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2026:CGHC:44748
CGHC010394042026
NAFR
Digitally signed
by SUMIT
SUMIT KUMAR
Date:
KUMAR 2026.10.16
16:53:40
+0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WP227 No. 1335 of 2026
1 - Shivkumar S/o Late Sandhya Uraon Aged About 62 Years Nayan S/o
Late. Sandhya Uraon (Dead) R/o Village Chirga Police Station And Tehsil Batauli District - Surguja C.G.
2 - Kunwar Sai S/o Late Kamu Uraon Aged About 50 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District - Surguja C.G.
3 - Rajkumar S/o Late Kamu Uraon Aged About 48 Years Patiparhin Alias
Birajo (Dead) R/o Village Chirga Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
4 - Dalsu S/o Late Kamal Uraon Aged About 51 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District - Surguja C.G.
5 - Bhole S/o Late Kamal Uraon Aged About 49 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District - Surguja C.G.
6 - Golendra S/o Late Kamal Uraon Aged About 47 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District - Surguja C.G.
7 - Ayush Kumar S/o Late Shukhlal Uraon (Minor) Aged About 7 Years Ayush
Kuamr Minor Through Her Natural Guardian Mother Petitioner No. 8 Katrina
R/o Village Chirga Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District - Surguja C.G.
8 - Katrina W/o Late Shukhlal Uraon Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District - Surguja C.G.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Mangru S/o Late Nadhiya Uraon Aged About 62 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
2 - Premchand S/o Late Nadhiya Uraon Aged About 60 Years R/o Village
Chirga Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
3 - Jalim S/o Late Dasu Uraon Aged About 55 Years R/o Village Chirga Police
Station And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
4 - Gahbar S/o Late Dasu Uraon Aged About 52 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
5 - Shrawan Kumar S/o Late Dasu Uraon Aged About 49 Years R/o Village
Chirga Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
6 - Dinesh S/o Late Mangal Uraon Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
7 - Rijhni W/o Late Mangal Uraon Aged About 55 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
8 - Amosh S/o Late Satish Uraon (Minor) Aged About 6 Years Minor Through
Their Mother Babi W/o Late Satish Uraon R/o Village Chirga Police Station
And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
9 - Anmol S/o Late Satish Uraon (Minor) Aged About 4 Years Minor Through
Their Mother Babi W/o Late Satish Uraon R/o Village Chirga Police Station
And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
10 - Babi W/o Late Satish Uraon Aged About 29 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
11 - Baliram S/o Late Kehtu Uraon Aged About 60 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
12 - Balwant S/o Late Kehtu Uraon Aged About 51 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
13 - Sukhiya S/o Late Kehtu Uraon Aged About 56 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
14 - Sakal S/o Late Beersao Uraon Aged About 55 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
15 - Kendu S/o Late Beersao Uraon Aged About 55 Years R/o Village Chirga
Police Station And Tehsil - Batauli District Surguja C.G.
16 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector District - Surguja C.G.
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s)
: Mr. Aditya Kumar Mishra, Advocate
For Respondent No.16 : Ms. Isha Jajodia, P.L. for the State
(Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.)
Order on Board
15/10/2026
1.
Heard.
2.
Present is a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
filed by the petitioners against the impugned order dated 01.09.2026
passed by learned First Civil Judge, Junior Division, Sitapur, District
Surguja in Civil Suit No.8A/2024, whereby the application filed by the
plaintiffs under Section 151 of CPC has been allowed and permitted
the plaintiffs to examine another witness, Bandhan Ram, in place of his
cited witness, Ramsai.
