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GAHC010011842026
2026:GAU-AS:9428
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Crl.Pet./88/2026
SATMINTHANG KHONGSAI AND ANR
SON OF LETHANG KHONGSAI, RESIDENT OF BEREA, P.O. P.S.
CHURACHANDPUR, CHURACHANDPUR, MANIPUR-795128.
2: DAVIN JAMTINLAL HAOKIP
SON OF SOLUNMANG HAOKIP
RESIDENT OF NEW MOREAH
WARD NO. 9
TENGNOUPAL SUB DIVISION
CHANDEL
MANIPUR- 795131
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM
REPRESENTED BY THE PP, ASSAM
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S C BISWAS, MR. MEHUL SHAH,MS. J GHOSH,MS. U
NANDA,MS. S. CHANDA,MS P HALDER
Advocate for the Respondent : SC, NCB,
Linked Case : Bail Appln./3617/2025
SATMINTHANG KHONGSAI AND ANR
SON OF LETHANG KHONGSAI
RESIDENT OF BEREA
P.O. AND P.S. - CHURACHANDPUR
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CHURACHANDPUR
MANIPUR-795128.
2: DAVID JAMTINLAL HAOKIP
SON OF - SOLUNMANG HAOKIP
RESIDENT OF NEW MOREA
WARD NO.9
TENGNOUPAL SUB DIVISION
CHANDEL
MANIPUR-795131.
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY STANDING COUNSEL
NCB
-----------Advocate for : MR. S C BISWAS
Advocate for : SC
NCB appearing for THE UNION OF INDIA
-BEFOREHON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRANJAL DAS
ORDER
26.06.2026
Heard Mr. S.C. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner assisted
by Ms. S. Chanda. Also heard Mr. R.K.Dev. Choudhury, learned Dy.
SGI and Standing Counsel for the NCB assisted by Ms. L. Gogoi.
2.
The instant criminal petition and the bail application are being
disposed of together due to commonality of issues involved therein.
3.
The criminal petition has been filed invoking section 528 BNSS
by the two petitioners, namely, Satminthang Khongsai and
David Jamtinlal Haokip seeking interference with order dated
16.10.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge, Cachar, Silchar, in
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NCB Crime Case No. 5/2025, whereby, invoking the provisions of
Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act -the statutory period was extended
by another 6(six) months (180) days.
4.
By the bail application filed under 483 BNSS, the accused
petitioners are seeking regular bail in connection with the same case
i.e. NCB Case No.5/2025.
5.
The facts in brief are that on 07.04.2025, the NCB Guwahati
Zonal Unit seized 20.530 kgs of methamphetamine tablets from a
Thar/vehicle bearing No.AS-01-GB-2498 at Lailapur Police Check
Post, Cachar. The said contraband is stated to fall in the bracket of
commercial quantity.
6.
Accordingly, the FIR was lodged. The contraband and other
materials seized, the accused persons apprehended and the case
was registered under Section 22(C)/29 NDPS Act.
7.
The petitioner contends that investigation is still continuing
despite the extension of the statutory period. The primary
contention of the petitioners in the criminal petition is that the
extension of the statutory period was made without the report of the
public prosecutor, as required under the statutory provision and the
case laws in this regard. It is submitted that as the extension of the
statutory period is bad in law and therefore, the same may be
interfered with and the petitioners may also be granted bail at this
stage.
8.
In fact, it is contended and submitted on behalf of the
petitioners that due to the infirmity in the extension order, the
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petitioners have become entitled to default bail.
9.
The NCB is represented by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. R. K.
Dev. Choudhury, the learned Deputy SGI, who contends that the
nature of the allegations and the alleged offences are very serious
and that due to bonafide reasons, the investigation could not be
completed within the initial statutory period of 180 days and
therefore, prayer for extension was made and the learned Trial
Court, upon being satisfied about the said reasons was pleased to
extend the same.
10.
I have perused the materials and considered the rival
submissions.
11.
The provisions of Section 36A of the NDPS Act may be
reproduced herein below:“[36-A.
Offences
triable
by
Special
Courts. —(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
(a) all offences under this Act which are punishable with
imprisonment for a term of more than three years shall be triable
only by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the
offence has been committed or where there are more Special
Courts than one for such area, by such one of them as may be
specified in this behalf by the Government;”
(b) where a person accused of or suspected of the
commission of an offence under this Act is forwarded to a
Magistrate under sub-section (2) or sub-section (2A) of Section
167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) 3, such
Magistrate may authorise the detention of such person in such
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custody as he thinks fit for a period not exceeding fifteen days in
the whole where such Magistrate is a Judicial Magistrate and
seven days in the whole where such Magistrate is an Executive
Magistrate:
Provided that in cases which are triable by the Special
Court where such Magistrate considers—
(i) when such person is forwarded to him as aforesaid; or
(ii) upon or at any time before the expiry of the period of
detention authorised by him; that the detention of such person is
unnecessary, he shall order such person to be forwarded to the
Special Court having jurisdiction;
(c) the Special Court may exercise, in relation to the person
forwarded to it under clause (b), the same power which a
Magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case may exercise under
Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) 4,
in relation to an accused person in such case who has been
forwarded to him under that section;
(d) a Special Court may, upon perusal of police report of
the facts constituting an offence under this Act or upon complaint
made by an officer of the Central Government or a State
Government authorised in his behalf, take cognizance of that
offence without the accused being committed to it for trial.
(2) When trying an offence under this Act, a Special Court
may also try an offence other than an offence under this Act with
which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974)5, be charged at the same trial.
(3) Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to
affect the special powers of the High Court regarding bail under
Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) 6,
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and the High Court may exercise such powers including the power
under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of that section as if the
reference to “Magistrate” in that section included also a reference
to a “Special Court” constituted under Section 36.
