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2026:CGHC:10980-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 720 of 2024
Santosh Kumar Kashyap S/o Motilal Kashyap Aged About 58 Years R/o
Village And Post Kaitha, P.S. Hasaud, Tehsil Jaijaipur, District Janjgir
Champa Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant(s)
versus
1.
State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of
Panchayat,
Mantralay,
Mahanadi
Bhawan
New
Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
2.
The Chief Executive Officer District Panchayat, District Janjgir
Champa, Chhattisgarh.
3.
Deputy Director District Panchayat, District Janjgir Champa,
Chhattisgarh.
...Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant
For Respondent/State
For Respondent No. 2
Digitally
signed by
BRIJMOHAN
BRIJMOHAN MORLE
MORLE
Date:
2026.03.03
14:34:31
+0530
:
:
:
Mr. Dilip Kumar Swain, Advocate.
Mr. S.S. Baghel, Government Advocate.
Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
03.03.2026
1.
Heard Mr. Dilip Kumar Swain, learned counsel for the appellant.
Also heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Government Advocate, appearing
for the State and Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, learned counsel, appearing for
respondent No. 2.
2.
The present intra-Court appeal has been preferred by the
appellant calling in question the legality and validity of the order dated
28.08.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 9086 of
2019 (Santosh Kumar Kashyap v. State of Chhattisgarh), whereby
the writ petition instituted by the appellant herein came to be dismissed.
3.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant was
appointed as Panchayat Karmi of Gram Panchayat Kaitha, Janpad
Panchayat Jaijaipur, District Janjgir-Champa, and was subsequently
designated to discharge the duties of Panchayat Secretary. During the
course of service, he was implicated along with four co-accused
persons in a criminal case, pursuant to which FIR bearing Crime
No.117/2001 was registered at Police Station Jaijaipur for offences
under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420 of the IPC. The appellant
was arrested on 08.08.2001 and remained in judicial custody till
05.10.2001. He further submits that owing to the aforesaid detention,
the appellant could not discharge his duties. However, no written order
of suspension, termination or removal was ever issued to him at that
point of time. Upon enquiry by the Chief Executive Officer, District
Panchayat, it was confirmed vide letter dated 09.04.2018 by the Chief
Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Jaijaipur, that the appellant had
not been removed from the post of Panchayat Karmi. This position was
reiterated in paragraph 4 of the order dated 26.04.2019 passed by the
CEO, District Janjgir-Champa.
4.
It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant tha
the criminal proceedings, registered as Criminal Case No.159/2007,
culminated in acquittal of the appellant by judgment dated 30.12.2017.
Despite acquittal, he was not permitted to resume duties. Consequently,
he filed WPS No.5868/2018 before this Court. Vide order dated
07.09.2018, this Court directed the respondents to take a decision
within 60 days and to determine the manner in which the intervening
period was to be treated, observing that upon acquittal the status of the
petitioner was required to be considered for restoration. Though the
order required compliance within 60 days, the Chief Executive Officer
passed order only on 26.04.2019, after a delay of 232 days. By the said
order, the appellant was reinstated as Panchayat Secretary, but it was
directed that he would not be entitled to any pay or allowances for the
intervening period on the principle of “No Work No Pay”. Aggrieved, by
the said order, appellant preferred WPS No.9086/2019 seeking back
wages, which came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide
order dated 28.08.2024 on the ground that the acquittal was not
honourable but on benefit of doubt.
5.
Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that under Rule
2 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1966 (for short, ‘Rules of 1966’), a Government servant detained
in custody for more than 48 hours is deemed to be under suspension.
Since the appellant remained in custody beyond 48 hours, he ought to
have been treated as deemed suspended and, at the least, entitled to
subsistence allowance and continuity of service. He also argued that
the observation of the learned Single Judge regarding dismissal w.e.f.
01.05.2002 is not borne out from the reinstatement order dated
26.04.2019. Reliance placed upon WA No.329/2019 (decided on
17.07.2019) is stated to be distinguishable on facts. It is urged that the
appellant was prevented from working without a lawful order and
therefore the principle of “No Work No Pay” ought not to have been
applied.
6.
Per contra, learned State counsel and learned counsel for
respondent No. 2 supported the impugned order and submitted that no
interference is called for in the intra-court appeal.
7.
It is submitted on behalf of respondent No. 2 that the appellant
was initially appointed as Panchayat Karmi by order dated 29.12.1995.
