Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Page No.# 1/12
GAHC010204452025
2026:GAU-AS:2892
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Review.Pet./245/2025
SATYENDRA DAS AND 3 ORS.
SON OF LATE JAGANNATH DAS
2: SANJAY DAS
S/O. LT. JAGANNATH DAS
3: SAILENDRA DAS
S/O. LT. JAGANNATH DAS
4: JOYMOTI DAS
W/O. LT. JAGANNATH DAS
ALL ARE R/O. SUNDARDIA
KALAYA HATI
BARPETA TOWN
P/O. AND P/S. BARPETA
DIST. BARPETA
ASSAM
PIN-781301
VERSUS
PRATIMA BORO @ PRATIMA GOALA
DAUGHTER OF LATE HARI GOALA,
WIFE OF RAJEN BORO,
RESIDENT OF VILLAGE JNATIGAON, MOUZA GOBARDHANA, DISTRICTBAKSA (BTAD), ASSAM
Advocate for the Petitioner
: MR M RANA, MR. R K D CHOUDHURY
Advocate for the Respondent : MR P K BASU, MR. A BISWAS,MR R KALITA
Page No.# 2/12
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
ORDER
Date : 25.02.2026
Heard Mr. R.K.D. Choudhury, learned counsel for the review petitioners. Also
heard Mr. A. Biswas, learned counsel for the respondent.
2.
This review petition, under Section 114 of the CPC, read with Order 47
Rule 1 of the CPC, is preferred by the review petitioners for review of the order
dated 06.08.2025, passed by this Court in CRP(I/O) No. 108/2025.
3.
Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the review petitioners submits that the
predecessor of the review petitioners had filed a title suit, being Title Suit No.
302/2013, before the learned Munsiff, Barpeta, and in the said title suit, the
original defendant, namely, Hari Goala had filed his written statement-cumcounter claim. Mr. Choudhury also submits that during the pendency of the suit,
the original defendant died and his legal heirs were substituted in his place, and
the said legal heirs of the defendant did not appear before the Court even after
getting notice, for which the suit proceeded ex-parte and the suit was decreed,
vide by ex-parte judgment and decree dated 23.10.2017. Mr. Choudhury further
submits thereafter, the review petitioners had filed Title Execution Case No.
05/2018, and then the respondents filed Misc. (J) Case No.53/2018, under
Order 9 Rule 13 and Order 1 Rule 10(2), read with Section 151 of the CPC to
add her as a defendant, but the same was dismissed, vide order dated
24.10.2019. Mr. Choudhury also submits that against the said order dated
24.10.2019, the respondent preferred Misc. Appeal No.04/2019, before the
learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Baksa, but the same was also dismissed,
vide order dated 16.07.2024. And thereafter, the respondent had filed Misc. (J)
Page No.# 3/12
Case No. 37/2024, under Order 21 Rule 97, 99 and 101 of the CPC, before the
learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Baksa in the execution proceeding. Mr.
Choudhury further submits that the said Misc. (J) Case No.37/2024, was allowed
by the Court below, vide order dated 05.02.2025, and against the said order
dated 05.02.2025, the review petitioners have preferred a revision petition,
being CRP(I/O) No.108/2025, before this Court. But, vide order under review
dated 06.08.2025, this Court was pleased to dismiss the same.
3.1. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioners also submits that
though the respondent had filed Misc. (J) Case No. 37/2024, before the learned
Court below, under Order 21 Rule 97, 99 and 101 of the CPC, but an application
under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC can only be maintained by a holder of a decree, in
view of the said provision and since the respondent herein is not the decree
holder, she cannot maintain a petition under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC. Mr.
Choudhury, by referring to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. vs. Rajiv Trust and Anr., reported in
(1998) 3 SCC 723, and also to another decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Sriram Housing Finance and Investment India Ltd. vs.
Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust, reported in 2022 Supreme
(SC) 694, submits that Order 21 Rule 97 CPC contemplates only the ‘decree
holder’ who is entitled to make an application in case where he is offered
resistance or obstruction by ‘any person’, and as such, the respondent herein
cannot maintain a petition under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC, and the only course
available to him is under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC, and the same has also been laid
down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Brahmdeo Chaudhary vs.
Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and Anr., reported in (1997) 3 SCC 694, in
paragraph Nos. 6 and 9 therein. Under such circumstances, Mr. Choudhury
Page No.# 4/12
submits that the order dated 06.08.2025, passed by this Court, in CPR(I/O) No.