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the petitioners
are defendants before the learned trial Court where the respondents
No.1 to 15 are prosecuting a suit for declaration of title, partition and
separate possession of the suit properties. During pendency of the suit,
the plaintiffs have filed an application on 22.06.2026 under Section 151
of CPC stating that their cited witness, Ramsai, is suffering from
paralysis and he is unable to walk and unable to speak anything, and
therefore, in his place, the plaintiffs want to examine one Bandhan Ram
and they may be permitted to produce him as a witness. He would
further submit that the application was objected by the defendants on
the ground that there is no sufficient cause shown by the plaintiffs for
non-examination of the cited witness, Bandhan Ram was not the cited
witness and he cannot be substituted in place of the cited witnesses,
even if the cited witness Ramsai is suffering from paralysis, the
defendants can take the commission for his examination and he may
be examined by the Commissioner duly appointed by the Court as
provided under Order 26 Rule 1 of CPC and further that where the
specific provision is there under Order 16 Rule 1 of CPC, the inherent
jurisdiction under Section 151 of CPC cannot be invoked. He would
further submit that the learned trial Court has considered the
application filed by the petitioners by invoking the jurisdiction under
Order 16 Rule 1 of CPC without considering the fact that there is no
documents filed by the plaintiffs with respect to illness of their witness,
Ramsai. Therefore, permitting the plaintiffs to examine Bandhan Ram
is erroneous and the same is liable to be set aside. In support of his
submission, he would rely upon the order passed by the Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court dated 27.07.2016 passed in WP227 No.445/2016
(Jeevanlal & Ors V/s Smt. Devki Jaiswal & Ors.).
4.
I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the
documents annexed with the petition.
5.
The petitioners’ submission in the present case is that the learned trial
Court cannot invoke the jurisdiction under Order 16 Rule 1 of CPC
when the non-examination of the cited witness of the plaintiffs has not
been explained duly supported by the documents. From perusal of the
application (Annexure P-4) filed by the plaintiffs, it transpires that they
have averred in their application that earlier the affidavit in the form of
examination-in-chief of the witness Ramsai has been filed. However, at
present, he is suffering from paralysis, and therefore, he is unable to
walk and speak and in such circumstance, they wants to get Bandhan
Ram, son of Late Dhaniram, examined in support of their case.
6.
Order 16 Rule 3 of CPC provided the following:
“3. Tender of expenses to witness.—The sum so paid
into Court shall be tendered to the person summoned,
at the time of serving the summons, if it can be served
personally.”
7.
It is not in dispute that Ramsai, son of Maniram was the cited witness
from the plaintiffs’ side and Bandhan Ram is not the cited witness.
Though the objection was raised by the defendants that no documents
of his ailment has been filed by the plaintiffs in support of their
submissions that Ramsai is actually suffering from paralysis, however,
looking to the nature of his ailment and the averment made in the
application that Ramsai is unable to walk and speak, the reasons
assigned by the defendants in their application appears to be sufficient
for its consideration by the learned trial Court while permitting the
plaintiffs to examine another witness.
8.
The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
that the plaintiffs may take commission for examination of their witness,
Ramsai, and he may be examined through the commission but as has
been averred in the application that Ramsai is unable to walk and
speak anything, even if the commission would be issued, no purpose
would be served as the plaintiffs have averred in their application that
the witness Ramsai is unable to speak anything. Even if the learned
trial Court permits the plaintiffs to examine their witness Bandhan Ram
while invoking the jurisdiction under Order 16 Rule 1 of CPC, the
defendants have every right to cross-examine the witness and no
prejudice is appears to be caused to the defendants.
9.
The further submission of the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners that the application has been filed under Section 151 of
CPC and the jurisdiction under Order 16 Rule 1 of CPC cannot be
invoked and is also misconceived in view of the judgment passed by
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of P.k. Palanisamy v. N
Arumugham and another (2009) 9 SCC 173 has held as under :“27. Section 148 of the Code is a general provision and
Section 149 thereof is special. The first application should
have been filed in terms of Section 149 of the Code. Once
the court granted time for payment of deficit court fee within
the period specified therefor, it would have been possible to
extend the same by the court in exercise of its power under
Section 148 of the Code. Only because a wrong provision
was mentioned by the appellant, the same, in our opinion,
by itself would not be a ground to hold that the application
was not maintainable or that the order passed thereon
would be a nullity. It is a well-settled principle of law that
mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of a
provision does not invalidate an order if the court and/or
statutory authority had the requisite jurisdiction therefor.
