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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Reserved on:
Pronounced on:
Uploaded on:
CM(M) No. 20/2026
CM No. 565/2026
10.02.2026
25.02.2026
26.02.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full
Satya Devi, Aged 73 years,
D/o Smt. Janki Devi,
R/o Gohlad, Tehsil Mendhar,
District Poonch
Through:-
…. Petitioner(s)
Mr. G.S. Thakur, Advocate.
Vs.
1. Mumtaz Hussain,
S/o Mohd. Shafi,
R/o Village Gohlad,
Tehsil Mendhar, District Poonch
2. Zulfiqar Ahmed,
S/o Mohd. Shafi,
R/o Village Gohlad,
Tehsil Mendhar, District Poonch
3. Niaz Ahmed,
S/o Bir Wali,
R/o Village Gohlad,
Tehsil Mendhar, District Poonch
4. Abdul Razak,
S/o Sakhi Mohd.,
R/o Dhargloon,
Tehsil Mendhar, District Poonch
…..Respondent(s)
Through:CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
Prayer:
1. Through the medium of the present petition preferred under Article 227
of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has sought the following relief:
“a) Issuance of appropriate order or direction, quashing/setting
aside the order dated 04.09.2025 passed by the learned Civil
Judge (Junior Division) Mendhar in case titled ‘Mumtaz Hussain
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vs. Satya Devi’, whereby the application filed by the petitioner
alleging therein that the suit with respect to the same subject
matter which is directly or substantially is the same has been
decreed by the Court of learned Principal District Judge, Poonch
and wrongly the application has been styled as application
under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC which has been dismissed.
2. Before adverting to the grounds of challenge to the impugned order, it
would be appropriate to reproduce the factual matrix which led to the
filing of the present writ petition.
Factual Matrix:
3. The petitioner, being the sole legal heir of Smt. Janki Devi, inherited
the land falling under Survey No. 181 measuring 6 kanals and 18 marlas,
situated at Village Gohlad, Tehsil Mendhar, District Poonch, by virtue of
a Will Deed duly registered before the Sub Registrar, Mendhar, on
29.01.1986. After the death of her mother, the land was mutated in favour
of the petitioner vide Mutation No. 557 dated 20.05.1994.
4. The case of the petitioner is that she has been in continuous and
peaceful possession of the said land. However, the respondents, in a
clandestine manner and in connivance with the revenue authorities,
managed to get their names entered in the revenue record with respect to
land measuring 04 marlas out of the said land. Despite such illegal entry,
possession of the land remained with the petitioner. The respondents
started forcibly interfering with the possession of the petitioner in the year
2012, which constrained her to file a civil suit for permanent prohibitory
injunction before the Court of learned Munsiff, Mendhar. In the said suit,
the learned Munsiff, vide order dated 06.07.2012, temporarily restrained
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the respondents from interfering with the possession of the petitioner;
however, the said interim direction was later vacated.
5. The petitioner, being aggrieved of the order dated 12.03.2015, filed an
appeal before the learned District Judge, Poonch. The learned District
Judge, without appreciating the real controversy and the stand taken by
the respondents, held that the appeal had been rendered infructuous and
accordingly dismissed the same.
6. It is further stated that the petitioner had specifically pleaded before the
learned Munsiff, Mendhar, that she is the owner in possession of land
falling under Khasra No. 181 measuring 6 kanals and 18 marlas situated at
Village Gohlad. According to the petitioner, it was incumbent upon the
appellate Court to pass an order of status quo; however, the learned District
Judge dismissed the appeal by observing that it had become infructuous.
7. The further case of the petitioner is that she was already pursuing a suit
for permanent prohibitory injunction with respect to land falling under
Khasra No. 181 min measuring 06 kanals and 18 marlas situated at Village
Gohlad. The said suit was instituted on 05.07.2012 and was thus prior in
time. In the meanwhile, the respondents, on 03.01.2013, filed another suit
for permanent prohibitory injunction in respect of the same subject matter.
8. In the aforesaid backdrop, the petitioner has moved an application for
stay of the subsequent suit titled “Mumtaz Hussain & Ors. vs Satya Devi”
and requested that the proceedings be stayed in terms of Section 10 CPC,
on the ground that the matter in issue relating to the suit land was directly
and substantially the same. However, the court below dismissed the said
application on the ground that it was hit by the doctrine of estoppel.
