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2026:CGHC:3195-DB
ROHIT
KUMAR
CHANDRA
NAFR
Digitally signed
by ROHIT
KUMAR
CHANDRA
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 1984 of 2025
Shaniram Manjhi S/o Late Etwaram Manjhi Aged About 55 Years R/o
Village Katkalo, Dumarpara, P.S. Sitapur, District : Surguja (Ambikapur),
Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through S.H.O. Sitapur, Sarguja, District : Surguja
(Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh
... Respondent
For Appellant
For Respondent/State
: Mr. Wasim Miyan, Advocate
: Mr. S.S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
20.01.2026
1.
Heard Mr. Wasim Miyan, learned counsel for the appellant as well
as Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Government Advocate, appearing for
the appellant.
2.
This criminal appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Section
415(2) of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short,
‘BNSS’) is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction
and order of sentence dated 12.08.2025 passed by the learned
Sessions Judge, Sarguja (Ambikapur), District - Sarguja (C.G.) in
Sessions Trial No. 06 of 2020, whereby the appellant/accused has
been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of
IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and fine of
Rs.100/-, in default of payment of fine, additional SI for 03
months.
Further the appellant has also been convicted under
Section 323 of IPC and sentenced to undergo SI for 01 month,
with a direction to run both the sentences concurrently.
3.
Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the complainant /
informant Laxman Manjhi appeared at the Sitapur Police Station
on 17/11/2019 and filed a verbal complaint stating that his father,
Shaniram, had doubts about his mother, Manmati's character. On
the date of the incident, he and his wife, Basanti, had gone to
work, while accused Shaniram and his wife, Manmati, were at
home. When his wife, Basanti Manjhi, went to drink water, she
saw accused Shaniram standing in the courtyard with an axe in
his hand, which was covered in blood. Manmati was lying dead on
the ground, her neck severed, and blood was on the floor. Seeing
this incident, his wife, Basanti, became alarmed and rushed
home. Meanwhile, when neighbor Nadhiyaro Bai arrived at their
house, accused Shaniram Manjhi also assaulted Nadhiyaro with a
stick. During the intervention, Laxman Manjhi tied accused
Shaniram with a rope and informed the surrounding people and
the Kotwar (village police officer). Based on the oral information
provided by complainant Laxman Manjhi, a Case Intimation No.
94/2019, Ex.P-14, was recorded at Sitapur Police Station.
Subsequently, a First Information Report (FIR) bearing Crime No.
136/2019, Ex.P.-1, was registered against the accused under
sections 302 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of
his wife, Manmati and causing simple injury to injured victim.
4.
During the investigation, after giving notice to the witnesses
(Ex.P.3), in their presence, the Panchnama (Ex.P.4) of the dead
body of the deceased Manmati was prepared. The dead body of
the deceased Manmati was sent to the Primary Health CentreSitapur for postmortem by Constable No.-68 Nirmal Kuren, from
where the postmortem report (Ex.P.11) was received. On the
basis of the accused's memorandum (Ex.P.7), the axe and stick
were seized as per Ex.P.8. An application, Ex.P-21, was
submitted to the Tehsildar, Narmadapur for providing a site plan of
the incident A site map of the incident was prepared by the
Patwari as per Ex. P-10. Blood-soaked soil and plain soil were
seized from the scene as per Ex.P-6. The injured victim was taken
to CHC, Sitapur, for medical treatment by female constable
Pushpa Lakra No. 604, who provided her medical report as per
Ex.P-12. The accused was arrested and an arrest panchnama
(Ex.P-19) was prepared. The seized items were sent to FSL,
Ambikapur, via letter Ex.P-22 through the Superintendent of
Police, Surguja, from where the FSL report Ex.P-24 was received.
After completing the remaining stages of the investigation, the
final report was submitted to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate
First Class, Sitapur.
5.
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sitapur registered the case as
Criminal Case No. 533/2019 and since the case was exclusively
triable by the Sessions Court, on being presented to the Court of
Sessions, Ambikapur, District - Sarguja on 03/01/2020 as per the
provision of Section 209 of the Cr.P.C., the case was registered as
a Sessions case and the trial of the case was started by the
Sessions Judge.
6.
On 23/01/2020, when the charge of offence under Sections 302
and 323 of the IPC was framed against the accused, he denied
the allegations of the prosecution and declared himself innocent
during his trial and expressed his intention to present evidence in
his defence, but the accused has not produced any witness in his
defence.
7.
In support of its case, the prosecution has examined as many as
09 witnesses, namely, Laxman Manjhi (PW1), Basanti (PW2),
Veer Singh (PW3), Nadhiyaro (PW4), Jaimuni Nag (PW5),
Shravan Kumar (PW6), Patwari Kannilal Beck (PW7), Dr. S.N.
