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SYED
ROSHAN
ZAMIR
ALI
Digitally signed
by SYED
ROSHAN
ZAMIR ALI
Date:
2026.10.30
19:32:07 +0530
2026:CGHC:46108
CGHC010420002026
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 2769 of 2026
1. Santosh Kumar Singh S/o. Rup Singh, Aged About 57 Years
Resident Of Ward No. 2, Rajapara, Near Raja Pond, Janjgir,
Police Station-Kotwali, District - Janjgir-Champa (Cg)
... Petitioner
versus
1. Laxminarayan Kaushik S/o. Bhagwat Kaushik Aged About 41
Years
Resident
Of
Chakarbhatha,
Police
Station-
Chakarbhatha, District-Bilaspur (CG)
... Respondent
For Petitioner
:
Mr. Amit Singh Chouhan, Advocate
SB: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Parth Prateem Sahu
Order on Board
30.10.2026
1. Petitioner has preferred this petition under Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short 'BNSS')
feeling partially aggrieved by the order dated 31.8.2026
passed in Criminal Appeal No.265/2026 by which learned
appellate Court has stayed the recovery of amount of
compensation as awarded by learned Magistrate under
Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short
‘the Act of 1881’) subject to petitioner’s depositing 20% of the
amount of compensation.
2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the proceedings under
Section 138 of the Act of 1881 had been initiated against the
petitioner. In the said proceedings, learned Magistrate held
the petitioner guilty of having committed offence punishable
under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 and accordingly,
convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment
for a period of three months and to pay compensation to the
tune of Rs.24,62,875/- to the complainant. Aggrieved
therewith, an appeal under Section 415 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 (for short ‘the BNSS’),
corresponding to Section 374 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973 (for short ‘CrPC’), was preferred by
petitioner. Along with the appeal, so preferred, an application
under Section 430 (1) of the BNSS, corresponding to Section
389 of CrPC, had been moved by petitioner. By the order
impugned, the sentence imposed upon petitioner was
suspended and he has been directed to be released on bail.
However, while staying recovery of amount of compensation
awarded by learned Magistrate, petitioner is directed to
deposit of 20% of the compensation amount. This condition
is to be complied on or before the next date of hearing.
3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that under Section
143A of the Act of 1881 it is the discretion of the appellate
Court to either order the appellant to deposit a portion of the
fine/ compensation amount awarded by learned Magistrate or
to waive such deposit and this discretion is to be exercised
judicially and not mechanically. Petitioner herein has sought
waiver of the condition for deposit of 20% of the
compensation amount imposed vide judgment dated 1.8.2026
specifically pleading that petitioner is not capable to deposit
20% amount of compensation, therefore if he is not exempted
from such deposit, it would lead to deprivation of his right of
appeal.
4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the
documents available in record of petition.
5. Section 148 of the Act of 1881, which is relevant for the
adjudication of the present case, reads as under:“148. Power of Appellate Court to order payment
pending
appeal
against
conviction.--(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in an appeal
by the drawer against conviction under section 138,
the Appellate Court may order the appellant to
deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of
twenty per cent. of the fine or compensation awarded
by the trial Court:
Provided that the amount payable under this
sub-section shall be in addition to any interim
compensation paid by the appellant under section
143A.
(2) The amount referred to in sub-section (1) shall be
deposited within sixty days from the date of the order,
or within such further period not exceeding thirty days
as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause
being shown by the appellant.
(3) The Appellate Court may direct the release of the
amount
deposited
by
the
appellant
to
the
complainant at any time during the pendency of the
appeal:
Provided that if the appellant is acquitted, the Court
shall direct the complainant to repay to the appellant
the amount so released, with interest at the bank rate
as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent
at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within
sixty days from the date of the order, or within such
further period not exceeding thirty days as may be
directed by the Court on sufficient cause being
shown by the complainant."
6. From perusal of above quoted Section 148 of the Act of 1881,
it emerges that in an appeal filed by the drawer against
conviction under Section 138, the Appellate Court ‘may’ order
the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum
of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the
Magistrate. The use of word ‘may’ in Section 148 makes the
intention of the legislature very clear that any order of deposit
by the appellate Court is not compulsory and/ or mandatory
and is thus, open to exercise of discretion and relaxation in
exceptional cases, as and when need arises.
Hence, an
order asking an accused, like petitioner herein, to deposit
20% of the compensation awarded by the learned Magistrate
in a complaint case under Section 138 of the Act of 1881, has
to reflect due application of mind as it ought not to be passed
mechanically.
