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2026:CGHC:3030
KUNAL
DEWANGAN
NAFR
Digitally
signed by
KUNAL
DEWANGAN
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRR No. 103 of 2026
Santosh Suryavanshi S/o Shri Dilip Suryavanshi Aged About 32 Years
R/o Leprosy Hospital Road, Ward No. 46, Basantpur, District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh
... Applicant(s)
versus
Hemlata @ Himanshi Suryavanshi D/o Mr. Mangal Bhave Aged About 30
Years R/o New Sahu Para, Near Deepak Kirana Stores, Khamtarai,
Raipur Chhattisgarh
... Non-applicant(s)
For Applicant
: Mr. Achyut Tiwari, Advocate.
For Non-applicant
:
None.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Order on Board
19.01.2026
1.
Heard Mr. Achyut Tiwari, learned counsel for the applicant on I.A.
No. 01 of 2025, which is an application for condonation of delay of 608
days in preferring the instant criminal revision.
2.
Learned counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that due to a
bona 9de miscommunication between the applicant and his counsel, the
applicant remained unaware of the impugned judgment passed by the
learned Family Court. Upon coming to know about the said judgment, the
applicant promptly applied for certi9ed copies of the impugned judgment
and decree along with other relevant documents. Immediately after
receiving the said documents, the applicant 9led the present petition
before this Court without any further delay. Accordingly, the delay of 608
days in 9ling the instant appeal is neither deliberate nor intentional, but
occurred due to circumstances beyond the control of the applicant. The
delay caused in 9ling the present revision is unintentional and bona 9de in
nature. Accordingly, he prays for condoning the delay in the interest of
justice and proceed to hear the revision on merits.
3.
I have heard learned counsel appearing for the applicant as also
perused the application for condonation of delay in preferring the instant
criminal revision.
4.
The primary question that arises for consideration before this Court
is whether the delay of about 608 days in preferring the present revision
petition deserves to be condoned or not.
5.
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932, while
considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:“5. The legal position is that where a case has
been presented in the Court beyond limitation,
the petitioner has to explain the Court as to
what was the "su cient cause" which means
an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the Court within
limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy
Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was
held by this Court that even though limitation
may harshly a*ect the rights of a party, it has
to be applied with all its rigour when
prescribed by statute. A reference was also
made to the decision of this Court in Ajay
Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92
wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition O cer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of su cient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
“15. The
law on
the
issue
can
be
summarised to the e*ect that where a case
has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the
court as to what was the “su cient cause”
which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach
the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona
<de
on
his
part
in
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case, or found to have
not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justi<ed ground to
condone the delay. No court could be
justi<ed in condoning such an inordinate
delay
by
imposing
any
condition
whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no
su cient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justi<cation, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court did not commit
any
mistake
in
dismissing
the
delay
condonation application of the present
appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously
based
on
facts
and
circumstances of each case and that, the
expression 'su cient cause' cannot be
liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction
or lack of bona <des is attributed to the
party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024
INSC
262,
wherein,
one
of
us
(J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after
referring to various decisions on the issue, it
was in unequivocal terms observed by this
Court that delay should not be excused as a
matter
of
generosity
and
rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice
to the opposite party. The relevant passage
of the same is pro<tably extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we
made it very clear that we are not going to
look into the merits of the matter as long as
we are not convinced that su cient cause
has been made out for condonation of such
a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India
when it comes to condoning the gross delay
of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses
to approach the court long after the lapse of
the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn
around and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being
condoned.
This
litigation
between
the
parties started sometime in 1981. We are in
2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed.
However, till date the respondent has not
been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It
would be a mockery of justice if we condone
the delay of 12 years and 158 days and
once again ask the respondent to undergo
the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it
appears that they want to <x their own
period
of
limitation
for
instituting
the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a
party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own
inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to
be
non-deliberate
delay
and
in
such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be
heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering
the plea for condonation of delay, the court
must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to <rst
ascertain the bona <des of the explanation
o*ered by the party seeking condonation. It
is only if the su cient cause assigned by the
litigant and the opposition of the other side
is equally balanced that the court may bring
into aid the merits of the matter for the
purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation
is
not
merely
a
technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should
not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging
over the head of the respondent for
inde<nite period of time to be determined at
the whims and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the High
Court committed no error much less any
error of law in passing the impugned order.
Even
otherwise,
the
High
Court
was
exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it
has been said that delay should not be
excused
as
a
matter
of
generosity.