Paikra (PW8), Deputy Police Superintendent Anup Kumar Ekka
(PW-9).
8.
The Sessions Judge upon appreciation of oral and documentary
evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 12.08.2025,
convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforementioned,
against which, this criminal appeal has been filed.
9.
Mr. Wasim Miyan, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the
appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC,
as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond
reasonable doubt. He further submitted that if the case of the
prosecution is accepted on the face of it, then also the appellant is
said to have caused injuries to deceased on the spur of the
moment and heat of passion, as the appellant used to suspect on
the character of his deceased wife, who used to go here and there
without intimating him and on the date of incident at about 7.30
am, when the appellant asked his wife that from where she had
worn new sari, petticoat and blouse, who had given the same, her
wife started speaking rudely and abusively, on account of which,
on the spur of moment and heat of passion, the appellant brought
the axe (tangi) kept in the room and stuck a strong blow on her
neck, due to which the deceased died. There was no motive or
intention on the part of the appellant to cause death of the
deceased and only on account of sudden hot talk and quarrel,
under heat of passion and in anger, the appellant caused injuries
to the deceased, which caused her death. Therefore, the case of
the present appellant falls within the purview of Exception 4 to
Section 300 of the IPC and the act of the appellant is culpable
homicide not amounting to murder, and therefore, it is a fit case
where the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable
under Section 302 of the IPC can be converted/altered to an
offence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) of the IPC. Further, as
appellant is in jail since 17.11.2019 and he has completed near
about 06 years and 02 months of jail sentence and at present, the
age of the appellant is about 61 years old, therefore, considering
the period he had already undergone and his age, he be awarded
the sentence of the period already undergone by him.
10.
On the other hand, Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Government
Advocate, appearing for the respondent/State supports the
impugned judgment and submits that the appellant has caused
murder of the deceased deadly attacking her with an axe due to
which he succumbed to injuries and while intercepting, the
appellant has also assaulte PW-4 Nadiyaro with stick due to
which she became unconscious though the same was simple in
nature, therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the
appellant under Section 302 of IPC and it is not a case where the
appellant’s conviction under Section 302 of the IPC can be
altered/converted under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC and as
such, the instant criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed.
11.
We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,
considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also
went through the records with utmost circumspection.
12.
The first question for consideration would be whether the
deceased died under unnatural circumstances ?
13.
The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence
available on record particularly relying upon the statement of
Dr.S.N. Painkra (PW-8), who had conducted postmortem over the
dead body of deceased Manmati, has stated that while conducting
postmorterm he found that there was a lacerated wound over the
laryngeal area of the neck, measuring 5 x 3 x 2 inches, with a clot
of blood in it and opined that cause of death is hemorrhagic shock
due to injury on neck and nature of death is homicidal.
14.
After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering
their submissions, we are of the considered opinion that the
finding recorded by the trial Court that death of deceased
Manmati was homicidal in nature is the finding of fact based on
evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to
record. We hereby affirm that finding.
15.
Now, the next question for consideration would be whether the
accused/appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in
question, which the learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative
by relying upon the testimony of Dr.S.N. Painkra (PW-8) and
further relying upon the testimonies Laxman Manjhi (PW-1) and
Basanti (PW-2), who are son and daughter-in-law of the appellant
and the deceased, who had specifically stated that they had seen
the accused holding a blood-soaked axe near his wife’s dead
body.
Furthermore, relying upon the statement of Nadhiyaro
(PW-4), to whom the appellant has also assaulted by stick on the
same day.
16.
Thus, on the basis of testimonies of aforesaid prosecution
witnesses, it is clear that it is the appellant herein who on the
fateful date and time has caused grievous injuries to the
deceased, due to which she died. As such, the learned trial Court
has rightly held that it is the appellant/accused who has caused
injuries over the body of the deceased and caused her death.
Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding.
17.
The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for
consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within
Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide
not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to
Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned
counsel for the appellant ?
18.
The cause of death assigned in the post-mortem report of the
deceased as already noticed are ‘hemorrhagic shock due to injury
on neck’. It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a genus and
“murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides,
but all “culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rampal Singh Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh1. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the
light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed
to be the circumstances.
19.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev Vs. State of
Pepsu2 has made the following observations :
“Of course, we have to distinguish between motive,
(2012) 8 SCC 289
AIR 1956 SC 488
intention and knowledge. Motive is something which
prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is
an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many
cases intention and knowledge merge into each other
and mean the same thing more or less and intention
can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating
line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin
but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote
different things. Even in some English decisions, the
three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led
to a certain amount of confusion.”