28. In Ram Sunder Ramv. Union of India (2007)13 SCC
255, it was held: (SCC pp. 260-61, para 19)
"19. ... It appears that the competent authority has
wrongly quoted Section 20 in the order of discharge
whereas, in fact, the order of discharge has to be
read having been passed under Section 22 of the
Army Act.
'9. It is well settled that if an authority has a power
under the law merely because while exercising that
power the source of power is not specifically referred
to or a reference is made to a wrong provision of law,
that by itself does not vitiate the exercise of power so
long as the power does exist and can be traced to a
source available in law' (See N. Maniv. Sangeetha
Theatre 2, SCC p. 280, para 9.)
Thus, quoting of wrong provision of Section 20 in the
order of discharge of the appellant by the competent
authority does not take away the jurisdiction of the
authority under Section 22 of the Army Act.
Therefore, the order of discharge of the appellant
from the army service cannot be vitiated on this sole
ground as contended by the learned counsel for the
appellant."
29. In N. Maniv. Sangeetha Theatre (2004) 12 SCC 278, it
is stated: (SCC p. 280, para 9)
"9. It is well settled that if an authority has a power
under the law merely because while exercising that
power the source of power is not specifically referred
to or a reference is made to a wrong provision of law,
that by itself does not vitiate the exercise of power so
long as the power does exist and can be traced to a
source available in law."”
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pankajbhai Rameshbhai
Zalavadiya v. Jethabhai Kalabhai Zalavadiya (Deceased) through
legal representatives and others (2017) 9 SCC 700 has held as
under :“14. In Banwari Lalv. Balbir Singh (2016) 1 SCC 607,
Defendant 1 (who was Respondent 1 in the first appeal),
had expired 2 years prior to the decision in the first appeal,
but no steps were taken to bring his legal representatives
on record. The first appellate court decided in favour of the
plaintiff. When the matter came up in second appeal, the
legal representatives of Defendant 1 filed an application
for condonation of delay and restoration. This Court
though observed that the application ought to have been
filed under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code inasmuch as the
death had occurred during the subsistence of the matter
before the Court and the application under Order 1 Rule
10 of the Code was not maintainable, had proceeded to
allow the application on the ground that it would be unjust
to non-suit the applicant on the ground of technicalities.
This Court permitted the legal representatives of
Defendant 1 to convert the application into one filed under
Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code.
.
.
16. In the matter on hand, though the trial court had rightly
dismissed the application under Order 22 Rule 4 of the
Code as not maintainable at an earlier point of time, in our
considered opinion, it needs to be mentioned that the trial
court at that point of time itself could have treated the said
application filed under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code as one
filed under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, in order to do justice
between the parties. Merely because of the nonmentioning of the correct provision as Order 1 Rule 10 of
the Code at the initial stage by the advocate for the
plaintiff, the parties should not be made to suffer. It is by
now well settled that a mere wrong mention of the
provision in the application would not prohibit a party to
the litigation from getting justice. Ultimately, the courts are
meant to do justice and not to decide the applications
based on technicalities. The provision under Order 1 Rule
10 CPC speaks about judicial discretion of the Court to
strike out or add parties at any stage of the suit. It can
strike out any party who is improperly joined, it can add
anyone as a plaintiff or defendant if it finds that such
person is a necessary or proper party. The Court under
Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code will of course act
according to reason and fair play and not according to
whims and caprice.”
12. Merely quoting an incorrect provision of law in an application does not
disentitle a party from having its application considered on merits. The
contents of the application, rather than the mere reference to a
particular statutory provision,
are relevant
for determining its
maintainability and consideration. Accordingly, the petitioners cannot
claim any relief on this ground for setting aside the impugned order
passed by the learned trial Court.
13. The judgment in Jeevanlal (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for
the petitioners is distinguishable on facts, and therefore, does not
extend any benefit to the petitioners. Accordingly, I do not find any
perversity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order passed by the
learned trial Court warranting interference by this Court.
14. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Sumit
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