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9. It is further stated that this Court, in a petition preferred under Section
104 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir (as then applicable), stayed
the proceedings in Civil Suit File No. 625/Civil. During the pendency of
the said proceedings, the suit filed by the petitioner before the learned
Munsiff, Mendhar, came to be dismissed on 08.01.2019. Feeling aggrieved,
the petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, Poonch.
The appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit in her favour
by granting a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the
respondents from interfering with the peaceful possession of the petitioner.
10. The respondents thereafter preferred a review petition, which also came
to be dismissed vide order dated 30.01.2025.
11. In the meantime, the respondents filed yet another suit titled “Mumtaz
Hussain & Ors. vs Satya Devi” before the Court of learned Sub Judge,
Poonch, which was dismissed in default on 19.04.2024. The petitioner, in
view of the changed circumstances, made a statement before this Court on
09.11.2023 that since the dispute qua the same subject matter already stood
decreed in her favour, the petition had been rendered infructuous and was
accordingly dismissed as not pressed.
12. The respondents thereafter filed a Civil Second Appeal, registered as
RSA No. 12/2025. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the proceedings
in Suit No. 625/Civil were hit by the doctrine of res judicata and there was
no occasion for the court below to conduct further proceedings.
13. The further stand of the petitioner is that she filed an application
before the learned trial Court, though styled under Order VII Rule 11
CPC, but in substance the purpose of the application was to bring to the
notice of the Court below that the dispute regarding land falling under
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Khasra No. 181 min measuring 06 kanals and 18 marlas already stood
decreed in her favour by the appellate Court, i.e., learned Principal
District Judge, Poonch. However, the court below, without considering
this aspect, dismissed the application on the ground that it was one under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Feeling aggrieved of the same, the petitioner has
preferred the present petition.
Arguments on behalf of the petitioner:
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the
impugned order dated 04.09.2025 passed by the learned Civil Judge
(Junior Division), Mendhar, is bad in the eyes of law. It is contended that
the court below failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it and
misdirected itself in dismissing the application.
15. It is argued that the suit was hit by Section 11 CPC (res judicata) and
the court below ought to have decided the application keeping in view that
mere mentioning of a wrong provision does not disentitle a party from
relief. It is submitted that it is a settled proposition of law that citing of a
wrong provision does not debar the court from granting appropriate relief.
16. Mr. G.S. Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, has further argued
that once the plea of res judicata was specifically raised, the court below
was required to deal with the said plea. Instead, the application was
dismissed mechanically, thereby compelling the petitioner to face
unnecessary proceedings. It is also argued that when the subject matter of
dispute inter se the parties was the same and a decree had already been
passed in favour of the petitioner, the court below ought to have stayed
the suit, and failure to do so amounts to miscarriage of justice.
Legal Analysis:
5|Page
17. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.
18. The petitioner, being a defendant in the suit pending before the learned
Civil Judge (Junior Division), Mendhar, had filed an application under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint. The said application has
been dismissed by the court below for the reasons recorded in the impugned
order, which are under challenge before this Court.
19. From a perusal of the record and the impugned order, it emerges that
the main ground urged by the petitioner for rejection of the plaint was that
the plaint was barred by law, inter alia, being hit by Section 10 CPC and
the doctrine of res judicata.
20. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had earlier filed an application
under Section 10 CPC seeking stay of the proceedings, which came to be
dismissed. After suffering dismissal of the said application, the petitioner
preferred another application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
21. In addition, it has also been the specific stand of the non-applicant
before the Court below that the suit was at the stage of defence evidence
and last and final opportunity had been granted to the defendants for
leading evidence, and the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC had
been filed only to delay the trial.
22. With a view to clinch the controversy in question, it would be apt to
reproduce Order VII Rule 11 CPC, which reads as under:
“11. Rejection of plaint — The plaint shall be rejected in the following
cases:—
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on
being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to
be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
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(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is
returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on
being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper
within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be
barred by any law;
[(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;]
[(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9:]
[Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the
valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be
extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that
the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from
correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the
case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to
extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.]”
23. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that a plaint
can be rejected only in the contingencies specifically enumerated therein, the
details whereof have been noticed hereinabove. It is also a settled proposition
of law that, while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the
Court is required to consider only the averments made in the plaint and the
documents filed along with it. The defence taken by the defendant in the
written statement or otherwise cannot be looked into at that stage.
24. The learned trial Court, for the purpose of deciding the application
under Clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII CPC, was required to
confine itself to the averments made in the plaint and not to the pleas
taken by the defendant in the written statement. The learned trial Court,
after examining the averments contained in the plaint, rightly came to the
conclusion that rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was
not warranted in the application so preferred.
