of 'proportionality' which is recognised in the
administrative law of several of our fellow members
of the European Economic Community."
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court also
recognised
the
theory
of
proportionality
of
punishment when they said that "an order imposing
punishment, which is shockingly disproportionate or
is highly excessive having regard to the gravity of
misconduct, is liable to be declared as arbitrary and
thus violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India."
10.8. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman
cum Managing Director, Coal India Limited v. Mukul
Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC 620, has dealt with
the doctrine of proportionality and the limited scope
of High Court under judicial review in paras 19, 20,
21 and 22 as under:19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, wellrecognized concept of judicial review in our
jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the
discretionary domain and sole power of the
decision-maker to quantify punishment once the
charge of misconduct stands proved, such
discretionary power is exposed to judicial
intervention if exercised in a manner which is out
of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment
which is grossly in excess to the allegations
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[CW-11468/2014]
cannot claim immunity and remains open for
interference under limited scope of judicial
review.
20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing
with the question of quantum of punishment
would be would any reasonable employer have
imposed such punishment in like circumstances?
Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to
take into consideration measure, magnitude and
degree of misconduct and all other relevant
circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters
before imposing punishment.
21. In a case like the present one where the
misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized
absence from duty for six months but upon being
charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted
his guilt and explained the reasons for his
absence by stating that he did not have any
intention nor desired to disobey the order of
higher authority or violate any of the Company's
Rules and Regulations but the reason was purely
personal and beyond his control and, as a matter
of fact, he sent his resignation which was not
accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to
be. justified, since in our judgment, no
reasonable employer would have imposed
extreme
punishment
of
removal
in
like
circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly
harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations.
22. Ordinarily, we would have sent the matter
back
to
the
appropriate
authority
for
reconsideration on the question of punishment
but in the facts and circumstances of the present
case, this exercise may not be proper. In our
view, the demand of justice would be met if the
Respondent No. 1 is denied back wages for the
entire period by way of punishment for the
proved misconduct of unauthorized absence for
six months."
11. In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that
in case a quantum of penalty, there should be
compelling and strong circumstances which must be
recorded and such interference cannot be on the
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basis of misplaced sympathy and generosity.
Considering the said concept of rendering justice, this
court has no hesitation to hold as far as the present
case on hand is concerned, that interference is called
for, which is not based on misplaced sympathy or
generosity, but on the basis of rendering equitable
justice which is a hallmark of judicial review by this
court which is exercising its constitutional jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
14. Bearing in mind the celebrated doctrine of
proportionality,
the
impugned
order
dated
15.01.2015
and
the
appellate
order
dated
12.03.2015 are quashed and set aside. The matter is
remitted back to the appropriate authority for
reconsideration on the question of punishment and
pass appropriate orders within a period of three
months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of
this order."
14.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of R.K.
Sharma (supra) has observed in paras 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and
13 as under:"8. The short question which falls for consideration is
whether the punishment of dismissal from service on
account
of
absence
from
duty
for
the
period
mentioned in Article 1 of the Charge-memo, is
proportionate, reasonable and in conformity with
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India?
9. Learned counsel for the appellants have rightly
pointed out that besides the absence period, the
respondent had on several occasions remained on
Casual Leave/Earned Leave or other sanctioned leave
also. It is pointed out that such leave was sanctioned
by the officers who were not competent to do so.
However, the appellants have not proved that the
respondent was "willfully" absent from service during
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those
periods.
It
[CW-11468/2014]
remains
a
possibility
that
respondent merely acted under the faith that the
officer in question had the power to approve his
requests for leave. It is also undeniable that no
action was taken against the officers who purportedly
granted leave to the respondent despite not being
competent to sanction the same.
10. In view of the above, we are of the considered
opinion that no misconduct can be attributed to the
respondent for the periods he availed one or the
other sanctioned leave.
11.
