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LegalFirms.in Judgments · legalfirms.in/judgments/baljit-singh-vs-the-chief-administrator-ias-haryana-state-agricultural-marketing-board-and-others-20260910/ · Printed 19 Nov 2026
Civil

Baljit Singh vs The Chief Administrator Ias Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board and Others

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Court
Punjab & Haryana High Court
Date
10 September 2026
Case No.
RSA 4295/2025
Result
Disposed
Bench
Justice Harkesh Manuja
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16. Accordingly, both appeals are allowed and the findings recorded by the learned Courts below to the extent they decline regularisation of the appellants services w.e.f. 01.10.2003, are hereby set aside. The appellant(s)plaintiff(s) are held entitled for regularization of their services w.e.f. 01.10.2003 with all consequential benefits including pay fixation/refixation of pay/increments etc. from the said date along with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of accrual till actual realization. The respondents are directed to release the aforesaid benefits to the appellant(s) within three months from the 2026.09.10 18:07 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) --12-- date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.

Full Judgment Text

Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs, CC BY 4.0). The court's own copy is the authoritative text.

SONIKA 2026.09.10 18:07 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) --2-- Appeals shall stand disposed of as they involve common question of law and fact. For the sake of brevity, the facts are being culled out from RSA-4295 of 2025 (O&M). 2. By way of the present appeal, challenge has been laid to the judgment and decree dated 10.10.2025 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bhiwani (hereinafter referred to as the "First Appellate Court"), whereby an appeal filed at the instance of the defendantsrespondents, as also cross-objections filed at the instance of the plaintiffappellant, against the judgment and decree dated 28.09.2017 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhiwani (hereinafter referred to as the "Trial Court"), decreeing the suit for declaration filed by the plaintiff to the extent of holding him entitled to regularisation of service w.e.f. 18.06.2014 while declining the same w.e.f. 01.10.2003, were both dismissed, thereby affirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court in its entirety. FACTS 3. Briefly stating, plaintiff-Baljit Singh filed a suit for declaration claiming that he joined the Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board, Bhiwani, on 01.01.2000 as a Road Roller Driver on daily-wage basis against a vacant and sanctioned post. After the road rollers became non-functional, he was retained as a Peon on daily-wage basis. It was pleaded that the plaintiff rendered satisfactory service since 01.01.2000 and thus was entitled to regularisation under the Haryana Government notifications dated 01.10.2003 and 18.06.2014. It was further pleaded that 85 Class-IV posts were created for regularisation of daily-wage employees and that several posts were lying vacant in the Board. It was also averred that his juniors SONIKA 2026.09.10 18:07 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) --3-- were regularised under the aforesaid policies but the case of the plaintiff was not considered. Accordingly, the plaintiff sought a declaration that he was entitled to regularisation as Peon w.e.f. 01.10.2003, with consequential benefits and arrears of pay and allowances along with interest @ 12% per annum. In the alternative, he sought regularisation w.e.f. 28.05.2014 under the policy dated 18.06.2014. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff is legally entitled to minimum of pay-scale and dearness allowance for ten years w.e.f. 01.01.2010, along with consequential benefits and interest and prayed for a decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendants to grant the aforesaid benefits. 4. Upon notice, the defendants appeared and filed their joint written statement while taking preliminary objections like lack of maintainability, lack of locus standi, lack of cause of action, lack of nonjoinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties etc. On merits, the suit was resisted mainly on the ground that the plaintiff did not approach the Court with clean hands and suppressed true and material facts. It was pleaded that the plaintiff was not appointed against a regular post and that he was engaged through a contractual agency and therefore, was not entitled for regularisation. As such, prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. Replication to the written statement was filed. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court framed the following issues:“1. 2. 3. 4. SONIKA 2026.09.10 18:07 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree for declaration alongwith consequential relief of mandatory injunction? OPP Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi and cause of action to file the present suit? OPD Whether the present suit is bad for mis-joinder and nonjoinder of necessary parties? OPD Whether the plaintiff has not approached the court with RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) clean hands and suppressed true and material facts? OPD Whether the civil court has no jurisdiction to try and decide the present suit? OPD Relief?” 