20.
It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the
aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two
different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate
punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to
cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act
committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death
without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal
terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of
the
circumstances
to
be
taken
into
consideration
while
determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence
would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of
the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge
that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held
guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this
background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code
namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being
a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act
to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would
disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and
such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the
said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300
IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that
particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was
sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to
be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
21.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v.
State of Haryana3 has observed as under:“21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances
of the case, we are of the opinion that in the
absence of the existence of common object
Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the
offence of culpable homicide without premeditation
in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a
sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or
unusual manner and his case is covered by
Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is
punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The
finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid
appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable
under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held
guilty for the commission of offence of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder punishable
under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to
(2002) 3 SCC 327
pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine,
he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for
one year.”
22.
The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of
Haryana4 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into
consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the
accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of
the IPC, which state as under :“23. These are some factors which are required to be
taken into consideration before awarding appropriate
sentence to the accused. These factors are only
illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each
case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The
relevant factors are as under :
(a) Motive or previous enmity;
(b) Whether the incident had taken place on
the spur of the moment;
(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused
while inflicting the blow or injury;
(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously
or the victim died after several days;
(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;
(f) The age and general health condition of the
accused;
(g) Whether the injury was caused without
premeditation in a sudden fight;
(h) The nature and size of weapon used for
inflicting the injury and the force with which
the blow was inflicted;
(i) The criminal background and adverse
history of the accused;
(2009) 15 SCC 635
(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death but the death was because of shock;
(k) Number of other criminal cases pending
against the accused;
(l) Incident occurred within the family members
or close relations;
(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused
after the incident.
Whether
injured/the
the
accused
deceased
had
to
taken
the
the
hospital
immediately to ensure that he/she gets
proper medical treatment ?
These are some of the factors which can be
taken into consideration while granting an
appropriate sentence to the accused.
24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is
only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered
view, proper and appropriate sentence to the
accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the
court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure
that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in
other words, sentence should be according to the
gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant
factors which are required to be kept in view while
convicting and sentencing the accused.”
23.
Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda5, their
Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge
that it is likely to cause death is established but without any
intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term
which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has
(2012) 8 SCC 450
further been held that to make out an offence punishable under
Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the
death of the person in question and such death was caused by
the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is
likely to cause death.
24.
Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of
Chhattisgarh6 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed
in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :“20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that
are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court
in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC
217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as
under :(SCC p. 220, para 7)
“7. To invoke this exception four
requirements must be satisfied, namely,
(I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no
premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a
heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had
not taken any undue advantage or acted
in a cruel manner. The cause of the
quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant
who offered the provocation or started the
assault. The number of wounds caused
during the occurrence is not a decisive
factor but what is important is that the
occurrence must have been sudden and
unpremeditated and the offender must
have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the
offender must not have taken any undue
advantage or acted in a cruel manner.
Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in
the heat of the moment picks up a
weapon which is handy and causes
injuries, one of which proves fatal, he
would be entitled to the benefit of this
exception provided he has not acted
cruelly.”
21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC
590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the
(2017) 3 SCC 247
proposition of law that under what circumstances
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if
death is caused, it has been explained as under :
(SCC p. 596, para 9)
“9. …. The help of exception 4 can be
invoked if death is caused (a) without
premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c)
without the offender's having taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner; and (d) the fight must have been
with the person killed. To bring a case
within Exception 4 all the ingredients
mentioned in it must be found. It is to be
noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception
4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the
Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a
fight. Heat of passion requires that there
must be no time for the passions to cool
down and in this case, the parties had
worked themselves into a fury on account
of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A
fight is a combat between two or more
persons whether with or without weapons.
It is not possible to enunciate any general
rule as to what shall be deemed to be a
sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and
whether a quarrel is sudden or not must
necessarily depend upon the proved facts
of each case. For the application of
Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that
there was a sudden quarrel and there was
no premeditation. It must further be shown
that the offender has not taken undue
advantage or acted in cruel or unusual
manner.
The
expression
“undue
advantage” as used in the provisions
means “unfair advantage”.
25.
In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case
of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of
knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily
injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the
IPC.
26.
Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v.
State (NCT of Delhi)7 has laid down four ingredients which
should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4
to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under:
“16.
A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC shows that the following four ingredients are
required:
(i)
There must be a sudden fight;
(ii) There was no premeditation;
(iii) The act was committed in a heat of
passion; and
(iv) The offender had not taken any undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner.”
