The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
15. In the instant case, it is pertinent to mention the most important fact of the case that the offending vehicle bearing registration No. CG-15-DZ-8001 was seized on 20.10.2025 and the petitioner has not been arrayed as an accused, and there has no objection to his ownership and he has a right to raise any other grounds and also reserving to submit all relevant documents and it is also necessary to note that no useful purpose would be served if the said vehicle is allowed to get exposed in the extreme weather conditions in the Police Station, rather the said vehicle can be released to the petitioner, who is claiming himself to be the owner of the article, so that he can use it and the said vehicle does not become junk after some time. It is also pertinent to mention here that the seized cattle have already been released on interim custody (supurdnama) by this Court in CRMP No. 3615/2025 on 02.02.2026, and neither the proceedings of confiscation of the vehicle have been initiated, nor has notice been given to the petitioner for confiscation of the said vehicle.
16. In that view of the matter, the impugned orders passed by the trial Court and affirmed by learned revisional Court are hereby set aside. It is held that bar under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 is not at all attracted. Hence, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matters of Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283 and Multani Hanifbhai Kalubhai (supra) the petitioner would be entitled for the custody of the vehicle till the conclusion of trial. Accordingly, the trial Court is directed to give the interim custody of the vehicle to the petitioner by imposing reasonable conditions. The vehicle shall be released within seven days from the date of complying with the conditions imposed by the trial Court.
17. The petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. Sd/(Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge H.L. Sahu
Full Judgment Text
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The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:CGHC:7791
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 3628 of 2025
1 - Shivendra Yadav S/o Radheshyam Yadav, Aged About 35
Years R/o House No. 2 Kh, Banaras Road, Gandhinagar,
Ambikapur, District Sarguja (C.G.)
... Petitioner
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer,
Police Station Nandghat, Bemetara, District Bemetara (C.G.)
... Respondent
For Petitioner
: Mr. Dashrath Kushwaha, Advocate.
For Respondent/State
: Mr. Sumit Singh, Dy. A.G.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal
Order on Board
12/02/2026
1. The petitioner has been preferred this instant petition under
Section 528 of BNS, 2023 being aggrieved by the order dated
15.11.2025 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bemetara,
District - Bemetara (C.G.) dismissing the Criminal Revision No.
61/2025 and affirming order dated 03.11.2025 passed by Chief
Judicial Magistrate Bemetara, District - Bemetara, C.G. in
Crime No. 192/2025, registered at police station – Nandghat,
Bemetara, District -Bemetara whereby Supurdnama application
Digitally
signed by
HEERA HEERA
LAL SAHU
LAL
Date:
SAHU 2026.02.13
10:18:02
+0530
filed by the petitioner has been dismissed.
2. As per the prosecution case, it is alleged that on the basis of a
written complaint lodged by the complainant Vivek Kumar
Shukla at police station Nandghat, it was alleged that on
20.10.2025 at about 12:50 am, a Tata Eicher mini truck bearing
registration No. CG-15-DZ-8001 was found transporting cattle
in a cruel manner. It was alleged that a total of 16 cattle were
found tied with ropes, overcrowded and crammed into the
vehicle/mini-truck under deplorable conditions. The said cattle
were seized and the vehicle was also seized and Crime No.
192/2025 was registered under Sections 4, 6 and 10 of the
Chhattisgarh Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 2004, Section
11(d) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, and
Section 130(1)/181, 130(3)/177, 66/192(a) of Motor Vehicle Act
against the accused persons namely, Manoj Kumar Yadav and
Vivek Yadav. It is further alleged that the cattle were being
transported in contravention of the provisions of the Act of
2004.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is
the registered owner of the offending vehicle, and he is having a
valid and effective documents required for the said vehicle,
therefore, he is entitled for the Supurdnama. He next submits
that the petitioner had given the vehicle to accused/driver
Manoj Kumar Yadav. He had no idea that the vehicle was being
used to take cattle to the slaughterhouse. He has not even been
prosecuted. He has not received any notice regarding the
confiscation of the vehicle till now. The seized cattle has already
been released on interim custody (supurdnama) by coordinate
bench in CRMP No. 3615/2025 on 02.02.2026. The seized
vehicle is machinery property and due to its lying idle in an
open place, its machinery parts are being deteriorated day to
day, the vehicle has been seized on 20.10.2025, i.e. about 4
months passed since the vehicle has been seized, therefore, it
will be appropriate to release the vehicle on interim custody. He
placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the matter of
Rampyare Sahu vs. State of C.G., passed in CRMP No.
