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ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.446 of 2025
CNR No.ODHC01-093437-2024
In the matter of an Application under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India, 1950
***
Shaista Parween
Aged about 52 years
Wife of the deceased husband
Sarfaraz Ahmad
Residing at: Yasin Manzil
Dargahi Mohalla, Old Station Road
…
Raurkela, Odisha – 769 001.
Petitioner
-VERSUSThe Assistant Commissioner
GST and Central Excise
Office of the Assistant Commissioner
GST and Central Excise
Rourkela-I Division, Nayabazar
Sector-21, Rourkela
...
Odisha – 769 010.
Opposite party
Counsel appeared for the parties:
For the Petitioner
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
: M/s. Saswat K. Acharya,
Abhijit Agarwal,
Abhisek Agarwal and
Jaish Joshi,
Advocates
For the Opposite party
: Mr. Avinash Kedia,
Junior Standing Counsel
Income Tax Department
P R E S E N T:
HONOURABLE
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
AND
HONOURABLE
MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
Date of Hearing : 03.11.2026 :: Date of Order
: 06.11.2026
O RDER
The Order-in-Original dated 04.05.2023 (Annexure-4) of
the Assistant Commissioner of Goods and Services Tax
and
Central
Excise,
Rourkela-I
Division,
Rourkela
raising a demand of service tax under Section 73,
Section 75, Section 77 and Section 78 of Chapter-V of
the Finance Act, 1994 (for convenience hereinafter be
referred to as ―the Act, 1994‖), pertaining to Financial
Year 2015-16, is assailed in the afore-noted writ petition
craving
to
invoke
extraordinary
jurisdiction
under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with
the prayer(s) to grant following relief(s):
“In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is
humbly prayed that this Hon‟ble Court may kindly be
pleased to:
A.
Admit this writ petition and issue appropriate writ(s)
quashing the impugned order passed by the
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
opposite party dated 04.05.2023 under Annexure-4,
and all such proceedings consequent thereto;
B.
Pass such other order(s) as may be deemed just and
proper in the interest of justice;
And for this act of kindness, the petitioner as in duty
bound shall ever pray.”
2.
Pursuant to the Order-in-Original No.39/ACCE/ST/
RKL-1/2023, dated 4th May, 2023 (Annexure-4), the
Assistant Commissioner, Raurkela-I Division, Raurkelaopposite party on 5th April, 2024 issued notice dated
05.04.2024 (Annexure-1) in the name of Sarfaraz Ahmad
(since dead), the husband of petitioner (Shaista Parween)
for payment of an amount of Rs.66,67,040/- and
interest as applicable.
2.1. Enclosing death certificate issued by the Registrar, Birth
and Death), Municipal Corporation, Gurugram, the
petitioner intimated on 2nd August, 2024 to the authority
concerned that her husband has passed away on 27th
April, 2020 (See, Annexure-2). Despite such information
made available to the authority-opposite party, Order-inOriginal was passed on 04.05.2023 and a letter dated
05.04.2024
was
issued
demanding
to
deposit
an
outstanding amount arising out of said Order-in-Original
with a warning ―failing which necessary recovery action
will be initiated‖ against the present petitioner under the
provisions of Section 87 of the Finance Act, 1994, as
amended read with Section 79 of the CGST Act, 2017.
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
2.2. Objecting to such a recourse to be initiated, questioning
jurisdiction of the authority concerned the petitioner
knocked the doors of this Court by way of filing the
instant writ petition with prayer to quash the Order-inOriginal.
3.
The short issue involved in this matter is whether the
Assistant Commissioner of Central Goods and Services
Tax and Central Excise, Rourkela-I Division, Rourkela
was justified in ignoring the intimation dated 2nd August,
2024 apprising that the noticee (Sarfaraz Ahmed) had
already left for heavenly abode since 27th April, 2020 and
proceed to pass Order-in-Original, dated 4th May, 2023
raising demand of service tax under the provisions of
Chapter-V of the Finance Act, 1994 and warned to take
coercive measure against the petitioner-wife of the
service provider (namely Sarfaraz Ahmed).
3.1. The matter was on board on 15.01.2025 and in course of
hearing the issue being agitated by the Sri Abhijeet
Agarwal, learned Advocate, the learned Junior Standing
Counsel
for
the
opposite
party
sought
for
accommodation to obtain instructions. The matter again
appeared before this Court for hearing on 18.12.2025,
when the learned Junior Standing Counsel instead of
filing response, sought to argue the matter. However,
necessary order could not be passed. The matter came
up before this Court 03.11.2026. On the consent of
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
counsel for both the parties, the matter is heard for final
disposal.
3.2. Accordingly,
heard
Sri
Abhijeet
Agarwal,
learned
Advocate for the petitioner and Sri Avinash Kedia,
learned Junior Standing Counsel for the opposite party.
4.
Sri Abhijeet Agarwal, learned Advocate contended that
the Order-in-Original (Annexure-4) is non est in the eye
of law and a nullity inasmuch as the same cannot
subsist as against a dead person. It is explained that in
absence of any statutory provision to continue with the
proceeding against a non-existing person, the proceeding
must stand abated.
4.1. In furtherance to such submission, the learned Advocate
would argue that merely because the income for the
Financial Year 2015-16 was disclosed in the returns
furnished under Section 139 of the Income Tax Act,
1961, it would not ipso facto attract service tax liability
under Chapter-V of the Finance Act, 1994. The record
would
reveal
that
the
initiation
of
proceeding
contemplating fastening liability and recovery thereof
under provisions of the said Act was on the basis of
presumption. Thus, the ex parte Order-in-Original, being
against a dead person, of course, without hearing,
cannot be held to be tenable in the eye of law.
