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CGHC010407062022
2026:CGHC:33507-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Judgment Reserved on 11.05.2026
Judgment Delivered on 03.08.2026
Judgment Uploaded on 03. 08.2026
FA No. 165 of 2022
Shambhu Nath Singh Aged About 57 Years S/o Shri Sarup Singh, Sikh, R/o
Durupa- Road, Pratap- Chowk, Purani Basti, Korba, Tahsil And District Korba,
District : Korba, Chhattisgarh
(Defendant)
... Appellant (s)
versus
1 - Vimal Kohli (Dead) Through Legal Representative :
1.1 - Ku. Kriti Kohli D/o Vimal Kohli, Aged About 14 Years (Now 15
Years), R/o Q. No. 21. S.N. Green Colony, D.D.M. School - Road Korba,
Tahsil And District Korba Chhattisgarh, Minor, Through Uncle And Next
Friend Vivek Kohli, Aged 50 Year, S/o Guru Dayal Kohli, Caste, Punjabi
(Kshatriya), R/o Dewanganpara, Purani Basti, Korba District Korba
Chhattisgarh.
(Plaintiff)
2 - The Collector Korba, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant
For Resp. No.1
For Resp. No.2
Digitally
signed by
PRAVEEN
KUMAR
SINHA
Date:
2026.08.03
17:33:10
+0530
: Mr. Somnath Verma, Advocate
: Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate
: Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Govt. Advocate
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D.B. : Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu &
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput
CAV Judgment
Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J.
1. Appellant/defendant has filed this appeal under Section 96 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, questioning legality and sustainability of the
judgment and decree dated 09.11.2022 passed in Civil Suit
No.86-A/2014 by the Additional District Judge (FTC) Korba, DistrictKorba (CG) whereby learned trial Court allowed the suit filed by
respondent-plaintiff for specific performance of contract, possession,
declaration, permanent injunction.
2. Facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are that respondent-plaintiff
filed a suit for specific performance of contract with other reliefs
pleading therein that the original plaintiff- Vimal Kohli entered into the
contract for purchase of the land from defendant- Shambhu Nath Singh
bearing kh.no. 164/10 admeasuring 0.10 acres situated at P.H. No.4
Village and Tahsil- Korba for a total consideration of Rs.11 lakh, out of
which, a sum of Rs.3,52,500/- was paid as advance and rest of the
amount was to be paid at the time of execution of sale deed after
taking prior permission from the competent authority by land
owner/defendant. An agreement to sell the land was registered on
14.01.2010. Application for permission under Section 165 (6) of the
Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as “ Code of 1959”)
was filed under signature of defendant before the competent authority
seeking permission to transfer ownership of land by registered sale
deed. Competent authority sent the matter to the Tahsildar for
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conducting enquiry and submitting its report and thereafter report
prepared by Tahsildar was forwarded to the office of Sub Divisional
Officer opining to give permission. In turn, Sub-Divisional Officer has
consented to report submitted by Tahsildar and it was forwarded to the
Collector. In the proceeding before the Collector, the authority who had
to grant permission, defendant has raised an objection based upon
which, the application submitted before the competent authority i.e.
Collector under Section 165 (6) of the Code of 1959 was dismissed
which made the plaintiff to file suit.
3. In the plaint, plaintiff has pleaded that the registered agreement to sell
was executed between the parties. According to terms of agreement,
defendant submitted an application seeking permission from the
competent authority under Section 165 (6) of the Code of 1959. it is
also pleaded that during pendency of proceeding of permission under
Section 165 (6) of the Code of 1959 defendant had made a demand of
further sum of Rs.7 lakh out of balance amount, pleading therein that
said amount is required for treatment of his wife. The said demand was
in contravention of the terms of agreement to sell dated 14.01.2010.
Plaintiff was not under an obligation to pay further sum of Rs.7 lakh
under the conditions of agreement to sell, before obtaining permission
from the competent authority to sell the land. Original plaintiff was
always ready and willing to execute sale deed after paying balance
amount of consideration, upon obtaining prior permission from the
competent authority by the seller of the land.
4. Defendant No.1 filed written statement pleading therein that defendant
No.1 was in need of money for getting treatment to his wife and he
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entered into an agreement to sell the land owned by him for sum of
Rs.30,01,000/- and agreement to that effect was executed on
14.11.2009. In the said agreement it was mentioned that purchaser will
pay 75% of the agreed consideration by 15th January and balance
amount is to be paid after obtaining permission from the competent
authority at the time of execution of sale deed. Plaintiff pursuant to
agreement dated 14.11.2009 had got the agreement to sell executed
on 14.01.2010 and got it registered. At the time of obtaining signature
of defendant, plaintiff had paid Rs.51,500/- to defendant and by the
date of execution of registered agreement to sell dated 14.01.2010
plaintiff had paid to defendant only Rs.3,52,500/-. Plaintiff not complied
with the conditions of agreement dated 14.11.2009 of making payment
of 75% amount of the agreed consideration. Agreement dated
14.01.2010 was executed and registered without knowledge of the
defendant. It is also pleaded that after one month from the date of
execution of agreement dated 14.01.2010 when the defendant met the
plaintiff, he informed him that the application for permission will be
submitted without any further delay at the earliest. Submission of
application is to be by the plaintiff and defendant is to appear as and
when required. On plain paper/blank paper, signature of defendant was
obtained on the pretext that application is to be submitted before the
competent authority/Collector for permission. Defendant had made
demand of Rs.7 lakh for treatment of his wife to which plaintiff denied.
