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2026:CGHC:10985-DB
Digitally signed
by SAGRIKA
NAFR
SAGRIKA AGRAWAL
AGRAWAL Date:
2026.03.03
18:41:58 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 155 of 2026
1 - Shivchandra Saha S/o Shri Gosai Saha Aged About 61 Years Upper
Division Teacher Mata Rukmani Kanya Ashram, Dimrapal, Distt. Bastar,
Chhattisgarh
... appellant(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Scheduled Caste And
Scheduled Tribes And Backward Classes Welfare Department, D.K.
Bhawan, Raipur C.G.
2 - Collector Tribal Department, District Bastar, Jagdalpur Chhattisgarh,
District Bastar (Jagdalpur), C.G.
3 - Mata Rukhmani Seva Sansthan Through Its Secretary, Mata
Rukhmani Seva Sansthan Dimarapal, District Bastar Chhattisgarh,
District- Bastar (Jagdalpur), C.G.
... Respondent(s)
For appellant (s)
: Mr. Vinod Kumar Deshmukh, Advocate
For State
: Mr. Prasoon Bhaduri, Dy. Advocate General
For Respondent No. 3 : Mr. Keshav Dewangan, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
03.03.2026
1.
Heard Mr. Vinod Kumar Deshmukh, Advocate, appearing for the
learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Prasoon Bhaduri,
Dy. Advocate General and Mr. Keshav Dewangan, learned
counsel for the Respondent No. 3 in the present writ appeal.
2.
Though, against the impugned order dated 18.07.2025 passed by
learned Single Judge, the appellant Shivchandra Saha has filed a
writ appeal bearing WA No. 83/2026 before this Court, which was
dismissed by this Court on 28.01.2026 on the ground of limitation,
but the present appeal is beyond time. Learned counsel for the
appellant would submit that after passing of the order dated
28.07.2025, the appellant preferred a review petition before the
learned Single Judge and the same was dismissed also on
03.11.2025 and the present writ appeal is within time, therefore,
the same may be decided on its merits. Hence, we proceed to
hear the matter finally.
3.
The present writ appeal has been filed by the writ appellant
against the order dated 28.07.2025 passed by learned Single
Judge in WPS No. 4284/2016 whereby the writ petition filed by
the writ petitioner for grant of revised pay scale is partly allowed to
the extent that the petitioner is entitled to get the difference of pay
scale prior to three years from the date of filing of this writ petition
i.e. 24.08.2016 till he was removed from service on 10.02.2018
and order dated 03.11.2025 passed in Rev. P. No. 326/2015
whereby the review petition the appellant for seeking review of the
order dated 28.07.2025 only to the extent that the petitioner would
be entitled to get the difference of pay scale prior to three years
from the date of filing of the first WP No. 7575/2006 filed by the
petitioner i.e. 19-12-2006 till he was removed from service on
10.02.2018 and fix the pay scale of the petitioner notionally and
arrears of difference of pay shall be paid to the petitioner from 1912-2003 till he was removed from service on 10.02.2018 with 7%
interest has been dismissed. Thereafter, the appellant prefer the
instant appeal before this Hon'ble Court with the following prayer:“ A This Hon'ble Court be pleased to call for the
record of the Writ Petition (8) No. 4284/2016 and
W.P. No. 7875/2006 for its kind perusal.
B. This Hon'ble Court be pleased to allow the
instant writ appeal and set aside the order dated
03-11-2025 passed in REVP No. 326 of 2025 and
modify the order dated 28-07-2025 passed in Writ
Petition (S) No. 4284/2016 only to the extent that
the petitioner/appellant is entitled to get the
difference of pay scale prior to three years from
the date of filing of the first W.P.No. 7575/2006 i.e.
19-12-2006 till he was removed from service on
10.02.2018 And further directed the respondents
to fix the pay scale of the petitioner notionally and
arrears of difference of pay shall be paid to the
petitioner from 19-12-2003 till he was removed
from service on 10.02.2018 with 7% interest and
further directed the respondents to grant proper
revised pay scale w.e.f. 01/01/1996 as well as
benefit of 6th Pay Commission scale at par with
similar situated employee who are getting proper
pay scale from the due date with all monetary
benefits and arrears of salary
C. Any other relief as deemed fit by this Hon'ble
Court”
4.