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
4.2. It is sought to be explained by the learned Advocate for
the petitioner that Section 65 of Chapter-V of the
Finance Act, 1994, enumerates the ―taxable service‖
provided “to any person by a hotel, inn, guest house, club
or campsite, by whatever name called, for providing
accommodation for a continuous period of less than three
months”. The purpose of above section is to levy service
tax on ―taxable service‖ specified therein. No finding of
fact is returned by the Assistant Commissioner, Central
Tax, GST and Central Excise, Raurkela-I Division to
demonstrate that the service provider at any time
received
amount
towards
service
provided
for
―a
continuous period of less than three months‖. The
presumptive basis of fastening liability is discernible
from the following words contained in the Order-inOriginal:
“I find that the noticee has received Rs.2,28,86,339/-only
towards providing taxable service during the period 201516 but they appears to be declared NIL taxable value in
ST-3 returns during the period.”
The authority ought to have examined whether such
information of receipt available with him comes within
the fold of Notification relating to Mega Exemption. It is
contended that while income from services provided may
attract liability under the Income Tax Act, 1961;
nevertheless, service tax liability cannot be saddled ex
hypothesi under the Finance Act, 1994, particularly in
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
the absence of material on record falling within the
scope of charge.
4.3. It is articulated by the learned Advocate that unlike
provisions of Section 159 of the Income Tax Act, 1961,
no statutory provision is available in the Finance Act,
1994 to comprehend that the legal representatives,
much less the legal heirs, can be roped into the ken of
service tax. Stemming on the interpretation propounded
by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court of India in the case of
Shabina Abraham Vrs. Collector of Central Excise and
Customs, (2015) 10 SCC 770 referring to a Judgment
rendered by the Bombay High Court in CIT Vrs. Ellis C.
Reid, AIR 1931 Bom 333 [which was referred to with
approval in CIT Vrs. James Anderson, AIR 1964 SC
1761], it is, thus, submitted that if the law does not
explicitly provide for the liability of legal representatives,
then such liability arising out of service provided by the
deceased cannot be inferred or imposed by analogy,
especially when a similar provision does exist in another
tax law but is absent in the statute under which demand
is raised by way of assessment. Highlighting the
principle of casus omissus it is impressed upon that the
Court need not venture to fill the legislative gaps.
5.
Sri Avinash Kedia, learned Junior Standing Counsel
representing the opposite parties submitted that since
there was no representation on behalf of the assessee
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
despite
notice/intimation,
the
authority
concerned
cannot be faulted with. Finding no other alternative, he
had
to
conclude
determined
the
the
tax
proceeding
and
has
rightly
liability. Strongly objecting to
entertain the writ petition, he urged that the petitioner is
not remediless. The Finance Act, 1994 enables the
petitioner to ventilate her grievance before the Appellate
Authority under Section 85. Therefore, he fervently
emphasised for relegating the petitioner to alternative
remedial forum.
6.
The factual matrix and the arguments advanced by the
counsel for the respective parties leaves sole question for
consideration is whether proceeding under Section 73 of
Chapter-V of the Finance Act, 1994 initiated by issue of
Notice can proceed further culminating in passing of
Order-in-Original in the name of the service providerassessee on his death, notwithstanding information
regarding death is intimated to the authority concerned
vide letter dated 02.08.2024 (acknowledged by the Office
to have received said letter on 05.08.2024)?
7.
Before delving into the merit of the matter to examine
whether death of an assessee stops the clock ticking to
proceed further to assess liability, a fortiori, to have
regard to Shabina Abraham Vrs. Collector of Central
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
Excise, (2015) 10 SCC 7701. Paragraphs 32 to 34 of said
reported judgment need to be quoted:
“32. The impugned judgment in the present case has
referred to Ellis C. Reid case, 1930 SCC OnLine Bom
58 = AIR 1931 Bom 333 but has not extracted the
real ratio contained therein. It then goes on to say
that this is a case of short-levy which has been
noticed during the lifetime of the deceased and then
goes on to state that equally therefore legal
representatives of a manufacturer who had paid
excess duty would not by the self-same reasoning be
able to claim such excess amount paid by the
deceased. Neither of these reasons are reasons
which refer to any provision of law. Apart from this,
the High Court went into morality and said that the
moral principle of unlawful enrichment would also
apply and since the law will not permit this, the Act
needs to be interpreted accordingly. We wholly
disapprove of the approach of the High Court. It
flies in the face of first principle when it comes
to taxing statutes. It is therefore necessary to
reiterate the law as it stands.
In Partington Vrs. Attorney General, (1869) LR 4 HL
100, Lord Cairns stated: (LR p. 122)
„*** If the person sought to be taxed comes
within the letter of the law he must be taxed,
however great the hardship may appear to the
judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the
State, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring
the citizen within the letter of the law, the
citizen is free, however apparently within the
Equivalent citation: (2015) 34 GSTR 146 = (2015) 83 VST 450.
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
spirit of the law the case might otherwise
appear to be. In other words, if there be
admissible, in any statute, what is called an
equitable, construction, certainly such a
construction is not admissible in a taxing
statute where you can simply adhere to the
words of the statute.‟
33.
In Cape Brandy Syndicate Vrs. IRC, (1921) 1 KB 64,
Rowlatt, J. laid down: (KB p. 71)
„*** in a taxing Act one has to look merely at
what is clearly said. There is no room for any
intendment. There is no equity about a tax.
There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is
to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can
only look fairly at the language used.‟
34.