27.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of
Anbazhagan vs. The State represented by the Inspector of
Police in Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on
20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted
to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the
act as under:
“60. Few important principles of law discernible from
the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:
(1) When the court is confronted with the question,
what offence the accused could be said to have
committed, the true test is to find out the intention or
knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the
intention or knowledge was such as is described in
Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act
7 (2019) 6 SCC 122
will be murder even though only a single injury was
caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’
comes and placing his revolver against the head of
‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously.
Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the
intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though
only single injury was caused. The case would,
therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of
Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’
sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the
latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left
chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left
chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter.
The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary
course of nature to cause death. There may be no
difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the
particular injury found to be caused and that the said
injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of
‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and
render him guilty of the offence of murder although
only single injury was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the
accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section
300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would
otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview
of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of
the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the
event of the case falling within any of those
exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide
not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of
Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is
such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300
of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of
Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within
Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the
intention or knowledge of the accused may be such
that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC,
may be attracted but not any of the clauses of
Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the
offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to
murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an
offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall
within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an
offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall
within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused
person falls within the first two clauses of cases of
culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the
IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section
304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is
punishable under the second part of Section 304. In
effect, therefore, the first part of this section would
apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the
second part would apply when there is no such
intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular
injury was intended, and objectively that injury was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section
300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be
murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following
classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one
or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is
covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii)
when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of
likelihood which is covered by the expression
‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is
generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause
death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of
Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with
the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but
without intention to cause death or an injury likely to
cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between the
two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the
first part, the crime of murder is first established and
the accused is then given the benefit of one of the
exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the
second part, the crime of murder is never established
at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an
accused guilty of the offence punishable under the
second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused
need not bring his case within one of the exceptions
to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is
distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of
happening are even or greater
than its not
happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably
happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to
place itself in the situation of the accused and then
judge whether the accused had the knowledge that
by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide
(Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of
the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind
while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the
IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both,
the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder
and those not amounting to murder would fall.
Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is
brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of
the IPC. But, even though none of the said five
exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on
the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be
required under the law to bring the case under any of
the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain
the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to
discharge this onus in establishing any one of the
four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly
to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out
and the case may be one of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder as described under Section 299
of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of
mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be
applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury
inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely
be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter
of
inference
to
be
drawn
from
the
proved
circumstances
of
the
case.
The
court
must
necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon
used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury,
degree of force used in causing the injury, the
manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and
attendant on the attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes
a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause
injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of
nature to cause death also makes a culpable
homicide a murder if death has actually been caused
and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be
inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or
injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused
results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a
general principle, can be drawn that the accused did
not have the intention to cause the death or that
particular injury which resulted in the death of the
victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty
intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be
determined on the facts of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused
had the intention to cause death of any person or to
cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which
results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely
falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC
unless one of the exceptions applies.
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused
had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case
where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that
injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, the fact that the act is done without
premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the
circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or
unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury,
would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and
the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of
the IPC.”
28.
Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of principles of
law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the
above-stated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that the appellant
used to suspect on the character of his deceased wife, who used
to go here and there without intimating him and on the date of
incident at about 7.30 am, when the appellant asked his wife that
from where she had worn new sari, petticoat and blouse, who had
given the same, her wife started speaking rudely and abusively,
on account of which, on the spur of moment and heat of passion,
the appellant brought the axe (tangi) kept in the room and stuck a
strong blow on her neck, due to which the deceased died. Though
there was no motive or premeditation on the part of the appellant
to cause death of deceased, but by attacking with sharp edged
axe he has intention to cause death of deceased and by doing so,
he must have had the knowledge that such injuries inflicted by
him would likely to cause death of the deceased, as such, his
case would fall within the purview of Exception 4 of Section 300 of
IPC, as the act of the appellant herein completely satisfies the
four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC i.e.
(i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation;
(iii) the act was committed in a heat of passion and (iv) the
appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel
or unusual manner.
29.
Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case
and also taking into consideration that at present appellant is
aged about 61 years, and he is in jail since 17.11.2019 and he
has already undergone about 06 years and 02 months of
imprisonment, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of
the IPC can be altered/converted to Section 304 Part-I of the IPC.
30.
Accordingly, conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of
the IPC is set aside, however, he is convicted under Section
304 Part-I of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 10 years.
31.
The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated
hereinabove.
32.
It is stated that the appellant is in jail, he shall serve out the
remaining sentence as modified by this Court.
33.
Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along
with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned
forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send
a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail
where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the
same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail
the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an
appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of
High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court
Legal Services Committee.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Chandra
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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