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2026:CGHC:1862-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 1 of 2026
1 - Shashi Prasad Sahu S/o Shri Pradhan Sahu Aged About 64 Years R/o Village
And Post- Tildega, Tehsil- Pathalgaon, Chhattisgarh
... appellant (s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Tribal Welfare Department, Mahandi
Bhawan, Mantralaya, Capital Complex, New Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh
2 - Director Tribal Research Institute, Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyay Nagar, Sector 4,
Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 - High Level Cast Certificate Scrutiny Committee Chhattisgarh Raipur Through Its
President, High Level Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee. Mahanadi Bhawan,
Mantralaya, Capital Complex, New Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh
4 - Life Insurance Corporation Through Its Branch Manager Chirimiri District Koriya
Chhattisgarh, District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
For appellant (s)
: Mr. Shobhit Koshta, Advocate
For Respondent/ State
: Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, Dy. Advocate General
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
13.01.2026
1.
Heard Mr. Shobhit Kosta, appearing for the appellant as well as
Dharmesh Shrivastava, learned Deputy Advocate General,
learned counsel, appearing for respondent/ State on I.A. No.01
of 2025, which is an application for condonation of delay of 25
days in preferring the instant appeal.
2.
The appellant has filed this writ appeal against an order dated
17.09.2025 passed by learned Single Judge in writ petition
bearing WPC No. 862/2016 (Shashi Prasad Sahu Vs. State of
Chhattisgarh), by which the learned Single Judge has partly
allowed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner.
3.
On a pointed query being made to the learned counsel for the
appellant as to why he has approached this Court against the
impugned order dated 17.09.2025, after an inordinate delay of 25
days, he has not offered any plausible explanation or any cogent
reason for delay in filing the writ appeal.
4.
Learned counsel for the respondent/ State submits that the writ
appeal is barred by delay and laches and further there is no
cogent reason or explanation has been given in the delay and
laches application filed for condonation of delay. Hence, the
appeal is not liable to be entertained.
5.
We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties as also
perused the application for condonation of delay in preferring the
instant writ appeal.
6.
The primary question that arises for consideration before this
Court is whether the delay of about 25 days in preferring the
present writ appeal deserves to be condoned or not.
7.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932,
while considering the delay, issued some directions and
observed as follows:“5. The legal position is that where a case has
been presented in the Court beyond limitation,
the petitioner has to explain the Court as to
what was the "sufficient cause" which means
an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the Court within
limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy
Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was
held by this Court that even though limitation
may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has
to be applied with all its rigour when
prescribed by statute. A reference was also
made to the decision of this Court in Ajay
Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92
wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj
v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a case
has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the
court as to what was the “sufficient cause”
which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or
found to have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by
imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard
to the condonation of delay. In case there was
no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory provisions
and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard
to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court did not commit any
mistake in dismissing the delay condonation
application of the present appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based on facts and circumstances
of each case and that, the expression
'sufficient
cause'
cannot
be
liberally
interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024
INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala,
J) was a member, after referring to various
decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal
terms observed by this Court that delay
should not be excused as a matter of
generosity and rendering substantial justice is
not to cause prejudice to the opposite party.
The relevant passage of the same is profitably
extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances,
we made it very clear that we are not going to
look into the merits of the matter as long as
we are not convinced that sufficient cause has
been made out for condonation of such a long
and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private
party or a State or Union of India when it
comes to condoning the gross delay of more
than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to
approach the court long after the lapse of the
time prescribed under the relevant provisions
of the law, then he cannot turn around and say
that no prejudice would be caused to either
side by the delay being condoned. This
litigation
between
the
parties
started
sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43
years have elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap the
fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of
justice if we condone the delay of 12 years
and 158 days and once again ask the
respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the
legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it
appears that they want to fix their own period
of limitation for instituting the proceedings for
which
law
has
prescribed
a
period
of
limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost
his right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a long,
it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate
delay and in such circumstances of the case,
he cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations. While
considering the plea for condonation of delay,
the court must not start with the merits of the
main matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It is
only if the sufficient cause assigned by the
litigant and the opposition of the other side is
equally balanced that the court may bring into
aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation
is
not
merely
a
technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public policy
and principles of equity. We should not keep
the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the
head of the respondent for indefinite period of
time to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached
to
the
conclusion
that
the
High
Court
committed no error much less any error of law
in
passing
the
impugned
order.