This Court has, in a plethora of judgments, referred
to the aforesaid principles. Suffice it to quote from
one of such judgments of this Court in CST v. Modi
Sugar Mills Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 1047 = (1961) 2 SCR
189, SCR at p. 198 = (AIR p. 1051, para 11)
„11. In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable
considerations are entirely out of place. Nor can
taxing statutes be interpreted on any
presumptions or assumptions. The Court must
look squarely at the words of the statute and
interpret them. It must interpret a taxing
statute in the light of what is clearly
expressed; it cannot imply anything which
is not expressed; it cannot import
provisions in the statutes so as to supply
any assumed deficiency.‟ ***”
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
7.1. Hence, what is not explicit cannot be construed to be
implicit in the provisions of the statute. Rudimentary
principles of taxation is reflected in Mineral Area
Development Authority Vrs. Steel Authority of India,
(2024) 7 SCR 1549 [nine-Judge Bench of the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court of India] with the following observations:
“182.
Conceptually, a tax has four elements—
(i)
the nature of the tax which prescribes the
taxable event attracting the levy;
(ii)
the person who is liable to pay tax;
(iii)
the rate at which the tax is paid; and
(iv)
the measure or value to which the rate
will be applied for computing the liability.
[Govind Saran Ganga Saran Vrs. CST, (1985)
Supp. SCC 205 (6); Mathuram Agrawal Vrs.
State of M.P., (1999) 8 SCC 667 (12); Union of
India Vrs. Mohit Minerals (P) Ltd., (2022) 10
SCC 700 (97)].
183. The subject matter of taxation has been exhaustively
enunciated in the Union and State Lists in the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. [Chhotabhai
Jethabhai Patel and Co. Vrs. Union of India, (1962)
Supp 2 SCR 1 (68)].
The occurrence of the taxable event creates or
attracts the liability to tax. [Goodyear India Ltd. Vrs.
State of Haryana (1990) 2 SCC 71]. For example, In
re Sea Customs Act, S.20(2), (1964) 3 SCR 787 (23)
this Court held that in the case of excise duties, the
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
taxable event is the manufacture of goods and the
duty is not directly on the goods but the manufacture
thereof. Thus, the activity of the manufacture of
goods attracts the liability for the levy of excise
duties.
184. The incidence of taxation pertains to the manner in
which the burden of tax would fall on a person.
[Godfrey Phillips India Ltd Vrs. State of UP, (2005) 2
SCC 515 (47)].
The incidence of tax was exemplified by the decision
of this Court in State of Karnataka Vrs. Drive-In
Enterprise, (2001) 2 SCR 378 = (2001) 4 SCC 60
(13).
While dealing with the validity of an entertainment
tax imposed by the State of Karnataka, it was held
that since an entertainment necessarily requires a
person who is entertained, the incidence of the tax is
on the persons entertained. The incidence of tax is
relatable to the person who bears the ultimate
burden of the tax.
185. The subject matter of Entry 50 of List II is “taxes on
mineral rights.” As discussed in the above segment,
„mineral rights‟ is a comprehensive term to mean the
bundle of rights with respect to minerals. The
taxable event under Entry 50 of List II would relate
to the exercise of mineral rights.
***
188. The taxable event with respect to taxes on mineral
rights will be the exercise of mineral rights. The
incidence of the tax on mineral rights depends upon
who is exercising the right. We do not agree with the
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
respondents that the incidence of a tax on mineral
rights would necessarily have to be on the owner of
the land. A tax under Entry 49 of List II is not only
levied on the owner of the land, but also an occupier.
[See Anant Mills Co. Ltd. Vrs. State of Gujarat (1975)
2 SCC 175].
Similarly, a tax on mineral rights could be levied on
any person who has an interest in the minerals.
189. The measure of tax is a matter of legislative policy.
The legislature can select any measure of tax to
compute liability, as long as it has a reasonable
nexus with the nature of the tax. Hence, it is for the
legislature to devise an appropriate measure of tax
to compute the tax liability, provided the measure
has a nexus with the nature of levy, that is a tax on
mineral rights.”
7.2. Analysing
from
the
aforesaid
angle,
the
field
of
legislation for exigibility of Service Tax can be traced out
to Entry 97 of List-I of Seventh Schedule appended to
the Constitution of India in pursuance of Article 246 of
the Constitution of India2. The taxable event, measure of
By dint of the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016, the
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, having been enacted came into force
with effect from 01.07.2017. Section 173 and Section 174 of said Act, 2017
provide as follows:
“173. Amendment of Act 32 of 1994.—
Save as otherwise provided in this Act, Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994
shall be omitted.
174. Repeal and savings.—
(1)
Save as otherwise provided in this Act, on and from the date of
commencement of this Act, the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) (except
as respects goods included in entry 84 of the Union List of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution), the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations
(Excise Duties) Act, 1955 (16 of 1955), the Additional Duties of Excise
(Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (58 of 1957), the Additional
Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textile Articles) Act, 1978 (40 of 1978), and
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
tax and rate of tax are spelt out in Section 66 to Section
66F read with Section 67 and Section 67A. However, the
term ―taxable person‖ is defined by providing the
meaning of ―assessee‖ in Section 65(7) of the Act, 1994.
7.3. In State of Telangana Vrs. Tirumala Constructions, (2023)
15 SCR 141 it is stated thus:
(2)
(3)
the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986) (hereafter referred to as the
repealed Acts) are hereby repealed.
