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R/CR.RA/2388/2026
(GJHC240561902026)
ORDER DATED: 27/10/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION (AGAINST CONVICTION NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT ACT) NO. 2388 of 2026
With
R/CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 2408 of 2026
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SHREE SADGURU COTTON CO. THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR NITINBHAI
NARENDRABHAI RAJGURU
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR VISHAL K ANANDJIWALA(7798) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR ROHAN RAVAL APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
Date : 27/10/2026
COMMON ORAL ORDER
RULE. Learned APP waives service of notice of rule on behalf of
the respondent No.1 – State.
2.
Since the issue arising out of the captioned revision applications is
similar and one, the facts stated in CR.RA No.2388 of 2026 are taking
into consideration for deciding both theses revision applications.
3.
By way of preferring the CR.RA No.2388 of 2026, the petitioner
seeks to quash and set aside the order 21/07/2026 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) in Criminal Appeal No.
353 of 2025 confirming the judgment and sentence passed by Ld.
Magistrate, Ahmedabad (Rural) dated 04/09/2025 in Criminal Case No.
768 of 2017. Whilst CR.RA No.2408 of 2026 challenges the judgment
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and order 21/07/2026 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Ahmedabad (Rural) in Criminal Appeal No. 354 of 2025 confirming the
judgment and sentence passed by Ld. Magistrate, Ahmedabad (Rural)
dated 04/09/2025 in Criminal Case No. 769 of 2017.
3.1
In furtherance of the above, by way of relief prayed for in terms of
paragraph 4(c) of the application, the petitioner also prays that pending
the revision application the order of sentence passed by the learned
Courts below be stayed and the petitioner may be released on bail.
4.
The brief facts of the case are that the respondent no.2 herein
original complainant filed a complaint against the petitioner under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short “the NI
Act”) alleging that the respondent no. 2 had sold and supplied goods to
the petitioner due to business relations and he had demanded payment of
Rs.15 lakhs from the petitioner against which even after multiple
reminders, the petitioner did not pay any outstanding amount. Upon
repeated requests by the respondent no.2, the petitioner issued a cheque
bearing No.014796 dated 8/2/2013 drawn on Kankaria Maninagar
Nagarik Sahakari Bank Ltd., for Rs.5.00 lakhs and assured the respondent
no.2 that upon presentation, he would receive the amount. The respondent
no.2 deposited the said cheque in his Bank on 18/2/2013 which came to
be dishonoured and returned unpaid with an endorsement "Insufficient
funds".
4.1
Respondent no.2 issued legal demand notice dated 18/3/2013
which was duly served upon the petitioner. Thereafter, the respondent
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no.2 filed a complaint which came to be culminated into Criminal Case
No.768 of 2017 before the learned Principal Senior Civil judge,
Dhandhuka, Ahmedabad (Rural) wherein after recording the evidence and
appreciation thereof, at the conclusion of the trial, the learned Magistrate
convicted the petitioner for the offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act and under Section 255(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and sentenced him to undergo Simple Imprisonment
for eighteen (18) months. The learned Magistrate further ordered to pay
the amount one and half (1 ½) times of the cheque amount as fine and in
default, to undergo S.I. for six months.
4.2
The petitioner unsuccessfully assailed Criminal Appeal No. 353 of
2025 before Learned Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) wherein the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) vide order dated
21/07/2026 confirmed the judgment and order of sentence of the learned
Trial Court observing the very demeanour and conduct of the petitioner
that petitioner did not remain present before the Court at the time of
pronouncement of the judgment and order of sentence.
4.3
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of dismissing the appeal on
21/07/2026 confirming the judgment and order of conviction and
sentence, the captioned revision applications came to be filed on
27/07/2026.
5.
Heard the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner and
learned APP for the respondent No.1-State.
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6.
ORDER DATED: 27/10/2026
Before dealing with the issue on hand, certain clinching and glaring
facts as emerging from the record are required to be taken into
consideration that though the present revision application has been filed
on 27/07/2026, the petitioner has not taken any pain to get the hearing of
the matter for suspension of the sentence and thereby to seek the
protective order. To the contrary, the petitioner is satisfied by mere
pendency of the revision applications. Thus, the very conduct and
intention of the petitioner is self explanatory that the petitioner intends to
linger / prolong the matter for one or the other reasons. To be noted that
the petitioner has moved the revision on 27/07/2026 and remained
indolent for these three months and it is only when the petitioner is
constrained to surrender to serve the order of sentence passed by the
learned Courts below, he had shown his readiness and willingness to
deposit the remaining cheque amount instead of one and half times of the
cheque amount as ordered by the learned Courts below.
