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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
BA 68 OF 2026
Sanjida Aktar,
Wife of Saddam Hossain, resident of UNC Nagar,
Fakiradola, P.S. Sonamura, District Sepahijala, Tripura.
….Applicant
On behalf of accused persons in custody, namely,
1. Idrish Miah,
Son of Late Ali Akbar, resident of UNC Nagar, Fakiradola,
P.S. Sonamura, District Sepahijala, Tripura.
2. Manoyara Khatun,
Wife of Idrish Miah, resident of UNC Nagar, Fakiradola,
P.S. Sonamura, District Sepahijala, Tripura.
3. Saddam Hossain,
Son of Idrish Miah, resident of UNC Nagar, Fakiradola,
P.S. Sonamura, District Sepahijala, Tripura.
….Accused persons
Versus
The State of Tripura
….Respondent.
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA
For the Applicant/petitioner(s) : Mr. Somik Deb, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. Jishan Sahed, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. Raju Datta, P.P.
06.04.2026
ORDER
Heard learned counsels of both sides.
2.
The allegations in the FIR are that on 08.09.2025 at around
14.05 hours, on the basis of a secret information, the informant with other
police personnel taking aid of BSF authority, one of whom was Assistant
Commandant, raided the house of accused person namely, Idrish Miah
where on search they found total 100 nos. of ‘Eskuf’ cough syrup and 30
Nos. of blue colour plastic pouch containing ‘Yaba’ tablets of weighing 600
grams. They then detained said Idrish Miah and his wife Manoyara
Khatun. During such raid, their sons, namely, Saddam Hossain, Iman
Hossian and Manir Hossain was found absconding. The police officer
thereafter returned to the police station and finally lodged the Ejahar on
08.09.2025 at 23:36 hours which was registered as Sonamura P.S. Case
No.75/2025, under Sections 21(c)/22(c)/25/29 of NDPS Act.
3.
In the Arrest Memo, the accused Idrish Miah was shown
arrested on 09.09.2025 in the night at 00.40 hours whereas accused
Manoyara Khatun was shown arrested on the following morning
i.e.09.09.2025 at 08.05 hours. They were forwarded to the Court of
learned Special Judge on 09.09.2025. It is reported that accused Saddam
Hossain was arrested later on.
4.
Regarding the accused Idrish Miah and Mayonara Khatun,
learned senior counsel Mr. Somik Deb submits that after expiry of 180
days of detention of both these two accused persons, the charge sheet
was submitted but despite the same, default bail was not granted to them.
As per the record, the learned Special Judge received the charge sheet
filed under Sections 21(C)/22(C)/25/29 of NDPS Act on 07.03.2026.
During hearing, while re-calculating the period of detention, learned senior
counsel fairly submits that on 180th day of their detention the charge sheet
was submitted, and therefore, the challenge on this point made by the
petitioner is not further dealt with and examined in this case.
5.
Learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb also submits that Section 50
of the NDPS Act was not complied with and that as per the report of the
Tehasildar, the house from which the said contraband items were seized
falls within the Govt. Khas land and the concerned Tehasildar who
submitted the report to the I.O. mentioned in his report that the said house
was identified by the I.O. and therefore, according to learned senior
counsel, the conscious possession of the accused persons were not
established in the present case.
6.
In this regard, learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb relies on a
decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal Vs. State of
Rajasthan, (2015) 6 SCC 222 and relevant paragraphs nos. 21 and 22 as
relied on by Mr. Deb, is extracted hereunder:
“21. From the aforesaid exposition of law it is quite vivid that the
term "possession" for the purpose of Section 18 of the NDPS
Act could mean physical possession with animus, custody or
dominion over the prohibited substance with animus or even
exercise of dominion and control as a result of concealment.
The animus and the mental intent which is the primary and
significant element to show and establish possession. Further,
personal knowledge as to the existence of the "chattel" i.e. the
illegal substance at a particular location or site, at a relevant
time and the intention based upon the knowledge, would
constitute the unique relationship and manifest possession. In
such a situation, presence and existence of possession could be
justified, for the intention is to exercise right over the substance
or the chattel and to act as the owner to the exclusion of others.