As
regards
to
the
period
for
which
the
respondent was absent from duty, we are satisfied
that the punishment of dismissal from service is too
harsh, disproportionate and not commensurate with
the
nature
of
the
charge
proved
against
the
respondent. We are, therefore, of the view that the
ends of justice would have been adequately met by
imposing some lesser but major penalty upon the
respondent.
12. The misconduct attributed to the respondent is
based on the charge-memo dated 04.12.1998 with
respect to which he was dismissed from service in
the year 2000. We, therefore, do not deem it
necessary to remit the case to the disciplinary
authority after such a long spell of 22 years. Instead,
we are inclined to invoke our power under Article 142
of the Constitution, keeping in mind the doctrine of
proportionality and with a view to do complete justice
between the parties. This Court has utilized Article
142 on numerous occasions in the past, such as in
Hind Construction & Engineering v. Their Workmen
and
Management
of
the
Federation
of
Indian
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[CW-11468/2014]
Chambers of Commerce v. Their Workmen to ensure
that the punishment meted out to a public sector
employee for a violation of the applicable service
laws/rules is not disproportionate to the infraction
that
he/she
has
committed.
The
doctrine
of
proportionality is employed to examine whether the
penalty that is imposed upon is congruent with the
charges brought against the delinquent employee.
13. We, thus, allow this appeal in part and dispose of
the same in the following terms:
(i) The order of the High Court dated 06.12.2012
to the extent of setting aside the dismissal dated
14.07.2000 is upheld.
(ii) The respondent is ordered to be reinstated in
service but he shall be deemed to have remained
in service till he completed minimum "qualifying
service" of 20 years to earn pension and other
retiral benefits.
(iii) The respondent shall be deemed to have
been 'compulsorily retired from service', with
entitlement to pension, gratuity and other retiral
benefits on completion of minimum qualifying
service.
(iv) No arrears of pay shall be paid to the
respondent from the date of dismissal from
service i.e. 14.07.2000 till he is deemed to have
completed the minimum "qualifying service".
(v) The respondent, however, shall be entitled to
arrears of pension and other retiral benefits,
without any interest, provided that such arrears
are paid within a period of four months from
today. In the event of delay, the respondent shall
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be entitled to interest @ 6% per annum on
delayed payment.
(vi) It is made clear that the above stated order
shall not constitute a precedent as the same has
been passed by invoking power under Article 142
of the Constitution."
15.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mukul
Kumar Choudhuri & Ors.(supra) in paras 15, 18, 19, 20
and 21 as observed as under:15.
The
question,
however,
remains:
is
the
punishment of removal grossly disproportionate to
the proved charge of unauthorized absence for more
than six months? In order to answer the aforesaid
question, it would be appropriate to refer to a few of
decisions
of
this
Court
wherein
doctrine
of
proportionality has been considered.
18.
Again, in the case of Coimbatore District
Central Cooperative Bank v. Coimbatore District
Central
Cooperative
Bank
Another
this
considered
court
Employees
the
Assn.
and
doctrine
of
proportionality and it was held:
“17. So far as the doctrine of proportionality is
concerned, there is no gainsaying that the said
doctrine has not only arrived in our legal system
but has come to stay. With the rapid growth of
administrative law and the need and necessity to
control possible abuse of discretionary powers by
various
administrative
authorities,
certain
principles have been evolved by courts. If an
action taken by any authority is contrary to law,
improper, irrational or otherwise unreasonable, a
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[CW-11468/2014]
court of law can interfere with such action by
exercising power of judicial review. One of such
modes of exercising power, known to law is the
“doctrine of proportionality”.
18. “Proportionality” is a principle where the
court is concerned with the process, method or
manner in which the decision-maker has ordered
his priorities, reached a conclusion or arrived at a
decision. The very essence of decision-making
consists in the attribution of relative importance
to the factors and considerations in the case. The
doctrine of proportionality thus steps in focus
true nature of exercise—the elaboration of a rule
of permissible priorities.
19.
de
Smith
states
that
“proportionality”
involves “balancing test” and “necessity test”.