The repeal of the said Acts and the amendment of the Finance Act, 1994
(32 of 1994) (hereafter referred to as „such amendment‟ or „amended Act‟,
as the case may be) to the extent mentioned in the sub-section (1) or
section 173 shall not—
(a)
revive anything not in force or existing at the time of such
amendment or repeal; or
(b)
affect the previous operation of the amended Act or repealed Acts
and orders or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c)
affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued
or incurred under the amended Act or repealed Acts or orders
under such repealed or amended Acts:
Provided that any tax exemption granted as an incentive against
investment through a notification shall not continue as privilege if
the said notification is rescinded on or after the appointed day; or
(d)
affect any duty, tax, surcharge, fine, penalty, interest as are due
or may become due or any forfeiture or punishment incurred or
inflicted in respect of any offence or violation committed against
the provisions of the amended Act or repealed Acts; or
(e)
affect any investigation, inquiry, verification (including scrutiny
and audit), assessment proceedings, adjudication and any other
legal proceedings or recovery of arrears or remedy in respect of
any such duty, tax, surcharge, penalty, fine, interest, right,
privilege, obligation, liability, forfeiture or punishment, as
aforesaid, and any such investigation, inquiry, verification
(including scrutiny and audit), assessment proceedings,
adjudication and other legal proceedings or recovery of arrears or
remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such
tax, surcharge, penalty, fine, interest, forfeiture or punishment
may be levied or imposed as if these Acts had not been so
amended or repealed; or
(f)
affect any proceedings including that relating to an appeal, review
or reference, instituted before on, or after the appointed day under
the said amended Act or repealed Acts and such proceedings shall
be continued under the said amended Act or repealed Acts as if
this Act had not come into force and the said Acts had not been
amended or repealed.
The mention of the particular matters referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2)
shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6
of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of
repeal.”
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
“3.
The pre-Amendment constitutional scheme had a
vision of taxation of goods and services supplied
within India. Excise and customs duty and excise on
manufacture were within the scope of the legislative
powers of the Union Parliament3, under the Seventh
Schedule. No separate entry for Service Tax existed
in the Constitution at the time it was enacted. In
Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Assn. Vrs. Union of
India, 2004 Supp (1) SCR 169 = (2004) 5 SCC 632
this court held that service tax as a subject matter
was within the “residuary power” of the Union;
nevertheless, Entry 92C was introduced into the
Union List by the Constitution (88th Amendment)
Act, 2004 clarifying that the Union had exclusive
authority to impose a service tax. Taxation of sale
and movement of goods was within the exclusive
purview of the States, by Entries 52 and 54 of the
State List (List II of the VIIth Schedule to the
Constitution). The delineation of Union and State
taxation powers through the Union and State Lists of
the Seventh Schedule was precise and clear, leaving
little room for any overlap in the kind of taxes that
the Union could impose and those that a State could
levy. The “Concurrent List” (or List III of the VIIth
Schedule) contained no taxing entries, signifying that
the constitutional scheme for taxation was to
apportion two distinct, exclusive spheres of taxation
for the Union and the States.”
7.4. With the above perspective of law, this Court now
proceeds to examine the issue involved in the instant
case.
Entries 83 and 84, List I, Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India.
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
7.5. From
the
above
factual
matrix,
which
remained
uncontroverted by the learned Junior Standing Counsel,
it surfaced that it was within the knowledge of the
Assistant Commissioner of Goods and Service Tax and
Central Excise, Raurkela-I Division on the date of
passing the Order-in-Original, dated 04.05.2023 that the
assessee-Sarfaraz Ahmed expired on 27th April, 2020; yet
he has also directed a dead person to discharge
outstanding liability by letter dated 05.04.2024. Law is
well settled that if a proceeding is initiated against a
dead person, it should be treated as a nullity. In the
instant case, during the course of proceeding under
Section 73 of the Act, 1994, the assessee, an individual
proprietor, is dead, and such death was on account of
natural cause, but not manoeuvred one.
7.6. Section 65(7) of the Act, 1994 defines the term
―assessee‖ to mean ―a person liable to pay the service tax
and includes his agent‖.
7.7. In the case at hand service provider, namely Sarfaraz
Ahmed, is the person liable to pay the service tax. The
terms ―person‖ and ―agent‖ are not defined in Chapter-V
of the Finance Act, 1994. To understand the connotation
of the words not defined in the statute, the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court of India in MSCO Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Union of
India, (1985) 1 SCR 1146 laid down the following as a
guiding principle:
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
“The expression „industry‟ has many meanings. It means
„skill‟, „ingenuity‟, „dexterity‟, „diligence‟, „systematic work
or labour‟, „habitual employment in the productive arts‟,
„manufacturing establishment‟ etc., But while construing a
word which occurs in a statute or a statutory instrument
in the absence of any definition in that very document it
must be given the same meaning which it receives in
ordinary parlance or understood in the sense in which
people conversant with the subject matter of the statute or
statutory instrument understand it. It is hazardous to
interpret a word in accordance with its definition in
another statute or statutory instrument and more
so when such statute or statutory instrument is not
dealing with any cognate subject. Craies on Statute
Law (6th Edn.) says thus and page 164:
„In construing a word in an Act caution is necessary in
adopting the meaning ascribed to the word in other Acts.
„It would be a new terror in the construction of Acts of
Parliament if we were required to limit a word to an
unnatural sense because in some Act which is not
incorporated or referred to such an interpretation is given
to it for the purposes of that Act alone.‟, Macbeth Vrs.
Chislet, (1910) A.C. 220, 223.‟
When the word to be construed is used in a taxing
statute or a notification issued thereunder it should
be understood in its commercial sense.”
7.8. In the case of Collector of Customs, Bombay Vrs. Swastic
Woollens Pvt. Ltd., (1988) Supp. 2 SCR 370 the
observation made is as follows:
“We are of the opinion that when no statutory definition is
provided in respect of an item in the Customs Act or the
Central Excises Act, the trade understanding, meaning
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
thereby the understanding in the opinion of those who
deal with the goods in question is the safest guide.”
7.9. In Union of India Vrs. G.S. Chatha Rice Mills, (2020) 14
SCR 571 it has been laid down as follows:
“44. In Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. Vrs. Union of
India (UOI), AIR 2000 SC 811, Constitution Bench of
this Court had to decide, inter alia, if Rules 10 and
10-a of the Central Excise Rules could be considered
a „Central Act‟ as defined in Section 3(7) of the
General Clauses Act. This decision of the Court,
albeit subsequently questioned for its interpretation
of „repeal‟ through omission [which does not have a
bearing on the issue at hand], was not assailed for
its interpretation of “Central Act” within the General
Clauses Act. Speaking through Justice D.P.