It is also pleaded that thereafter defendant had sent legal notice
through his Advocate on 23.08.2011. In written statement it is also
pleaded that defendant had not submitted application for permission
before the Collector under his
signature. However, the signature
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appearing in the application is forged. In the application there is prayer
for permission to sell the land bearing kh. no.624 admeasuring 0.58
acres which is not owned by defendant No.1 for which also the
objection is raised before the Collector/competent authority. It is also
pleaded that plaintiff by playing fraud with defendant had not made any
mention with regard to earlier agreement dated 14.11.2009 in the
registered agreement to sell dated 14.01.2010. The plaintiff himself has
caused delay in submitting the application for permission before the
competent authority so that the plaintiff can sell the land to another
person after lapse of time on higher rate. It is also pleaded that later on,
agreement to sell executed between the parties was cancelled as there
was no necessity to sell the property.
5. Learned trial Court on the basis of pleading made by the plaintiff and
defendant has formulated as many as seven issues for consideration.
Plaintiff in support of his case had submitted copy of registered
agreement to sell as Ex.P-1; copy of registered legal notice dated
23.08.2011 sent by defendant as Ex.P-2; copy of reply to legal notice
dated 23.08.2011 given by plaintiff as Ex.P-3;
copy of second
registered legal notice sent by defendant as Ex.P-4; reply to legal
notice (Ex.P-4) sent to defendant as Ex.P-5, copy of postal receipts as
Ex.P-6 and Ex.P-7; copy of acknowledgment as Ex.P-8; copy of ordersheets of Revenue Court passed in Revenue Case No.27-A/21/200910 as Ex.P-9; copy of statement of defendant No.1 as Ex.P-10; copy of
statement of plaintiff in other proceeding as Ex.P-11; copy of
information supplied by SECL with regard to land subject matter of suit
as Ex.P-12; copy of ‘NOC’ given to Tahsildar as Ex.P-13; copy of report
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submitted by Patwari as Ex.P-14; copy of report with regard to value of
the land submitted before the Tahsildar as Ex.P-15; copy of inquiry
report under Section 165 (6) (g) of the Land Revenue Code, 1959 as
Ex.P-16; copy of objection filed by defendant as Ex.P-17; copy of
order-sheets in the revenue proceedings as Ex.P-18; copy of letter sent
to Sub-Registrar, Korba for providing value of the land according to
guidelines as Ex.P-19; copy of Isthar as Ex.P-20; copy of objection
submitted by defendant as Ex.P-21; copy of objection submitted by
defendant to cancell the proceedings under Section 165 (6) (a) of the
Land Revenue Code 1959 as Ex.P-22; copy of letter sent to Collector
through Advocate as Ex.P-23 and examined Vimal Kohli as PW1,
Raju Makwana as PW2.
6. Defendant No.1 in support of his case submitted copy of agreement to
sell dated 14th November 2009 as Ex.D-1; copy of order sheet as Ex.D2; copy of order passed by Revenue Court as Ex.D-3; copy of
application for seeking permission as Ex.D-4 and copy of objection as
Ex.D-5.
7. Learned trial Court upon appreciation of documentary and oral
evidence brought on record by respective parties had allowed the suit
filed by plaintiff holding that the registered agreement to sell dated
14.01.2010 for selling of land situated at kh.no.164/10 admeasuring
0.10 acres is binding upon the parties. Defendant was directed to get
the permission from the competent authority under Section 165 (6) of
the Code of 1959 and to get the sale deed registered in accordance
with the provision of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and Registration Act, 1908
along with further directions.
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8. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant would submit that learned
trial Court has passed the impugned judgment and decree without
proper appreciation of facts and evidence available on record as also
overlooking the relevant laws applicable to facts of the case. He
contended that learned Court below had erred in not drawing adverse
inference against the plaintiff as provided under Section 114 (g) of the
Evidence Act, 1872 because plaintiff has not produced the first
agreement to sell dated 14.11.2009. It is next contended that plaintiff
had not pleaded in the plaint that the plaintiff was ready and willing but
then also learned trial Court erred in decreeing the suit for specific
performance of contract and therefore impugned judgment and decree
is illegal. Pleading made by defendant and evidence adduced by him is
totally overlooked. He contended that execution of agreement to sell in
the year 2009 was admitted by plaintiff which ought to have been
considered by the trial Court, which mentioned sale consideration of
Rs.30,01,000/- and had overlooked that another agreement for same
piece of land Ex.P-1 was executed on 14.01.2010 but showing less
sale consideration which itself is sufficient to conclude that it was
without knowledge of defendant. Plaintiff has to prove his case on the
evidence brought by him and have to stand on his own legs. First Civil
Suit filed by plaintiff bearing Civil Suit No.5-A/2012 was withdrawn only
to fulfill the lacuna which is not taken note of, by learned trial Court.