Whereas the former (balancing test) permits
scrutiny
of
excessive
onerous
penalties
or
infringement of rights or interests and a manifest
imbalance of relevant considerations, the latter
(necessity test) requires infringement of human
rights to the least restrictive alternative. [Judicial
Review of Administrative Action (1995), pp. 60105, para 13.085; see also Wade & Forsyth:
Administrative Law (2005), p. 366.]
20. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.),
Reissue, Vol. 1(1), pp. 144-45, para 78, it is
stated:
“The
court
will
quash
exercise
of
discretionary powers in which there is no
reasonable relationship between the objective
which is sought to be achieved and the
means
used
to
that
end,
or
where
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punishments
[CW-11468/2014]
imposed
by
administrative
bodies or inferior courts are wholly out of
proportion to the relevant misconduct. The
principle of proportionality is well established
in European law, and will be applied by
English
courts
enforceable
where
European
law
is
in the domestic courts. The
principle of proportionality is still at a stage
of
development
in
English
law;
lack
of
proportionality is not usually treated as a
separate ground for review in English law,
but is regarded as one indication of manifest
unreasonableness.”
21. The doctrine has its genesis in the field of
administrative law. The Government and its
departments, in administering the affairs of the
country, are expected to honour their statements
of policy or intention and treat the citizens with
full personal consideration without abuse of
discretion. There can be no “pick and choose”,
selective applicability of the government norms
or unfairness, arbitrariness or unreasonableness.
It is not permissible to use a “sledgehammer to
crack a nut”. As has been said many a time;
“where
paring
knife
suffices,
battle
axe
is
precluded”.
22. In the celebrated decision of Council of Civil
Service Union v. Minister for Civil Service(1985
AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1984) 3 All ER
935 (HL) Lord Diplock proclaimed: (All ER p.
950h-j)
“Judicial review has I think developed to a
stage today when, without reiterating any
(16 of 21)
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analysis
[CW-11468/2014]
of
the
steps
by
which
development
has
come
about,
one
the
can
conveniently classify under three heads the
grounds on which administrative action is
subject to control by judicial review. The first
ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second
‘irrationality’
and
the
third
‘procedural
impropriety’. That is not to say that further
development on a case-by-case basis may
not in course of time add further grounds. I
have
in
mind
particularly
the
possible
adoption in the future of the principle of
‘proportionality’….” (emphasis supplied)
23. CCSU has been reiterated by English courts
in several subsequent cases. We do not think it
necessary to refer to all those cases.
24. So far as our legal system is concerned, the
doctrine is well settled. Even prior to CCSU, this
Court has held that if punishment imposed on an
employee by an employer is grossly excessive,
disproportionately high or unduly harsh, it cannot
claim immunity from judicial scrutiny, and it is
always open to a court to interfere with such
penalty in appropriate cases.
25. In Hind Construction & Engg. Co. Ltd. v.
Workmen (AIR 1965 SC 917), some workers
remained absent from duty treating a particular
day
as
holiday.
They
were
dismissed
from
service. The Industrial Tribunal set aside the
action. This Court held that the absence could
have been treated as leave without pay. The
workmen might have been warned and fined.
(But)
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[CW-11468/2014]
“It is impossible to think that any other
reasonable employer would have imposed the
extreme punishment of dismissal on its entire
permanent staff in this manner.” (AIR p. 919,
para 7) (emphasis supplied)
The
Court
concluded
that
the
punishment
imposed on the workmen was
“not only severe and out of proportion to the
fault, but one which, in our judgment, no
reasonable employer would have imposed”.
(AIR pp. 919-20, para 7) (emphasis supplied)
In
26.
Federation
of
Indian
Chambers
of
Commerce and Industry v. Workmen [(1972) 1
SCC 40], the allegation against the employee of
the Federation was that he issued legal notices to
the Federation and to the International Chamber
of Commerce which brought discredit to the
Federation—the employer. Domestic inquiry was
held against the employee and his services were
terminated. The punishment was held to be
disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and
established. This Court observed that: (SCC p.
62, para 34)
“[T]he Federation had made a mountain out
of a mole hill and made a trivial matter into
one
involving
loss
of
its
prestige
and
reputation.”