108/2025, has to be reviewed as there is error apparent on the face of the
record, and that the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Silverline Forum
Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Sriram Housing Finance and Investment India Ltd.
(supra) were not placed before this Court except, however, the decision in
Brahmdeo Chaudhary (supra) and on such count, he has contended to allow
this petition.
4.
Per contra, Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently
opposed the petition. By supporting the order dated 06.08.2025, Mr. Biswas has
pointed out that in paragraph No. 9 of Brahmdeo Chaudhary (supra), it has
categorically been held that the word ‘any person’ in Order 21 Rule 97 CPC
includes a stranger also and he can very well maintain a petition under Order 21
Rule 97 CPC.
4.1. In support of his submission, Mr. Biswas has referred to the decisions of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd.
(supra); Shreenath and Anr. Vs. Rajesh and Ors., reported in (1998)
4 SCC 543; Asgar and Ors. Vs. Mohan Varma and Ors., reported in
(2020) 16 SCC 230.
4.2.
Mr. Biswas further submits that this Court has rightly relied upon
paragraph Nos. 6 and 9 of Brahmdeo Chaudhary (supra) and no error apparent
on the face of the record could be demonstrated by the petitioners, and
therefore, Mr. Biswas has contended to dismiss the petition.
5.
Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I have
carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record, and
also perused the order under review dated 06.08.2025, and the decisions
Page No.# 5/12
referred by learned counsel for both the parties.
6.
It is to be noted here that the respondent herein, who had preferred a
petition under Order 21 Rule 97, 99 and 101 of the CPC, upon which Misc. (J)
Case No. 37/2024,
was registered by the learned Civil Judge (Junior
Division), Baksa, is one of the daughters of the original defendant and in Title
Suit No. 302/2013, she was not arrayed as a party and only when the execution
case was filed before the learned Executing Court, she came to know about it
and then she had filed a petition for setting aside the ex-parte decree; but, the
same was dismissed. Thereafter, she preferred a petition under Order 21 Rule
97, 99 and 101 of the CPC in the execution proceeding, upon which Misc. (J)
Case No. 37/2024, was registered and after hearing both the parties, the
learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Baksa, had allowed the petition, vide order
dated 05.02.2025, which was challenged before this Court in CRP(I/O)
No.108/2025. But, vide order under review dated 06.08.2025, this Court was
pleased to dismiss the same.
7.
It also appears that while dismissing the aforesaid revision petition, this
Court had relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Brahmdeo Chaudhary (supra), wherein in paragraph Nos. 6 and 9, it has been
held as under:
“6. On the undisputed facts on record it has, therefore, to
be held that because of the resistance or obstruction
offered by the appellant, amongst others, on 28-4-1991 the
application moved by the respondent decree-holder on 6-51991 was necessarily to be one falling within the scope and
ambit of Order 21, Rule 97. It is pertinent to note that the
resistance and/or obstruction to possession of immovable
property as contemplated by Order 21, Rule 97 CPC could have
been offered by any person. The words “any person” as
Page No.# 6/12
contemplated by Order 21, Rule 97, sub-rule (1) are
comprehensive enough to include apart from judgment-debtor
or anyone claiming through him even persons claiming
independently and who would, therefore, be total strangers
to the decree. It is not in dispute between the parties that
no decree for possession has been obtained by Respondent 1
against the appellant. He is, therefore, prima facie a
stranger to the decree. When he offered obstruction or
resistance to the execution of the decree he would squarely
fall within the sweep of the words “any person” as found in
Order 21, Rule 97, sub-rule (1). Consequently it must be
held that Respondent 1's application dated 6-5-1991 though
seeking only reissuance of warrant for delivery of
possession with aid of armed force in substance sought to
bypass the previous resistance and obstruction offered by
the appellant on the spot. Thus it was squarely covered by
the sweep of Order 21, Rule 97, sub-rule (1) CPC. Once that
happened the procedure laid down by sub-rule (2) thereof had
to be followed by the executing court. The Court had to
proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance
with the subsequent provisions contained in the said order.
