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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA // AT HYDERABAD
WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTY EIGHTH DAY OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENW SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE T.MADHAVI DEVI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 3452 OF 2025
Petition under Article 227 of lhe Constitution of lndia, Aggrieved by the
order dated 03-09-2025 passed in l.A.No 169 OF 2025 in O.S.No. 49 OF 2019
on the file of the 1"t Addl. Dist., Judge, at Suryapet allowing the application to
demark the Ex.A-1.
Between:
Shaik Hasanuddin, S/o E.Khasim Saheb, aged about 40 years Occ. Business,
R/o Flat No 501,Sth Floor, Sal Srinivasam apartment, Behind Venkateswara
Swamy Temple, KPHB Colony, Hyderabad.
...Petitioner/Respondent -1 /Plaintiff
AND
1 . M/s Sneha Rural Development Society, Represent by its president Shaik
Kasim Saheb, S/o. Shaik Mohammed Saheb, R/o H.No i4-147, lingagiri road,
Huzurnagar Town and Mandal Suryapet
...Petitioher/Def.
Dist.
No.1
2. Shaik Hussain Babu, S/o late Dada sahib Aged about 65 years, Occ.
Business, R/o H.No 7-4, Matampalli Road, Huzurnagar Town dnd Mandal,
Suryapet Dishict.
3. Telangana Minorities Residential Education lnstitution Society, 8-2-5961111,
Road No.10, Beside Star Hospital, Opp. KARVY, Lane beside Shakarlal
Jewelers, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad-34.
4. The Principal, Telangana Minorities Residential School for Girls, R/o Shirdi
Sai Nagar Colony, Near Dr HR School, Khammam Road, Kodada Town,
quryapet District - 508206. (Respondent no 2 to 4 not necessary parties to
this revision)
...RespondentsrDef.No.2 to 4
lA NO: 1 OF 2025
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
Stay all further proceedings in OS. No. 49 of 2019 on the file of the lstAddl.
Dist., Judge, Suryapet.
Petitioner:
Counsel for the
Mr. T SHARATH, Advocate
Counsel forthe Respondents: Mr. S P UDAY KUMAR, Advocate
The Court made the following: ORDER
!
i
IN THE HIGTI COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE T. MADHAVI DEVI
DATED : 28.01.2026
Between
Shaik Hasaruddin
... Petitioner
AND
M/s Sneha lRural Development Society
Representerl by its President Shaik Kasim
Saheb and:i others
Respondents
ORDER
This'civil Revision petition (cRp) is filed against the order of the
I Additional Districr Judge at Suryapet dt.03.09.2025 in I.A.No.16g of
2025 in O.S.No.49 of 2019.
2.
The suit was filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of the
contract. De:fendant No.1 filed I.A.No.r69 of 2025 under order 13 Rule
3 of cPC to reject and de-exhibit Ex.A.l agreement of sale
dt-07.a4.2017. It is stated that the agreement of sale dt.07.04.2017
was
C.R.p.No.3452of 2025
marked during the chief examination, but at the time of marking the said
document, neither defendant No.1 nor its counsel was present and that in
Ex.A.l original agreement of sale dt.07.04.2017, there is a recital that
possession of the suit schedule was delivered to the party and in the
plaint pleadings, it was also mentioned that possession was delivered
and if possession was delivered, the said document is to be treated as
sale deed and it requires stamp duty and penalty, but the plaintiff did not
pay the required stamp duty and penalty and therefore, the said
document cannot be marked. Therefore, it was prayed to reject and de-
exhibit Ex.A.l agreement of sale dt.07.04.20t7. The same was opposed
by the plaintiff by filing a counter submitting that the said petition is not
maintainable and particularly since defendant No.l denied delivery of
possession in his written statement in the main suit. It is also stated that
it is not correct to say that defendant No.l or its counsel was not present
in Court on 30.06.2025 at the time of marking of Ex.A.land that the
cross-examination of P.W.l was deferred at the request of the learned
counsel for defendant No. I and that there was no objection at the time of
marking of Ex.A.l. It is further stated that Ex.A.l has since been
marked and has been admitted into evidence, such admission cannot be
called in question in view of the bar contained in Section 36 of the
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2025
Indian Starnp Act. He also placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Su,:reme Court of India in the case of Javer Chand and others
Vs. Pukhraj Suranar, wherein it was hetd that once a document has
been admitted in evidence, it is not open either to the trial Court itself or
to a court cf appeal or revision to go behind that order. It is stated that
the petitioner/defendant No.l is taking contrary stands, one in the
written statement that possession is not delivered and the second in I.A.
