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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP-37898-2025
Date of Decision : January 20, 2026
SD PUBLIC SCHOOL
-PETITIONER
V/S
APPELLATE
AUTHORITY
CUM
COMMISSIONER AND ANOTHER
DEPUTY
LABOUR
-RESPONDENTS
CWP-37908-2025
SD PUBLIC SCHOOL
-PETITIONER
V/S
APPELLATE
AUTHORITY
CUM
COMMISSIONER AND ANOTHER
DEPUTY
LABOUR
-RESPONDENTS
CWP-37976-2025
SD PUBLIC SCHOOL
-PETITIONER
V/S
APPELLATE
AUTHORITY
CUM
COMMISSIONER AND ANOTHER
DEPUTY
LABOUR
-RESPONDENTS
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI
Present:
Mr. Dinesh Rawat, Advocate (Through V.C.)
for the petitioner.
Mr. Bhupender Singh, Addl. A.G., Haryana.
***
KULDEEP TIWARI, J. (ORAL)
1.
All these writ petitions are amenable for being decided through
a common verdict on account of theirs inhering a common question of law
for consideration. For the sake of brevity and convenience, the prayer clause
DEVINDER YADAV
2026.01.22 16:23
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this
order/judgment
CWP-37898-2025 and connected cases
is extracted from CWP-37898-2025.
2.
The relief yearned for in this writ petition appertains to
quashing of the order dated 01.10.2025, whereby the appeal(s) filed by the
petitioner, under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, were
dismissed by the respondent No.1- Appellate Authority on the ground of
theirs being suffering from the vice of delay.
3.
There was delay of more than six months in filing the
appeal(s), which the petitioner attributes to having pursued its claim before a
wrong forum.
4.
The pivotal issue, which emerges for consideration, is
“whether the appellate authority is vested with jurisdiction to condone
delay in filing the appeal beyond 120 days”. On this issue, a reference to
Rule 7(2) of The Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to
as the “Rules of 1997”), which is extracted hereunder, is inevitable:“7. Fee, time for filing appeal, deposit of amount due on filing appeal.
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(2) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central
Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any
other authority under the Act, may within 60 days from the date of
issue of the notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal.
Provided that the Tribunal may if it is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal
within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period
of 60 days.
Provided further that no appeal by the employer shall be
entertained by the Tribunal unless he has deposited with the Tribunal a
Demand Draft payable in the Fund and bearing 75% of the amount
due from him as determined under Section 7-A.
Provided also that the Tribunal may for reasons to be recorded
in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under Section
DEVINDER YADAV
2026.01.22 16:23
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this
order/judgment
CWP-37898-2025 and connected cases
7-O.”
5.
Further, the issue (supra) is no more res integra inasmuch as a
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, relying upon the decision in “Bank of
Baroda Vs. Union of India and others”, CWP-1121-2025, held in “M/s
Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. Vs. Assistant Provident
Fund Commissioner and others”, CWP-6719-2025, that the appellate
authority has no power to condone delay beyond 120 days. The relevant
paragraphs of the verdict rendered in CWP-6719-2025 are extracted
hereunder:“4. The same question of law came up for consideration before this
Court while deciding CWP-1121-2025 titled as Bank of Baroda vs.
Union of India and others on 17.02.2025 wherein, it has been held
that the Appellate Authority does not have the power to condone the
delay beyond 120 days.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation has not been able to
rebut the said principle of law.
6. Keeping in view the said fact, present petition is also dismissed in
terms of CWP-1121-2025 titled as Bank of Baroda vs. Union of India
and others, decided on 17.02.2025 keeping in view the findings
recorded by this Court.”
6.
The verdict (supra) was challenged before a LPA Bench of this
Court in LPA-3242-2025, however, the same was upheld vide order dated
13.11.2025.
7.
A similar issue has been examined by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in “Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada and others Vs.
M/s. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited”, 2020 AIR (SC)
2819. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court read as under:“8. From the indisputable facts, it is evident that the assessment order
dated 21.6.2017 was challenged by the respondent by way of statutory
appeal before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner only on 24.9.2018.
DEVINDER YADAV
2026.01.22 16:23
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this
order/judgment
CWP-37898-2025 and connected cases
Section 31 of the 2005 Act provides for the statutory remedy against an
assessment order. The same, as applicable at the relevant time, reads
thus:
“31. (1) Any VAT dealer or TOT dealer or any other dealer
objecting to any order passed or proceeding recorded by any
authority under the provisions of the Act other than an order
passed or proceeding recorded by an Additional Commissioner
or Joint Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner, may within
thirty days from the date on which the order or proceeding was
served on him, appeal to such authority as may be prescribed:
Provided that the appellate authority may within a
further period of thirty days admit the appeal preferred after a
period of thirty days if he is satisfied that the VAT dealer or
TOT dealer or any other dealer had sufficient cause for not
preferring the appeal within that period:
Provided further that an appeal so preferred shall not be
admitted by the appellate authority concerned unless the dealer
produces the proof of payment of tax, penalty, interest or any
other amount admitted to be due, or of such instalments as have
been granted, and the proof of payment of twelve and half
percent of the difference of the tax, penalty, interest or any
other amount, assessed by the authority prescribed and the tax,
penalty, interest or any other amount admitted by the appellant,
for the relevant tax period, in respect of which the appeal is
preferred.