Ex.P-1 which is stated to have been executed between the parties as
agreement to sell itself is void because it has been executed in
contravention of the law and hence learned trial Court ought not to
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have granted the decree for specific performance of contract on the
basis of Ex.P-1.
9. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would support the
judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court and would submit
that learned trial Court has allowed the suit filed by plaintiff upon
appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. He contended that
defendant had not denied the execution of registered agreement to sell
(Ex.P-1) dated 14.01.2010. In the legal notice which has been issued
by the defendant through his Advocate also mentioned about the
execution of agreement to sell dated 14.01.2010 for total consideration
of Rs. 11 lakh and in the said agreement have further mentioned about
the advance amount received of Rs.3,52,500/- and balance amount to
be paid as Rs.7,47,500/-. Application for permission was filed by
defendant under his own signature. However, in the procedure of
getting the report from Tahsildar, Sub-Divisional Officer, it took some
time. It is the defendant himself who raised objection in grant of
permission before the Collector and therefore defendant will not be
permitted to take undue advantage of his own wrong.
10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the
record of the trial Court.
11.To prove his case, plaintiff had produced before the Court copy of
registered agreement to sell as Ex.P-1; copy of registered legal notice
dated 23.08.2011 sent by defendant as Ex.P-2; copy of reply to legal
notice dated 23.08.2011 given by plaintiff as Ex.P-3; copy of second
registered legal notice sent by defendant as Ex.P-4; reply to legal
notice (Ex.P-4) sent to defendant as Ex.P-5, copy of postal receipts as
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Ex.P-6 and Ex.P-7; copy of acknowledgment as Ex.P-8; copy of ordersheets of Revenue Court passed in Revenue Case No.27-A/21/200910 as Ex.P-9; copy of statement of defendant No.1 as Ex.P-10; copy of
statement of plaintiff in other proceeding as Ex.P-11; copy of
information supplied by SECL with regard to land subject matter of suit
as Ex.P-12; copy of ‘NOC’ given to Tahsildar as Ex.P-13; copy of report
submitted by Patwari as Ex.P-14; copy of report with regard to value of
the land submitted before the Tahsildar as Ex.P-15; copy of inquiry
report under Section 165 (6) (g) of the Land Revenue Code, 1959 as
Ex.P-16; copy of objection filed by defendant as Ex.P-17; copy of
order-sheets in the revenue proceedings as Ex.P-18; copy of letter sent
to Sub-Registrar, Korba for providing value of the land according to
guidelines as Ex.P-19; copy of Isthar as Ex.P-20; copy of objection
submitted by defendant as Ex.P-21; copy of objection submitted by
defendant to cancell the proceedings under Section 165 (6) (a) of the
Land Revenue Code 1959 as Ex.P-22; copy of letter sent to Collector
through Advocate as Ex.P-23 .
12. Perusal of the Ex.P-1 i.e. registered agreement to sell between the
parties would show that defendant No.1 has been shown to be as party
No.1 and plaintiff has been shown to be party No.2. Description of the
property is mentioned as kh. no.164/10 admeasuring 0.10 acres of land
situated at Village- Korba P.H. No.4 which is a diverted land. Area has
been shown as 4360 sq.ft. Total sale consideration is mentioned as 11
lakh and advance amount as Rs.3,52,500/- and balance amount to be
paid as Rs.7,47,500/- It is also specifically mentioned that balance
amount is to be paid after obtaining permission and at the time of
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registration of sale deed. This document bears signature of the plaintiff
and defendant both on each of the pages. Registration of this
agreement to sell has not been denied by defendant nor its execution
was denied initially but have made an attempt to say at later stage that
second agreement got executed without his knowledge.
13. This defence taken by defendant in written statement appears to be
false and fabricated. It is reflecting from Ex.P-2 registered legal notice
issued by defendant through his Advocate on 23.08.2011. In the said
legal notice plaintiff had pleaded about execution of agreement to sell
dated 14.01.2010 for total consideration of Rs.11 lakh out of which
Rs.3,52,500/- has been received as advance and the remaining
amount of sale consideration to be Rs.7,47,500/-. It is also pleaded that
at what time balance amount is to be paid i.e. after obtaining
permission and at the time of execution of sale deed. In the legal notice
defendant has further pleaded that defendant is in need of Rs.7 lakh for
purpose of getting treatment to his wife and further that he is not having
any other property to liquidate it for meeting out the said exigency. In
this notice it is further mentioned that plaintiff had got signature of
defendant on the application for seeking permission but even after
lapse of more than 1 and ½ years, permission could not be obtained. It
is further pleaded that plaintiff should obtain the permission without
any delay and after making payment of balance amount, get the sale
deed executed within 15 days. In the last para of notice it is also
mentioned that plaintiff should get the sale deed registered within 15
days and to pay balance amount i.e. Rs.7,47,500/- or to pay Rs.7 lakh
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without getting the sale deed executed or else he will get the registered
agreement to sell cancelled.