No.169 of 1'-025 that possession is delivered and therefore, such a stand
cannot be accepted and the plaintiff cannot be called to pay the stamp
duty since the point for consideration by the Court will depend on a
finding wh:ther possession has at all been delivered in terms of the
agreement rf sale or not. It is further stated that if the Court gives a
finding on the possession, the plaintiff undertakes to pay the stamp duty
upon the dccument being sent for determination of the actual stamp duty
leviable on the instrument Ex.A.l after reference to the Collector under
the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act. It was therefore prayed for
dismissal o:: [.A.No.169 of 2025.
'eln l96t sc .655
C.R.P.No.3452of 2025
3.
The trial Court, however, allowed I.A.No.169 of 2025 and held
that Ex.A.l is demarked and liberty is given to respondent No.l/plaintiff
to take necessary steps to seek impounding of the document and to make
a request to mark the document again as exhibit in evidence. The trial
Court observed that since there is a recital of handing over of possession
in the agreement of sale, it amounts to conveyance deed and requires
stamp duty under Schedule-l-A of Article 47A, Explanation I of the
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and as per Section 35 of the said Act,
instruments not duly stamped are inadmissible in evidence and
therefore, the agreement of sale is inadmissible in evidence for want of
stamp duty. It was further observed that while marking the document, no
exercise was taken up to examine whether it requires stamp duty as there
was no such endorsement of the office of the Court on the document
when it was filed along with the plaint though there was relief prayed
for recovery of past and future rents. It was observed that before
proceeding with cross-examination of P.W.l through whom the said
document was marked, defendant No.l raised objection about marking
of Ex.A.l and hence, the document was not put to scrutiny in the crossexamination nor was it used by parties. Thus observing, I.A.No.169 of
it
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2025
2025 was :rllowed. The said order dt.03.09.2025 is challenged in this
CRP.
4.
Learned counsel for the petitioner herein/plaintiff also pointed out
from the written statement that defendants admitted that the suit
schedule property was let out to tenants and they are collecting rents and
therefore, the plaintiff cannot be said to be in possession of the property
and therefc,re, he cannot be called upon to pay stamp duty and the point
for considr:ration of the Court will depend on the finding as to whether
possession at all has been delivered in terms of the agreement of sale or
not. The leamed counsel for the petitioner herein, while relying upon the
averments made in the counter to I.A.No.l69 of 2025 and also in the
written sta:ement fited by the defendants, has drawn the attention of this
Court to the judgment of the Hon'bte Supreme Court in the case of
R,V.E. Venkatachala Gounder Vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami &
V.P. Temple and another2, wherein it was observed that objections to
admissibility of secondary evidence can be classified as (i) objection
that the document sought to be proved is itself inadmissible, and (ii)
objection directed not against the admissibility of the document but
'1zoo31 a sct: z5z
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2025
against the mode of proof thereof on the ground of irregularity or
insufficiency and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the objection
under category (i) can be raised even after the document has been
marked as "as exhibit" and even in appeal or revision, but the objection
under category (ii) can be raised when the evidence is tendered but not
after the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an
exhibit. The learned counsel for the petitioner herein submitted that in
this case, the objection is relating to category (i) that it itself is not
admissible and as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it can be raised
even subsequently after it is marked. He also referred to the judgment of
the Hon'ble supreme Court of India in the case of Javer Chand and
others vs. Pukhraj surana (1 supra), wherein a question raised was as
to the admissibility of a document on the ground that it has not been
stamped or has not been properly stamped. It was held that the party
challenging the admissibility of the document has to be alert to see that
the document is not admitted in evidence by the court and once a
document has been marked as an exhibit in the case and has been used
by the parties in examination and cross-examination of their witnesses,
Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act comes into operation and it is not
open either to the trial Court itself or to a Court of Appeal or Revision to
/i
,/
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2025
go behind that order. He further placed reliance upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V.E.A. Annamalai Chettiar and
another Vs. S.V.V.S. Veerappa Chettir and others3, wherein it was
held that :he document having been admitted in evidence, such
admission could not be called in question at any stage of the proceedings
on the ground that it had not been duly stamped and the provisions of
Section 36 of the Stamp Act preclude the appellants from raising any
objection a,gainst the admission of the document at this stage and that
the appellants are not entitled now to urge this objection before the
Supreme Crrurt.
