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CGHC010358112026
2026:CGHC:39612
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 4664 of 2026
AVINASH
SHARMA
Digitally signed
by AVINASH
SHARMA
Date: 2026.09.10
14:55:43 +0530
Shri Digrilal Sidar S/o Anandram Sidar Aged About 41 Years Sarpanch Gram
Panchayat Tarapur District- Raigarh Chhattisgarh,
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary Department Of Panchayat And
Rural Development Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur,
District- Raipur (C.G.)
2 - The Collector Raigarh District- Raigarh Chhattisgarh
3 - The Sub- Divisional Officer Raigarh District- Raigarh Chhattisgarh.
4 - The Tahsildar Raigarh District- Raigarh Chhattisgarh
5 - Shri Rajiv Dansena S/o Babulal Dansena Aged About 42 Years Panch Ward
No.1 Gram Panchayat Tarapur District- Raigarh (C.G.)
6 - Smt Suman Sarathi W/o Rakesh Sarathi Aged About 26 Years Panch Ward No.2
Gram Panchayat Tarapur District- Raigarh (C.G.)
7 - Smt Sunawati Sidar W/o Tikaram Sidar Aged About 26 Years Panch Ward No 3
Gram Panchayat Tarapur District- Raigarh (C.G.)
8 - Shri Lukeshwar Patel S/o Rohit Kumar Patel Aged About 58 Years Panch Ward
No.5 Gram Panchayat Tarapur District- Raigarh (C.G.)
9 - Smt Rukhmani Nishad W/o Jageshwar Nishad Aged About 28 Years Panch
Ward No. 7 Gram Panchayat Tarapur District- Raigarh (C.G.)
10 - Smt Santoshi Bareth W/o Late Nandlal Bareth Aged About 46 Years Panch
Ward No 8 Gram Panchayat Tarapur District- Raigarh,
11 - Shri Ghanshyam Nishad S/o Sukhram Nishad Aged About 39 Years Panch
War No.9 Gram Panchayat Tarapur District- Raigarh (C.G.)
12 - Smt Jyoti Dansena W/o Rajendra Dansena Aged About 34 Years Panch Ward
No.10 Gram Panchayat Tarapur District- Raigarh (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
:
For State/respondent :
For Respondent No.5 :
Shri Akhand Pratap, Advocate.
Shri SS Choubey, GA and Dr. Arham Siddiqui, PL.
Shri Amit Sharma, Advocate on caveat.
SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
Order on Board
10/09/2026
1. By
way of the present writ petition, the petitioner calls in question the
order/notice dated 02.09.2026 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Sub-Divisional
Officer cum Prescribed Authority, Raigarh C.G. by which, a meeting of noconfidence motion has been directed to be convened on 10.09.2026 at 12:00
afternoon against the petitioner/Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Tarapur.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Petitioner is duly elected
Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Tarapur, Janpad Panchayat Raigarh, District
Raigarh, and is presently discharging his statutory duties and functions as
Sarpanch in accordance with the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat
Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 and the Rules framed thereunder. Respondent Nos.5 to
12, submitted a purported application/proposal seeking initiation of a noconfidence motion against the Petitioner. The said application dated
27.07.2026 contains certain allegations against the functioning of the
petitioner as Sarpanch. Hence this petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the purported proposal/notice
for moving a motion of no-confidence was signed on 27.07.2026 but was
sought to be acted upon only on 19.08.2026. A notice intended to constitute
the statutory foundation for initiating proceedings cannot be kept alive
indefinitely and thereafter resurrected on a subsequent date. The statutory
scheme contemplates a live and legally valid notice before the Prescribed
Authority; the Authority cannot treat a stale proposal as a perpetual authority
to initiate proceedings at a time of its own choosing. If the signatories
intended to move the motion on 19.08.2026, a fresh notice complying with
Rule 3(1), including the requirement of support of not less than one-third of
the total elected members, ought to have been submitted on that date. The
statutory clock under Rule 3(3) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Gram
Panchayat Ke Sarpanch Tatha Up-Sarpanch, Janpad Panchayat Tatha Zila
Panchayat Ke President Tatha Vice-President Ke Virudh Avishwas
Prastava ) Niyam, 1994 runs from the date of receipt of a legally admissible
notice and not from a stale document subsequently relied upon by the
Authority. Reliance is placed on Bhulin Dewangan v. State of M.P., {2000 (4)
MPHT 69}, which recognises the time-bound character of the statutory
procedure governing no-confidence proceedings. Further, Rule 3(1) requires
a notice of no-confidence to be signed by not less than one-third of the total
elected members, and Rule 3(3) requires the Prescribed Authority to satisfy