14. So far as the execution of agreement to sell Ex.P-1 and contents of the
legal notice issued by the defendant through his Advocate Ex.P-2 is
concerned, plaintiff examined Vimal Kohli party No.2 to agreement, as
PW1. He stated according to paint averment in his examination-in-chief
which is submitted in the form of an affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4
CPC. He was extensively cross-examined by defendant. In crossexamination he was put a question with regard to execution of unregistered agreement to sell, to which he admitted. However, he stated
that he is not aware about the specific date. He further denied the
suggestion given to him that in the un-registered agreement to sell,
there was condition to pay 75 % of agreed sale consideration. In his
cross-examination he stuck to his pleading made in the plaint with
regard to payment of Rs.3,52,500/- as per the terms of agreement to
sell. He also admitted that condition which is mentioned in unregistered sale deed is mentioned as it is in the registered sale deed
Ex.P-1. This witness has not made any contrary statement in his crossexamination than what he has pleaded in plaint and have stated in
examination-in-chief. He also proved the documents Ex.P-1 to Ex.P23. PW2 Raju Makwana has also submitted affidavit under Order 18
Rule 4 CPC as his examination in chief stating that the agreement to
sell was executed for sale of land bearing kh. no.164/10 admeasuring
0.10 acres to plaintiff for a sum of Rs.11 lakh. It was executed on
14.01.2010 and the plaintiff had paid sum of Rs.3,52,500/- to defendant
at the time of execution of agreement to sell and balance amount is to
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be paid after obtaining permission from the Collector to sell the land, at
the time of execution of sale deed. He also stated that demand of Rs.7
lakh before execution of sale deed is contrary to the contents of
agreement Ex.P-1. In cross-examination also he stuck to his statement
which he has given in examination in chief. In cross-examination he
also stated that prior to 14.01.2010, one agreement was executed
between parties and further stated that on the date of execution of
registered agreement to sell dated 14.01.2010, he plaintiff, defendant
and one Ashok Nair were present. He also stated that based on the
earlier agreement, agreement to sell dated 14.01.2010 was executed.
15. Defendant himself got examined as DW1. He submitted affidavit under
Order 18 Rule 4 CPC as statement-in-chief stating therein that one
agreement to sell was executed between the parties on 14.11.2009 to
sell the suit land for consideration of Rs.30,01,000/- and getting
advance sum of Rs.3,01,000/-. He also stated that there is a condition
in the agreement dated 14.11.2009 that for getting permission to sell
the land, demarcation, defendant will keep himself present and help. It
is also stated that proceeding for taking permission and entire
expenditure for permission is to be borne by plaintiff and where-ever
presence of defendant is required, he will keep himself present. In
examination-in-chief he had made statement on the basis of unregistered agreement to sell dated 14.11.2009 for a total consideration
of Rs.30,01,000/- and getting of total advance amount of Rs.
3,52,500/-. It is also stated that only to save stamp duty second
agreement to sell was executed showing sale consideration of Rs.11
lakh. It is also stated that plaintiff had not complied with the condition of
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paying 75% of the agreed sale consideration and when the defendant
had asked for further advance of Rs.7 lakh for treatment of his wife, he
denied. In cross-examination this witness had admitted about the
execution of registered agreement to sell dated 14.01.2010 (Ex.P-1).
He admitted his signature in Ex.P1 on “B” to “B”. However, in self
statement he further stated that Ex.P-1 agreement was got executed by
the plaintiff to save stamp duty. He also admitted that at the time of
execution of agreement to sell Ex.P-1 he was mentally and physically
fit and he has put signature after understanding the contents of
agreement . He also tried to clarified that his signature was obtained
and was stated that payment will be made in his home, however no
payment has been made. He also admitted about the receipt of total
amount of Rs.3,52,500/-. He also admitted that he has not made any
statement before the Registrar that total consideration for sale of
property mentioned in agreement was Rs.30,01,000/- . He also
admitted that in the agreement Ex. P-1, there is no mention of
agreement dated 14.11.2009.
16. If in the light of aforementioned evidence available on record, contents
of notice Ex.P-2 which is issued by defendant through his Advocate is
to be considered, in Ex.P-2 there is no mention about execution of
agreement to sell dated 14.11.2009 Ex.D-1 but in para-2 of the said
legal notice it only mentioned that noticee has agreed upon to sell the
land owned by his client (defendant) for sum of Rs.11 lakh and has
executed registered agreement dated 14.01.2010. It further mention of
receipt of advance amount of Rs.3,52,500/- and further balance
amount of agreement to sell to be Rs.7,47,500/-.