5.
Leanred counsel for respondent/defendant No.l, on the other
hand, supported the impugned order and submitted that under Section 35
of the Indi'rn Stamp Act, instruments which are not duly stamped are
inadmissible in evidence and Article 6 of Schedule-l-A refers to
agreement or memorandum of an agreement not otherwise provided for
and therefcrre, the subject agreement of sale falls within this category.
He also sulimitted that the subject agreement of sale was cancelled by
mutual cr)nsent vide memorandum of mutual understanding
eln t956 sc t2
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2025
dt.16.06.2019 between the petitioner herein and respondents I and 2 and
a third party one Mr. Shaik Saidulu. It is submitted that subsequent to
the agreement of sale dt.07.04.2017 and a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- was
paid as an advance, the share of the purchaser under Ex.A.l was handed
over to the purchaser out of the total property and both the parties
agreed to make construction on their share of property in fourth floor
with their own expenses and also in stilt floor and both parties have
agreed to permit the purchaser to demolish the old stair case for second,
third and fourth floors and as per the MoU dt.16.06.2019, the
respondents accepted to return the.amount of Rs.25,00,000/- paid by the
petitioner towards advance of sale consideration and also the amount of
Rs.15,00,000/- spent by the petitioner for the construction of the
unfinished building covered by the sale agreement and accordingly,
respondent No.l repaid the sum of Rs.5,00,000/- through online
transaction on 1,5.06.2019 and agreed to pay Rs.55,00,000/- to the
mediator, i.e., Shaik Saidulu and his son Shaik Madar and therefore,
according to the learned counsel for defendant No.l, the suit on the basis
of the agreement of sale itself is void ab initio and it is submitted that
the petitioner and the father of the petitioner have conspired with
malafide intention to cause great loss and irreparable damage to the
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2025
reputation of respondent No.l society and therefore, the petitioner is not
entitled for any relief and further that, the agreement of sale filed by the
petitioner could not have been admitted as evidence without payment of
stamp duty He also relied upon the judgments which have been referred
to by the trial Court in allowing I.A.No.l69 of 2025 and de-admitting of
the docume nt.
6.
Leamed counsel for the petitioner has filed a reply affidavit along
with the drtcuments such as lease agreements and copies of cheques,
FIRs, copy of plaint in O.S.No.236 of 2O2l to demonstrate that the
possession of the subject property was with the defendants only and not
with the plaintiff and therefore, the document which has been marked as
Ex.A.l did not require impounding. He submitted that Section 47 of the
Indian Sta.mp Act deals with a situation where instruments of
conveyance etc., are undervalued and provides for a procedure to deal
with the sarne.
7.
Having regard to the rival contentions and the material on record,
this Court finds that the plaintiff is seeking specific performance of the
agreement of sale while the defendants are denying the same and in the
written statement, it is claimed that possession is with the defendant
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2025
society itself. The document was marked as Ex.A.l during the chiefexamination of P.w.1 and immediatery thereafter, an objection has been
raised by the defendants that the document was marked without their
presence and further that it was not a document where stamp duty is
paid. The trial Court has accepted the contentions of the defendants and
de-admitted the document. Therefore, the questions to be decided in this
cRP are (1) whether the agreement of sale sought to be introduced as
evidence on behalf of the plaintiff is admissible without payment of
stamp duty, and (2) whether the document which has been marked can
be de-admitted subsequently. As far as the I't question is concerned, this
court finds that Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act prescribes that no
document which is not sufficiently stamped can be admitted in evidence
and for the purpose of determining whether the subject document is
sufficiently stamped or not, it is only the recitals in the documents which
have to be considered. The Hon'ble supreme court of India in the case
of omprakash vs. Laxminarayan & ors.a has affirmed the decision
of the Division of the High court of Madhya pradesh in w.p.No .6464
of 2008 (Man Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives Smt.
