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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RSA NO.04 OF 2020
Shri Deshapremik Roy,
S/o Late Jatindra Chandra Roy,
Vill-Fulkumari, Presently residing at Dak Bunglow Road,
P.O. & P.S: R.K. Pur, Udaipur Town, Gomati District,
Tripura.
-----Defendant-Appellant.
Versus
Shri Amar Ranjan Sarkar,
S/o Late Nishi Kanta Sarkar,
Vill-Fulkumari, P.O & P.S: R.K. Pur,
Udaipur Town, Gomati District, Tripura
-----Plaintiff-Respondent.
For the Appellant(s)
: Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, Sr. Advocate.
Ms. A. Pal, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. S. Saha, Advocate.
Date of hearing
: 02.08.2022
Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order
: 05/08/2022
Whether fit for reporting: NO.
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
JUDGMENT & ORDER
This is an appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code
of
Civil
Procedure,
against
the
judgment
dated
09.09.2019 passed by the learned District Judge, Gomati
District, Udaipur in Title Appeal No.05 of 2018 upholding the
judgment passed by the learned Civil Judge(Junior Division),
Gomati District, Udaipur dated 07.06.2018 in Title Suit No.02
of 2000.
2.
The fact of the case is brief are that one Lt. Nishi
Kanta Sarkar, the father of the respondent herein was the
possessor of the suit land from 1955 and he made some
construction therein. After his death, the respondent started
possessing the same and in the year 1984, the appellant
entered into the possession of the suit premises based on a
registered lease deed for a period of two years, where he
started a sweet-meet shop which was renewed in the year
1989 for another two years. After the expiry of the said lease
period, it was further extended up to 08.08.1991, for two
years. Thereafter on expiry of the lease period, the appellant
continued the possession of the said premises ignoring the
request of the respondent to execute a fresh lease deed for the
same. The same premises required some maintenance and the
respondent requested him to vacate the premises for the
purpose of repairing, but of no result. So, after serving a legal
notice to vacate the said premises, and to pay the unpaid rent,
he filed the suit for eviction against the appellant.
3.
After receiving the summons from the learned Court,
the appellant appeared therein and contested the suit by filing
a written statement denying all the averments made in the
plaint. It was the contention of the appellant that he has been
running the said sweet-meet shop on C.S. Plot No.1528 as a
tenant of Radha Ballav Sutradhar since Aswin 1400 BS. The
respondent never possessed any portion of the said C.S. Plot
No.1528 and never made any construction on that land. It was
further claimed by the appellant that construction made within
the C.S. Plot No.1528 was of Shri Radha Ballav Sutradhar and
from 1391 BS to 1400 BS, he was a tenant of the respondent
in a temporary shed constructed by him to the eastern side of
C.S. Plot No.1529. The said plot is lying to the southern
boundary of the C.S. Plot No.1528 and during that period of
time, some registered instruments were created between the
appellant and the respondent. He further denied having
knowledge
regarding
the
contents
of
these
registered
instruments. He further claimed that in the middle part of 1399
B.S., the respondent requested him to vacate the ‘dokan’ shed.
Accordingly, in the last part of 1400 B.S. he vacated the said
premises and handed over the possession to the respondent.
Thereafter, he entered into possession of the premises on
12.09.1993 as a tenant of Radha Bhallav Sutradhar and started
running his business therein. He further stated that the
boundary of the suit land mentioned in the plaint was not
correct and prayed for disposal of the suit.
4.
Based on the evidence of the parties, the learned
Court below after completion of the trial, passed the judgment
on 07.06.2018. The Court below decreed the suit directing the
respondent therein to handover the possession of the suit land
to the appellant and also to pay rent at the rate of Rs.300 per
month along with damaged amounting to Rs.29 per day from
the month of Jaisthya 1406 till vacation of the suit premises.
5.
The appellant felt seriously aggrieved by the said
judgment of the Trial Court below and challenged the same by
filing an appeal in the Court of District Judge, Gomati District,
Udaipur, Tripura which was numbered as T.A.05 of 2018. The
learned Appellate Court below, after hearing the appeal passed
the impugned judgment on 09.09.2019 dismissing the appeal
and confirming the judgment of the learned Trial Court below.
6.
Aggrieved
thereby
with
the
impugned
judgment,
passed by the learned Appellate Court below, the appellant
filed this instant second appeal before this Court.
7.
This
instant
second
appeal
was
admitted
on
26.08.2020 on the following substantial question of law:“i. Whether the plaintiff has any right to seek
eviction of the defendants without having any title over
the suit land?
ii. Whether the findings of both the Courts
below are perverse?
iii. Any other substantial question which may
arise at the time of hearing of this appeal.”
8.
Heard Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned Sr. counsel
assisted by Mrs. A. Pal, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant as well as Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, learned Sr. counsel
assisted by Mr. S. Saha, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent.
9.
Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned Sr. counsel appearing
for the appellant herein argued that Courts below miserably
failed to appreciate the pleaded case of the appellant and the
evidence on record. Learned Sr. counsel further submitted that
all the Courts below misread the record. The Courts below
failed to appreciate that they were under obligation to
appreciate both the fact and law involved in the case. The
Courts below while passing the impugned order miserably
failed to appreciate that the land measuring 0.023 acre covered
by the C.S. Plot No.1528 of khatian No.616 on which the shop
premises of the respondent is situated was the land under the
ownership and exclusive possession of Smt. Laxmi Rani
Sutradhar,
wife
of
Late
Radha
Ballav
Sutradhar.