itself as to the admissibility of the notice before convening the meeting. The
record does not disclose how many elected members actually presented the
proposal on 19.08.2026, does not disclose the identity or number of such
members, contains no categorical finding that the signatories constituted
one-third of the total elected members, and reflects no verification of
continuing support of the original signatories. The jurisdictional condition
precedent therefore stands unestablished. He further submits that the fifteenday period is intended to ensure that Prescribed Authority acts expeditiously
upon a legally admissible notice, while also protecting the elected officebearer from an indefinite and unregulated cloud of proceedings. The Full
Bench in Bhulin Dewangan (supra), recognised the time-bound nature of the
Rules. The Authority cannot selectively enforce the Rule to the disadvantage
of the elected office-holder while disregarding it when compliance would
protect that office-holder.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the Petitioner received
the notice only on 07.09.2026, whereas the meeting was fixed for
10.09.2026, in breach of the mandatory requirement that notice be
despatched seven clear days before the meeting. The right in question is not
a bare right to be present, but a right to participate effectively, understand the
basis of the motion, and marshal facts in defence of the electoral mandate.
Reliance is placed on Sau. Sangeeta w/o Sunil Shinde v. State of
Maharashtra, Civil Appeal No. 5059 of 2021 (decided 01.09.2021), which
underscores adherence to the prescribed democratic procedure governing
no-confidence proceedings. The short and insufficient notice denied the
Petitioner a meaningful opportunity to examine the record, obtain legal advice
and avail of the remedy in law, causing actual and substantial prejudice.
5. Per contra, learned State counsel submits that the no-confidence
proceedings have been initiated strictly in accordance with law. It is
submitted that the proposal dated 27.07.2026 was submitted before the SubDivisional Officer (Revenue), Raigarh, and out of 10 elected members,
including the Up-Sarpanch and Panchas, 8 members had signed the
proposal. It is, therefore, submitted that the statutory requirement regarding
the requisite number of members stood duly satisfied.
6. Counsel for Respondent No.5 on caveat would support the impugned
order/notice.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents
annexed with the petition carefully.
8. This Court in the matter of Smt. Janki Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh in
WPC No.2757 of 2021, decided on 25.07.2023 has observed in paragraph
Nos.11 to 17 as under;“11. With respect to other grounds raised by learned
counsel for petitioner that S.D.O. has got the signature of
Panchas who submitted application for convening no
confidence motion through Chief Executive Officer is in
violation of Rule 3 (2) and 3 of the Rules of 1994. Perusal of
Rule 3 (3) of the Rules of 1994 would show that
requirement under the said rules is only that Prescribed
Authority has to satisfy himself about the admissibility of the
notice with reference to Section 21 (3) of the Act of 1993.
Section 21 (3) of the Act of 1993 is extracted below for
ready reference :“21.
No-confidence motion against Sarpanch and Up-
Sarpanch. - (1) On a motion of no-confidence being passed
by the Gram Panchayat by a resolution passed by majority
of not less than three fourth of Panchas present and voting
and such majority is more than two third of the total number
of Panchas constituting the Gram Panchayat for the time
being, the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch against whom such
motion is passed, shall cease to hold office forthwith.
(2)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the
rules made thereunder a Sarpanch or an Up-Sarpanch shall
not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no-
confidence is discussed against him. Such meeting shall be
convened in such manner as may be prescribed and shall
be presided over by an officer of the Government as the
Prescribed Authority may appoint. The Sarpanch or the UpSarpanch, as the case may be, shall have a right to speak
at, or otherwise to take part in, the proceeding of the
meeting.
(3) No-confidence motion shall not lie against the Sarpanch
or Up-Sarpanch within a period of,(i) one year from the date on which the Sarpanch or
Up-Sarpanch enter their respective office;
(ii) six months preceding the date on which the term
of office of the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch, as the case may
be, expires:
(iii) one year from the date on which previous motion
of no-confidence was rejected.