27. In Ranjit Thakur referred to earlier, an army
officer did not obey the lawful command of his
superior officer by not eating food offered to him.
Court-martial proceedings were initiated and a
sentence of rigorous imprisonment of one year
was
imposed.
He
was
also
dismissed
from
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[CW-11468/2014]
service, with added disqualification that he would
be unfit for future employment.
28. Applying the doctrine of proportionality and
following
CCSU,
Venkatachaliah,
J.
(as
His
Lordship then was) observed: (SCC p. 620, para
25)
“The question of the choice and quantum of
punishment is within the jurisdiction and
discretion of the court martial. But the
sentence has to suit the offence and the
offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly
harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to
the offence as to shock the conscience and
amount in itself to conclusive evidence of
bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part
of the concept of judicial review, would
ensure that even on an aspect which is,
otherwise, within the exclusive province of
the court martial, if the decision of the court
even
as
to
sentence
is
an
outrageous
defiance of logic, then the sentence would
not be immune from correction. Irrationality
and perversity are recognised grounds of
judicial review.” (emphasis supplied)
19.
The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well
recognized
concept
jurisprudence.
What
of
is
judicial
review
otherwise
in
our
within
the
discretionary domain and sole power of the decision
maker to quantify punishment once the charge of
misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power
is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a
manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award
of punishment which is grossly in access to the
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[CW-11468/2014]
allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open
for
interference
under
limited
scope
of
judicial
review.
20.
One of the tests to be applied while dealing
with the question of quantum of punishment would
be: would any reasonable employer have imposed
such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a
reasonable
employer
is
expected
to
take
into
consideration measure, magnitude and degree of
misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and
exclude
irrelevant
matters
before
imposing
punishment.
21.
In a case like the present one where the
misconduct
of
the
delinquent
was
unauthorized
absence from duty for six months but upon being
charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his
guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by
stating that he did not have any intention nor desired
to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any
of the Company’s Rules and Regulations but the
reason was purely personal and beyond his control
and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation
which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot
be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no
reasonable employer would have imposed extreme
punishment of removal in like circumstances. The
punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in
excess to the allegations."
16.
The petitioner has served with the respondents for
a long period of 29 years and nothing has been brought on
record as regards any adversity during these 29 years against
[2025:RJ-JP:52010]
(20 of 21)
[CW-11468/2014]
him. The petitioner has been imposed with a penalty of
dismissal from service on account of willful absence from duty
for a period of about three months. It is also submitted by
the counsel appearing for the petitioner that the petitioner
submitted an application for V.R.S. but the said application
was turned down because of pendency of the inquiry.
17.
Taking into consideration the observations of the
Hon’ble Apex Court and also Coordinate Bench of this Court,
as stated above, as regards the proportionality of
the
punishment in the similar circumstances of misconduct of
willful absence and the charge has been found to be proved
against the present petitioner i.e. of willful absence from the
duty for a period of about three months only, this Court can
safely held that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner i.e.
dismissal from service is too harsh and deserves to be
interfered with.
18.
Accordingly,
the
writ
petition
is
allowed.
The
impugned order of dismissal from service dated 09.10.2013
(Annex.2) is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded
to the Disciplinary Authority for passing a fresh order as
regards the penalty to be imposed on the petitioner other
than the penalty of dismissal from service.
19.
The respondents shall pass a fresh order within a
period of one month from the date of receiving a copy of this
order.
(21 of 21)
[2025:RJ-JP:52010]
20.
[CW-11468/2014]
Consequences to follow according to fresh order to
be passed by the respondents, as directed above.
21.
The
fresh
order
passed
by
the
Disciplinary
Authority in compliance of this order shall be treated to be
with effect from the date of the impugned order dated
09.10.2013.
22.
In view of the order passed in the main petition,
the pending application/s, if any, also stand disposed of.
(GANESH RAM MEENA),J
Sharma N.K./Dy. Registrar-368-S
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