o
Ci,ril Appeal No.9032 of 2013 @ SLp (C) No.20721 of 2028dt.07.10.2013
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2025
Sumranbai & Ors. Vs. Rameshwar) and agreed with the conclusions
of the Division Bench as under:
A document would be admissible on basis of the recitals made
in th,z document and not on basis of the pleadings raised by the
parties. In the matter of Laxminarayan (supra), the learned Single
Judgt with due respect to his authority we don't think that he did look
into the legal position but it appears that he was simply swayed away
by thz argument that as the defendant was denying the delivery of
possession, the endorsement/recital in the document lost all its effect
and e.fficaqt.
9.
It would be trite to say that if in a document certain recitals
are r,nade then the Court would decide the admissibility of the
docunnent on the strength of such recitals and not otherwise. In a
given case, if there is an absolute unregistered sale deed and the
parties say that the same is not required to be registered then we don't
think that the Court would be entitled to admit the document because
simplv the parties say so. The jurisdiction of the Court flows from
Sections 33, 35 and 38 of the Indian Stamp Act and the Court has to
decide the question of admissibility. With all humiliqv at our command
we ov,zr-rule the judgment in the matter of Laxminarayan (Supra)."
Therefore, it is clear that no document which is insufficiently stamped
can be adraftted in evidence. The second question is to be now
considered. This Court finds that the A.P. High Court (it then was) in
the cases of Chebrolu Srinivasa Rao and others vs. Ravi venkata
C.R.P.No.3452of 2025
Ratna Vara Prasad and otherss and Syed Yousuf Ali Vs. Mohd.
Yousuf and othersu has held that a document once admitted under
Section 36 of the Registration Act cannot be objected to subsequently.
For the sake of clarity, the relevant observations in the case of Syed
Yousuf AIi Vs. Mohd. Yousuf and others (6 supra) are reproduced
hereunder:
"24. According to Order l3 Rule 3 CPC the Court may at any
stage of the suit, reject any document which it considers irrelevant or
otherwise inadmissible, recording the grounds for such rejection.
Order 13 Rule 4 CPC prescribes the endorsement to be made on the
document when a document is admitted in evidence. According to it,
there shall be an endorsement on every document which has been
admitted in evidence containing number and title of the suit, the name
of the person producing the document, the date on which it was
produced and a statement of its having been so admitted and the
endorsement shall be signed or initialled by the Judge.
26. In the present case, the trial Court did not record any
statement as to the admissibility as required under Order 13 Rule
4(l)(d) and there was absolutely no judicial determination about the
admissibility of possessory contract of sale, in evidence. In such a
case, when an objection was raised, the Court is under obligation to
record reasons in admitting the document in evidence or reject the
same even if it is marked for numerical purpose or for convenience of
reference, by following the procedure under Order li Rule 3 CPC.
s
zot t scc online Hyd 491 : (2018) 6ALT 606 : (2019) IALD 90
Z0t6 SCC Online Hyd37 : (2016) 3 ALD 235 : (2016) 2 ALT 557
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2O25
The trial Court in the present case, only on the ground that once the
docu,nent is marked as exhibit, the same cannot be challenged in view
of inrerdict contained under Section 36 of Indian Stamp Act. The trial
Court did not draw distinction between marking of document for
conv,znience of reference and judicial determination of admissibility
of th'z docament, as no obiection was raised as to the admissibility of
the document at the time, it was marked, committed an error in
considering the objection raised by the learned counsel for the
petitioner i.e. 4'h defendant before the trial Court.
32. A co-joint reading of Section 36 of Indian Stamp Act and
Order XII Rule 3 of CPC, there is little conflict as to rejection of any
document which is already marked on the ground that the docttment is
irrelevant or inadmissible in evidence after recording reasons- lf
really the bar contained in Section 36 is absolttte which preclude the
Court to entertain any objection as to admissibility at any subsequent
stage, after the document is marked in evidence, Order XIII Rule
3 become redundant. When Court did not determine iudicially as to
adnissibility of possessory contract of sale and marked the sume as
Exhibit, without applying its mind, the admissibility of document can
be clecided judicially and reject if the Court find that the document is
inaclmissible in evidence or reject the document at any stage of the
proceedings. Hence, the trial Court did not exercise its jurisdiction
under Order ilII Rule 3 of CPC, consequently liable to be set aside."