5. 6. 6. --4-- The learned Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 28.09.2017, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff while holding that he is legally entitled to regularization w.e.f. 18.06.2014 with all consequential benefits like arrears of pay and allowances etc. along with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of accrual till actual realization. The claim for regularisation w.e.f. 01.10.2003 was declined on the ground that the plaintiff's case could not be considered at the appropriate time due to administrative reasons. 7. Aggrieved thereof, the respondents-defendants preferred an appeal whereas the appellant-plaintiff filed cross-objections confining his claim to the extent that regularisation from 01.10.2003 was declined. Both the appeal and the cross-objections came to be dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 10.10.2025, while affirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court in its entirety, and additionally holding that the policy of 01.10.2003 was "no more existing" on the date of institution of the suit (13.10.2015) and that only the policy of 18.06.2014, being subsisting on that date, could be given effect to. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT-PLAINTIFF 8. Impugning the aforesaid judgments & decrees passed by both learned Courts below, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the concurrent findings recorded, insofar as they decline regularization of the SONIKA 2026.09.10 18:07 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) --5-- services of the appellant w.e.f. 01.10.2003 along with consequential arrears of pay and allowances with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of accrual till actual payment, are contrary to the evidence on record and are, therefore, liable to be set aside. It has been submitted that once it stands admitted through DW1 that the appellant fulfilled every condition prescribed under the policy dated 01.10.2003, and that a substantial number of the 85 sanctioned Class-IV posts remained vacant, the bare recital of "administrative reasons" cannot defeat an entitlement that had already accrued in favour of the appellant. It has further been submitted that the respondents cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own default in implementing the 2003 policy within a reasonable time by taking shelter behind the subsequent policy of 2014. Thus, he prays that the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below, to the extent they decline regularization of the appellant's services w.e.f. 01.10.2003, were liable to be set aside, and that the present appeal deserves to be allowed. ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS-DEFENDANTS 9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-defendants submits that the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below were based on proper appreciation of the material facts and the relevant rules, and thus call for no interference. It has been submitted that the policy dated 01.10.2003 stood superseded and was no longer in existence either on the date of institution of the suit or thereafter, and that the appellant was rightly extended the benefit of regularisation only under the subsisting policy dated 18.06.2014. It is submitted that the present appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. SONIKA 2026.09.10 18:07 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) --6-- DISCUSSION AND REASONING 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the paper-book as well as the complete records provided by the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff. 11. The claim in the present appeal being confined to regularisation of the appellant's services w.e.f. 01.10.2003 and the consequential benefits flowing therefrom, the only question that falls for determination is whether the learned Courts below were justified in declining regularisation from that date while granting it w.e.f. 18.06.2014. 12. Admittedly, the appellant joined the services of respondents as Road Roller Driver on 01.01.2000 and the claim for regularization of his services was made in terms of policy dated 01.10.2003. In view of the findings recorded by the Courts below there is no dispute that the appellantplaintiff fulfilled the requirements of policy dated 01.10.2003 for regularization of his services. However, his services were regularized in terms of subsequent policy/instruction dated 18.06.2014 w.e.f. the date of policy along with other consequential benefits of arrears of pay and allowances with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of accrual till actual realization. The benefit of regularization in terms of policy dated 01.10.2003, has been declined for the following reasons:“(i) The regularization of services of the respondent- plaintiff w.e.f. 01.10.2003 cannot be granted as his case could not be considered at appropriate