The brief facts of the case are that The petitioner was appointed
on 01.04.1995 as Banchalak/UDT in Mata Rukmani Adiwasi
Kanya Ashram under a Government-aided society receiving 100%
grant-in-aid, but despite continuation in service he was paid only
the initial pay scale of Rs. 740/- without any increments and was
denied the benefits of revised pay scales under the 5th and 6th
Pay Commissions, unlike similarly situated employees. He initially
filed W.P. No. 7575/2006 seeking revised pay scale benefits in
light of the judgment in Smt. A. Lall v. State of Chhattisgarh &
Others, pursuant to which he submitted representations that were
rejected by the authorities. Thereafter, he filed WPS No.
4284/2016 challenging the rejection and seeking parity in pay
along with arrears, which was partly allowed by order dated
28.07.2025 directing payment of differential salary only for three
years prior to filing of the writ petition (from 24.08.2013 till removal
on 10.02.2018) with 7% interest, while his petition challenging
termination was dismissed. His subsequent Review Petition No.
326/2025 seeking arrears from an earlier date was dismissed on
03.11.2025, leading to the present writ appeal challenging the
limitation of arrears and seeking modification of the said orders.
5.
It is most respectfully submitted on behalf of the appellant that the
learned Single Judge has committed an error apparent on the
face of the record in restricting the arrears to three years prior to
the filing of WPS No. 4284/2016, overlooking the fact that the said
writ petition was the second round of litigation arising out of
rejection of representation pursuant to the earlier order dated
10.11.2009 passed in WP No. 7575/2006; therefore, the cause of
action relates back to the first round of litigation filed on
19.12.2006 and the appellant is legally entitled to fixation of pay
and arrears at least three years prior thereto. It is further
submitted that the appellant, a permanent employee working as
Sanchalak/Upper Division Teacher since 1995 in a 100% grant-inaid institution, was arbitrarily denied the benefit of revised pay
scales under the 5th and 6th Pay Commissions, though the same
were extended to all similarly situated employees, and his
increments were illegally withheld merely due to pendency of
proceedings against a charge-sheet, which cannot be a lawful
ground to deny statutory pay revision. The action of the
respondents in paying the appellant only Rs. 1421/- per month
while extending revised scales to other employees performing
identical duties is discriminatory, violative of the principle of “equal
pay for equal work” and contrary to Articles 14 and 39(d) of the
Constitution of India; hence, the appellant is entitled to notional
fixation and payment of arrears from 01.01.2003 (being three
years prior to the first writ petition) till his removal from service
with 7% interest, and the impugned orders deserve to be modified
accordingly.
6.
Learned counsel for the respective respondents would submit that
the appellant cannot claim parity with the other employees of the
institutions who are getting pay scale with the other employees as
the appellant’s appointment was not in accordance with law and
other employees who are being granted pay scale by the
respondents, are eligible to appoint as per the qualification as well
as age and other required conditions for appointment with
respondent No. 3. It has also been contended that the principle of
'equal pay for equal work' is not applicable in the present facts of
the case. So far as termination of the appellant, it has been
contended that the termination order passed against the appellant
is legal and justified as the appellant was not fulfilling the required
condition for employment as he was over aged at the time of
getting initial appointment.
7.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents.
8.
After considering the submissions made by learned counsel for
the parties and perusal of the documents on record, we are going
through the judgment passed by learned Single Judge and
observed that the petitioner initially filed WP No. 7575/2006
seeking grant of revised pay scale in terms of the decision in Smt.