(4)
If the Sarpanch or the Up-Sarpanch, as the case may
be, desires to challenge the validity of the motion carried out
under sub-section (1), he shall, within seven days from the
date on which such motion was carried, refer the dispute to
the Collector who shall decide it, as far as possible, within
thirty days from the date on which it was received by him,
and his decision shall be final.”
12. Challenge to the proceedings of no confidence motion is
not on the ground that it was convened contrary to the
provisions as mentioned under Section 21 (3) of the Act of
1993. In the Case at hand, the Prescribed Authority for his
satisfaction have got the signatures of the Panchas in the
application placed before him verified. After satisfying, he
proceeded for convening the no confidence motion. There is
no specific provision in this regard and therefore, once the
Prescribed Authority recorded his satisfaction that the
application is in accordance with the provisions under
Section 21 of the Act of 1993, the submission of learned
counsel for petitioner that entire proceedings is vitiated as
Prescribed Authority has not verified the signatures himself
is also not sustainable.
13. The petitioner in this writ petition has not pleaded that
she suffered serious prejudice at any stage of proceeding.
In absence of any serious prejudice shown, pleaded, no
confidence motion carried out by majority can not be
interfered with. In democratic system when majority of
elected Panchas have posed no confidence motion on
petitioner. Provision under Section 21 of the Act of 1993 and
the Rules of 1994 only provides that no confidence motion
can be requested before the Prescribed Authority and it has
to be convened in accordance with the Rules of 1994
subject to application is not falling within the Sub-Section 3
of Section 21 of the Act of 1993.
14. In case of Bhulin Dewangan vs State of MP & Others
{2000 (4) MPHT 69}, Full Bench of High Court of Madhya
Pradesh considered the non-compliance of the Rules of
1994 and observed thus :“15. The general rule is that non-compliance of mandatory
requirement results in nullification of the Act. There are,
however, several exceptions to the same. If certain
requirements or conditions are provided by statute in the
interest of a particular person, the requirements or
conditions, although mandatory, may be waived by him if no
public interest are involved and in such a case the act done
will be valid even if the requirements or conditions have not
been performed. This appears to be the reason for learned
C.K. Prasad, J., in Dhumadhandin v. State of M.P. (1997 (1)
Vidhi Bhasvar 49) which was followed by R.S. Garg, J., in
Mahavir Saket v. Collector, Rewa (1998 (1) JLJ 113) for
holding that mere non-compliance of first part of the rule in
fixing a meeting beyond the prescribed days of the motion
of
no-confidence
would
not
invalidate
the
whole
proceedings. In case of Dhumadhandin (supra), the
Sarpanch did not question the validity of the notice calling
the meeting of no-confidence and in fact had taken chance
by facing the motion. R.S. Garg, J., in Mahavir Saket
(supra) placed reliance on the decision of C.K. Prasad, J., in
Dhumadhandin (supra) to up-hold the passing of the noconfidence motion in the adjourned meeting as in the
meeting called within the prescribed fifteen days the
Presiding Officer was not available. Sub-section (4) of
Section 21 permits reference of a dispute to the Collector by
Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch against whom a notice of no
confidence motion had been passed. The proceedings of
the no-confidence motion or other proceedings under the
Act are also assailable in this Court as Constitutional Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. As has been
construed by us, even though second part of the rule
requiring dispatch of notice of the meeting to the member is
mandatory, yet in every case of challenge to the proceeding
of no-confidence motion either before the Collector or this
Court, it would still be open to the Collector or this Court to
find out whether in a given case non-compliance of any part
of the rule has in fact resulted in any failure of justice or has
caused any serious prejudice to any of the parties. The
general rule is that a mandatory provision of law requires
strict compliance and the directory one only substantial. But
even where the provision is mandatory, every noncompliance of the same need not necessarily result in
nullification of the whole action. In a given situation even for
non-fulfillment of mandatory requirement, the authority
empowered to take a decision may refuse to nullify the
action on the ground that no substantial prejudice had been
caused to the party affected or to any other party which
would have any other substantial interest in the proceeding.