7.
Now, reverting back to the case on hand keeping in mind the
aforesaid undisputed facts, it is pertinent to note that, at the time of filing
of the appeal before the learned first appellate Court while suspending the
execution and operation of the order of sentence passed by the learned
Magisterial Court, the learned first appellate Court directed the petitioner
to deposit 20% of the amount of fine / compensation awarded within a
period of 60 days which order appears to have been unsuccessfully
assailed by the petitioner by preferring CR.RA No.57 of 2026 before this
Court wherein the co-ordinate Bench of this Court directed the petitioner
to deposit 20% of the amount on or before 12/03/2026. Thus, as reflecting
from the entire material, the alleged transactions appears to have been
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taken place way back in the year 2017 and thereafter the said litigation
stretches for inordinate period followed by different means initiated by
the petitioner herein so as to avoid the legitimate payment to be made to
the original complainant as directed by the learned Court concerned.
8.
Be that as it may, on earlier occasion when the captioned revision
applications were listed for hearing before the co-ordinate Bench of this
Court, it is only on 13/10/2026 learned advocate for the petitioner
submitted that since the petitioner had deposited 20% of the cheque
amount and is now ready and willing to deposit the remaining cheque
amount before the learned Trial Court, the learned trial Court concerned
was directed to accept the same without insisting the personal presence of
the petitioner and petitioner is directed to produce the receipt thereof so
that the relief prayed for by the petitioner seeking suspension of the
sentence can be determined in accordance with the law.
9.
It is submitted by learned Advocate for the petitioner that the entire
cheque amount has been deposited. However, considering the facts
emerging from the record, it appears that though the petitioner was
directed to pay the one and half (1 & 1/2 ) time of the cheque amount,
instead thereof, the petitioner deposited only cheque amount and that too
after a long period of nine years which is nothing but a sheer misuse of
the legal process of the Court while adopting dilatory tactics by the
petitioner. It would also appear that the petitioner had tried to exhaust all
available remedy under the law so as to avoid the compliance of the order
passed by the learned Courts below which itself shows the conduct of the
petitioner which is nothing but to take undue advantage of the legal
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process of the Court by indulging in unfair practice.
10.
Learned Advocate for the petitioner to substantiate his argument
has placed reliance upon the decision in case of Damodar S Prabhu vs.
Sayed Babalal H. AIR [2010 SC 1907] mainly on account that in case of
willingness of accused to pay in accordance with the guidelines
enumerated in the above case, the Court may suggest to the parties to go
for compounding. If for any reason, the financial institutions/complainant
asks for payment other than the cheque amount or settlement of entire
loan or other outstanding dues, then the Magistrate may suggest to the
Accused to plead guilty and exercise the power under Section 255(2)
and/or 255(3) of the Cr.P.C. or 278 of the BNSS, 2023 and/or give the
benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 to the Accused.
11.
However, while equating the aforesaid proposition of law with the
facts of the case on hand, apparently no such efforts appears to have been
made by the petitioner during the interregnum period of nine years i.e.
from the date of filing of the complaint i.e. in 2017 till the challenge is
made by the petitioner by filing one or the another applications before the
learned Courts below as well as before this Court and, lastly upto the
filing the captioned revision applications. No such readiness and
willingness has ever been expressed by the petitioner uptil filing of the
captioned revision application and it is only at the time when the
petitioner was directed to surrender before the jail authority, such
proposal has been made which smacks not only doubt on the conduct of
the petitioner; but also appears to be made with oblique purpose to
absolve from surrendering before the Court concerned for execution of
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the order of the sentence which has attained finality before the learned
first appellate Court. It also borne out from the record that even no such
efforts have been made during the pendency of the appeal before the
learned first appellate Court right from filing of the appeal till the same
has been dismissed which also speaks volume about the very conduct of
the petitioner and thus the said conduct of the petitioner would ultimately
dis-entitle the petitioner to grant the prayer for suspension of sentence.