7|Page
25. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
“Saleem Bhai and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others”, 2003
AIR SC 759, wherein it was held that:
“9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant
facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application
thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise
the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit — before
registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any
time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an
application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC, the
averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant
in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage,
therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the
application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural
irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court. The
order, therefore, suffers from non-exercising of the jurisdiction vested
in the court as well as procedural irregularity. The High Court, however,
did not advert to these aspects.”
26. With a view to test the legality of the order passed by the learned trial
Court, it would be appropriate to understand the expression “barred by law.”
In legal parlance, the said expression signifies that the suit must be
prohibited by some statutory provision, rendering it legally unsustainable
from the very inception.
27. The question, therefore, which arises for consideration is whether the
plaint filed by the respondents could be said to be “barred by law” within
the meaning of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. In the present case, the
petitioner has taken two pleas, i.e., doctrine of res judicata and Section 10
CPC, as main grounds for rejection of the plaint.
28. As regards the plea of res judicata, the same can be invoked only when
the matter has been finally heard and decided. The question of res judicata
8|Page
is a mixed question of law and fact, which requires examination of
pleadings, issues and judgments in the earlier proceedings. Such a question
ordinarily cannot be decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
29. Admittedly, the decision on which the respondents were relying
before the learned trial Court has not attained finality and is pending
adjudication in appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, this
Court is of the view that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be invoked in
the present matter as a ground for rejection of the plaint under Order VII
Rule 11(d) CPC.
30. The learned trial Court, after considering the averments made in the
plaint and the documents produced along with it, has rightly observed that
rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was not warranted, the
application being devoid of merit, and accordingly dismissed the same.
31. This Court finds itself in agreement with the reasoning given by the
learned trial Court and does not find any legal infirmity or jurisdictional error
therein. The order passed by the trial Court is well founded and in
consonance with the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
32. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
“Srihari Hanumandas Totala vs. Hemant Vithal Kamat and others”,
AIR 2021 SC 3802, wherein it was held that:
“16. Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC provides that the plaint shall be rejected
“where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred
by any law”. Hence, in order to decide whether the suit is barred by any
law, it is the statement in the plaint which will have to be construed.
The Court while deciding such an application must have due regard only
to the statements in the plaint. Whether the suit is barred by any law
must be determined from the statements in the plaint and it is not open
to decide the issue on the basis of any other material including the
9|Page
written statement in the case. Before proceeding to refer to precedents
on the interpretation of Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, we find it imperative to
refer to Section 11 of CPC which defines res judicata:
“11. Res judicata—No Court shall try any suit or issue in which
the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly
and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same
parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them
claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to
try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has
been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally
decided by such Court.”
20. On a perusal of the above authorities, the guiding principles for deciding
an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) can be summarized as follows:
(i) To reject a plaint on the ground that the suit is barred by any
law, only the averments in the plaint will have to be referred to;
(ii) The defense made by the defendant in the suit must not be
considered while deciding the merits of the application;
(iii) To determine whether a suit is barred by res judicata, it is
necessary that (i) the ‘previous suit’ is decided, (ii) the issues in the
subsequent suit were directly and substantially in issue in the
former suit; (iii) the former suit was between the same parties or
parties through whom they claim, litigating under the same title;
and (iv) that these issues were adjudicated and finally decided by
a court competent to try the subsequent suit; and
(iv) Since an adjudication of the plea of res judicata requires
consideration of the pleadings, issues and decision in the
‘previous suit’, such a plea will be beyond the scope of Order 7
Rule 11 (d), where only the statements in the plaint will have
to be perused.”
(emphasis supplied)
33. Insofar as the alternate ground taken by the petitioner before the learned
trial Court for rejection of the plaint is concerned, the same was not
maintainable in view of the fact that an earlier application filed by the
petitioner under Section 10 CPC had already been adjudicated upon and
dismissed. Having suffered dismissal of the said application, the petitioner
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could not have re-agitated the same issue through the medium of another
application, which is now the subject matter of the present petition. The
finding recorded by the learned trial Court in the earlier application
precludes the petitioner from raising the same issue again.
34. On this count also, the learned trial Court has recorded a finding which is
strictly in accordance with law and borne out from the record. Thus, on both
the grounds urged by the petitioner before the learned trial Court, reasons
have been assigned and the same have rightly been rejected.
35. No ground has been made out which would warrant interference by this
Court with the order passed by the learned trial Court. The impugned order
neither suffers from any jurisdictional error nor from any patent illegality or
perversity so as to invite exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.