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17. In the the aforementioned paragraph of agreement it is not mentioned
that there was a sale agreement between the parties for transfer of the
property subject matter of suit in favour of plaintiff for consideration of
Rs.30,01,000/- Further there is no mention that 75% of the agreed
amount has not been paid as mentioned in the other alleged
agreement said to be executed and as stated by defendant in his
evidence. In the notice grievance of the defendant is of non-payment of
Rs.7 lakh to meet out the emergent need of getting his wife treated. In
the said notice (Ex.P-2) which is sent by defendant also mentions that
balance amount to be received towards sale consideration as
Rs.7,47,500/- only. In the aforementioned facts and documentary
evidence available and undisputed contents of Ex.P-2, submission of
learned counsel for defendant that he was not paid agreed sum of 75%
of the agreed sale consideration out of Rs.30,01,000/- is not
sustainable and this submission is perverse to the evidence available
on record.
18. From the registered agreement to sell the land (Ex.P-1), it is apparent
that sale deed is to be executed after getting permission from the
competent authority as provided under Section 165 (6) of the Code of
1959. Application was submitted immediately under signature of
plaintiff. Though the defendant had made an attempt to state that
signature in the application seeking permission to sell the land
submitted before the Collector is not his, but the said submission and
evidence of defendant is not acceptable because no such plea has
been taken by him at the time of sending the legal notice (Ex.P-2) to
the plaintiff through his Advocate but in the notice there is mention that
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at the time of execution of agreement to sell plaintiff had got signature
of defendant on the application for initiating proceeding of seeking
permission for transfer of land subject matter of suit. Statement of
defendant is also recorded before the Tahsildar and in his statement
before the Tahsildar in proceeding of seeking permission to sell the
land, he has not made any objection with regard to submission of
application with his forged signature.
19. In para-37 of evidence, defendant Shambhu Nath (DW1), he denied his
signature in his statement recorded before the Tahsildar and further
stated that he did not appear before the Tahsildar to record his
statement. However, in para-42 he admitted that except Ex.D-4 he has
not made any attempt to obtain permission from Collector. He also
stated that he has handed over the application to plaintiff on
14.01.2010. From the evidence of defendant it is appearing that
defendant is not stating the correct fact but made self-contradictory
statement with regard to submission of an application before the
Collector for permission to sell the land. Once the defendant admits
execution of D-4 with his signature then defendant
will not be
permitted to submit that signature in the application is forged and
fabricated. From the above it is apparent that defendant for one or the
other ground wants to avoid specific performance of contract vide Ex.P1. In the objection raised before the Collector vide D-5 also defendant
has pleaded about execution of agreement to sell dated 14.01.2010 for
total consideration of Rs.11 lakh out of which accepting the advance
amount of Rs.3,52,500/-. He also mentioned that he wanted to sell the
land for purpose of treatment of his wife. He further mentioned in the
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said objection that period to obtain permission is of 6 months for the
purchaser and when he further demanded Rs.7 lakh from balance
amount it was denied. There was also objection that in some place
permission sought is with regard to land bearing kh. no.624
admeasuring 0.58 acres which was not registered in the name of
defendant.
20. From facts and evidence available, it is apparent that there was an
agreement between the parties to sell the land bearing kh. no.164/10
admeasuring 0.10 acres for sum of Rs.11 lakh out of which
Rs.3,52,500/- was accepted as advance and further application is
submitted in the month of January 2010. Signature in the application is
not denied. Merely mentioning in the prayer clause of different land
when in the first paragraph the land subject matter of agreement to sell
is mentioned it cannot be said that application is submitted before the
authority seeking permission of different land when it is the case of
defendant himself that, he is no owner of the land which is mentioned
in the last paragraph of the application. From it, defendant cannot get
any benefit but it can be considered only that relief has not been
appropriately made. The Collector in its order dated 07.03.2014 (part of
Ex.D-3) has recorded a finding that applicant does not want to sell land
is a different matter but it is wrong to say that applicant therein
(defendant) has not submitted an application seeking permission to
sell the land and, has dismissed the application recording that for
getting permission under Section 165 (6) of the Code of 1959
agreement of both the parties is necessary to obtain the order of
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permission and only recording that applicant is not ready to sell the
land, application seeking permission was dismissed.
21. From the aforementioned finding recorded by Collector vide its order
dated 07.03.2014 it appears that defendant himself got the proceeding
seeking permission to sell the land dismissed by raising false and
fabricated ground which is observed by competent authority i.e.
Collector in its order.