7. In case of Jamboo Bhandari (supra), Hon’ble Supreme
Court has observed thus:"7. Therefore, when Appellate Court considers the
prayer under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. of an
accused who has been convicted for offence under
Section 138 of the N.I. Act, it is always open for the
Appellate Court to consider whether it is an
exceptional
case
which
warrants
grant
of
suspension of sentence without imposing the
condition
of
deposit
of
20%
of
the
fine/
compensation amount. As stated earlier, if the
Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that it is
an exceptional case, the reasons for coming to the
said conclusion must be recorded.
8.
The
submission
of
the
learned
counsel
appearing for the original complainant is that
neither before the Sessions Court nor before the
High Court, there was a plea made by the
appellants that an exception may be made in these
cases and the requirement of deposit or minimum
20% of the amount be dispensed with. He submits
that if such a prayer was not made by the
appellants, there were no reasons for the Courts to
consider the said plea.
9. We disagree with the above submission. When
an accused applies under Section 389 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure for suspension of sentence,
he normally applies for grant of relief of suspension
of sentence without any condition.
Therefore,
when a blanket order is sought by the Appellants,
the Court has to consider whether the case falls in
exception or not.”
8.
In case of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v State of
Jharkhand and others, reported in (2024) 4 SCC 419,
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus:27. Subject to what is held earlier, the main
conclusions can be summarized as follows:
27.1. The exercise of power under sub-section (1)
of Section 143-A is discretionary. The provision is
directory and not mandatory. The word "may" used
in the provision cannot be construed as "shall".
27.2. While deciding the prayer made under
Section 143-A, the court must record brief reasons
indicating consideration of all relevant factors.
27.3. The broad parameters for exercising the
discretion under Section 143-A are as follows:
27.3.1. The court will have to prima facie
evaluate the merits of the case made out by
the complainant and the merits of the
defence pleaded by the accused in the reply
to the application. The financial distress of
the accused can also be a consideration.
27.3.2.
A
direction
to
pay
interim
compensation can be issued, only if the
complainant makes out a prima facie case.
27.3.3. If the defence of the accused is found
to be prima facie plausible, the court may
exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim
compensation.
27.3.4. If the court concludes that a case is
made out to grant interim compensation, it
will also have to apply its mind to the
quantum of interim compensation to be
granted. While doing so, the court will have to
consider several factors such as the nature of
the transaction, the relationship, if any,
between the accused and the complainant,
etc.
27.3.5. There could be several other relevant
factors in the peculiar facts of a given case,
which cannot be exhaustively stated. The
parameters stated above are not exhaustive.”
9.
In case of Rohit Chaturvedi Vs. State of Uttarakhand &
others, reported in 2026 SCC Online SC 865 Hon'ble
Supreme Court has observed thus:
"It is a settled principle of law that any order
affecting rights of a person and particularly his
liberty must be with reasons and must reflect
due application of mind. Recording of reasons
is not an empty formality, it is a safeguard
against arbitrariness and ensures transparency,
fairness, and accountability in decision-making.
The absence of reasons renders it bald and
makes it impossible to ascertain whether
relevant factors were duly considered or not."
10. Reading of above statutory provisions coupled with the
guidelines laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in above
decisions, demonstrates that it is always open for the
appellate Court to impose or not to impose condition of
deposit of a portion of amount of fine/compensation. It is not
compulsory and the appellate Court can, depending on the
facts and circumstances of the case, determine whether
deposit should be ordered at 20%, reduced to a lesser
amount or waived altogether.
However, the Court must
record the reasons in support of such exercise of discretion.
11. Reverting back to the present case. Perusal of the impugned
order reveals that the appellate court while considering prayer
for stay/exemption from deposit of amount of compensation,
has not recorded any reason as to why case of petitioner is
not an exception case where condition of deposit of 20% can
be exempted. True it is that the Appellate Court was not
expected to pass any detailed order, but at least some prima
facie reasons ought to have been recorded that why the
petitioner’s case was not found to be an exceptional case,
once specific argument had been raised before the appellate
Court by the petitioner that due to financial distress he is
unable to fulfill the condition of 20% deposit.
12. For the foregoing, the petition is allowed. The impugned order
dated 31.08.2026 to the extent it directs for deposit of 20%
amount of compensation is set aside. The matter is remanded
back to the Appellate Court with a direction to consider the
question of deposit/waiver of amount of compensation afresh
within a period of one month from the date of production of
copy of this order before the trial Court.
13. Certified copy as per rules.
Sd/(Parth Prateem Sahu)
Judge
roshan/
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