Mohapatra, this Court answered the question of
whether the aforesaid Rules constituted a „Central
Act‟ in the negative, in the following terms:
„32. When the term Central Act or Regulation
or Rule is used in that Act reference has to
be made to the definition of that term in
the statute. It is not possible nor
permissible to give a meaning to any of
the terms different from the definition. It
is manifest that each term has a distinct
and separate meaning attributed to it for
the purpose of the Act. Therefore, when
the question to be considered is whether a
particular provision of the Act applies in a
case then the clear and unambiguous
language of that provision has to be given
its true meaning and import. The Full Bench
has equated a „rule‟ with „statute‟. In our
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
considered view this is impermissible in view of
the specific provisions in the Act. When the
Legislature by clear and unambiguous
language has extended the provision of Section
6 to cases of repeal of a „Central Act‟ or
„Regulation‟, it is not possible to apply the
provision to a case of repeal of a „Rule‟. The
position will not be different even if the rule has
been framed by virtue of the power vested
under an enactment; it remains a „rule‟ and
takes its colour from the definition of the term
in the Act (General Clauses Act).‟ ***”
7.10. In Concise Law Dictionary, by P.G. Osborn, published by
Sweet and Maxwell, 1927, the term ―agent‖ is described
as a person employed to act on behalf of another. An act
of an agent, done within the scope of his authority,
binds his principal. There are four kinds of agents—
(1)
Universal.—
Appointed to act for the principal in all matters,
e.g., where a party gives another a universal power
of attorney.
(2)
General.—
Appointed to act in transactions of a class, e.g., a
banker, solicitor. The scope of authority of such
agent is the authority usually possessed by such
agents, unless notice is given to third parties of
some limitation.
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
(3)
Special.—
Appointed for one particular purpose. The agent‘s
scope of authority is the actual authority given to
him.
(4)
Agent of necessity.—
A person, who in urgent circumstances acts for the
benefit of another, there being no opportunity of
communicating with that other.
7.11. To conceive the meaning of ―agent‖, if one turns to
Section 182 of the Contract Act, the term ―agent‖ has
been defined as being a person employed to do any act
for another, or to represent another in dealings with a
third person. Section 186 lays down that the authority of
the agent may be expressed or implied. Section 187 lays
down that an authority is said to be expressed when it is
given by the words spoken or written, while it is implied
when it is to be inferred from the circumstances of the
case and things spoken or written or the ordinary course
of dealings. It will, thus, be seen that under the Contract
Act, an agent may be authorised expressly by the
principal to do a particular act or his power to do such
act may be implied from other circumstances. It is not
the case of the opposite party that the deceased service
provider engaged his legal heirs as agents in his
business.
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
7.12. It may be pertinent to take note of the following
observations found in Mahavir Prasad Amrit Lal Vrs.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, (1977) 39 STC 531 (All):
“The word „employee‟ as commonly understood in
vernacular, means a servant and the present case has
been argued by the parties on this footing. Now a servant
is not an agent of the master for all purposes. The
distinction between an agent and a servant has been
considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the
case of Lakshminarayan Ram Gopal & Son Ltd. Vrs.
Government of Hyderabad through the Commissioner of
Excess Profits Tax, (1954) 25 ITR 449 (SC) = (1955) 1 SCR
3934. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court after referring
to Halsbury‟s Laws of England have approved of the
distinction laid down by these authorities between an
agent and a servant. It will be profitable to extract the
decision of the Supreme Court on this point:
„10. The distinction between a servant and an agent is
thus indicated in Powell‟s Law of Ageney, at page
16:
(a)
Generally a master can tell his servant what to
do and how to do it.
Lakshminarayan Ram Gopal & Son Ltd. Vrs. Government of Hyderabad through
the Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, (1954) 25 ITR 449 (SC) = (1955) 1 SCR
393 has been referred to in Singapore Airlines Ltd. Vrs. CIT, Delhi, (2022) 9 SCR
1 with the following observations:
“21.
The definition of a “principal” and an “agent” is provided under Section
182 of the Contract Act. The provision states:
182. “Agent” and “principal” defined.—
An “agent” is a person employed to do any act for another, or to
represent another in dealings with third persons. The person for
whom such act is done, or who is so represented, is called the
“principal”.
22.
Due to the interlinked nature of Section 194H of the Income Tax Act and
Section 182 of the Contract Act, our examination will axiomatically focus
upon both provisions.”
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
(b)
Generally a principal cannot tell his agent how
to carry out his instructions.
(c)
A servant is under more complete control than
an agent,
and also at page 20:
11.
(a)
Generally, a servant is a person who not only
receives instructions from his master but is
subjected to his masters right to control the
manner in which he carries out those
instructions. An agent receives his principals
instructions but is generally free to carry out
those instructions according to his own
discretion.
(b)
Generally, a servant, qua servant, has no
authority to make contracts on behalf of his
master. Generally, the purpose of employing an
agent is to authorise him to make contracts on
behalf of his principal.
(c)
Generally, an agent is paid by commission
upon effecting the result which he has been
instructed by his principal to achieve.
Generally, a servant is paid by wages or
salary.