This Court under Article 227 of the Constitution has also a
discretion not to interfere even though a mandatory
requirement of law has not been strictly complied with as
thereby no serious prejudice or failure of justice has been
caused. This is how various Single Bench decisions in
which even after finding some infraction of the second part
of Rule 3 (3) of the Rules of 1994, the resolution of noconfidence motion passed was not invalidated on the
ground that no substantial prejudice thereby was caused to
the affected parties. The intention of the legislature has to
be gathered from the provisions contained in Section 21
and the Rule 3 (3) framed thereunder. The provisions do
evince an intention that a meeting of the no-confidence
motion be called within a reasonable period of not later than
15 days and every member has to be informed of the same
seven days in advance. A notice of no-confidence motion is
required to be moved by not less than 1/3rd of the total
number of elected members as required by first Proviso to
Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 and can be lawfully carried by a
resolution passed by majority of not less than 3/4th of the
Panchas present and voting and such majority has to be
more than 2/3rd of the total number of Panchas constituting
the Panchayat in accordance with subsection (1) of Section
21 of the Act. This being the substance of the provisions
under the Act and the rules, a mere non-compliance of
second part of Sub-rule (3) would not in every case
invalidate the action unless the Collector while deciding the
dispute under Sub-section (4) of Section 21 or this Court in
exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution comes to the conclusion that such noncompliance has caused serious prejudice to the affected
office bearer or has otherwise resulted in failure of justice.
15. In case of Sahasram Jangde & Ors vs. State of
Chhattisgarh & Others {2013 (4) CGLJ 526}, this Court
observed as under :"6.When the law laid down by the full Bench of M.P. High
Court and Division Bench of this Court is applied to the facts
of the present case, it is to be seen that respondent No.6
Sarpanch has not raised any ground before the Additional
Collector that because of the fact that meeting was
convened on 8th day from the date of dispatch of notice and
not on 9th day, and thus clear 7 days notice was not issued,
she has suffered grave prejudice in preparing herself for the
meeting and there being no such finding by the Additional
Collector in the impugned order, it will be taken as if no
prejudice has been caused to respondent No.6 Sarpanch
and thus in absence of prejudice or failure of justice, the
Additional Collector has wrongly set aside the resolution of
the Gram Panchayat declaring the no-confidence motion to
be passed. It is also to be seen that once this Court in the
earlier writ petition has held that the earlier resolution of the
Gram Panchayat passing no-confidence motion in May,
2011 having been annulled on technical grounds, the bar
against moving of another motion within one year would not
apply, the SDO(Revenue) should not have sought opinion
from the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat or from
the Deputy Director Panchayat. However, by doing so, he
wasted 7 days in the process. Therefore, once the no
confidence motion has been passed the democratic norms
and the statutory provisions cannot be left at the mercy of
the prescribed authority when the law is well settled in the
case of Bhulin Dewangan(Supra). Declaring the resolution
of the Gram Panchayat which has passed the no
confidence motion by majority as illegal would render the
wish of the house nugatory and the Sarpanch who has lost
the confidence of the house shall be allowed to function
without any mandate in her favour. Such interpretation of
Rule is neither permissible nor contemplated and this Court
will not allow such effort of the prescribed authority to
frustrate the will of the house by adopting dilatory tactics on
the pretext of seeking legal opinion or opinion from the
higher authorities. Learned counsel for respondent No.6 has
relied on judgment of M.P. High Court in the matter of Jugraj
Singh Markam Vs. Dhannalal Maravi and others : 2003 (4)
MPLJ 378. However, in view of the discussion made above,
and particularly the law laid down by the Full Bench of the
M.P. High Court and the peculiar facts of this case, the said
judgment relied upon by respondent No.6 has no
application and is distinguishable. In the result, the writ
petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dt.
28.06.2012 passed by the Additional Collector is set aside.
Consequently respondent No.6 no longer remains as
Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Dahida, Tahsil Sarangarh
District Raigarh."
16. In the aforementioned decision, the Court have held that
every non-compliance of mandatory provisions need not
necessarily resulted nullification of the whole action and in
the given situation of non-fulfillment of the mandatory
provisions the authority empowered to take decision may
refuse to nullify the action on the ground that no substantial
prejudice has been caused to the party affected.
17. In absence of raising any specific grounds that
members against whom no confidence motion is carried
stating that she suffered grave prejudice in the procedure
adopted for convening the no confidence meeting no such
finding can be recorded.