The
respondent had no claim of right or title over the said land. So
the learned Courts below have no scope to pass the eviction
decree in favour of the respondent. The learned Court below
miserably failed to appreciate the contents of Exbt-13 i.e. the
judgment of this Court dated 12.08.2016 passed analogously in
RSA No.76 and 77 of 2017, wherein, it was specifically held in
para-35 and 36 that the original plaintiff of that suit, viz, Radha
Ballav Sutradhar was able to prove his hostile possession over
his shop which was standing on 0.023 acres of land and not on
the entire land of 0.052 acres on which the earlier decree was
passed. Accordingly, partly allowing that appeal and after that
judgment of this Court, both the Courts below were left with no
authority to arrive at the third finding avoiding the said
judgment.
10.
Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, learned Sr. counsel countering
the argument of the learned Sr. counsel appearing for the
appellant pointed out the findings of the learned first appellate
Court and held that the judgment and order passed on
09.09.2019 is just and proper and needs no interference.
Further, in support of his contention, Mr. Bhattacharjee,
learned Sr. counsel pressed into service Para-25 of the Apex
Court
Judgment
dated
02.14.2020
passed
in
C.
Doddanarayana Reddy(Dead) by Legal Representative
and
ors.
Vs.
C.
Jayarama
Reddy(Dead)
by
Legal
Representatives and ors., reported in (2020) 4 SCC 659
which is reproduced herein-under:“25. The question as to whether a substantial question of law
arises, has been a subject matter of interpretation by this Court. In
the judgment reported as Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-EIsmail Madris-Un-Niswan, it was held that findings of the fact could
not have been interfered within the second appeal. This Court held as
under:
“12. This Court had repeatedly held that the power of the
High Court to interfere in second appeal under Section 100 CPC is
limited solely to decide a substantial question of law, if at all the
same arises in the case. It has deprecated the practice of the High
Court routinely interfering in pure findings of fact reached by the
courts below without coming to the conclusion that the said finding of
fact is either perverse or not based on material on record.
13. In Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu (1996 3 SCC
392), this Court held:
"It is now well settled that concurrent findings of fact of trial
court and first appellate court cannot be interfered with by the High
Court in exercise of its 8 (1999) 6 SCC 343 jurisdiction under Section
100 of Civil Procedure Code. The Single Judge of the High Court
totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal
under Section 100 of the Code in the way he did."
14. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty (1996 6 SCC
166), this Court held :
"Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts
below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided
unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court
is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to re- place the
findings of the lower courts. … Even as- assuming that another view
is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not
have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view
taken by the first appellate court was based on no material."
15. And again in Secy., Taliparamba Education Soci- ety v.
Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M.N. , this Court held: (SCC p. 486, para
5)
„5………."The High Court was grossly in error in trenching upon the
appreciation of evidence under Section 100 CPC and recording
reverse finding of fact which is impermissible."
Mr.
Bhattacharjee,
learned
Sr.
counsel
also
referred to para-10 of the judgment of the Apex Court dated
07.16.2019 passed in Chaman Lal(Dead) Through Legal
Representative
Vs. Kamlawati(Dead) Through Legal
Representatives reported in (2020) 11 SCC 693 which is
reproduced herein-under:“10. We are fortified in our aforesaid view by earlier judicial
pronouncements. We may note that these judgments are in the context of
the provisions for second appeal under Section 100 of the said Code as it
existed prior to the amendment of 1976, which is almost pari material to
the existing provision which applies to Punjab[as noticed in Pankajakshi in
para-24]. Per se construction of documents (unless documents of title) to
prove a question of fact do not involve an issue of law unless it can be
shown that the material evidence contained in that was misunderstood by
the Court of fact. In the facts of the present case we are, in fact, dealing
with a document of title i.e. the gift deed. Thus, there can be little doubt
that if the translation of the document itself is not correctly done, an
aspect which was addressed to by the High Court by getting the
translation done, which was accepted, then the correct translation would
have to be re-construed. It is the principle, which was recognized in
Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. V. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., while
observing in Para-2 as under: (Chunilal Vs. Mehta case, AIR p.1316)
“ 2…… Indeed it is well settled that the construction of a
document of title or of a document which is the foundation of the rights of
parties necessarily raises a question of law.”
11.
Heard both sides and perused the evidence on
record.
12.
At this stage, this Court cannot go into the point of the
factual issue in the second appeal. The present appeal is filed
against the concurrent findings. It is not necessary for the
plaintiff to get his right, title and interest proved before this
Court since it is an suit for eviction of tenant. It is not a suit for
declaration of title. No argument is advanced on legal issues by
the appellant except on the facts.
counsel
prayed
to
get
the
Moreover, the appellant-
property
surveyed
by
a
Commissioner to find out the boundaries. It is not for this Court
to consider the said argument at the stage of second appeal.
The appellant has not made out a case for interference with the
orders of the Courts below.
13.
Hence
the
instant
second
appeal
filed
by
the
defendant-appellant is dismissed confirming the orders of the
Courts below dated 09.09.2019 and 07.06.2018 passed in Title
Appeal No.05 of 2018 and Title Suit No.02 of 2000.
13.
Consequently, pending application(s), if any, also
stands closed.
Send down the LCRs.
JUDGE
suhanjit
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