time due to administrative reasons. (ii) Policy of 01.10.2003 has been subsequently render ineffective by virtue of coming into force of other policies in this regard.” SONIKA 2026.09.10 18:07 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) 12.1. --7-- In the humble opinion of this Court, the aforesaid two reasons are legally unsustainable. Taking up the first reason, that the case of the appellant could not be considered due to administrative reasons, the mere mentioning of administrative reasons, without any further description or particulars, cannot by any stretch of imagination be treated as a certificate sufficient to deny the claim of regularization of services of the appellantplaintiff w.e.f. 01.10.2003, especially when, against 85 sanctioned Class-IV posts, only a fraction had been filled and 49 vacancies still remained, as admitted by DW1 himself in his cross-examination. A vague and unparticularised assertion of administrative difficulty is not a substitute for a specific and justiciable explanation, and it cannot be permitted to defeat a benefit that had already accrued to the appellant on his fulfilling every condition of the 2003 policy. 13. As regards the second reason, that the policy of 01.10.2003 was subsequently rendered ineffective by the coming into force of the policy dated 18.06.2014, this premise does not survive scrutiny of the record. A Coordinate Bench of this Court, in Ashish Sharma and others v. State of Haryana and others, CWP-2158-2020 and connected cases, vide decision dated 13.03.2024, upon examining the State's own record, held that the policies dated 17.06.1997, 05.11.1999, 01.10.2003 and 10.02.2004, though rescinded on 13.04.2007, were revived by the notification dated 18.06.2014 itself, the very notification relied upon by the respondents in the present case. This finding stands independently reinforced by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in State of Haryana and others v. Balwinder Singh and others, LPA No. 688 of 2021 and other connected cases, decided on 02.12.2022, which, examining the same Government communication dated SONIKA 2026.09.10 18:07 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) --8-- 21.12.2018, held that the State had itself kept a window open for these policies to be applied to persons not yet regularised, and that it did not lie in its mouth to contend that they stood withdrawn. The relevant portion of Balwinder Singh’s case (supra) judgment is reproduced hereunder:“Thus, we are of the considered opinion that a window had been kept open by the State that the policies dated 17.06.1997, 05.11.1999, 01.10.2003, 10.02.2004 were to be applied to persons who had not been regularized and, therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the counsel for the State to argue that the policies stood withdrawn. The learned Single Judges were justified in issuing directions for consideration. As noticed above the claim is based on a legal right for seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus and in such circumstances it cannot be said that the learned Single Judges were in error in allowing the writ petitions. Accordingly, the appeals filed by the State are dismissed. All pending civil miscellaneous applications, if any, are also disposed of.” Therefore, the policy dated 01.10.2003 was never rendered ineffective by the 2014 notification; it was revived by it, and the second reason assigned by the learned First Appellate Court cannot be sustained. 13.1. Even otherwise, and independent of the above, once the respondents-defendants failed to discharge the obligation cast upon them under the 2003 policy within a reasonable time, despite the appellant's admitted eligibility and the admitted availability of vacant sanctioned posts, the subsequent notification of 2014 cannot be taken as a defence to non-suit an otherwise eligible beneficiary of the earlier policy. A right that has already accrued cannot be extinguished merely because the department chose not to act upon it before a new policy came into force; the responsibility to identify, consider, and regularise eligible employees such as the appellant rested squarely upon the respondents, and their failure to SONIKA 2026.09.10 18:07 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) --9-- discharge it in time cannot now be turned to his detriment. Administrative inaction of this kind cannot be converted into a tool to deprive a workman of his accrued rights, for that would allow the State to take advantage of its own wrong, an outcome wholly impermissible in constitutional jurisprudence. 13.2. The conclusion recorded above finds further doctrinal support in the well-established principle of accrued or crystallised rights, which holds that once an employee fulfils all the conditions of a policy while it is in operation, the benefit ceases to be contingent and becomes a vested entitlement. In the humble opinion of this Court, a subsequent withdrawal or supersession of that policy cannot retrospectively defeat such a vested entitlement. Applying this principle, the appellant, having fulfilled every condition prescribed under the 2003 policy prior to the cut-off date of 30.09.2003 fixed therein, had his right crystallised in his favour on that very date, well before either the 2014 notification or the institution of the present suit came into the picture. Regularization from that date is accordingly a legal consequence flowing from this crystallised right, and not an equitable indulgence granted at the Court's discretion; it merely gives effect to a right that already stood vested, restoring the appellant to the position he would have lawfully occupied had the respondents discharged their obligations in a timely manner. 