22. There is no dispute that grant of relief/decree of specific performance is
a discretionary and equitable relief. Before coming to conclusion that
plaintiff is entitled for the decree of specific performance, Court has to
consider the fact whether there was a valid and concluded contract
between the parties; readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to
perform his part of contract; whether the plaintiff is still ready and willing
to perform his part; whether the plaintiff has performed his part of
contract as also whether the grant of decree of specific performance
would be suitable or not.
23. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kamal Kumar Vs. Premlata Joshi
& Ors. reported in (2019) 3 SCC 704 has observed thus:
“7. It is a settled principle of law that the grant of
relief of specific performance is a discretionary and
equitable relief. The material questions which are
required to be gone into for grant of relief of specific
performance are:
7.1 First, whether there exists a valid and
concluded contract between the parties for
sale/purchase of the suit property.
7.2. Second, whether the plaintiff has been
ready and willing to perform his part of contract
and whether he is still ready and willing to
perform his part as mentioned in the contract.
18 / 27
7.3. Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact,
performed his part of the contract and, if so,
how and to what extent and in what manner he
has performed and whether such performance
was in conformity with the terms of the contract.
7.4. Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant
the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff
against the defendant in relation to suit property
or it will cause any kind of hardship to the
defendant and, if so, how and in what manner
and the extent if such relief is eventually
granted to the plaintiff;
7.5. Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for
grant of any other alternative relief, namely,
refund of earnest money etc. and, if so, on what
grounds.”
24. If the facts of the present case is considered in the light of
aforementioned decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court as discussed
above, execution of agreement was not disputed by appellantdefendant. One of the condition of agreement is that defendant (owner
of the land) has to obtain permission from the Collector for transfer of
the suit property, application is filed. However, it is the defendant who
raised objection making false pleading of his forged signature on
application, which was found incorrect by the Collector, the competent
authority considering the application for grant of permission. With
regard to readiness and willingness, it is undisputed fact that plaintiff
had paid advance sum of Rs.3,52,500/- and remaining amount is to be
paid at the time of execution of sale deed, after obtaining permission
from competent authority.
25. Plaintiff- Vimal Kohli, in paragraph- 2 of his affidavit filed under Order
18 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically stated that he had
19 / 27
borne all the expenses required for obtaining the requisite permission
in terms of the contract, had always been ready to bear the remaining
expenses, and continues to remain ready and willing to do so. Further,
in paragraph- 7 of the said affidavit, he categorically stated that he has
always been ready and willing to comply with the terms and conditions
of the agreement and continues to be ready and willing to perform his
part of the contract. Notably, during his cross-examination, no
suggestion or challenge was put to him disputing his specific
averments regarding his continuous readiness and willingness to
perform his contractual obligations. In the absence of any challenge to
the plaintiff's testimony on this material aspect, his evidence regarding
his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the
contract remains un-rebutted and is deemed to have been accepted.
Consequently, the plaintiff has successfully established his continuous
readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the
agreement, thereby satisfying the mandatory requirement under the
Specific Relief Act.
26. Learned trial Court has not framed specific issue with regard to
readiness and willingness of plaintiff. Merely non-framing of issue in
itself will not be sufficient to interfere with the finding recorded by trial
Court if the parties went to trial knowing that a particular question is in
issue.
27. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Nagubai Ammal and Ors. Vs. B.
Shama Rao and Ors. reported in (1956) 1 SCC 698 has observed
thus:
20 / 27
“9.3. It was argued for the appellants that as no plea of
lis pendens was taken in the pleadings, the evidence
bearing on that question could not be properly looked
into, and that no decision could be given based on Ext.
J series that the sale dated 30-1-1920 was affected by
lis; and reliance was placed on the observations of
Lord Dunedin in Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt. Saran
and others that "no amount of evidence can be looked
into upon a plea which was never put forward". The
true scope of this rule is that evidence let in on issues
on which the parties actually went to trial should not be
made the foundation for decision of another and
different issue, which was not present to the minds of
the parties and on which they bad no opportunity of
adducing evidence. But that rule has no application to
a case where parties go to trial with knowledge that a
particular question is in issue, though no specific issue
has been framed thereon, and adduce evidence
relating thereto. ……”
28. In case of Sayeda Akhtar Vs. Abdul Ahad reported in (2003) 7 SCC
52, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that omission to frame an
important issue may sometimes cause prejudice to parties resulting
failure to lead evidence on the point. But where the parties were not
only aware of the point in controversy but also led evidence and
advanced their submissions, it will not be appropriate to interfere with
finding of facts.
29. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Pramod Shroff Vs. Mohan Singh
Chopra (Civil Appeal arsing out of SLP (C) No.20779 of 2025, decided
on 16th April 2026) has observed thus :
“28. Though framing of issues, as mentioned above,
although, is not mandatory yet, if the omission to frame
21 / 27
the same causes prejudice to the parties, then the
same can vitiate the trial. The test for finding as to
omission to frame the issues have caused prejudice to
the parties or not can be laid down on the touchstone
as to whether parties that go to trial had knowledge
that (i) a particular question is in issue and (ii) had
opportunity to lead evidence on that issue.”