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2025
t4
8.
In the case of sure Ranga Murali Krishna Reddy vs. sure
Yerri vara Prasada Reddy and othersT also, this Court has observed
thus:
o27.
In the case on hand, the objection is not only with regard
to the mere stfficiency or otherwise of the stamp duty payable on the
original partition deed but, also with regard to non-registration of the
ortginal partition deed. The law is well settled that there is no bar
under law to consider at any stage of the matter, an objection which is
raised with regard to the admissibility of an unregistered doanment,
which is compulsorily registerable, even though such document is
marked as an exhibit, more particularly, when such marking is given
inadvertently and without application of mind. Indeed, in a recent
decision in Uma Pandey v. Munna Pandey tQ|lS) 5 SCC 376J the
Supreme Court held that question relating to admissibitity of an
unregistered partition deed relied upon by the defendants is a
substantial question of law and can be permitted to be raised even in a
second appeal. Further, as already noted the law is well settled that
section 35 only deals with original instruments and not copies and
that Section 36 cannot be so interpreted as to allow secondary
evidence of an instrument to have its benefit. The words ,an
instntment' in Section 36 must have the same meaning as that in
section 35. The Legislature only relentedfrom the strict provisions of
section 35 in cases where the original instrument was admitted tn
evidence without objection at the initial stage of a suit or proceeding.
Therefore, the document in question now being a certified copy and
z0r8 scc online Hyd,209: (2018) 4 ALT 616: (20r8) 5 ALD 396
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2025
!
t5
not c,.n original the benefit cannot be extended to it in any view of the
matt,zr.
28.1n the facts & circumstances and in view of the
preczdential guidance, this Court is of the well considered view that
the rlourt below was in error in marking the document, viz., CC of
unregistered partition deed as exhibit BI without application of mind
and without first deciding the objection raised as ordained in the
deci.vion of the Supreme Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal's
case (supra) and in further refusing to accede to the request of the
plaintilf to de-exhibit the document or exclude/eschew it from
evidence for deciding its admissibility or otherwise after adverting to
the ,zspects viz., whether it's original was duly stamped/charged u'ith
dutl' and whether it can be admitted in evidence for collateral purpose
in tirc light of the ratios in the precedents adverted to supra. For the
foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the order is unsustainable and
is lizble to be set aside."
9.
All these decisions have been relied upon by the trial Court for
de-admitting the document. After considering the above judgments
retied up,)n by both the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as
responderlt No.l and the trial Court, this Court observes that in the
present case, the document was marked as Ex.A.l only for numerical
purpose during the evidence of P.W.l, but immediately thereafter,
before thg cross-examination was undertaken, the defendants have taken
an objection about its admissibility and as held in the above cases, when
there is no judicious application of mind by the learned Judge about the
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2025
t6
admissibility of the document at the time
cannot be said that the petition under
of marking of the document, it
order r 3 Rure 3 0f cpc cannot be
entertained. The contention of the petitioner
otherwise of the stamp duty is to be decided
the question of possession. The issue
document and the issue of
have to be decided onry after the document
has been admitted by the court and
payment of the stamp duty. The
the admission wifl not be subject to
submission of the learned counsel for
the petitioner is that the petitioner wourd
were required to pay stamp duty first
suffer irreparabre ross if he
and if rater it was decided that he
did not have possession, since the defendants
have claimed the possession to be with
considered since there is no provision
them. This contention is to be
is herd to be not varid by the
court. Further, the Hon'bre Supreme court,
case of vayyaeti Srinivasarao vs.
in its recent decision in the
Gaineedi JagajyothiE, has held as
under.
ZOZ6 fNSC 59 : Civil Appeal Nos.