The statement of the law contained in Halsbury‟s
Laws of England, Hailsham Edition: Vol. 22, page
113, paragraph 192, may be referred to in this
connection:
„The difference between the relations of master and
servant and of principal and agent may be said to
be this: a principal has the right to direct what work
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
the agent has to do : but a master has the further
right to direct how the work is to be done.‟
The position is further clarified in Halsbury‟s Laws
of England, Hailsham Edition-Vol.1, at page 193,
Article 345, where the positions of an agent, a
servant and independent contractor are thus
distinguished:
„An agent is to be distinguished on the one hand
from a servant, and on the other from an
independent contractor. A servant acts under the
direct control and supervision of his master and is
bound to conform to all reasonable orders given him
in the course of his work; an independent contractor,
on the other hand, is entirely independent of any
control or interference and merely undertakes to
produce a specified result, employing his own means
to produce that result. An agent, though bound to
exercise his authority in accordance with all lawful
instructions which may be given to him from time to
time by his principal, is not subject in its exercise to
the direct control or supervision of the principal. An
agent as such is not a servant, but a servant is
generally for some purposes his masters implied
agent, the extent of the agency depending upon the
duties or position of the servant.”
7.13. This Court, thus, finds that the word ―agent‖ as found in
the definition of the term ―assessee‖ vide Section 65(7) of
the Act, 1994, it cannot be treated as equal in status of
―legal heir‖.
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
7.14. The meaning of ―person‖ can be derived from the
definition of the term ascribed to in Section 3(43) of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, which reads thus:
“(42) “person” shall include any company or association
or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not;”
7.15. The Hon‘ble Supreme Court of India in
Shabina
Abraham Vrs. Collector of Central Excise and Customs,
(2015) 10 SCC 770 having noted the said definition held
as follows:
“It will be noticed that this definition does not take us any
further as it does not include legal representatives of
persons who are since deceased. Equally, Section 6 of the
Central Excises Act, which prescribes a procedure for
registration of certain persons who are engaged in the
process of production or manufacture of any specified
goods mentioned in the schedule to the said Act does not
throw any light on the question at hand as it says nothing
about how a dead person‟s assessment is to continue
after his death in respect of excise duty that may have
escaped assessment. Also, the judgments cited on behalf
of revenue, namely, Yeshwantrao Vrs. The Commissioner
of Wealth Tax, Bangalore, AIR 1967 SC 135 at pages 140,
141 para 18 = (1966) Suppl. SCR 419 at 429 A-B, C.A.
Abraham Vrs. The Income Tax Officer, Kottayam &
Another, AIR 1961 SC 609 at 612 para 6 = (1961) 2 SCR
765 at page 771, The State of Tamil Nadu Vrs. M.K.
Kandaswami & Others, AIR 1975 SC 1871 (para 26) =
(1975) 4 SCC 745 (para 26), Commissioner of Sales Tax,
Delhi & Others Vrs. Shri Krishna Engineering Co. &
Others, (2005) 2 SCC 695, page 702, 703 paras 19 to 23,
all enunciate principles dealing with tax evasion in the
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
context of construing provisions which are designed to
prevent tax evasion. The question at hand is very
different— it only deals with whether the Central Excises
and Salt Act contains the necessary provisions to continue
assessment proceedings against a dead man in respect of
excise duty payable by him after his death, which is a
question which has no relation to the construction of
provisions designed to prevent tax evasion.”
7.16. To adhere to a meaning of a term not defined, Clause
(121) of Section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994 provides for
the following:
“Words and expressions used but not defined in this
Chapter and defined in the Central Excise Act, 1944 or
the Rules made thereunder, shall apply, so far as may be,
in relation to service tax as they apply in relation to a
duty of excise:
Explanation.—
For the purposes of this section, taxable service includes
any taxable service provided or to be provided by any
unincorporated association or body of persons to a
member thereof, for cash, deferred payment or any other
valuable consideration:
Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply
with effect from such date as the Central Government
may, by notification, appoint.”
7.17. In the context of whether an assessment proceeding
under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, can
continue against the legal representatives/estate of a
sole proprietor/manufacturer after he is dead, in the
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
case of Shabina Abraham Vrs. Collector of Central Excise
and Customs, (2015) 10 SCC 770 it is held as follows:
“26. A reading of the ratio of the majority decision
contained in Murarilal Mahabir Prasad Vrs. B.R.
Vad, (1975) 2 SCC 736 would lead to the conclusion
that the necessary machinery provisions were
already contained in the Bombay Sales Tax Act,
1953 which were good enough to bring into the tax
net persons who wished to evade taxes by the
expedient of dissolving a partnership firm. The fact
situation in the present case is entirely different. In
the present case an individual proprietor has died
through natural causes and it is nobody‟s case that
he has maneuvered his own death in order to evade
excise duty. Interestingly, in the written submissions
filed by revenue, revenue has argued as follows:
„It is pertinent to mention that in the present case,
Shri George Varghese (predecessor in interest of the
appellants herein) was doing business in the name
of manufacturing unit namely M/s. Kerala Tyre &
Rubber Company and after the death of Shri George
Varghese, his legal representatives (appellants
herein) might have been in possession of the plant,
machinery, stock etc. and continuing the same
business, but might be in some other name in order
to avoid the excise duty chargeable to the previous
manufacturing unit.‟
27.
It is clear on a reading of the aforesaid paragraph
that what revenue is asking us to do is to stretch the
machinery provisions of the Central Excises and Salt
Act, 1944 on the basis of surmises and conjectures.
This we are afraid is not possible. Before leaving the
judgment in Murarilal‟s case (supra), we wish to add
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
that so far as partnership firms are concerned, the
Income Tax Act contains a specific provision in
Section 189(1) which introduces a fiction qua
dissolved firms. It states that where a firm is
dissolved, the Assessing Officer shall make an
assessment of the total income of the firm as if no
such dissolution had taken place and all the
provisions of the Income Tax Act would apply to
assessment of such dissolved firm. Interestingly
enough, this provision is referred to only in the
minority judgment in M/s. Murarilal‟s case (supra).
28.
The argument that Section 11A of the Central
Excises and Salt Act is a machinery provision which
must be construed to make it workable can be met
by stating that there is no charge to excise duty
under the main charging provision of a dead person,
which has been referred to while discussing Section
11A read with the definition of “assessee” earlier in
this judgment.