30. In para-3 of the plaint, plaintiff has specifically pleaded that he has
borne all the expenses for obtaining permission as per the contract and
has always been willing and is presently willing to bear the remaining
expenses. In para-9 of the plaint also, he pleaded that he has always
been ready to comply with the agreement and is still ready for the
same. He pleaded that he has already paid sum of Rs.3,52,500/- to
defendant and is ready to pay the remaining amount as well, however,
the defendant is not taking any steps for execution of sale deed.
31. In para-3 of his written statement, defendant had not specifically denied
with regard to pleading of readiness and willingness in plaint to bear
the all expenses of proceeding for grant of permission of the Collector
to transfer the land. In reply to para -9 of the plaint also, wherein the
plaintiff has pleaded about his readiness and willingness, defendant
had not made specific denial.
32. In the affidavit filed under Order 18 Rule 4 of CPC, in the evidence-inchief, defendant has not specifically denied that the plaintiff was ready
and willing to execute the sale deed in terms of contract but has stated
that when he demanded Rs.7 lakh because of urgent need of treatment
of his wife, it was not paid to him.
22 / 27
33. From the aforementioned facts of case, when plaintiff has specifically
pleaded that he is ready and willing and further the plaintiff had made
statement with regard to readiness and willingness in his evidence, in
the considered opinion of this Court, the parties to the suit were aware
about the issue involved of readiness and willingness in the suit
proceeding. Readiness and willingness is a connecting issue to be
decided in case of suit for specific performance of contract and
therefore when the parties went to trial knowing well that a particular
question is involved, entire trial of the case cannot be vitiated and the
judgment impugned cannot be said to be illegal.
34. So as to consider the plea raised by defendant for not getting sale
deed executed that he could not get amount in time of Rs.7 lakh for
treatment of his wife is concerned, if the claim of defendant is to be
appreciated of necessity of Rs.7 lakh then the wife of defendant might
have been suffering with some severe disease for which she might
have taken treatment from different doctors and hospitals etc., but
defendant had not submitted any document in this regard to prove the
defence taken by him with regard to not getting the money to meet out
emergent need . It is for the defendant who has to prove this fact, as
pleaded in reply. In absence of any such documentary evidence merely
pleading and oral evidence will not be considered to be proof of the
said fact. In above facts of the case, non-payment of further demand of
advance amount of Rs.7 lakh out of balance amount of Rs.7,47,500/-,
it cannot be said that the plaintiff has acted in contravention of the
conditions in the agreement to sell, but condition to pay balance
23 / 27
amount is only after getting permission to sell the land, at the time of
execution of sale deed.
35.
From the aforementioned facts of the case it is apparent that defendant
has not pleaded correct facts before the Court and had not come to the
Court with clean hands and has only tried to make an attempt to avoid
specific performance of contract pursuant to Ex.P-1 registered
agreement entered into between the parties. True it is that relief under
the specific performance of contract as on the date of execution of
agreement to sell and on the date of filing of suit was discretionary
however Court has to look into entire facts and circumstances of case,
evidence of parties and further the intention of parties to the suit.
36.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Binod Pathak & Ors. Vs. Shankar
Choudhary & Ors. (Civil Appeal No.7706 of 2025, decided on 14 th July
2025) observed thus:
“45. The genesis of the provision of Rule 10A of the
Order XXII lies in the doctrine of ‘clean hands’. The
doctrine of ‘clean hands’ originates from the Roman
Law, and finds expression in two latin maxims being (i)
ex injuria ius non oritur and (ii) nullus commodum
capere potest de injuria sua propia, which mean “from
wrong, no right arises” and “no one can take advantage
of their own wrong”, respectively. [See : Schwebel,
Stephen M. “Clean Hands, Principle” Eds., Rüdiger
Wolfrum, Oxford University Press, 2009].
46. Although the aforesaid two maxims, semantically
appear to be one and the same, with the courts often
applying the two interchangeably, yet there lies a very
fine but pertinent distinction between the two maxims.
The two maxims are comparable to each other but they
24 / 27
are not interchangeable, and differ in their scope. Aaron
X. Fellmeth and Maurice Horwitz in the “Guide to Latin
Maxims in International Law” 1st Ed., Oxford University
Press, has explained the maxim ex injuria ius non oritur
as follows : “A right does not arise from wrongdoing.” A
maxim meaning that one cannot generally rely
on a violation of law to establish a new legal
right or to confirm a claimed right. E.g., “As
Lauterpacht has indicated the maxim ex injuria
ius non oritur is not so severe as to deny that
any source of right whatever can accrue to third
persons acting in good faith. Were it otherwise
the general interest in the security of
transactions would be too greatly invaded and
the cause of minimizing needless hardship and
friction would be hindered rather than helped.”
Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences For
States Of The Continued Presence Of South
Africa In Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, 167 (separate
opinion of Judge Dillard). An alternative
formulation is Ius ex iniuria non oritur. Compare
with Nullus commodum capere (potest) de sua
iniuria propria.”