36. It is trite that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India is supervisory in nature and is meant to keep the
subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. The said jurisdiction
cannot be invoked to correct every erroneous order or to act as a Court of
appeal. Interference is warranted only where there is manifest miscarriage of
justice or flagrant violation of law, which is not the case herein.
37. The learned trial Court has considered the matter in its correct
perspective, applied the settled principles governing Order VII Rule 11 CPC,
and has returned findings which are in consonance with law. This Court does
not find any reason to take a different view.
38. The Hon’ble Apex Court in ‘M/s Garment Craft vs. Prakash Chand
Goel’, (2022) 4 SCC 181, has held as under:
“18. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the
view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be
sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the
11 | P a g e
limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory
jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate,
reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under
challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every
error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or
can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own
decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or
tribunal. 1 The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional
jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse,
violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power
under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like
when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so
perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a
conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that
such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no
miscarriage of justice. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under
Article 227, this Court in “Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P)
Ltd.” has observed:“6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a
High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is
examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court.
The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the
High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds
of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or
required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested
with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or
wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and
interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to
cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of
fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court
does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also
well settled that the High Court while acting under this article
cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own
judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an
error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High
Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior
court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the
12 | P a g e
finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come
to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.”
39. This Court in case titled ‘Smt. Suman Sharma and others vs. Darbari
Lal and another’, CM(M) No. 204/2024, decided on 20.09.2024, has held
as under:
“14. Before proceeding further, it would be apt to consider the scope
of judicial intervention by the courts while exercising power under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The law has been settled by
the Apex Court in authoritative pronouncements that the power
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to be exercised
sparingly in appropriate cases like, when, there is no evidence at all
to justify the finding or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable
person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the Court or the
Tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief
must be exercised to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice.
15. The Apex Court in catena of judgments has already held that the
High Court has to exercise such wide powers under Article 227 with
great care and circumspection and the same cannot be exercised to
correct all errors of a judgment of Court and Tribunal acting within
the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be
exercised in cases, where orders have been passed in grave
dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of
law or justice. Even the power to re-appreciate the evidence would
only be justified in rare and exceptional situations, where the grave
injustice would be done, unless the Court interferes and the exercise
of such discretionary power would depend upon the peculiar facts of
each case with the sole objective of ensuring that there is no
miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court in the case of Jai Singh
Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi; (2010) 9 SCC 385 has held
as under: 15. We have anxiously considered the submissions of the learned
counsel. Before we consider the factual and legal issues involved
herein, we may notice certain well recognized principles governing
the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India. Undoubtedly the High Court, under this
Article, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts as
well as statutory or quasi judicial tribunals, exercise the powers
13 | P a g e
vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High
Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in
accordance with the well established principles of law. The High
Court is vested with the powers of superintendence and/or judicial
revision, even in matters where no revision or appeal lies to the
High Court. The jurisdiction under this Article is, in some ways,
wider than the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. It is, however, well to remember the well
known adage that greater the power, greater the care and caution in
exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise
such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The
exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognized
constraints. It cannot be exercised like a „bull in a china shop‟, to
correct all errors of judgment of a court, or tribunal, acting within
the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be
exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave
dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of
law or justice. The High Court cannot lightly or liberally act as an
appellate court and re-appreciate the evidence. Generally, it cannot
substitute its own conclusions for the conclusions reached by the
courts below or the statutory/quasi judicial tribunals. The power to
re-appreciate evidence would only be justified in rare and
exceptional situations where grave injustice would be done unless
the High Court interferes. The exercise of such discretionary power
would depend on the peculiar facts of each case, with the sole
objective of ensuring that there is no miscarriage of justice.”
40. Tested on the aforesaid principles, this Court does not find that the
impugned order suffers from any manifest perversity, patent illegality,
jurisdictional error, or gross miscarriage of justice. The learned trial Court
has exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law and has assigned cogent
reasons while dismissing the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
Merely because another view may be possible on the same set of facts would
not justify interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
41. In view of the above discussion, the petition, being devoid of merit, is
accordingly dismissed. The order dated 04.09.2025 passed by the learned
14 | P a g e
Civil Judge (Junior Division), Mendhar, in case titled “Mumtaz Hussain
vs. Satya Devi” is upheld.
(Wasim Sadiq Nargal)
Judge
Jammu:
25.02.2026
Michal Sharma/PS
Whether approved for reporting:
Whether the order is speaking
Vijay Kumar
2026.02.09 00:24
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
:
:
Yes
Yes
15 | P a g e
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