***”
7.18. In view of Section 65(121) of Chapter-V of the Finance
Act, 1994, the exposition of law in Shabina Abraham
(supra) shall apply to the present fact-situation of the
case.
7.19. Glance at Section 65(7) reveals that the ―assessee‖ is a
―person‖ and said term includes ―his agent‖. It is also
well-settled that in order to determine whether the word
‗includes‘ has that enlarging effect. The interpretation
and purport of ―includes‖ in definition clause being
referred to a three-Judge Bench of the Hon‘ble Supreme
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
Court of India, in the case of Ramala Sahkari Chini Mills
Ltd. Vrs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Meerut-I,
Meerut, Civil Appeal No. 3976 of 2007, decided on
February 19, 2016 it has been held that:
“We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. We
have also read and considered the order dated 29th
November, 2010 of this Court referring the matters to a
larger bench for a decision on the question as to whether
the definition of the term “input” in Rule 2(g) of the
CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 is to be understood to include
items beyond the six items mentioned specifically in Rule
2(g). The answer to the question referred, according to us,
is self-contained in the order of reference which has
referred, inter alia, to a three judge bench decision of this
Court in Regional Director, Employees‟ State Insurance
Corporation Vrs. High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X.
Saldanha and Sons, (1991) 3 SCC 617. There are other
decisions of this Court by Coordinate Benches (three
judge) on the issue which need not be adverted to
specifically inasmuch as it has been clearly held in
Regional
Director,
Employees‟
State
Insurance
Corporation (supra) that the word “include” in the
statutory definition is generally used to enlarge the
meaning of the preceding words and it is by way of
extension, and not with restriction. We answer the
question referred to us in the above manner leaving it for
the appropriate bench of this Court to decide on the
factual parameters of the case(s) and the entitlement of
the assessee(s) to CENVAT credit in the facts of each
case.”
7.20. Three-Judge Bench of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court of
India in the case of B.B. Patel Vrs. DLF Universal Ltd.,
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
(2022) 8 SCR 51 took note of decision rendered in Philips
Medical
Systems
(Cleveland)
Inc.
Vrs.
Indian
MRI
Diagnostic & Research Ltd., (2008) 10 SCC 227.
7.21. In Philips Medical Systems (Cleveland) Inc. Vrs. Indian
MRI Diagnostic & Research Ltd., (2008) 10 SCC 227 it
has been explained as follows:
“24. In the original Section 36A [of the Monopolies and
Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969] which was
introduced by 1984 amendment, it was necessary to
attract the provision that some injury or the unfair
trade practice should have caused some loss to the
consumer. By the 1991 amendment to Section 36A,
the requirement to establish loss or injury to the
consumer has been deleted. Also, another change
brought out by the 1991 amendment was that while
the original Section 36A had adopted an exhaustive
definition of unfair trade practice, the 1991
amendment has given an inclusive and not an
exhaustive definition of unfair trade practice.
25.
However, we are of the opinion that principles of
ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis will apply to
the interpretation of Section 36A as amended in
1991. Applying these well-known principles of
interpretation we are of the opinion that Section 36A
does not apply in a situation where goods are not
sold at all. It only applies where goods in fact are
sold.
***
28.
No doubt by the 1991 amendment the definition of
unfair trade practice was made inclusive and not
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
exhaustive, but this does not mean that when
interpreting the amended Section 36A we should
disregard the object for which Section 36A was
enacted. Thus in Hemens (Valuation Officer) vs.
Whitsbury Farm and Stud Ltd., (1988) 1 All ER 72
(HL), in construing Section 2(3) of the Rating Act,
1971 which defines „Livestock‟ to include any
mammal or bird kept for the production of food or
wool or for the purpose of its use in the farming of
land, the word livestock was not given the wide
meaning (in contradiction to deadstock) to include
any animal whatsoever and was held not to extend
to thorough bred horses not kept for use in the
farming of land.
29.
Similarly,
in
South
Gujarat
Roofing
Tile
Manufacturers Association Vrs. State of Gujarat AIR
1977 SC 90 (vide pp. 93-94) and Hindustan
Aluminium Corporation Vrs. State of UP, AIR 1981
SC 1649, the inclusive definition was given a
restrictive meaning. As observed by Wanchoo, J. in
Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd.,
Madras Vrs. Fraser & Ross, AIR 1960 SC 971, the
Court has not only to look at the words but also to
look at the context, the collocation and the object of
such words relating to such matter and interpret the
meaning; intended to be conveyed by the use of the
words under the circumstances. No doubt, because
of the inclusive definition the meaning of the
expression „unfair trade practice‟ goes beyond
the specific clauses mentioned in Section 36A,
but that does not mean that the meaning will
go beyond the very object of Section 36A.”
7.22. The Hon‘ble Supreme Court of India in the case of
Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Ltd. Vrs. State of Kerala,
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
(2013) 14 SCR 475 interpreted the meaning of ―means
and includes‖ in the following words:
“27. Legislature, in its wisdom, while defining the
expression „public authority‟ under Section 2(h) [of
the Right to Information Act, 2005], intended to
embrace only those categories, which are specifically
included, unless the context of the Act otherwise
requires. Section 2(h) has used the expressions
„means and includes‟. When a word is defined to
„mean‟ something, the definition is prima facie
restrictive and where the word is defined to
„include‟ some other thing, the definition is
prima facie extensive. But when both the
expressions „means‟ and „includes‟ are used,
the categories mentioned there would exhaust
themselves. Meanings of the expressions „means‟
and „includes‟ have been explained by this Court in
Delhi Development Authority Vrs. Bhola Nath
Sharma (Dead) by LRs and others, (2011) 2 SCC 54,
(in paras 25 to 28). When such expressions are
used, they may afford an exhaustive explanation of
the meaning which for the purpose of the Act, must
invariably be attached to those words and
expressions.”