(Emphasis supplied)
47. On the other hand, they have explained the maxim
‘nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propia’
as follows:—
“No advantage (may be) gained from one's
own wrong.” A maxim meaning that the law
will not recognize or validate any profit a
person derives from his own wrongdoing.
For example, one may not destroy evidence
of the extent of damages caused by one's
illegal act, then counter a claim for damages
based on that act by pointing to the lack of
evidence. E.g., “[T]he State must not be
allowed to benefit by its inconsistency when
it is through its own wrong or illegal act that
25 / 27
the other party has been deprived of its right
or prevented from exercising it […]”
(Emphasis supplied)
48. A perusal of the aforesaid makes it abundantly
clear, that while the maxim ‘ex injuria ius non oritur’ is a
principle
governing
the
general
spirit
of
the
jurisprudence of “rights”, that a right cannot emanate or
emerge from a wrongful act, the maxim ‘nullus
commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria’, on
the other hand, confirms the general rule of equity and
prudence that no one can benefit from their own
wrongdoing. The scope of the latter is wider than the
former. The first maxim explains that the legitimacy of a
right stands vitiated if such right, which otherwise would
have been legitimately exercisable, accrues from a
wrongdoing of the person claiming under or exercising
such right. Although, under the law, a right may arise
even if from a wrongdoing, yet if exercise of such right
is allowed, it would malign the very jurisprudential
underpinning of ‘right’ and ‘duty’. A right has a legal
sanctity and backing to it, in order for it to have a
legitimising effect, since the jural correlative of a right is
duty. More particularly, the term “right” is very specific to
not include every benefit, profit or advantage. The
maxim solidifies the faith in law that no wrong action will
be given a legal validity. The legal validity of a right
flows from other legal norms or from a source of law
[See : Niel MacCormick, “Rights in Legislation”, Law,
Morality and Society : Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart,
P.M.S. Hacker, and Joseph Raz (eds). 189-206,
Oxford : Clarendon Press (1977)].
49. The maxim, ‘nullus commodum capere potest de
injuria sua propria’, on the other hand, lays itself as a
rule of equity. An advantage falling from wrongdoing
may be a legal or illegal advantage. The maxim dictates
26 / 27
that, be that as it may, no profit or advantage of a
person's wrongful act may be validated by the seal of
law. It may very well happen, that the advantage may
be legal or illegal, but the validation of law will not be
extended to it by the law. Thus, the courts that have the
discretion to allow or disallow the availment of such
advantage in ordinary circumstances, are constrained
to not permit a person who has committed a wrongful
act to benefit from the advantageous position afforded
to him because of such wrongful action as a matter of
justice, equity and fairness. Fellmeth and Horwitz rightly
extend an illustration, that when a person himself
destroys evidence, he cannot take shelter of the
defence of lack of evidence. The advantage falling from
the wrong will not be validated by the courts of law.”
37. The aforesaid exposition of law leaves no manner of doubt that a
litigant is under a bounden obligation to approach the Court with all
material facts. A party who suppresses material facts, takes
inconsistent pleas, or seeks to derive an advantage from its own
wrongful conduct cannot seek the equitable consideration of the Court.
The doctrine that no person can be permitted to take advantage of his
own wrong is a fundamental principle governing the exercise of
equitable jurisdiction and is of particular relevance while adjudicating a
claim for specific performance.
38.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this
Court finds that the defendant has not only failed to disclose the true
and correct facts but has also attempted to avoid the contractual
obligations arising out of the registered agreement to sell (Ex.P-1). The
evidence led by the plaintiff, both oral and documentary, inspires
27 / 27
confidence and stands duly corroborated by the documents brought on
record. On the other hand, the defence put forth by the defendant is
neither supported by reliable evidence nor consistent with the admitted
documents. The suppression of material facts and the false pleas
raised by the defendant clearly demonstrate an attempt to defeat the
legitimate contractual rights of the plaintiff.
39.
In the present case, the plaintiff has successfully established the
execution of the registered agreement to sell (Ex.P-1), payment of the
agreed consideration to the extent proved on record, and continuous
readiness and willingness to perform the remaining obligations under
the contract. On the other hand, defendant has failed to substantiate
any legally sustainable defence which could disentitle the plaintiff from
the relief claimed. The overall conduct of the defendant, viewed in the
light of the evidence on record, clearly reflects an attempt to resile from
the contractual obligations.
40.
For the foregoing discussions, we do not find any merit in the appeal.
The First appeal deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. The
impugned judgment and decree dated 09.11.2022 passed in Civil Suit
No.86-A/2014 by the Additional District Judge (FTC) Korba, DistrictKorba, are hereby affirmed.
41. Let a decree be drawn accordingly.
Sd/(Parth Prateem Sahu)
Judge
Praveen
S
Sd/(Sachin Singh Rajput)
Judge
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