12.
While inviting attention of this Court to an order passed by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Sudhir Khaitan vs. State of Rajasthan &
Ors., rendered in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos.19025-19027 of
2025 dated 10/04/2026 seeking to challenge that the revision petition and
the application for suspension of sentence were not taken up for
consideration on the ground that the petitioner had not surrendered,
learned Advocate for the petitioner would submit that as per the said
order, the matter has now been referred to the larger Bench and therefore,
this Court may consider the same while insisting for surrender of the
petitioner.
13.
No doubt, the issue relates to surrender before hearing the
application seeking suspension of sentence refers to the Larger Bench of
the Hon’ble Apex Court, but that would not mean to say that such law is
not binding. In case of Union Territory Of Ladakh & Ors. Versus
Jammu And Kashmir National Conference & Anr. [2023 Livelaw (SC)
749], the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that merely because the leading
judgment of the Court on the subject is either referred to a larger Bench
or a revision petition relating thereto is pending that would not be the sole
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ground for not considering the order under challenge and the proposition
of law laid down in the order under challenge stands and held to be a
good law and thus the submissions advanced by the learned Advocate for
the petitioner that in view of the aforesaid decision on the issue of
petitioner to surrender first should not be taken into consideration does
not find much force as it has been held that High Courts will proceed to
decide the matters on the basis of the law as it stands. Relevant
observations made in paragraph No.35 is quoted herein under:
“35. We are seeing before us judgments and orders by High Courts
not deciding cases on the ground that the leading judgment of this
Court on this subject is either referred to a larger Bench or a
review petition relating thereto is pending. We have also come
across examples of High Courts refusing deference to judgments of
this Court on the score that a later Coordinate Bench has doubted
its correctness. In this regard, we lay down the position in law. We
make it absolutely clear that the High Courts will proceed to
decide matters on the basis of the law as it stands. It is not open,
unless specifically directed by this Court, to await an outcome of a
reference or a review petition, as the case may be. It is also not
open to a High Court to refuse to follow a judgment by stating that
it has been doubted by a later Coordinate Bench. In any case, when
faced with conflicting judgments by Benches of equal strength of
this Court, it is the earlier one which is to be followed by the High
Courts, as held by a 5-Judge Bench in National Insurance
Company Limited v Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 6805. The High
Courts, of course, will do so with careful regard to the facts and
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circumstances of the case before it.”
14.
At this stage, it would be apt to note that this Court had an occasion
to deal with such similar issue in the case of Girish Harsukhray
Vasavada & Anr Versus Shankarlal Govindji Joshi & Anr [2025
GUJHC 60640]. The issue on hand has been succinctly dealt with which
has attained finality before the Hon’ble Apex Court. Relevant
observations made in paragraph No.9 to 17 are quoted herein below.
“9. To deal with the aforesaid issue, at the outset, it is required
to be noted that once accused having convicted and sentenced by
the learned trial Court which has been affirmed by the learned first
appellate Court, in view of provisions of Section 418 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 458 of the BNSS) which relates
for execution of sentence of imprisonment, the accused concerned
is required to be sent jail for execution of sentence and thus the
learned first appellate Court becomes functus officio after
pronouncement of the order of sentence. For ready reference,
Section 418 of the Code is quoted hereunder:
“418. Execution of sentence of imprisonment.--- (1) Where the
accused is sentenced to imprisonment for life or to imprisonment for a
term in cases other than those provided for by section 413, the Court
passing the sentence shall forthwith forward a warrant to the jail or
other place in which he is, or is to be, confined, and, unless the
accused is already confined in such jail or other place, shall forward
him to such jail or other place, with the warrant;
Provided that where the accused is sentenced to imprisonment
till the rising of the Court, it shall not be necessary to prepare or
forward a warrant to a jail and the accused may be confined in such
place as the Court may direct.
(2)
Where the accused is not present in Court when he is sentenced
to such imprisonment as is mentioned in Sub-Section (1), the Court
shall issue a warrant for his arrest for the purpose of forwarding him
to the jail or other place in which he is to be confined; and in such
case, the sentence shall commence on the date of his arrest.”