99/2016 on 11.05.2016.
4. On the other hand, learned State counsel vehemently opposes
the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner and
supports the impugned order, submitting that there are no valid
documents about the transport of the said cattle, and there are
also no documents with regard to the purchase or sale of the
cattle.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and
perused the order impugned with utmost circumspection.
6. The Act of 2004 has been enacted in the interest of the general
public and to maintain communal harmony and peace, for
prohibition of slaughter of agricultural cattle. Section 6 of the
Act of 2004 provides prohibition on transport of agricultural
cattle for slaughter. At this stage, it would be appropriate to
notice the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Act of 2004
which reads as under: “6. Prohibition on transport of Agricultural cattle for
slaughter:—
(1) No person shall sell, or transport or offer to transport or
cause to be transported any Agricultural cattle from any
place within the state to any place within the state or outside
the State, for the purpose of its slaughter in contravention of
the provision of this Act or with the knowledge that it will be
or is likely to be, so slaughtered.
(2) Whenever any person transports or causes to be
transported in contravention of provisions of sub-section (1)
any agricultural cattle as specified in the Schedule, such
vehicle or any conveyance used in transporting such animal
along with such agricultural cattle shall be liable to be seized
by such authority or officer as the State Government may
appoint in this behalf.
(3) The vehicle or conveyance so seized under sub-section (2)
shall not be released by the order of the court on bond or
surety before the expiry of six months from the date of such
seizure or till the final judgment of the court, whichever is
earlier and such vehicle shall also be liable for confiscation
at the end of the trial.”
7. A focused perusal of Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004, would show
that the provision bars transport, possession and sale of cattle
for the purpose of slaughter or with the knowledge that the
same may be slaughtered. Mere transport of cattle from one
place to another for the purpose other than slaughter is not
barred under the Act and in that case the provision under
Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 would not be applicable.
8. It is well settled law that penal statutes are to be strictly
construed.
When a specific word has been inserted by the
legislature, the provision cannot be given a different meaning.
In the matter of W. H. King v. Republic of India and another 1,
1 AIR 1952 SC 156
their Lordships of the Supreme Court pertinently observed as
under:“10. As the statute creates an offence and imposes a
penalty of fine and imprisonment, the words of the section
must be strictly construed in favour of the subject. We are
not concerned so much with what might possibly have been
intended as with what has been actually said in and by the
language employed.”
9. Similarly, in the matter of State of West Bengal and others v.
Swapan Kumar Guha and others2, the Supreme Court held as
under: “15. … when it is said that penal statutes must be
construed strictly, what is meant is that the court must see
that the thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning
of the words used and it must not strain the words : “To put
it in other words, the rule of strict construction requires that
the language of a statute should be so construed that no
case shall be held to fall within it which does not come
within the reasonable interpretation of the statute”, and that
in case of doubt, the construction favourable to the subject
should be preferred.
But I do not think that this rule of
strict interpretation of penal statutes in any way affects the
fundamental principle of interpretation, that the primary test
which can safely be applied is the language used in the Act
and, therefore, when the words are clear and plain, the court
must accept the expressed intention of the legislature. ...”
10. The pari materia provision contained in clause (4) of Section
6(A) of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954 came up for
consideration before the Gujarat High Court in Ravidasbhai
Segjibhai Vasava v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine Guj
14545 in which the Gujarat High Court considering the issue
2 (1982) 1 SCC 561
identical as involved in the present case held that clause (4) of
Section 6(A) would apply only in a case where the animals are
being transported for the purpose of slaughter.
It has been
observed in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the report as
under: “10. The plain reading of section 6(A) clause (1) would
indicate that the same is applicable in a case where it is
found that the animals were being transported from any
place within the State to any other place within the State for
the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the provisions of
the Act or with the knowledge that they were likely to be
slaughtered. There is a proviso to section 6(A) clause (1)
which provides that a person shall be deemed to be
transporting such animal for the purpose of slaughter unless
contrary is proved thereto to the satisfaction of the
concerned authority or officer by such person or he has
obtained a permission under sub-section (2) for transporting
the animal for bona fide agricultural or animal husbandry
purpose.
11. Clause (4) to section 6(A) puts a restriction so far as
the release of the vehicle is concerned for a period of six
months.
12. It is, therefore, manifest that section 6(A) clause (4)
would apply only in a case where the animals are being
transported for the purpose of slaughter.