Rendering substantial justice is not to cause
prejudice
to
the
opposite
party.
The
appellants have failed to prove that they
were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the
matter and this vital test for condoning the
delay is not satis<ed in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this
appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There
shall be no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the
facts of the present case, we are of the opinion
that the High Court correctly refused to
condone the delay and dismissed the appeal
by observing that such inordinate delay was
not explained satisfactorily, no su cient cause
was shown for the same, and no plausible
reason was put forth by the State. Therefore,
we are inclined to reject this petition at the
threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush
aside the delay occurred in preferring the
second
appeal,
due
to
callous
and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the o=cials
functioning in the State machinery. Though the
Government adopts systematic approach in
handling the legal issues and preferring the
petitions/applications/appeals well within the
time, due to the fault on the part of the o=cials
in merely communicating the information on
time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the
Government exchequer. The present case is
one such case, wherein, enormous delay of
1788 days occasioned in preferring the second
appeal due to the lapses on the part of the
o=cials functioning under the State, though
valuable Government lands were involved.
Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the
machinery touching the legal issues, o@ering
legal opinion, 9ling of cases before the Tribunal
/ Courts, etc., 9x the responsibility on the
o=cer(s)
concerned,
and
penalize
the
o=cer(s), who is/are responsible for delay,
deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the
loss caused to the Government. Such direction
will have to be followed by all the States
scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter
which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a
period of time, we have noticed that whenever
there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at
the instance of a private litigant or State the
delay is sought to be explained right from the
time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay
of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end
of the same. For example if the period of
limitation is 90 days then the party seeking
condonation has to explain why it was unable
to institute the proceedings within that period
of limitation. What events occurred after the
91st day till the last is of no consequence. The
court is required to consider what came in the
way of the party that it was unable to <le it
between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is
true that a party is entitled to wait until the last
day of limitation for <ling an appeal. But when
it allows the limitation to expire and pleads
su cient cause for not <ling the appeal earlier,
the
su cient cause
must establish
that
because of some event or circumstance
arising before the limitation expired it was not
possible to <le the appeal within time. No
event or circumstance arising after the expiry
of limitation can constitute such su cient
cause. There may be events or circumstances
subsequent to the expiry of limitation which
may further delay the <ling of the appeal. But
that the limitation has been allowed to expire
without the appeal being <led must be traced
to a cause arising within the period of
limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and
Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC
733).”
6.
Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the discretion
to condone delay has to be exercised with great caution and only upon a
clear and satisfactory demonstration of “su=cient cause.” The law is wellsettled that ignorance of law, by themselves, do not constitute such
su=cient cause, and that negligence, inaction or lack of bona 9des cannot
be overlooked under the guise of advancing substantial justice.
7.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful
consideration of the rival submissions, this Court 9nds that the delay of
608 days in 9ling the present revision is grossly inordinate. The
explanation o@ered by the applicant that the delay is neither intentional
nor deliberate, but has occurred due to bona 9de and unavoidable
reasons beyond the control of the applicant. The applicant was genuinely
unaware of the passing of the impugned judgment due to bona9e
miscommunication between the applicant and his counsel and when the
applicant knows and approached his counsel, then the counsel advised to
9le criminal revision, thereafter, he has preferred the instant criminal
revision, though invoking sympathy, cannot be treated as “su=cient
cause” in the eye of law. It is now well-settled that poverty or ignorance of
law by themselves do not constitute adequate justi9cation for condoning
delay, nor can the valuable right that accrues to the opposite party by
virtue of the law of limitation be lightly taken away.
8.
The doctrine of limitation is founded upon public policy that seeks to
ensure certainty and 9nality in litigation. Once the statutory period has
expired, a litigant seeking indulgence of the Court must show diligence
and bona 9des, and must explain satisfactorily the circumstances which
prevented timely action. In the present case, the applicant has not been
able to point out any circumstance arising within the period of limitation
which disabled him from approaching this Court. On the contrary, the
record reveals that he remained inactive for a long period. Such
explanation cannot be construed as su=cient cause for condonation of
delay, particularly when the delay is prolonged and unexplained for a
substantial period.
9.
Therefore, this Court is constrained to hold that no case for
condonation of delay is made out. The application for condonation of
delay is accordingly rejected. As a consequence, the instant criminal
revision petition, being hopelessly barred by limitation, also stands
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
Kunal
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