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(GJHC240561902026)
ORDER DATED: 27/10/2026
Sub-section (2) of Section 418 of the Code clearly provides
that if the accused is not present in the Court when he is sentenced
to such imprisonment as mentioned in sub-section (1), the Court
shall issue a warrant for his arrest for the purpose of forwarding
him to the jail.
10. Now, coming to the facts of the present case, as is evident
from the record and as recorded by the learned first appellate
Court, the petitioners – accused were not present before the
learned first appellate Court at the time of pronouncement of the
sentence and thereafter, moved two different applications seeking
to extend the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act and
further to stay the order of serving the sentence for a period of
fifteen days and the learned first appellate Court rejected the
application to grant benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act
and allowed the application seeking stay against the order of
sentence for a period of 15 days while releasing petitioners –
accused on bail. Thus, the learned Sessions Judge concerned in
absence of any statutory powers conferred upon him committed
serious error of law and has not followed the mandate of Section
418(2) of the Code.
11. Now, insofar as the submissions made by the rival parties on
facts of the case are concerned, one of the argument sought to be
canvassed by the petitioners – accused that in absence of any
specific charge qua offence under Section 409 r/w 120- B of the
IPC, the petitioners-accused were convicted and sentenced and
therefore, the said order becomes nonest order; it cannot find any
force since as submitted on behalf of the respondent – State that
due to bona-fide and typographical error, such mistake has been
occurred which can be rectified by making an appropriate
applications by either of the party before the court concerned. The
petitioners – accused has raised such a contention before this
Court as if it was not well within the knowledge of the petitioners –
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accused.
From the record, it appears that, after the
pronouncement of the judgment by the learned first appellate
Court; instead drawing the attention to rectify such bona-fide
mistake, application seeking benefit under the Probation of
Offenders Act as well as seeking extension of time to surrender and
to stay the order of serving the sentence for a period of fifteen days
have been moved and during the entire hearing of the said
applications, learned Counsel representing the petitioner – accused
of CR.RA No.1857 of 2025 herein was very well present; but
nothing sort of any material appears to have been made to draw
the attention of the learned first appellate Court to the said aspect
and therefore, under the garb of making such submissions, the
petitioners- accused would intend to seek such relief which cannot
be granted by this Court. The petitioners – accused as well as the
learned Counsel representing the petitioners – accused were very
well aware about such bona-fide mistake; and it is for the
petitioners – accused to move such application for rectification of
such bona-fide which has not done in the present case during the
interregnum period i.e. even after passing of 15 days’ after
pronouncement of the judgment by the learned first appellate Court
till the filing of these revision applications, who otherwise claimed
to be sufferer / affected party.
12. In context to the submissions made on behalf of the
petitioner – accused of CR.RA No.1857 of 2025 that the petitioner
is decorated with several medals pursuance to his services
rendered during his tenure and therefore looking to this aspect, this
Court may exercise the discretion in favour of the petitioner –
accused cannot be examined at this stage, as the said aspect has
nothing to do with the issue on hand. To the contrary, it would be
appearing from the record that the petitioner – accused did not
remain present before the learned first appellate Court at the time
of pronouncement of judgment and gave an application for
exemption, which came to be rejected by the learned Court
concerned and later on, the application as noted herein above were
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moved to extent the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act
and to stay the order of serving the sentence for a period of fifteen
days. Thus, this itself speaks volume about the conduct and
demeanor on the part of the petitioner – accused by marching over
the legal process of the Court.
13. While relying upon the decision of Madras High Court in
case of Easwaramurthy (supra), it is contended that pending
revision application against the conviction and sentence, the
accused need not require to surrender. There is no dispute to the
said proposition; but the said observations are made in relation to
the cases under Section 138 of NI Act and other compoundable
offences where there is possibility of compounding the offences
within a short period and therefore, the said ratio also would not
come to the rescue of the petitioners-accused.
14. In context to the reliance placed upon the decision in case of
Sohan Lal (supra), it is sought to be contended that exemption
application from surrendering came to be allowed by the Apex
Court and therefore, accused may be also granted such relief.
There is no dispute to the proposition also; but in the said case, the
accused therein after exhausting all remedy of filing criminal
appeal as well as revision moved the Apex Court. Whereas in the
present case, neither the appeal is filed; nor the revision is
dismissed and therefore, on the facts of the present case, the said
ratio would not be made applicable.
15.