(4) In respect of persons accused of an offence punishable
under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27-A or for offences
involving commercial quantity the references in sub-section (2) of
Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974)7 thereof to “ninety days”, where they occur, shall be
construed as reference to “one hundred and eighty days”:
Provided that, if it is not possible to complete the
investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty
days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to one year
on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of
the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the
accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)8, the offences punishable
under this Act with imprisonment for a term of not more than
three years may be tried summarily.]”
12.
In the case of Sanjay Kumar Kedia v. Narcotics Control Bureau,
(2009) 17 SCC 631, the Hon’ble Apex Court explained the aforesaid
provisions of Section 36A (4) of the NDPS Act and laid down the
following essential conditions for its compliance. The para-12 is
hereby reproduced herein below:“12. The maximum period of 90 days fixed under Section 167(2) of the
Code has been increased to 180 days for several categories of offences
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under the Act but the proviso authorises a yet further period of detention
which may in total go up to one year, provided the stringent conditions
provided therein are satisfied and are complied with. The conditions
provided are:
(1) a report of the Public Prosecutor,
(2) which indicates the progress of the investigation, and
(3) specifies the compelling reasons for seeking the detention of the
accused beyond the period of 180 days, and
(4) after notice to the accused.”
13.
In the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra ,
(1994) 4 SCC 602, the Hon’ble Apex Court clearly held in para-38, in
the context of similar extension provision in Clause(bb) of Section
20(4) of TADA, that – the report of the Investigating Officer is not a
substitute for the report of the Public Prosecutor.
14.
In the case of Ravindran vs. Directorate of evenue Intelligence,
(2021) 2 SCC 485, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that if the application
for extension is made before the expiry of the period and the
application for default bail is also filed both can be taken up and
disposed of together and that such disposal can be made even after
the expiry of the period. The relevant paragraph 20.1 may be
reproduced herein below:“20.1. The observations made in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur [Hitendra
Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC
(Cri) 1087] and Sanjay Dutt [Sanjay Dutt v. State, (1994) 5 SCC 410 :
1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] to the effect that the application for default bail
and any application for extension of time made by the Public Prosecutor
must be considered together are, in our opinion, only applicable in
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situations where the Public Prosecutor files a report seeking extension of
time prior to the filing of the application for default bail by the accused.
In such a situation, notwithstanding the fact that the period for
completion of investigation has expired, both applications would have to
be considered together. However, where the accused has already applied
for default bail, the Prosecutor cannot defeat the enforcement of his
indefeasible right by subsequently filing a final report, additional
complaint or report seeking extension of time.”
[emphasis added]
15.
In the case of Jayanandan Prasad v. State of Assam, 2012 SCC
OnLineGau 8, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court noticed the aforesaid
principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and applied the same
in the facts of that case by granting bail to the accused. The
relevant paragraph-8 of the said decision may be reproduced herein
below:“8. The record of learned Special Judge contains the application of the
Investigating
Officer
dated
3.9.2011
for
extension
of
time
of
investigation. Though this application was forwarded to the court
through Prosecuting Inspector, Dhubri Court, no separate report was
submitted by the Public Prosecutor. The prayer for extension of time was
allowed vide order dated 28.9.2011. The said order is totally silent about
any report from the Public Prosecutor. Hence, rejection of the bail prayer
by the learned Special judge on the ground that detention period of the
accused persons has been extended for one year from 2.8.2011 is not
sustainable in law.”
16.
Coming back to the facts of the instant case, I go back to the
impugned order dated 16.10.2025 passed by the learned Trial Court.
From a perusal of the order, it appears that both sides, including
defence were heard by the learned Trial Court.
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17.
I have also perused the application dated 03.10.2025. The said
application is filed by the complainant through the Public Prosecutor.
In the impugned extension order also, the learned Trial Court has
referred to the petition filed by the complainant NCB through the
learned Special P.P. for extension of the statutory period. In the said
factual situation and the backdrop of the case laws noticed above the extension vide ordered dated 16.10.2025 was not made on the
basis of any report of the Special Public Prosecutor and therefore,
such extension of the statutory period suffers from a fatal legal
infirmity, which is required to be interfered with in this criminal
petition.
18.
In this context, I respectfully agree with the conclusions
arrived at in the facts of that case by a Coordinate Bench of this
Court in Jayanandan Prasad (supra). Consequently, the impugned
extension order dated 16.10.2025 passed by the learned trial Court,
extending the statutory period is hereby set aside and quashed.
19.
The prayer for extension was stated to have been filed on the
179th day prior to the expiry of the initial statutory period of 180
days and the date of filing was 03.10.2025 and the extension was
granted by the order dated 16.10.2025, as already narrated above.
The extension order having been set aside for the reasons
indicated above - it can be held that the statutory period of 180 days
has expired and there are no materials to indicate completion of
investigation. Therefore, the petitioners are required to be granted
default bail.
20.
Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances and in view of the
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above discussion, I allow this bail petition and the accused persons
are allowed to go on bail on furnishing a bail bond of
Rs.1,00,000/- lakh each with two sureties of the like amount
each, one of whom has to be from the State of Assam - to the
satisfaction of the learned Special Judge, Kamrup (M), Guwahati.
The following conditions are imposed:(i)
The accused persons shall not abscond and shall be
available for the remaining trial;
(ii)
They shall not hamper or tamper with evidence;
(iii)
They shall not commit any illegal activities or
offences, including any offences under the NDPS Act,
(iv)
They shall not in any manner intimidate, harass or try
to influence any witnesses.
21.
Violation of the bail conditions would lead to cancellation of
the bail.
22.
The criminal petition and the bail application stand allowed
and disposed of.
JUDGE
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