Subsequently, in exercise of powers under Section 69(1) of the
M.P./C.G. Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993, he was
designated to discharge the duties of Panchayat Secretary. Upon
registration of FIR and his detention from 08.08.2001 to 05.10.2001, the
Collector, by order dated 01.05.2002, terminated/de-notified him from
the post. The appellant was acquitted on 30.12.2017 by extending
benefit of doubt. In compliance with the direction dated 07.09.2018
passed in WPS No.5868/2018, respondent No. 2 passed order dated
26.04.2019 reinstating him in service but denying continuity of service
and back wages for the intervening period by applying the principle of
“No Work No Pay”.
8.
It is further contended by the learned counsel for respondent No.2
that the Appellant substantively remained an employee of Gram
Panchayat Kaitha, which is an autonomous local body under the
Panchayat Raj Act. In absence of Gram Panchayat being impleaded as
a party, the writ petition itself suffered from non-joinder of necessary
party. It is also urged that under Rule 18(1)(f) of the M.P. Panchayat
Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, an efficacious alternative
remedy was available to the appellant to challenge the determination
regarding pay and allowances for the intervening period. Without
exhausting the statutory remedy, he directly invoked writ jurisdiction.
Additionally, it is submitted that the Appellant did not plead or establish
that he was not gainfully employed during the relevant period. In
absence of foundational pleadings and proof, back wages cannot be
claimed as a matter of right.
9.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
10.
It is not in dispute that the Appellant was dismissed/de-notified
from service by order dated 01.05.2002 following his arrest and
detention in connection with offences under Sections 409, 467, 468,
471 and 420/34 IPC. He remained in judicial custody from 08.08.2001
to 05.10.2001 and was acquitted by judgment dated 30.12.2017 by
granting benefit of doubt. Pursuant to order dated 07.09.2018 passed in
WPS No.5868/2018, he was reinstated vide order dated 26.04.2019 but
denied pay and allowances for the period 01.05.2002 to 26.04.2019 on
the principle of “No Work No Pay”.
11.
The issue requires consideration in light of Rule 54 of the
Fundamental Rules. Sub-rule (1) mandates that upon reinstatement, the
competent authority shall pass a specific order regarding pay and
allowances for the period of absence and whether such period shall be
treated as duty. Sub-rule (2) provides that where the Government
servant has been “fully exonerated”, he shall be paid full pay and
allowances, subject to sub-rule (6). Sub-rule (7) further provides that
even where pay is reduced under the proviso, it shall not be less than
subsistence allowance admissible under Rule 53.
12.
The expression “fully exonerated” assumes significance. The
distinction between honourable acquittal and acquittal on benefit of
doubt has been recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal Singh Panchal,
reported in (1994) 1 SCC 541, wherein it was held that reinstatement
with full benefits would arise only where the employee is acquitted of all
blame and honourably exonerated.
13.
In the present case, perusal of the judgment dated 30.12.2017
passed in Criminal Case No.159/2007 shows that the learned trial Court
acquitted the appellant by extending benefit of doubt, holding that the
prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. It is thus
not a case of honourable acquittal or a finding that the prosecution was
false or malicious.
14.
The principle of “No Work No Pay” is founded upon the concept
that wages are paid in consideration of services rendered. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Union Territory, Chandigarh v. Brijmohan Kaur,
reported in (2005) 9 SCC 43, reiterated that a Government servant who
has not worked is ordinarily not entitled to salary for the period of
absence.
15.
A Division Bench of this Court in Rakesh Kumar Rathore v.
State of Chhattisgarh (WA No. 329 of 2019, decided on 17.07.2019),
has held that where acquittal is based on benefit of doubt and not
honourable exoneration, and where there is no case of malicious
prosecution, the employee cannot claim entire service benefits for the
intervening period at the cost of public exchequer.
16.
In the present case, the appellant was out of service on account of
his involvement in a criminal case and consequent detention. It is not
his case that the prosecution was malicious or fabricated. The acquittal
being on benefit of doubt, he cannot be said to have been “fully
exonerated” within the meaning of Rule 54(2) of the Fundamental
Rules.
17.
The competent authority, while reinstating the Appellant on
26.04.2019, specifically exercised its jurisdiction under Rule 54(1) and
determined that the intervening period from 01.05.2002 to 26.04.2019
would be treated under the principle of “No Work No Pay”. Such
determination cannot be said to be arbitrary or contrary to the statutory
framework.
18.
The learned Single Judge has rightly appreciated the distinction
between honourable acquittal and acquittal on benefit of doubt, and has
correctly applied the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and
this Court. No perversity or jurisdictional error has been demonstrated
warranting interference in intra-court appeal.
19.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered
opinion that the learned Single Judge has passed a well-reasoned and
legally sustainable order. The appellant is not entitled to back wages or
continuity of service for the period from 01.05.2002 to 26.04.2019.
20.
Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is hereby
dismissed. No order as to costs.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Brijmohan
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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