Even
otherwise, the High Court was exercising its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it
has been said that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to
the opposite party. The appellants have failed
to prove that they were reasonably diligent in
prosecuting the matter and this vital test for
condoning the delay is not satisfied in this
case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal
fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be
no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the
facts of the present case, we are of the
opinion that the High Court correctly refused
to condone the delay and dismissed the
appeal by observing that such inordinate
delay was not explained satisfactorily, no
sufficient cause was shown for the same, and
no plausible reason was put forth by the State.
Therefore, we are inclined to reject this
petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush
aside the delay occurred in preferring the
second
appeal,
due
to
callous
and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials
functioning in the State machinery. Though the
Government adopts systematic approach in
handling the legal issues and preferring the
petitions/applications/appeals well within the
time, due to the fault on the part of the officials
in merely communicating the information on
time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the
Government exchequer. The present case is
one such case, wherein, enormous delay of
1788 days occasioned in preferring the
second appeal due to the lapses on the part of
the officials functioning under the State,
though valuable Government lands were
involved. Therefore, we direct the State to
streamline the machinery touching the legal
issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases
before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the
responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and
penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible
for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the
value of the loss caused to the Government.
Such direction will have to be followed by all
the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter
which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a
period of time, we have noticed that whenever
there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at
the instance of a private litigant or State the
delay is sought to be explained right from the
time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay
of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end
of the same. For example if the period of
limitation is 90 days then the party seeking
condonation has to explain why it was unable
to institute the proceedings within that period
of limitation. What events occurred after the
91st day till the last is of no consequence. The
court is required to consider what came in the
way of the party that it was unable to file it
between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is
true that a party is entitled to wait until the last
day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when
it allows the limitation to expire and pleads
sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier,
the sufficient cause must establish that
because of some event or circumstance
arising before the limitation expired it was not
possible to file the appeal within time. No
event or circumstance arising after the expiry
of limitation can constitute such sufficient
cause. There may be events or circumstances
subsequent to the expiry of limitation which
may further delay the filing of the appeal. But
that the limitation has been allowed to expire
without the appeal being filed must be traced
to a cause arising within the period of
limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and
Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC
733).”
8.
Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident
that the discretion to condone delay has to be exercised with
great
caution
and
only
upon
a
clear
and
satisfactory
demonstration of “sufficient cause.” The law is well-settled that
poverty or ignorance of law, by themselves, do not constitute
such sufficient cause, and that negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fides cannot be overlooked under the guise of advancing
substantial justice.
9.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful
consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the
delay of 25 days in filing the present appeal is grossly inordinate.
The explanation offered by the applicant, namely financial
constraints, lack of legal guidance, and ignorance of the remedy,
though invoking sympathy, cannot be treated as “sufficient
cause” in the eye of law. It is now well-settled that poverty or
ignorance of law by themselves do not constitute adequate
justification for condoning delay, nor can the valuable right that
accrues to the opposite party by virtue of the law of limitation be
lightly taken away.
10.
The doctrine of limitation is founded upon public policy that seeks
to ensure certainty and finality in litigation. Once the statutory
period has expired, a litigant seeking indulgence of the Court
must show diligence and bona fides, and must explain
satisfactorily the circumstances which prevented timely action. In
the present case, the applicant has not been able to point out
any circumstance arising within the period of limitation which
disabled her from approaching this Court. On the contrary, the
record reveals that she remained inactive for a long period and
sought to revive her claim only after consulting legal aid services.
Such explanation cannot be construed as sufficient cause for
condonation of delay, particularly when the delay is prolonged
and unexplained for a substantial period.
11.
Therefore, this Court is constrained to hold that no case for
condonation of delay is made out. The application for
condonation of delay is accordingly rejected. As a consequence,
the instant writ appeal, being hopelessly barred by limitation, also
stands dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
sagrika
Digitally signed
by SAGRIKA
SAGRIKA AGRAWAL
AGRAWAL Date:
2026.01.14
10:47:27 +0530
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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