13.3. This also disposes of the reasoning that the 2003 policy could not be given effect to merely because it was not "existing" on the date of institution of the suit (13.10.2015). A suit for declaration does not create the right, it only enforces a right that already exists, and the suit filed in 2015 was merely a step to enforce a right that had already crystallised in 2003, not SONIKA 2026.09.10 18:07 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) --10-- the origin of that right. Whether the 2003 policy remained in force on the date of filing is, therefore, immaterial. If this reasoning were accepted, an employee's right, once accrued, would depend entirely on how long the respondents could delay him before he was forced to approach the Court, and that cannot be the correct position in law. 14. It is also relevant to notice that the appellant's own juniors, namely Sh. Rajesh Kumar, Sh. Satpal and Sh. Rajbir, were regularised by the very same Board under the policy dated 01.10.2003, while the appellant, despite being equally, if not more, eligible, was left out. The respondents have not been able to point out any legally sustainable distinction between the appellant and those juniors who have already been regularized under the very same policy. Such selective application of policy results in hostile discrimination and creates an unreasonable classification devoid of any rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Equality before law requires that persons similarly situated must be treated alike, and any State action which suffers from such arbitrariness is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3, held that arbitrariness is the very negation of equality. This position finds direct application to service jurisprudence in Hari Nandan Prasad v. Employer I/R to FCI, (2014) 7 SCC 190, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “However, wherever it is found that similarly situated workmen are regularised by the employer itself under some scheme or otherwise and the workmen in question who have approached Industrial/Labour Court are at par with them, direction of regularization in such cases may be legally justified, otherwise, non-regularization of the left over workers itself would amount to invidious discrimination qua SONIKA 2026.09.10 18:07 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) --11-- them in such cases and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus, the Industrial adjudicator would be achieving the equality by upholding Article 14, rather than violating this constitutional provision.” 15. The State, as a model employer, is constitutionally bound to act fairly, reasonably, and with sensitivity toward its employees. Denying the appellant regularization w.e.f. 01.10.2003, when the very same benefit was extended to his similarly situated juniors from that date, would render the promise of equality illusory and would legitimize a course of conduct that is arbitrary, discriminatory and constitutionally impermissible. 15.1 For the reasons recorded above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the policy dated 01.10.2003 was neither rendered ineffective by the subsequent notification dated 18.06.2014, nor could the respondents' own default in implementing it within a reasonable time be used to defeat a right that had already accrued and crystallised in favour of the appellant. The denial of regularisation w.e.f. 01.10.2003, when the appellant's own juniors stood regularised under the very same policy, is accordingly unsustainable in law. RELIEF 16. Accordingly, both appeals are allowed and the findings recorded by the learned Courts below to the extent they decline regularisation of the appellants services w.e.f. 01.10.2003, are hereby set aside. The appellant(s)plaintiff(s) are held entitled for regularization of their services w.e.f. 01.10.2003 with all consequential benefits including pay fixation/refixation of pay/increments etc. from the said date along with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of accrual till actual realization. The respondents are directed to release the aforesaid benefits to the appellant(s) within three months from the SONIKA 2026.09.10 18:07 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document RSA-4295-2025 (O&M) --12-- date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. 17. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. A copy of this order be placed on the file of the connected appeal. 10.09.2026 (HARKESH MANUJA) JUDGE sonika Whether speaking/reasoned: SONIKA 2026.09.10 18:07 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document Yes Whether reportable: Yes

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