Leave petition 1c) wos.iDz 6-21977
in their written statement,
under the Stamp Act to refund the
stamp duty already paid if the document
after the trial court decides
of requirement to pay stamp duty
would depend on the recitars in the
possession or otherwise wilr
is that sufficiency or
of 2026 arising out of Special
0f 2023dt.r5.01.2026
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2025
" l 1.2 The
facts of the case in Gafoor can be compared to the
pre.sent case, as it was rightry overrured
by the Division Bench of the
Ancthra Pradesh High court in Ratnamara, as thefindings
in the said
cas'. were incorrect wherein, it had been expressry
mentioned in the
agr,€m€nt to seil that the possession of the schedure
property was
with the appellant therein as a tenant. Therefore,
the appeilant therein
alsa did not come into possession of the property
agreement to seil but was arready in possession
in reration to the
of the property as a
tenant. But, there was surrender within the meaning
the '4ct so as to determine the rease or tenancy.
of section t r r of
on the other hand.
pursuant to the agreement to seil in the present
case, there was no
change in the status of the appellant herein inasmuch
as he continued
to be a tenant and did not acquire possession
under the agreement to
sell. The appellant herein also suffered an eviction
order as a tenant
of tlrc schedule property. Therefore, the appeilant did
possession of the property prior to the
not acquire
agreement to sell dated
14.10.2009 tn reration thereto or at the time
of tts execution or
subs'zquent thereto. In other words, the possession
of the schedure
property by the appellant herein was not
following the agreement to
sell nor was delivery of possession pursuant to the execution
of
agr€enzent to sell as stipulated under the
A.p. stamp Act. It is onry
when the possession is acquired tn reration
to the execution of the
agrecment to sell, that it would be a deemed
conveyance and stamp
duty ,has to be levied os conveyance.
12. However, tn the instant case, the agreement
l4.l(t.2009 expressry states that the appelrant was
to sell dated
in possession of the
schea'ule property as a tenant
for.fifty years and in fact an order of
eviction was also passed against the appeilant.
Therefore, the
appellant did not come into possession of the
schedure property
in
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2025
relation to the execution of the agreement to sell dated 14.10.2009 but
atmost fifty years prior thereto as a tenant and not as a vendee. In
fact, the existing tenant sought to purchase the schedule property but
there was no eq)ress or implied surrender of tenancy so as to bring
about determination of the tenancy or lease by the appellant herein.
Hence, the judgment of this Court in Ramesh Mishrimal is not
applicable to thefacts of the present case.
l2.l The Trial Court failed to notice this aspect of the matter
and simply directed the appellant herein to pay the stamp duty as if it
were a conveyance or sale and there was a transfer of title from the
respondent to the appellant herein. The High Court infact misdirected
itself in assuming that there was infact a deemed conveyance betw'een
the respondent and the appellant herein. The appellant herein is not
liable to pay any additional duty and penalty on the said instrument
and neither is the said instrument liable to be impounded for the
purpose of payment of duty and pennlty. Hence, we find that the High
Court was not right in sustaining the order of the Trial Court.
Consequently, both the impugned orders of the High Court us well as
the order of the Trial Court are set aside. The appeals are allowed in
the aforesaid terms.
12.2 The Trial Court shall mark the agreement to sell dated
14.10.2009 as an Exhibit and proceed to dispose the suit
as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of six
monthsfrom the date of the next hearing before the Trial Court.
No costs."
Therefore, the payment of stamp duty can be subject to the furding about
the possession by the trial Court.
C.R.P.No.3452 of 2025
t9
I
f0. Th,: Civil Revision Petition is accordingly allowed. No order as
to costs.
11. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in this Civil Revision
Petition shall stand closed.
SD/- C.DEEPIKA
SISTANT REGISTRAR
I
i
//TRUE COPY//
ECTION OFFICER
To,
1. The 1't Alditional District Judge, at Suryapet
2. One CC kr Mr. T SHARATH, Advocate tOpUCl
3. One CC kr Mr S P UDAY KUMAR, Advocate tOpUCI
4. Two CD Copies
RC/PSt-
HIGH COI.'RT
DATED: 2810112026
1 tt E 5 TA
z
3 ,12 lt
o
ti
*
c
\
*
CRP.No.3452 ot 2025
Accordingly, this Civil Revision petition is Altowed
I
t
a j
\d
0, L
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