Insofar as the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court case of
Bihari Prasad Singh (supra) pressed into service on behalf of the
petitioners – accused that under the revisional powers under
Section 401 of the Code, it is not the sine qua non to first surrender
after pronouncement and confirmation of the sentence by the
learned first appellate Court and only thereafter the bail can be
granted by the High Court; cannot be applied to the facts of the
present case as in the present case, the revision applications filed
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by the petitioners – accused are admitted and not dismissed.
Whereas, in the case before the Hon’ble Apex Court the revision
application was dismissed on the sole ground of accused having
not surrendered. Thus, the said ratio also would not be made
applicable to the facts of the present case.
16. It is not in dispute that to deal with the issue in the case of
hand, the provisions of Section 397, 389 and 389(3) of the Code
are provided for. However, subject to the conditions a Court
convicting the accused to release the accused on bail and suspend
the sentence in order to enable the convicted person to prefer an
appeal. As such, the same cannot be considered rather impliedly
read that the Court can suspend the sentence in order to enable the
accused to prefer the revision application. It is an admitted fact
that in the facts of the present case learned first appellate court
after pronouncement of sentence stayed its own order and granted
15 days’ time to petitioner-accused to approach higher Courts by
releasing him on bail. Thus, the powers exercised by the learned
first appellate court extending time to surrender to enable the
petitioners – accused to file revision application seems to be
without any substance and powers so vested by the provisions
contained in the Code. The sum and substance as amalgamated
from the above discussions while equating with the proposition of
law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court makes it crystal clear
that so far as the release of accused on bail or to extend the time to
surrender for filing revision application is concerned, there is no
provision anywhere in the Code, which may enable the Court of
appeal to suspend the sentence or to release the applicant –
accused on bail solely on the ground that he intends to file a
revision application before Higher Courts. The legislature has
made specific provision as per sub-section (3) of Section 389 of the
Code to release the accused on bail when he intends to prefer an
appeal and as such there is no provision at all anywhere in the
Code empowering the Court to release the accused on bail or
suspend the sentence in case, he intends to file revision application
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the Court convicting the accused. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, it
can be sum up that the legislature did not intend to confer any such
power in such circumstances to the appellate Court to stay and / or
suspend and to keep the order in abeyance or to extend the time to
surrender to the accused so as to enable the accused to file revision
application.
17. Resultantly, the reliefs granted by the learned first appellate
Court does not have any legs to stand in the eyes of law as after
disposing the appeal, the learned first appellate Court becomes
functus officio and seized with any power to exercise post disposal
of the appeal. However, by doing so as in the present case, the
learned Sessions Judge concerned has indirectly tantamount by
suspending the sentence and releasing the convicted accused on
bail. At this stage, I may refer to the relevant observations made in
case of Arvind Maneklal Bhagat (supra) wherein in similar such
circumstances, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court has made
following observations in paragraph [4] while summing up the
issue:
“[4] I may mention here that I have found in some other cases
also that the Judges of the Court of Session have given directions
similar to the one given by the learned Addl. Session Judge in the
present case. Such directions cannot be given by the Court of
Session while dismissing the appeal The Court of Session cannot
give any such time for surrendering. The moment the Sessions
Court dismisses the appeal, it follows that the accused whose
appeal has been dismissed has to surrender to serve out the
sentence imposed upon him. It is only the High Court which can
pass appropriate orders in this regard. Order accordingly.”
15.
Thus, the sum and substance of the aforesaid detailed discussions
made in the proceeding paragraphs would reveal that petitioner is using
dilatory tactics by adopting one or the other mode and misusing the
process of law at least for the period of nine years and when the petitioner
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realized that due to the concurrent finding of the learned Courts below
and after having exhausting all the remedies available under the law, now
the petitioner is constrained to surrender in view of the proposition of law
laid down in the aforesaid cases, the petitioner has come-forward with the
proposal to deposit the cheque amount instead of one and half times of
the cheque amount as ordered by the Courts below which also speaks
volume on the conduct of the petitioner.
16.
For the foregoing reasons, the prayer as sought for in terms of
paragraph 4(c) seeking suspension of sentence is hereby rejected.
17.
Registry is directed to communicate the copy of this order to the
court concerned for necessary action in accordance with the law.
(R. T. VACHHANI, J)
sompura
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