13. It is not in dispute so far as the present case is
concerned that no permit was obtained by the petitioner
herein as the registered owner of the vehicle for the purpose
of transport. However, at the same time, the prosecution
has to, prima facie, show something that the transport of the
cattle was for the purpose of slaughter. For such purpose, I
inquired with Mr. Dabhi, the learned APP, regarding the
materials collected by the police in the course of
investigation. Mr. Dabhi has fairly submitted that there is
nothing to show that the cattle were being transported for
the purpose of slaughter. It appears that there is no
investigation in that direction. If it is the case of the
prosecution that the cattle were being transported for the
purpose of slaughter, then at least, it is expected from the
investigating officer to investigate at which place they were
being taken and were to be handed over to whom for the
purpose of slaughter. There is nothing in that regard. In the
absence of such material, in my view, the prosecution
cannot straight way take recourse to the deeming fiction as
provided under section 6(A)(1). In such circumstances, I am
of the view that there should not be any legal impediment in
releasing the vehicle before the expiry of the statutory time
period i.e six months.”
11. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the
aforesaid legal position and the principle of law flowing from the
judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Ravidasbhai Segjibhai
Vasava (supra), it is established legal position that if the
agricultural cattle is being transported for the purpose of
slaughter in contravention of the Act of 2004, bar under
Section 6(3) would apply and vehicle cannot be released on
interim custody for a period of six months or till the judgment
is pronounced whichever is earlier, but mere transportation of
agricultural cattle from one place to another for the purpose
other than slaughter is not an offence under the said Act and in
case Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004 is not attracted, bar
contained in Section 6(3) of the Act would not attract and
interim custody can be granted without waiting for the period of
six months as provided.
12. Similar stand has also been taken by the Supreme Court in the
case of Multani Hanifbhai Kalubhai Vs. State of Gujarat &
Another, reported in 2013 (3) SCC 240, wherein the Supreme
Court has expressed that it is not advisable to keep the seized
vehicle in the Police Station in open condition which is prone to
natural decay on account of whether conditions for a long
period.
13. A careful perusal of the order impugned and other documents
annexed with the petition would show that the prosecution or
the investigating agency at no place has alleged that the
petitioner’s vehicle was being used to transport the cattle for
the purpose of slaughter in contravention of the provisions of
the Act, specifically Section 6(1) of the Act of 2004. Case of the
prosecution in sum and substance is that the petitioner’s
vehicle was being used to carry the cattle from Zila Panchayat
Gourakhpur (U.P.) to his resident Bhilai, Durg (C.G.) i.e. from
one place to another and it was not in contravention of Section
6(1) of the Act of 2004. In the entire prosecution case, no
specific place has been mentioned where the cattle were being
transported to slaughter house.
14. In the absence of prima facie material to establish that the cattle
were being transported for slaughter, the statutory embargo
under Section 6(3) of the Act of 2004 cannot be invoked
mechanically. The learned trial Court and the revision Court
failed to consider the settled legal position governing grant of
interim custody of the seized vehicle and rejected the
application in a perfunctory manner.
15. In the instant case, it is pertinent to mention the most
important fact of the case that the offending vehicle bearing
registration No. CG-15-DZ-8001 was seized on 20.10.2025 and
the petitioner has not been arrayed as an accused, and there
has no objection to his ownership and he has a right to raise
any other grounds and also reserving to submit all relevant
documents and it is also necessary to note that no useful
purpose would be served if the said vehicle is allowed to get
exposed in the extreme weather conditions in the Police Station,
rather the said vehicle can be released to the petitioner, who is
claiming himself to be the owner of the article, so that he can
use it and the said vehicle does not become junk after some
time. It is also pertinent to mention here that the seized cattle
have already been released on interim custody (supurdnama)
by this Court in CRMP No. 3615/2025 on 02.02.2026, and
neither the proceedings of confiscation of the vehicle have been
initiated, nor has notice been given to the petitioner for
confiscation of the said vehicle.
16. In that view of the matter, the impugned orders passed by the
trial Court and affirmed by learned revisional Court are hereby
set aside. It is held that bar under Section 6(3) of the Act of
2004 is not at all attracted. Hence, in the light of the decision of
the Supreme Court in the matters of Sunderbhai Ambalal
Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283 and Multani
Hanifbhai Kalubhai (supra) the petitioner would be entitled for
the custody of the vehicle till the conclusion of trial.
Accordingly, the trial Court is directed to give the interim
custody of the vehicle to the petitioner by imposing reasonable
conditions.
The vehicle shall be released within seven days
from the date of complying with the conditions imposed by the
trial Court.
17. The petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above.
Sd/(Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal)
Judge
H.L. Sahu
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