A. Lall v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others (W.P. No. 4108/2005),
pursuant to which this Hon’ble Court on 10.11.2009 directed the
respondents to decide his representation accordingly; however,
though similarly situated teachers were granted revised pay, the
petitioner’s representation dated 26.11.2009 was rejected on the
ground of pendency of WPS No. 7557/2007, wherein he had
challenged a show cause notice and charge-sheet alleging
irregular appointment on account of age and domicile. The said
writ petition was disposed of on 08.01.2018 directing conclusion
of departmental enquiry, and thereafter the petitioner’s services
were terminated on 10.02.2018. His representation against
termination was rejected by the Director, Public Instruction on
13.09.2021 holding that he was not a domicile of Madhya
Pradesh/Chhattisgarh and was not entitled to age relaxation,
leading to filing of WPS No. 6196/2021 challenging the
termination
and
seeking
reinstatement
with
consequential
benefits.
9.
We also observed that the learned Single Judge, in his judgment
also pointed out that :9. So far as allegation leveled against the petitioner
that he is not the domicile of the State of Madhya
Pradesh when he has obtained the service on
01.04.1995 with respondent No. 3 whereas the circular
dated 31.01.1994 specifically provides that the
relaxation of three years will be applicable to the
domicile of the State of Madhya Pradesh only. The
petitioner has also not been able to deny that he was
not over-aged at the time of securing the employment,
therefore, there is no dispute about the fact that at the
time of appointment, the petitioner was over-aged for 1
year, 1 month & 10 days. The record of the case would
show that the petitioner was granted appointment
though he was ineligible, therefore, his appointment
was not in accordance with law from inception and he
was continued in service in view of the interim order
passed by this Court. As such, it cannot be held that
the termination order was passed after 26 years o
appointment. This submission made by learned
counsel for the petitioner is liable to be rejected.
10.
The learned Single Judge also considered the law laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rushibhal
Jagdishchandra
Pathak
Vs.
Bhavnagar
Municipal
Corporation reported in (2022) 18 SCC 144, wherein it has been
held in paragraph 15, 16 & 19 as under15. The aforesaid ratio in Tarsem Singh (supra) has
been followed by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh
and Others v Yogendra Shrivastava14 and Asger
Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of India.
16. In the facts of the present case, it is accepted that
the
respondent
Corporation
had
accepted
the
interpretation rendered by the High Court of Gujarat to
the Scheme whereby the appellants, on financial
upgradation, would be entitled to the higher grade pay
scale of the next promotional post, which is Rs.5,0008,000/- in the present case. As noted above, the
impugned judgment of the Division Bench accepts the
said position and grants the appellants the said pay-
scale but restricts the benefit from the date of the
judgment of the Single Judge in the Writ Petitions filed
by the appellants, that is, with effect from 31 st July
2018. The Division Bench should not have taken the
date of the decision/judgment of the Single Judge for
grant of the said benefit in view of the decision and ratio
in Tarsem Singh. (supra) which has been followed in
several other decisions. That apart, the date of the
decision of the Single Judge is a fortuitous circumstance.
Only the date of filing of the writ petition is relevant while
examining the question of delay and laches or limitation.
The appellants would, in consonance with the case law
referred to above, be entitled to the arrears for three
years before the date of filing of the Writ Petitions.
19. Recording the aforesaid, we partly allow the present
appeals with a direction that the appellants would be
entitled to arrears in the pre-revised pay-scale of
Rs.5,000-8,000/- for three years prior to the date of filing
of the Wit Petitions along with interest at the rate of 7%
per annum with effect from 1 st September 2017. The
arrears, with interest, would be paid within a period of
four months from the date of pronouncement of this
judgment A computation sheet/statement of accounts on
the basis of which payment is made by the respondentCorporation shall be furnished to the appellants. The
impugned judgment is, accordingly, partly set aside and
the Writ Petitions filed by the appellants would be treated
as allowed in the aforesaid terms There would be no
order as to costs."
and In view of the law laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in
case of Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak (supra), the leaned
Single Judge came to the conclusion that the petitioner is entitled
to get the difference of pay scale prior to three years from the date
of filing of this writ petition i.e. 24.08.2016 till he was removed
from service on 10.02.2018.
11.
Thus, considering the submissions made by the parties and in the
aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and the finding
recorded by the learned Single Judge, we are of the considered
opinion that the learned Single Judge has not committed any
illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order
warranting interference by this Court.
12.
Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be
and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s)..
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Sagrika
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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