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Going by the text of this provision, it is evident that the statutory
appeal is required to be filed within 30 days from the date on which the
order or proceeding was served on the assessee. If the appeal is filed
after expiry of prescribed period, the appellate authority is empowered
to condone the delay in filing the appeal, only if it is filed within a
further period of not exceeding 30 days and sufficient cause for not
preferring the appeal within prescribed time is made out. The appellate
authority is not empowered to condone delay beyond the aggregate
period of 60 days from the date of order or service of proceeding on
the assessee, as the case may be. In the present case, admittedly, the
appeal was filed way beyond the total 60 days’ period specified in
terms of Section 31 of the 2005 Act……
DEVINDER YADAV
2026.01.22 16:23
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this
order/judgment
CWP-37898-2025 and connected cases
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11. In the backdrop of these facts, the central question is: whether the
High Court ought to have entertained the writ petition filed by the
respondent? As regards the power of the High Court to issue
directions, orders or writs in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, the same is no more res integra. Even
though the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order
or direction passed/action taken by the State under Article 226 of the
Constitution, it ought not to do so as a matter of course when the
aggrieved person could have availed of an effective alternative remedy
in the manner prescribed by law (see Baburam Prakash Chandra
Maheshwari vs. Antarim Zila Parishad now Zila Parishad,
Muzaffarnagar, AIR 1969 Supreme Court 556 and also Nivedita
Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Association of India & Ors., (2011) 14
SCC 337). In Thansingh Nathmal & Ors. vs. Superintendent of Taxes,
Dhubri & Ors., AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1419, the Constitution Bench
of this Court made it amply clear that although the power of the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is very wide, the Court
must exercise self-imposed restraint and not entertain the writ petition,
if an alternative effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person.
In paragraph 7, the Court observed thus:“7. Against the order of the Commissioner an order for
reference could have been claimed if the appellants satisfied the
Commissioner or the High Court that a question of law arose
out of the order. But the procedure provided by the Act to
invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court was bypassed, the
appellants moved the High Court challenging the competence of
the Provincial Legislature to extend the concept of sale, and
invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 and sought to reopen the decision of the Taxing
Authorities on question of fact. The jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide
terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions
except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided
in the Articles.
But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it is not
exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very
amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be
DEVINDER YADAV
2026.01.22 16:23
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this
order/judgment
CWP-37898-2025 and connected cases
exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort that
jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief
which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by
statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a
writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative
remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an
equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not
generally enter upon a determination of questions which
demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the
right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does
not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a
court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by
assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an
alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief.
Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another
tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining
redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court
normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article
226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute
to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek
resort to the machinery so set up.” (emphasis supplied)
We may usefully refer to the exposition of this Court in Titaghur Paper
Mills Co. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of Orissa & Ors., (1983) 2 SCC 433,
wherein it is observed that where a right or liability is created by a
statute, which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy
provided by that statute must only be availed of. In paragraph 11, the
Court observed thus: “11. Under the scheme of the Act, there is a hierarchy of
authorities before which the petitioners can get adequate
redress against the wrongful acts complained of. The
petitioners have the right to prefer an appeal before the
Prescribed Authority under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the
Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in the
appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under
sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case
to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High
Court under Section 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a
complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and
DEVINDER YADAV
2026.01.22 16:23
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this
order/judgment
CWP-37898-2025 and connected cases
the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by
the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that
where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a
special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that
statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great
clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v.
Hawkesford [(1859) 6 CBNS 336, 356] in the following
passage:
There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be
established founded upon statute.... But there is a third class,
viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a
statute which at the same time gives a special and particular
remedy for enforcing it…. The remedy provided by the statute
must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue
the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form
given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to.
The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House
of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. (1919
AC 368) and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in
Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant &
Co. Ltd. (1935 AC 532) and Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.
(AIR 1940 PC 105). It has also been held to be equally
applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by
this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in
dismissing the writ petitions in limine.” (emphasis supplied)
In the subsequent decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. & Ors. vs.
Union of India & Ors., (1997) 5 SCC 536, this Court went on to
observe that an Act cannot bar and curtail remedy under Article
226 or 32 of the Constitution. The Court, however, added a
word of caution and expounded that the constitutional Court
would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in
the provisions of the Act and would exercise its jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of the enactment. To put it
differently, the fact that the High Court has wide jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution, does not mean that it can
disregard the substantive provisions of a statute and pass
orders which can be settled only through a mechanism
DEVINDER YADAV
2026.01.22 16:23
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this
order/judgment
CWP-37898-2025 and connected cases
prescribed by the statute.
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14. The Petitioner faced with this unfortunate situation, filed an appeal
under Section 31 of the VAT Act on 24.9.2018 on the bona fide belief
that there are good grounds for condonation of the delay since the
Petitioner cannot suffer for the errors committed by one of its
employees.
15. It is submitted that the 2nd Respondent, vide order, dated
25.10.2018 (Ex. P-7), rejected the appeal on the ground that he has no
power to condone the delay beyond 30 days. It is also observed in the
said order that appeal against the Endorsement was also dismissed by
him on 17.8.2018. However, copy of the order is not yet served on the
petitioner. The 2nd Respondent observed that the Petitioner cannot
dispute the service of assessment order on 22.6.2017 and failure to file
the appeal within 60 days would mean that the assessment order has
attained finality.”
8.
In view of the judicial pronouncements (supra), and in light of
the mandate enclosed in Rule 7(2) of the Rules of 1997, this Court finds no
merit in these writ petitions, which are accordingly dismissed.
9.
A photocopy of this order be placed on file of each connected
case.
(KULDEEP TIWARI)
JUDGE
January 20, 2026
devinder
Whether speaking/reasoned :
Whether Reportable
:
DEVINDER YADAV
2026.01.22 16:23
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authenticity of this
order/judgment
Yes/No
Yes/No
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