7.23. One of the legal heirs of the deceased service provider in
the status of ―individual‖ can neither be construed as a
―person liable to pay service tax‖ nor is he/she treated to
be ―his agent‖. The proceeding under Section 73 of the
Act, 1994 could not, therefore, have been completed
after the death of the service provider and the Order-inOriginal being issued in the name of a dead person,
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
namely Sarfaraz Ahmed, cannot be held to be tenable in
the eye of law.
7.24. It is also noticed that a notice vide Letter dated 5th April,
2024 (Annexure-1) has come to be issued by the
opposite party with the following text under the caption:
―Recovery of Government Dues/Arrears‖:
“Therefore, you are requested to pay the above amount of
Service Tax (including Penalty and Late Fee, if any) of
Rs.66,67,040/- along with interest, as applicable within
15 (fifteen) days of receipt of this letter and submit the
payment particulars to this office, failing which necessary
recovery action will be initiated against you under the
provisions of Section 87 of the Finance Act, 1994, as
amended read with Section 79 of the CGST Act, 2017. ”
7.25. As the ―assessee‖ is dead and gone, the actions
contemplated under Section 87 of the Act, 1994 cannot
be taken inasmuch as the Order-in-Original itself is
vitiated in view of discussions made herein above and on
the ratio of Shabina Abraham (supra). A co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Kanakatala
Senapati Vrs. The Assistant Commissioner GST and
Central Excise, Bhubaneswar-II Division and another,
2026 SCC OnLine Ori 156 following Shabina Abraham
(supra) held the question in favour of the petitioner and
against the opposite party-Revenue.
7.26. Basic allegation seems to be failure of the service
provider to get himself registered, as he is allegedly to
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
have
concealed
the
fact.
Section
deals
with
―Registration‖ of service provider, which reads as follows:
“(1) Every person liable to pay the service tax under
this Chapter or the rules made thereunder
shall, within such time and in such manner and in
such form as may be prescribed, make an
application for registration to the Superintendent of
Central Excise.
(2)
The Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, specify such other person or class of
persons, who shall make an application for
registration within such time and in such manner
and in such form as may be prescribed.”
7.27. Said section employs the expression ―person liable to
pay the service tax‖. This makes abundantly clear that it
is the ―person‖, as defined in Section 3(42) of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 and expounded by the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court of India in Shabina Abraham (supra),
liable to get registered. Section 73 with the marginal
heading ―Recovery of service tax not levied or paid or
short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded‖ in
sub-section (1) makes it ample clear that “where any
service tax has not been levied or paid or has been short
levied or short paid or erroneously refunded the Central
Excise Officer may within thirty months from the relevant
date, serve notice on the person chargeable with the
service tax which has not been levied or paid or which
has been short levied or short paid or the person to whom
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
such tax refunded has erroneously been made, requiring
him to show cause why he should not pay the amount
specified in the notice”. The stress is laid on the word
―person‖.
7.28. The argument of learned Counsel that there is no
explicit provision contained in Chapter-V of the Finance
Act, 1994, which lays down that proceeding under
Section 73 thereof could be continued against the legal
heir remained uncontroverted by the learned Junior
Standing
Counsel.
04.05.2023
The
(Annexure-4)
Order-in-Original
passed
by
the
dated
Assistant
Commissioner, GST and Central Excise, Rourkela-I
Division, Rourkela in the name of a person, who is no
more, is faulted with.
Conclusion:
8.
It is, thus, deduced from the above discussions that
―legal heir‖ cannot fall within ken of Section 65(7) of
Chapter-V of the Finance Act, 1994 so as to proceed
further to determine service tax under Section 73 of said
Act after the death of service provider. In other words, on
the death of the service provider, in absence of statutory
provision empowering the authority to continue further,
the proceeding under Section 73 would abate.
8.1. In the light of legal position set forth by the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of Shabina Abraham
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
Vrs. Collector of Central Excise and Customs, (2015) 10
SCC 770, that in absence of provision to continue with
the proceeding after the death of service provider, it is,
hence, held the Order-in-Original could not be passed
against the dead person.
8.2. Fact on record emerges that notwithstanding copy of
certificate of death issued by the Department of Health
Services, Municipal Corporation Gurugram enclosed to
the letter of intimation dated 2nd August, 2024 to the
Assistant
Commissioner,
GST
and
Central
Excise,
Rourkela-I Division regarding death of Sarfaraz Ahmed,
the authority could not have discarded such vital piece
of evidence (Annexure-2 series) and pass the Order-inOriginal dated 04.05.2023 (Annexure-4). This Court is
thus persuaded to hold that the contemplated action for
initiation of recovery proceeding under Section 87 of
Chapter-V of the Finance Act, 1994 vide Letter dated 5th
April, 2024 indicating the demand of Rs.66,67,040/along with interest, cannot be held to be valid.
9.
In view of the enunciation of law on the subject and the
discussion on the facts made above, there is no scope
left for this Court but to set aside Order-in-Original
dated
04.05.2023
(Annexure-4)
by
the
Assistant
Commissioner, GST and Central Excise, Rourkela-I
Division, Rourkela. Accordingly direction contained in
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
vide Letter dated 5th April, 2024 to discharge liability is
quashed.
9.1. With the aforesaid observation, the writ petition is
allowed.
9.2. As a result of disposal of the writ petition, pending
Interlocutory Application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
9.3. In the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs.
(Dr. SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI)
JUDGE
(MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)
JUDGE
Signature Not
Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR
SETHY
Designation: Personal
Assistant (Secy in-charge)
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH
COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 06-Nov-2026 15:03:11
High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
The 6th November, 2026//Aswini/Laxmikant
WP(C) No.446 of 2025
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