22. In the case at hand, the appellant, we hold, had the
requisite degree of control when, even if the said narcotic
substance was not within his physical control at that moment. To
give an example, a person can conceal prohibited narcotic
substance in a property and move out thereafter. The said
person because of necessary animus would be in possession of
the said substance even if he is not, at the moment, in physical
control. The situation cannot be viewed differently when a
person conceals and hides the prohibited narcotic substance in
a public space. In the second category of cases, the person
would be in possession because he has the necessary animus
and the intention to retain control and dominion. As the factual
matrix would exposit, the appellant -accused was in possession
of the prohibited or contraband substance which was an offence
when the NDPS Act came into force. Hence, he remained in
possession of the prohibited substance and as such the offence
under Section 18 of the NDPS Act is made out. The possessory
right would continue unless there is something to show that he
had been divested of it. On the contrary, as we find, he led to
discovery of the substance which was within his special
knowledge, and, therefore, there can be no scintilla of doubt that
he was in possession of the contraband article when the NDPS
Act came into force. To clarify the situation, we may give an
example. A person had stored 100 bags of opium prior to
the coming into force of the NDPS Act and after coming into
force, the recovery of the possessed article takes place.
Certainly, on the date of recovery, he is in possession of the
contraband article and possession itself is an offence. In such a
situation, the appellant-accused cannot take the plea that he
had committed an offence under Section 9 of the Opium Act and
not under Section 18 of the NDPS Act.”
7.
The last point as argued by learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb
is that accused Mayonara Khatun was shown arrested on 09.09.2025 at
around 8:05 hours whereas on the previous night she was taken to the
police station under their custody and therefore, an artificial time has been
shown in the Arrest Memo by the police authority to save them from any
allegation of violation of Section 43 (5) of BNSS. In this regard, learned
senior counsel relies on a decision of this Court in the case of Anawora
Begam vs. State of Tripura, Bail Application No.137 of 2025, decided
on 16.03.2026. Therefore, learned senior counsel prays for bail of the
accused persons on the said grounds.
8.
Learned P.P., however, opposes the bail prayer of the
accused persons and submits that there are prima facie materials that the
accused persons are involved in dealing with the commercial quantity of
narcotic items, and therefore, rigour of Section 37 of NDPS Act is
applicable here in their cases and thus bail cannot be granted to them.
9.
This Court has considered the submissions of learned
counsels of both sides.
10.
It appears from the statements of two witnesses, namely
Firoz Miah and Joynal Miah that the alleged raid and search was
conducted by the police officer in the house of Idrish Miah and police
found both Idrish Miah and Mayonara Khatun available there during such
search and both the said two witnesses also were present there at that
time. Though the Tehasildar has reported that said hut was constructed in
the Govt. Khas land, but in view of statements of witnesses as indicated
above, apart from statements of other witnesses like the informant, prima
facie, there are materials that from the house of the accused persons said
contraband materials were recovered, and therefore, whether the owner of
the land was the accused persons or the State is irrelevant, for, there are
materials that they had dominion and control over said alleged contraband
items.
11.
Now, regarding the second point in respect of arrest of
Mayonara Khatun as shown by the police on 09.09.2025 at 08.05 hours is
concerned, it appears that as per the contents of the FIR itself on
08.09.2025 the police raided her house at around 14.50 hours and
thereafter such contraband items were recovered and she was also
detained and finally, she along with her husband with recovered
contraband items were brought to the police station. Her husband was
shown arrested at 00:40 hours on the same day whereas she was shown
arrested on 08.05 hours of that day. There is no explanation as to why
there is mentioning of different times of their arrest, one is during night
and in case of another it was during day hours on the same day, though
both of them were simultaneously detained in the house of Idrish Miah
and together they were brought to the police station. But there is no clear
materials available as to exactly when they were detained. As per the
contents of the FIR, on 14:50 hours they arrived in the house of the
accused Idrish Miah and found both Idrish Miah and Mayonara Khatun
available there and they after observing necessary formalities conducted
search and recovered those items from the kitchen room of the said hut.
12.
FIR also further indicates that the search and seizure
including packing etc., were done in between 15:05 hours to 17:00 hours
and at that time they were detained and then police left the said house
with the detained persons and seized items. Therefore, it cannot be
decided with certainty at this stage, whether detention of female accused
was effected after sunset or not. Anyway, if the accused Mayonara Khatun
has any grievance in this regard for alleged violation of Section 43, sub
Section (5) of BNSS, she may approach the competent authority in this
regard seeking relief but on that ground she cannot be said to be entitled
to grant bail in this case which relates to commercial quantity of narcotic
items and rigour of Section 37 of the NDPS Act is there.
13.
In Anawora Begam (supra) also this Court did not accept the
contention of the petitioner of that case that for non-compliance of Section
46(4) of CrPC [corresponding to Section 43(5) of BNSS], the accused
cannot claim as an indefeasible right to be released on bail on that ground
in every case.
14.
Considering all these aspects, the bail prayer is rejected.
15.
Return the C.D. with a copy of this order to learned P.P.
16.
Also re-consign the trial Court record to the learned Court
below with a copy of this order.
JUDGE
SANJAY GHOSH
sanjay
Date: 2026.04.08 12:45:01 +05'30'
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