………
9. In short the aforesaid statutory provisions of Order 21
lay down a complete code for resolving all disputes
pertaining to execution of the decree for possession
obtained by a decree-holder and whose attempts at executing
the said decree meet with rough weather. Once resistance is
offered by a purported stranger to the decree and which
comes to be noted by the executing court as well as by the
decree-holder the remedy available to the decree-holder
against such an obstructionist is only under Order 21, Rule
97, sub-rule (1) and he cannot bypass such obstruction and
insist on reissuance of warrant for possession under Order
21, Rule 35 with the help of police force, as that course
would amount to bypassing and circumventing the procedure
Page No.# 7/12
laid down under Order 21, Rule 97 in connection with removal
of obstruction of purported strangers to the decree. Once
such an obstruction is on the record of the executing court
it is difficult to appreciate how the executing court can
tell such obstructionist that he must first lose possession
and then only his remedy is to move an application under
Order 21, Rule 99 CPC and pray for restoration of
possession. The High Court by the impugned order and
judgment has taken the view that the only remedy available
to a stranger to the decree who claims any independent
right, title or interest in the decretal property is to go
by Order 21, Rule 99. This view of the High Court on the
aforesaid statutory scheme is clearly unsustainable. It is
easy to visualise that a stranger to the decree who claims
an independent right, title and interest in the decretal
property can offer his resistance before getting actually
dispossessed. He can equally agitate his grievance and claim
for adjudication of his independent right, title and
interest in the decretal property even after losing
possession as per Order 21, Rule 99. Order 21, Rule 97 deals
with a stage which is prior to the actual execution of the
decree for possession wherein the grievance of the
obstructionist can be adjudicated upon before actual
delivery of possession to the decree-holder. While Order 21,
Rule 99 on the other hand deals with the subsequent stage in
the execution proceedings where a stranger claiming any
right, title and interest in the decretal property might
have got actually dispossessed and claims restoration of
possession on adjudication of his independent right, title
and interest dehors the interest of the judgment-debtor.
Both these types of enquiries in connection with the right,
title and interest of a stranger to the decree are clearly
contemplated by the aforesaid scheme of Order 21 and it is
not as if that such a stranger to the decree can come in the
picture only at the final stage after losing possession and
Page No.# 8/12
not before it if he is vigilant enough to raise his
objection and obstruction before the warrant for possession
gets actually executed against him. With respect the High
Court has totally ignored the scheme of Order 21, Rule 97 in
this connection by taking the view that only remedy of such
stranger to the decree lies under Order 21, Rule 99 and he
has no locus standi to get adjudication of his claim prior
to the actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder in
the execution proceedings. The view taken by the High Court
in this connection also results in patent breach of
principles of natural justice as the obstructionist, who
alleges to have any independent right, title and interest in
the decretal property and who is admittedly not a party to
the decree even though making a grievance right in time
before the warrant for execution is actually executed, would
be told off the gates and his grievance would not be
considered or heard on merits and he would be thrown off
lock, stock and barrel by use of police force by the decreeholder. That would obviously result in irreparable injury to
such obstructionist whose grievance would go overboard
without being considered on merits and such obstructionist
would be condemned totally unheard. Such an order of the
executing court, therefore, would fail also on the ground of
non-compliance with basic principles of natural justice. On
the contrary the statutory scheme envisaged by Order 21,
Rule 97 CPC as discussed earlier clearly guards against such
a pitfall and provides a statutory remedy both to the
decree-holder as well as to the obstructionist to have their
respective say in the matter and to get proper adjudication
before the executing court and it is that adjudication which
subject to the hierarchy of appeals would remain binding
between the parties to such proceedings and separate suit
would be barred with a view to seeing that multiplicity of
proceedings and parallel proceedings are avoided and the
gamut laid down by Order 21, Rules 97 to 103 would remain a
Page No.# 9/12
complete code and the sole remedy for the parties concerned
to have their grievances once and for all finally resolved
in execution proceedings themselves.”
8.
The proposition laid down in the case of Brahmdeo Chaudhary (supra) is
affirmed in subsequent decisions also, including in the case of Shreenath
(supra), Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. (supra), wherein it has categorically
been held that the word ‘any person’ in Order 21 Rule 97 CPC, includes ‘all
persons’ resisting delivery of possession, claiming right in the
property, even those not bound by the decree, including tenants
or other persons claiming right on their own, including a stranger. In the case of
Shreenath (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No. 10, it has been
held as under:
“....We find the expression "any person" under sub-clause
(1) is used deliberately for widening the scope of power so
that the executing court could adjudicate the claim made in
any such application under Order 21 Rule 97. Thus by the use
of the words "any person" it includes all persons resisting
the delivery of possession, claiming right in the property,
even those not bound by the decree, including tenants or
other persons claiming right on their own, including a
stranger.”