9. The principal contention of the petitioner is that the proposal dated
27.07.2026 could not have been acted upon on 19.08.2026 and that there
was no proper satisfaction by the Prescribed Authority regarding compliance
with Rule 3(1) of the Rules of 1994.
10. This Court, in Smt. Janki Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh , WPC No.2757 of
2021, decided on 25.07.2023, after considering Section 21 of the
Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 and Rule 3 of the Rules of
1994, has held that the requirement under Rule 3(3) is that the Prescribed
Authority must satisfy himself regarding the admissibility of the notice with
reference to Section 21(3) of the Act. It was further held that where the
Prescribed Authority had satisfied himself regarding the admissibility of the
application and had proceeded to convene the meeting, a challenge merely
on the ground that the signatures were not personally verified by the
Prescribed Authority was not sustainable.
11. In the present case, the State has specifically stated that the proposal was
supported by 8 out of 10 elected members. Thus, the statutory requirement
regarding the minimum number of members supporting the proposal is prima
facie satisfied. The petitioner has not placed any material on record to
demonstrate that the persons who signed the proposal were not elected
members of the Gram Panchayat or that the proposal did not satisfy the
requirement of Rule 3(1). Mere absence of a separate recital in the order
regarding the number of supporting members, in the facts of the present
case, would not by itself render the entire proceedings without jurisdiction.
12. The petitioner has also relied upon the time prescribed under Rule 3(3) and
the decision in Bhulin Dewangan (supra). The said decision, however, also
makes it clear that while the procedural requirements under the Rules are
intended to ensure expeditious consideration of a no-confidence motion, the
effect of an alleged procedural infraction has to be examined in the context of
the prejudice, if any, caused to the affected office-bearer.
13. The more substantial contention raised by the petitioner is regarding the
alleged failure to provide seven clear days' notice of the meeting. The
petitioner asserts that the impugned notice/order was received by him on
07.09.2026 and the meeting was scheduled for 10.09.2026. However, the
material placed on record does not establish that the petitioner was wholly
prevented from participating in the proceedings or that any specific prejudice,
beyond the assertion of insufficient time, has actually been caused to him.
14. In Bhulin Dewangan (supra), the Full Bench has held that although the
requirement regarding dispatch of notice of the meeting to the members is
mandatory, every instance of non-compliance would not necessarily result in
nullification of the entire proceedings. The Court is required to examine
whether such non-compliance has caused serious prejudice or resulted in
failure of justice.
15. Similarly, in Sahasram Jangde & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others ,
2013 (4) CGLJ 526, this Court, while considering the requirement of notice in
no-confidence proceedings, reiterated that the effect of procedural noncompliance has to be considered with reference to actual prejudice and
failure of justice. The democratic mandate reflected through a no-confidence
motion passed by the requisite majority cannot ordinarily be defeated merely
on technical grounds where no substantial prejudice is demonstrated.
16. In the present case, the no-confidence motion is yet to be considered by the
Gram Panchayat. At this stage, the petitioner seeks to interdicted the very
meeting on the basis of alleged procedural irregularities. The material on
record does not demonstrate any such circumstance which would establish
that the petitioner has been rendered incapable of participating in the
meeting or putting forth his case before the elected members.
17. It is also relevant that Section 21(2) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj
Adhiniyam, 1993 expressly confers upon the Sarpanch against whom the noconfidence motion is proposed a right to speak at, or otherwise take part in,
the proceedings of the meeting. The petitioner can, therefore, place his case
before the meeting in accordance with law.
18. The judgments relied upon by the petitioner do not lay down an absolute
proposition that every procedural deviation in a no-confidence proceeding
must necessarily result in quashing of the proposed meeting irrespective of
the prejudice caused. On the contrary, the decisions relied upon by the
petitioner themselves have to be understood in the context of the statutory
scheme and the requirement of examining failure of justice and substantial
prejudice.
19. Having regard to the aforesaid legal position and considering the fact that the
proposal has admittedly been supported by the requisite number of elected
members and no substantial prejudice or failure of justice has been
demonstrated so as to warrant interference at this stage, this Court is not
inclined to interfere with the impugned order/notice dated 02.09.2026.
20. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.
Sd/(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Avinash
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