9.
And this being the position, the submission of Mr. Choudhury, learned
counsel for the review petitioners, is found to be devoid of substance. Though
Mr. Choudhury has tried to persuade this Court that the respondent herein
cannot maintain a petition under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC, rather it can file a
petition under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC, yet the said submission left this Court
unimpressed in view of the observation made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in
paragraph No. 9 of Brahmdeo Chaudhary (supra).
Page No.# 10/12
10. In paragraph No. 9 of Brahmdeo Chaudhary (supra), it has been observed
that Order 21 Rule 97 deals with a stage which is prior to the actual execution
of the decree for possession wherein the grievance of the obstructionist can be
adjudicated upon before actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder.
While Order 21, Rule 99 on the other hand deals with the subsequent stage in
the execution proceedings where a stranger claiming any right, title and interest
in the decretal property might have got actually dispossessed and claims
restoration of possession on adjudication of his independent right, title and
interest dehors the interest of the judgment-debtor. Both these types of
enquiries in connection with the right, title and interest of a stranger to the
decree are clearly contemplated by the aforesaid scheme of Order 21 and it is
not as if that such a stranger to the decree can come in the picture only at the
final stage after losing possession and not before it if he is vigilant enough to
raise his objection and obstruction before the warrant for possession gets
actually executed against him. It is also observed that with respect the
High Court has totally ignored the scheme of Order 21, Rule 97
in this connection by taking the view that only remedy of such
stranger to the decree lies under Order 21, Rule 99 and he has
no locus standi to get adjudication of his claim prior to the
actual
delivery
of
possession
to
the
decree-holder
in
the
execution proceedings. It has also been held that the view, taken by the
High Court, in this connection also results in patent breach of principles of
natural justice as the obstructionist, who alleges to have any independent right,
title and interest in the decretal property and who is admittedly not a party to
the decree even though making a grievance right in time before the warrant for
execution is actually executed, would be told off the gates and his grievance
Page No.# 11/12
would not be considered or heard on merits and he would be thrown off lock,
stock and barrel by use of police force by the decree-holder. That, according to
Hon’ble Supreme Court, would obviously result in irreparable injury to such
obstructionist whose grievance would go overboard without being considered on
merits and such obstructionist would be condemned totally unheard. It has also
been held that such an order of the executing court, therefore, would fail also
on the ground of non-compliance with basic principles of natural justice.
11. It has also been held that on the contrary the statutory scheme envisaged
by Order 21, Rule 97 CPC as discussed earlier clearly guards against such a
pitfall and provides a statutory remedy both to the decree-holder as well as to
the obstructionist to have their respective say in the matter and to get proper
adjudication before the executing court and it is that adjudication which subject
to the hierarchy of appeals would remain binding between the parties to such
proceedings and separate suit would be barred with a view to seeing that
multiplicity of proceedings and parallel proceedings are avoided and the gamut
laid down by Order 21, Rules 97 to 103 would remain a complete code and the
sole remedy for the parties concerned to have their grievances once and for all
finally resolved in execution proceedings themselves.
12. In view of the observations made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Brahmdeo Chaudhary (supra), and also in the cases of Shreenath (supra) and
Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. (supra), this Court is unable to record
concurrence with the submission of Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the
review petitioners.
13. Mr. Choudhury has also tried to convince this by referring to the decision
of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sriram Housing Finance and
Page No.# 12/12
Investment India Ltd. (supra), by contending that it was a later decision.
But, such argument of Mr. Choudhury also cannot be accepted in view of the
fact that the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Brahmdeo
Chaudhary (supra) is earlier in point of time and also in view of the decision of
a Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National
Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and Ors., reported in
(2017) 16 SCC 680, wherein it has been categorically held that the decision in
earlier point of time will prevail. Notably, the decision in Brahmdeo Chaudhary
(supra) was affirmed by a three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. (supra).
14.
In the result, this Court finds this review petition devoid of merit as no
error is apparent on the face of the record nor existence of any other sufficient
ground could be demonstrated by the review petitioners, and accordingly, the
same stands dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review